This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

**Usage guidelines**

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

+ *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.

+ *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.

+ *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.

+ *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

**About Google Book Search**

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at `http://books.google.com/`

Y4.M59/1:UN3/1

# UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING

## STATEMENTS

MADE BY

## MAJ. GEN. LEONARD WOOD

BEFORE THE

## SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS AND THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS

ON

A BILL TO PROVIDE FOR THE MILITARY AND NAVAL TRAINING OF THE CITIZEN FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES

WASHINGTON
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1917

# UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING

## STATEMENTS

MADE BY

## MAJ. GEN. LEONARD WOOD

BEFORE THE

## SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS AND THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS

ON

A BILL TO PROVIDE FOR THE MILITARY AND NAVAL TRAINING OF THE CITIZEN FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES

WASHINGTON
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1917

45 421SU XL 2140
9/01 31150-200

# STATEMENTS BEFORE SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE

## DECEMBER 18, 1916, AND JANUARY 31, 1917

# UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING.

**MONDAY, DECEMBER 18, 1916 (AFTER RECESS).**

The committee reassembled at the expiration of the recess, at 2 o'clock p. m.

## STATEMENT OF GEN. LEONARD WOOD.

The CHAIRMAN. Gen. Wood, the subcommittee which has been appointed by the Committee on Military Affairs is holding hearings upon the subject of military training for the purpose of the creation of a reserve force, or for any other purpose that may make the young men of the country available for duty, and we would like to hear from you upon that subject. You understand, of course, that there are two or three measures pending upon the subject of universal military training.

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. One bill is S. 1695, another is a suggested substitute prepared by the General Staff, and one by Capt. Moseley.

Gen. WOOD. Do you wish me to make a statement upon that subject?

The CHAIRMAN. We would like you to proceed in your own way, Gen. Wood.

Gen. WOOD. I believe, Mr. Chairman, that in addition to our regular force, including in this the Naval Establishment, we must have a citizenry so trained that they will be reasonably efficient soldiers in case of need. I think that training as a permanent proposition, on the general lines proposed in your bill, will ultimately meet the demands of the situation.

I think there are some modifications which will suggest themselves as time goes on. I believe, however, that world conditions are such that we are not in a position to wait for any considerable period of time to develop our trained forces; nor should we adopt any system which will postpone the immediate training of young men who have reached the military age. Each bill presents certain excellent features.

I believe we should start as soon as practicable the training of the youth on the lines proposed in your bill, which are substantially along the lines of the Australian system. We should immediately begin the training of the youths who are physically fit during the year in which they become 19 years of age, and I estimate this number as 500,000. I say the year in which they become 19 years of age, fearing that if we take them in the year in which they become 18 we shall have half of our 500,000 fit for military service arriving at 18 years of age after the 1st of July; in other words, half of them would be 17 when they came to us, which is rather young. I feel we should start in with the training of young men in their nineteenth year with the least possible delay and concentrate our entire available energy upon them, if necessary leaving the instruction of the younger boys to be taken up after we have the system in smooth running order. I am convinced that a period of six months' intensive training will be sufficient to give us a reasonably effective and well-trained private soldier. I make this statement as a result of four years of

observation of training under the intensive system which we have had in force at the military training camps, a system under which it was estimated by a board of Regular officers that as much was accomplished in one month as is accomplished in four and a half under average conditions and methods of instruction in the regular service.

That is to say, they have rated one month of intensive training as we give it, which is something over eight hours a day, as equivalent to about four and a half months under average conditions in the Regular Establishment.

I think that is a conservative estimate. In actual hours of work it is equivalent to that performed in an enrollment of three years in an average organization of the militia. It is a character of training that is so intensive that you could not impose a system of that degree of intensity upon any body of men for six months; they would become stale. So we should have to adopt a rather less intensive system, say one equal to 3 to 1, compared with the work we do in the Regular Establishment, so that out of our six months of intensive training we would give young men the same number of hours under arms and the same amount of training they would receive in 18 months in the Regular Establishment. If anyone proposed 18 months in the Regular Establishment as the period of training, and that all physically fit men should take it, the bulk of the people would say it is too long. But six months' training under the organization which we are employing in these training camps would be in value and accomplishment fully 4½ to 1 what we give the men in the Regular Establishment. We could not maintain for six months the high pressure of intensive methods which can be applied for one or two months, and as I stated, it would be necessary for us to reduce somewhat the hours of work. We could maintain for six months a system which would give us three times as much work of a purely military character as is given in the average organization of the Regular Establishment. I desire to emphasize this statement as strongly as possible.

And I say again that six months of intensive training in camp, all of it under conditions where the men have nothing to do but receive and absorb military instruction, would be sufficient. The officers and some of the higher noncommissioned officers would require a longer period of training. Speaking now of the private soldier, we should be able to cover pretty thoroughly the instruction in any arm of the service. The instruction of officers would probably have to be carried on on the general lines laid down in the Australian system, with which you are familiar, or on the lines of the Swiss system as modified to fit conditions in this country. There are about 1,030,000—estimates vary—men reaching the military age—that is, the age of 18—every year. I think it is safe to assume that not over one-half of those men would be fit for military service—that is, for intensive training. So we would have about 500,000 men a year coming up for this period of intensive training, which ought to begin as soon as the season permits in the spring, say, May 1, and be terminated at the end of October of that year. The men would terminate their training, in other words, in the year in which they became 19 years of age, and then they stand ready for the year of service with the colors on reaching 21.

When I say a year of service with the colors I do not mean a year of service with the colors in the sense of living constantly in barracks or in uniform, but I mean that beginning July 1 of the year in which they are 21 and ending with June 30 of the year in which they are 22, every man who has had this intensive training during his nineteenth year and is physically fit should serve one year in a troop battery or other organization of the citizen forces of the military establishment. The year of service should be commenced by one month of field training. In other words, a course of repetition, in addition to the six months, which he gets in his nineteenth year. It is rather doubtful whether we would be able to give them a full month. We might have to shorten that period of repetition training to a lesser period on account of men in business, but there certainly should be a minimum of 20 days—a month, if we can give it—of work in camp.

Having finished this period of intensive training in camp, men remain for the balance of the year in a Federal organization maintained at war strength, completely equipped in every way and ready for service. Its officers will be men who have been trained in the Officers Reserve Corps or elsewhere. Its entire enlisted personnel will consist of men who have had six months of intensive training followed by a course of repetition. Their status, so far as freedom of movement, business, etc., are concerned, would be that which now pertains in the case of the National Guard. Each year's class will represent about 500,000 men, or about double the present National Guard at war strength. Its force will be composed of young men at the age of physical best and minimum dependent and business responsibility. They will have known in advance that they are to render this service during their twenty-first year, and in case of a call such as has recently been made those affected will be men who have made preparation for just such a contingency. They will be men in the full vigor of youth and whose withdrawal for service will cause a minimum of hardship and inconvenience. If conditions should exist which render it probable that more than 500,000 men might be needed in case of a call, the class should be held for the colors for an additional year, which would hold in a condition of immediate readiness the class of 21 and class of 22, or 1,000,000 men. If additional classes were needed they could be called by successive years, 23, 24, etc. I should include in the first line troops men from 21 to 28, inclusive. In other words, I would have the service begin with the twenty-first year and terminate with the twenty-eighth, or a period of eight years. This would give us a total of approximately 4,000,000 men who have had as good training as it is possible to give them in that time. Ordinary casualties would somewhat reduce this total, but it would be safe to say that we should have available at least 3,700,000 in this first-line group and probably more. I do not think it an exaggeration to say that the classes of 21, 22, and 23 will have had as good training and be as well informed and prepared for the discharge of their duties as the bulk of the enlisted personnel of our Regular Establishment to-day, including the regular reserves.

The CHAIRMAN. Suppose you had the number of men you speak of trained in the manner you suggest, how long, if they were called into

service, would they have to be trained to become proficient or efficient soldiers?

Gen. WOOD. They will be as well trained as are our regular reservists when they report and should be immediately available. It is proposed to give them 30 days' repetition training when called to the colors.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Gen. WOOD. They will size up very well with the men of the regular organization to-day and be better trained than half of them. I do not think that the people at large realize that the Regular Army is a constantly changing organization. The men are constantly coming and going. Under the system of intensive training we are going to give the men instruction under conditions which will be at least equivalent to three to one in the regular service in effectiveness and efficiency. I speak with absolute certainty from experience in this matter; at the end of six months you will have men as efficient on the average as the average of men in the United States Army at the end of 18 months.

Senator BRADY. Do you think that six months' intensive training is equal to three to one of Regular Army training?

Gen. WOOD. Absolutely. There is in my mind no question about it. A great deal of the time of our Regular Establishment is wasted time in a military sense. The men have much nonmilitary work to do. They are busy, but it is not military work. Our men are stationed in small posts, a handful here and a handful there. Organizations are only partially filled up, and when turned out for instruction oftentimes there is only a small portion of what should be a full organization present. The officers have many detached duties; the troops are very seldom assembled in large bodies for the instruction of the higher units. Under the training system which I trust will be inaugurated all organizations will be at war strength; they will be in camp under conditions which will reduce nonmilitary work to the minimum; the training will be most valuable to our officers, for it will be the first time most of them have had an opportunity to handle a war-strength organization appropriate to their grade under conditions which will permit the maximum amount of time being devoted to purely military work.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you ever made any estimate as to the cost that such training would entail upon the Government?

Gen. WOOD. I have not gone into it in detail. It is largely a matter of equipment, food, and transportation, and the wear and tear of arms and equipment. There should be no pay for this service. It should be part of a man's service to the United States, to the Nation. I will make an approximate estimate and insert it.

COST FOR 6 MONTHS' TRAINING FOR A HALF MILLION MEN PER YEAR BY INTENSIVE METHOD.

Only Infantry, Cavalry, and Field Artillery considered in estimates. Training for for special arms would be such a small percentage of the total as not to change estimates materially.

| | Men. |
|---|---|
| Infantry, 206 regiments | 400,670 |
| Cavalry, 20 regiments | 26,800 |
| Field Artillery, 60 regiments | 73,020 |
| | 500,490 |

*Cost for individuals, 6 months.*

| | Men. |
|---|---|
| Infantry: | |
| Ration | $54.00 |
| Clothing | 16.65 |
| Quartermaster field equipment (estimated to be replaced every four periods) | 3.20 |
| Ordnance (maintenance) | 6.73 |
| Medical (first-aid package) | .47 |
| Ammunition | 8.74 |
| Per infantryman | 89.79 |
| Total Infantry (400,670) | 35,976,159.30 |
| Cavalry [1] (calculated in same way, allowing maintenance of 1 horse for every 5 men under training): | |
| Per cavalryman | 114.05 |
| Total Cavalry (26,800) | 3,056,540.00 |
| Field Artillery [1] (calculated in same way, allowing one-fifth horses for full field service): | |
| Per field artilleryman | 118.28 |
| Total Field Artillery (73,020) | 8,636,805.60 |
| Total Infantry | 35,976,159.30 |
| Total Cavalry | 3,056,540.00 |
| Total Field Artillery | 8,636,805.60 |
| | 47,669,504.90 |
| Transportation and subsistence en route ($15 per man) | 7,507,350.00 |
| Total for individuals | 55,176,854.90 |

*Initial expenses (reduced number of animals for Cavalry and Field Artillery used in calculating shelter).*

| Arm. | Regiments. | Camp. | Cantonment. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Infantry | 206 | $12,346,082 | 16,872,430 |
| Cavalry | 20 | 1,051,660 | 1,523,700 |
| Field Artillery | 60 | 2,590,080 | 3,741,000 |
| Total | | 15,987,822 | 22,137,130 |

As the wear and tear on camp equipment requires replacement of practically all after 12 months' use and the cantonments will last 10 to 15 years with average annual expense for maintenance of 2½ per cent initial cost, it is assumed the cantonments will be established and maintenance calculations have been made on that basis.

The equipment for transportation, for purchase of animals for Cavalry and other mounted organizations, for any individual equipment for soldiers, for special equipment for the various arms and corps, are not included in the initial expenses, as all of these are necessary for the reserve stores of any troops which we may have to raise, and are now presumably being accumulated for our reserves, volunteers, and militia, in the place of which this civilian force is being contemplated.

*Maintenance and overhead charges.*

| | |
|---|---|
| Additional clerical help and office supplies (War Department and department headquarters) | [2] $1,000,000.00 |
| Reserve officers, noncommissioned officers, and cooks (pay and allowances) | [3] 18,000,000.00 |

[1] It is appreciated that the proportion of these arms under training is not that required for the best organizations of the Army. The expense of training these arms, however, is considerably greater than that of Infantry and the essentials of discipline, physical training, and organization can be obtained as well by the Infantry training. In the event of war we should probably call in case of need additional classes of those trained in the Cavalry and Field Artillery. For example, if we would call four classes of Cavalry we should have (allowing for casualties) approximately 100,000 trained men, and three classes of Field Artillery would give us 200,000 trained artillerists.

[2] This is less than estimate for similar services at present. Simpler system contemplated.

[3] As a comparison the National Guard pay is $27,000,000. Act approved Aug. 29, 1916.

| | |
|---|---|
| Mileage for officers | $300,000.00 |
| Maintenance of cantonments (2½ per cent of cost) | [1] 555,000.00 |
| Maintenance of roads, etc., in cantonments | 100,000.00 |
| Water | 455,000.00 |
| Light | 120,000.00 |
| Fuel (kitchen and incinerators) | 2,000,000.00 |
| Crude oil (incinerators and latrines) | 480,000.00 |
| General camp sanitation | 600,000.00 |
| Hire of camp sites and damage claims | 750,000.00 |
| Office supplies, clerical force in camps | [2] 500,000.00 |
| Medical supplies and maintenance of equipment | 1,026,000.00 |
| Maintenance of camp communication | 20,000.00 |
| Transportation of supplies | 1,000,000.00 |
| Camp and maneuver transportation (repairs, gasoline, oil) | [3] 1,500,000.00 |
| Maintenance of animals for mounted officers and orderlies | [4] 2,769,000.00 |
| | 31,175,000.00 |
| Total | 86,351,854.90 |
| Allowing a reasonable amount for unforeseen contingencies, in round numbers a grand total of | 88,000,000.00 |

The above estimates are based largely on the limited data available from our training camps. As numbers increase and experience improves administrative methods the cost should decrease.

EXPENSES OF TRAINING THE 21-YEAR CLASS FOR A PERIOD OF 15 OR 30 DAYS.

No cantonments or permanent camp equipment will be required. The training will be entirely in field maneuvers, using the transportations supplied for the six months' men. Officers and men will have only the equipment authorized for individuals in field service. Allowing the same cost for transportation to and from concentration points we should have for 500,000:

| | 15 days. | 30 days. |
|---|---|---|
| Transportation | 7,500,000 | 7,500,000 |
| Other expenses | 6,250,000 | 12,500,000 |
| | 13,750,000 | 20,000,000 |

Any appropriation made should, of course, be expendable for any purpose not inconsistent with the intent of the law. That is, the appropriation should be expendable for the various items entering into the estimate at the discretion of the Secretary of War. This will be necessary for efficient administration, especially at first.

It is believed, also, that railroad rates should be fixed at not to exceed one-third normal rates, and it is thought the railroad companies will be willing to do this as their share in the preparedness movement. A large percentage of the cost, especially for the 21-year class, is for transportation to and from the rendezvous. If this can be done, the cost for 15 days' training will be reduced to $8,750,000 and for 30 days' training to $15,000,000; while the larger estimate for the 6 months' training will be reduced from $88,000,000 to $83,000,000.

BASE PAY FOR OFFICERS.

It is believed that the base pay for officers should be smaller and the increase for longevity greater. This in view of the large number of reserve officers to be trained in time of peace and the volunteer officers necessary in time of war. As a general rule the present base pay is greater than should be given untrained officers, while the increase for service is not commensurate with the increased value of an officer of long experience.

[1] To this must be added replacement of cantonments once every 10 to 15 years.
[2] As a comparison the National Guard pay is $27,000,000. Act approved Aug. 29, 1916.
[3] Based on experience at Plattsburg.
[4] One-half Field Service Regulation allowance.

The following tables show the present and the proposed rates of pay:

*Present pay.*

| Grade. | Pay of grade. | | Monthly pay. | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Yearly. | Monthly. | After 5 years (10 per cent). | After 10 years (20 per cent). | After 15 years (30 per cent). | After 20 years (40 per cent). |
| Lieutenant general | $11,000 | $916.67 | | | | |
| Major general | 8,000 | 666.67 | | | | |
| Brigadier general | 6,000 | 500.00 | | | | |
| Colonel | 4,000 | 333.33 | $366.67 | $400.00 | $416.67 | $416.67 |
| Lieutenant colonel | 3,500 | 291.67 | 320.83 | 350.00 | 375.00 | 375.00 |
| Major | 3,000 | 250.00 | 275.00 | 300.00 | 325.00 | 333.33 |
| Captain | 2,400 | 200.00 | 220.00 | 240.00 | 260.00 | 280.00 |
| First lieutenant | 2,000 | 166.67 | 183.33 | 200.00 | 216.67 | 233.33 |
| Second lieutenant | 1,700 | 141.67 | 155.83 | 170.00 | 184.17 | 198.33 |

*Proposed pay.*

| Rank. | Base. | 2½ years. | 5 years. | 7½ years. | 10 years. | 12½ years. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lieutenant general | $7,000 | $7,700 | $8,400 | $9,100 | $9,800 | $10,500 |
| Major general | 6,000 | 6,600 | 7,200 | 7,800 | 8,400 | 9,000 |
| Brigadier general | 4,500 | 4,950 | 5,400 | 5,850 | 6,300 | 6,750 |
| Colonel | 3,000 | 3,300 | 3,600 | 3,900 | 4,200 | 4,500 |
| Lieutenant colonel | 2,500 | 2,750 | 3,000 | 3,250 | 3,500 | 3,750 |
| Major | 2,300 | 2,530 | 2,760 | 2,990 | 3,220 | 3,450 |
| Captain | 1,800 | 2,100 | 2,400 | 2,600 | 2,800 | 3,000 |
| First lieutenant | 1,500 | 1,800 | 2,100 | 2,340 | 2,520 | 2,700 |
| Second lieutenant | 1,200 | 1,500 | 1,800 | 1,950 | 2,100 | 2,250 |

| Rank. | 15 years. | 17½ years. | 20 years. | 22½ years. | 25 years. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lieutenant general | $11,200 | $11,900 | $12,600 | $13,300 | $14,000 |
| Major general | 9,600 | 10,200 | 10,800 | 11,400 | 12,000 |
| Brigadier general | 7,200 | 7,650 | 8,100 | 8,550 | 9,000 |
| Colonel | 4,800 | 5,100 | 5,400 | 5,700 | 6,000 |
| Lieutenant colonel | 4,000 | 4,250 | 4,500 | 4,750 | 5,000 |
| Major | 3,680 | 3,910 | 4,140 | 4,370 | 4,600 |
| Captain | 3,200 | 3,400 | 3,600 | 3,600 | 3,600 |
| First lieutenant | 2,850 | 3,000 | 3,000 | 3,000 | 3,000 |
| Second lieutenant | 2,400 | 2,400 | 2,400 | 2,400 | 2,400 |

It will be observed that, except for the general and the junior officers, there will be little change for officers of the Regular Army, due to the average length of service in each grade.

If the proposed base pay were put in effect the reduction in the estimates for six months' training of 500,000 young men amount to $3,818,200.

For the repetition course at 21 years of age the reduction would be $320,000 for 15 days' training and $640,000 for 30 days' training.

In this connection the effect of the proposed change in case of war is noteworthy. The pay of each division of volunteers called would be $452,700 less per annum; and if the usual 10 per cent additional pay for war service were given it would be $498,770 less than at the present rates for each division. As stated, the pay is ample for inexperienced officers, and the amount saved in each division would purchase nearly 30,000 high explosive shell, 4.7-inch caliber.

We should all bear equally our share of this burden of service for the Nation. I am confident that from the discipline, habits of regularity, and promptness will result a great increase in our economic efficiency as a Nation, a great improvement in morality through discipline and its resulting respect for authority, for law, and the constituted authorities. I believe that our murder rate will be divided

by 10. It is about 126 per million now, as compared with 12 to 13 in Switzerland.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Walter Fisher testified here this morning, and read from an English writer to the effect that there is more crime committed in Germany of various kinds—the book tabulated them—with its military-efficiency system, than under Great Britain's, with its volunteer service.

Gen. WOOD. Great Britain has probably the best system of justice in the world, and the most prompt. If you take the arrests and trials for crime, you will find that they are very prompt, and they are effective. Great Britain is exceptionally efficient in that respect. I can not vouch for the excessive number of crimes, but certainly the prompt arrest and punishment under the English law are such that the more serious crimes are reduced to a minimum. Great Britain has a remarkably low criminal rate, so far as capital crimes are concerned. The murder rate of the United States is approximately 126 per million—the heaviest by far of any of the great Christian nations. The average in Europe is anywhere from 12 to 20, Switzerland representing the lower figure. I think that we can account very largely for this low murder rate by the discipline which a man gets during his period of military training. It produces respect for the flag, the law, and the constituted authorities, and it results not only in better men physically, but in greater economic efficiency. You have a better physical being, better coordinated muscles—in a word, a better all-around man, from the moral standpoint and from the standpoint of citizenship. This training tends to build up a spirit of national solidarity and a sense of the obligations of citizenship; the obligation for service in war as well as in peace—a sense of obligation which is very largely lacking in our population. I think universal training, service shoulder to shoulder, in which newcomers and our native-born citizens participate will have great weight in welding together these various and divers elements and making good Americans of them.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Fisher takes the position that we have the cart before the horse; that we take military training as the principal thing and make efficiency the by-product. He says we ought to reverse the method of procedure and adopt industrial training and efficiency with military universal training as a by-product.

Gen. WOOD. I think he is entirely wrong. He does not understand the value of military training from the economic standpoint.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it be possible, in your opinion, to train men in civil life and at the same time make them proficient as units?

Gen. WOOD. I think we could train men to be efficient soldiers while we are training them along industrial lines, but it would take a great deal of time. It would mean that we should have to hold men probably two or three times the period I am recommending, and it would also mean the equipment of the plants at training camps which would be enormously expensive, and the maintenance at these plants of instructors in all lines of industry, and it would, in a way, amount to failure to take advantage of the opportunities for this training which are offered in the industrial field, where the boy has a chance to learn his trade under conditions more favorable on a whole than the Government could afford to maintain. It would cover an unnecessary long time and would dissipate his interest in military training.

I do not think it would be either practical or desirable. The actual situation in this country to-day is that we have no defense in any way adequate to meet an attack by a great power. We are without supplies, organization, officers, or trained men. In this project of general training, we are dealing with a proposition which is vital to national life. We must place something in the way of a trained force behind our little Regular Army, and we can only do it on lines consistent with the ideals of democracy through adopting a system of universal military training. Universal military training is absolutely opposed to militarism. It is the only purely democratic method. It exemplifies the basic principle of democracy; that is, that equality of obligation goes hand in hand with equality of opportunity and privilege. This principle is the very foundation of the Republic. We must get this training and get it quickly if we are going to have an adequate military defense in emergency.

The CHAIRMAN. Why do you say that we are practically without defense?

Gen. WOOD. You have an Army of what? Taking it all, at home and abroad, some 109,000 men. I think we are up to that now. In this country, a mobile army of perhaps 43,000, roughly speaking; about two divisions at war strength; about 14,000 Coast Artillery. In all, say a total of 57,000 men within the continental limits of the United States. That is all you have in the way of regular troops excepting a small number of auxiliary troops. We can not depend on the militia. You have seen the mobilization on the border. A more complete demonstration of the entire unsuitability for actual service could not have been given. It has been very expensive, but if we have profited by the experience it will have been money used to advantage. I will secure a full statement as to strength of the Army at home and oversea and insert it.

*Actual strength of the Regular Army, based on the returns for November 30, except for organizations in the Philippine Islands and in China, which are based on returns for October 31, 1916.*

| | United States. | Alaska. | Porto Rico. | Panama. | Hawaii. | Philippines. | China. | Absent. | Total. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Engineers | 1,420 | ..... | ..... | 201 | 207 | 261 | ..... | 16 | 2,105 |
| Cavalry | 14,171 | ..... | ..... | 311 | 989 | 2,136 | ..... | 57 | 17,664 |
| Field Artillery | 5,084 | ..... | ..... | 320 | 877 | 875 | ..... | 30 | 7,186 |
| Infantry | 22,169 | 446 | 1,299 | 4,234 | 5,436 | 4,990 | 1,303 | 206 | 40,083 |
| Mobile | 42,844 | 446 | 1,299 | 5,066 | 7,509 | 8,262 | 1,303 | 309 | 67,038 |
| Coast Artillery | 14,098 | ..... | ..... | 1,640 | 1,264 | 2,396 | ..... | 90 | 19,488 |
| Line | 56,942 | 446 | 1,299 | 6,706 | 8,773 | 10,658 | 1,303 | 399 | 86,526 |
| Prison companies | 325 | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | 325 |
| School detachments | 685 | ..... | ..... | ..... | 6 | ..... | ..... | ..... | 691 |
| Recruiting parties and recruits | 6,244 | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | 6,244 |
| Recruits en route | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | 309 | 459 | ..... | ..... | 768 |
| Quartermaster Corps | 4,408 | 89 | 46 | 178 | 269 | 547 | 13 | 6 | 5,556 |
| Ordnance Department | 585 | 5 | 1 | 5 | 50 | 79 | 1 | 1 | 727 |
| Signal Corps | 1,120 | 191 | 1 | 44 | 36 | 176 | ..... | 3 | 1,571 |
| Military Academy detachment | 659 | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | 659 |
| Indian Scouts | 38 | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | 38 |
| Regular Army | 71,006 | 731 | 1,347 | 6,933 | 9,443 | 11,919 | 1,317 | 409 | 103,105 |
| Hospital Corps | 4,903 | 28 | 33 | 176 | 322 | 576 | 37 | 10 | 6,085 |
| Total | 75,909 | 759 | 1,380 | 7,109 | 9,765 | 12,495 | 1,354 | 419 | 109,190 |

The number reported absent are those on furlough, and while most of them are in the United States, they are not counted as being in this country because they do not belong to organizations stationed here, and they are not included in the strength outside the United States because they are not a part of the effective strength on the date the returns are made.

The CHAIRMAN. It was better than none, was it not?

Senator THOMAS. As compared with the mobilization in the Spanish War, it has some points of superiority, has it not?

Gen. WOOD. It has and it has not. As a promptly available efficient military asset, taken as a whole, it was of little value to meet trained troops on either occasion. Of course, there were organizations of carefully selected men who would have done their best, but it would have been a wanton waste of human life to have sent these men against moderately good troops. Again, it should be remembered that only a very small number of the organizations could be started until after weeks of delay, and that even then they were imperfectly equipped and filled up with men the bulk of whom were untrained and absolutely unfit for combat. Our own staff departments were lacking in efficiency, and, in my opinion, left much to be desired in their performance of duty. This will always be the case as long as the bureau heads are permanent fixtures in Washington and the General Staff is not in full coordinating control. The efficient work of mobilization was done, as a rule, by line officers filled with the spirit and knowledge which comes from service with troops.

The sanitary work was far in advance of that of 1898. Camp diseases were less. Equipment in the way of transportation was sadly lacking. I do not know of an organization on the border to-day which is at full strength and properly and fully equipped for war service. I include in this statement the great bulk of the regular organizations. They are short of men, practically all of them, and they lack much which modern war considers of vital importance under combat conditions. The Militia are, of course, much worse off. Their situation as a fighting force was and is hopeless. The Regulars, what there is of them, are good well trained men and under Regular officers, which means well-trained officers.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that due to the Militia system or due to the fault of the Army itself?

Gen. WOOD. It is due to both. To inefficiency and shortages in our supply department, but the principal cause of deficiency is found in the Militia itself. This is not due to faults in personnel but to unsurmountable faults in the system.

In the Eastern Department we have 56 per cent of the militia. There is no criticism to be made of the officers or men; they are a good lot of individuals and they have done the best they could. It is the system only that I am criticising. We found that 20 per cent, and a small fraction—I think it was 20.5—but 20 per cent is near enough—of all men in the militia, and it should be remembered that when I say all men I mean men who are in the militia whose presence in it made it possible for them to draw Federal pay—20 per cent of them were physically unfit for service and had to be dropped. In the average Infantry regiments you have about 820 men. If you drop 20 per cent of them you would be down to the neighborhood of, say, 650. The governors dropped a great many of the old men upon the call for mobilization; that is, men who were obviously too old to go, but whose presence in the regiments added much to the strength and

character of the organizations. After they were dropped and the 20 per cent additional you are down to about 570 men. Of those 570 men, roughly, 50 per cent had had a year or more of training and 50 per cent have come in in the last few months, so you had a regiment going to the front with a nucleus of, say, 285 men who had had a year's militia training, which may mean, perhaps, 48 to 72 hours' drill, or it may mean more or even less. You added to that little nucleus 285 men who had had less than one year; many of them had come in since the so-called Federalization of the militia and had had very little training. So you had 570 men of the degree of training I am describing, and to that number you added other men with a view to making up the war strength of 1,900 men, speaking in round numbers.

That is what we sent to the front. Organizations, the greater portion of which consisted of untrained, undisciplined, and consequently undependable men as soldiers. In some of the regiments the percentage physically defective was nearly 50 per cent. Twenty per cent was the average for the whole department. It is to be remembered that the great Eastern Department has about 56 per cent of all the militia of the United States within its borders. Twenty per cent of the men who were in the service at the time of the call had to be dropped because of physical disability. In addition to this number many were dropped by the governors. The estimate of the training of the militia as a whole prior to the outbreak of the war showed that 64 per cent of the men in the ranks had had a year or more of service in the militia; the balance less than a year. The old men dropped out by the governors came, of course, from the 64 per cent, so that the regiment was left with men about one-half of whom had had a year's training and half less; many of them only a few months. The mounted troops were not equipped with horses, almost without exception; they had a few, but only a small per cent of what they required. The Field Artillery likewise—most of them—had had little training. Some had practically none. Such was the collection of willing men in uniform, equipped with arms with whose use they were little familiar, who were sent to the front. If they had had to meet highly-trained, well organized troops they would not have known what hit them.

Senator THOMAS. Were those men dropped before the regiments departed for the front or after?

Gen. WOOD. Before. In some instances it took months to fill a regiment up to the minimum strength required necessary to muster it into the Federal service. In many instances regiments were held for long periods in order to secure men to replace those who had been dropped out because of physical disability. The complement to be supplied by the Eastern Department was in round numbers 132,000. We are to-day short 47,000 of that complement; in other words, working very vigorously on this matter since June, we are still short 35 per cent of the full complement.

Senator THOMAS. What is the proportion of resignations and discharges of men after they were mobilized?

Gen. WOOD. That would be hard to answer because a great many of these men were men with dependent families. I have those statistics, and I will put them in the hearing, if I may be permitted, giving you the answer as close as I can.

Senator BRADY. I wish you would do that.

Gen. WOOD. We mobilized in all 86,876 in the Eastern Department. Up to September 25, 1916, 1,836 were discharged on account of dependent relatives. The authority to do so was then recalled. We have no record of the number so discharged on the border from the regiments sent from this department. Fortunately there was no enemy to meet in the shape of an organized, well-equipped force. Had there been it would have been a tragedy, as the troops were in no sense prepared for campaign. If we have learned the impossibilities and the unworkability of the system, this mobilization will have been worth whatever it cost, because it should have taught us never again to place reliance upon militia organizations for service of this kind. Twenty per cent of all the men in the militia in this department were discharged for physical disability after thay had been mobilized and in the process of taking them into the United States service. In addition to this number a great many men were discharged by the governors during the period between the President's call and the response of the troops. In other words, they were released before going to the mobilization camps and some after they went there.

Senator BRADY. How many of the National Guard in numbers have you had on the border during this mobilization?

Gen. WOOD. From our department—I can only speak for that—about 86,800 from the Eastern Department.

Senator BRADY. What is your judgment, General, as to what the results would have been if we had not called on the National Guard at all and have attempted to raise the same force that you have raised, by volunteer service? Do you think it could have been done?

Gen. WOOD. I think it could have been done, but I think it would have taken a longer time to have done it. The best regiments of militia were gotten off in the first eight to ten days, much quicker than we possibly could have gotten off volunteer troops. If we had had to meet good troops, well organized and well led, it would have been simply slaughter to have sent these untrained militia against them. Organizations raised and trained as these are, are not trained, disciplined troops. The portion which had had reasonable training would not exceed 20 per cent. I believe this is a liberal estimate. The remaining 80 per cent were untrained, or slightly trained. They were organizations made up of enthusiastic well-meaning men, wearing the uniform of the United States and carrying arms of whose use they knew little or nothing. They were not soldiers in the sense of being trained men. They were actuated by the spirit of willingness to serve. They were willing but unprepared. Some of the regiments we had were better than others. Some of the New York, some of the Massachusetts and Pennsylvania regiments, and some from the other northern and southern States were good militia regiments, but they were not disciplined troops prepared for campaign and none of them were at full strength when they went to the front, or adequately equipped.

Senator BRADY. They were not up to the full requirements?

Gen. WOOD. I do not think we sent an organization excepting such units as field hospitals and ambulance companies, to the front at full war strength; we sent very few even approximately full. I want to try to make it clear that it is not the fault of the officers or men; it is the fault of the defective system

Senator BRADY. I thoroughly understand your position in that matter, General, and I thoroughly agree with you in your statements. Will you, before you finish your remarks, give us some information or some idea as to what you think should have been done relative to the present National Guard, as to the effect its present status has upon universal military training?

Gen. WOOD. I think the system of universal military training and service should be established as soon as possible, and the enlisted personnel of the National Guard replaced by men who have had Federal training—men who are young and have the minimum of dependent and business responsibility. In other words, men who can afford to go to the front and serve—men who are under absolute Federal control. We must maintain the militia until the preliminary steps of the new system can be taken and we have men enough reasonably trained for service in the Federal Reserve Regiments. I think we should take into this new Federal reserve every officer in good standing in the National Guard. Nothing should be done which appears to be adverse to these men. We should, of course, take the men also who are of suitable age.

Senator BRADY. Would you have that continued under the present form of governmental control, or would you have the National Guard revert back to its former position as State militia?

Gen. WOOD. I would drop the National Guard entirely out of the scheme of Federal defense. If the States want to keep it, of course they have, under their own sovereignty, the rights to do so if Congress consents, but I feel very strongly that the Federal Government should not be dependent upon any State for its weapons of defense.

Senator BRADY. What you believe is that it would be best to have the National Guard go back to its former status as a State organization?

Gen. WOOD. If it is to be maintained, yes sir—absolutely. I have in effect so recommended in a communication which I think should have reached the War Department to-day. I feel that the Federal Government must own and control the military forces absolutely and beyond preadventure.

Senator THOMAS. Was there observable any conflict of authority between the Federal and the State authorities in the handling of its militia during its recent mobilization, or in the operations of the soldiers on the border?

Gen. WOOD. No essential one, except that the standards of efficiency are all determined very largely by the standards of interest in the State. Interest of State authorities.

Senator THOMAS. A necessary result.

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir. There are, of course, possibilities of radical differences of opinion. Governors, if they wish, can muster out men and make radical changes in personnel of organizations. In fact, they can do very much anything with the militia up to the time of call. In the past, as you know, the governors of various States have differed with the policy of the Federal Government and in some instances have refused to send the militia in response to Federal call. The only policy to be adopted is that of universal military training and service, and the building up as soon as possible of a force of citizen soldiery, officered principally by trained officers of

the Officers' Reserve Corps. The States, of course, have the right to maintain a militia force if they desire. I hope they will drop their militia, however, and establish State constabulary—a force much better fitted to do the ordinary work incident to the maintenance of public order than the militia. This universal training will do much to build up a spirit of national solidarity, to Americanize the various new elements which are coming into our population. It will bring home to every youngster a sense of his individual obligation for the nation and make him think not in terms of the locality but of the nation. It will give us men with better bodies, bodies better co-ordinated and more responsive to the will. It will give us a more effective working machine, one which will aid to individual and national efficiency and be a strong influence for the betterment of public and private morals. Once in force, it would result in the establishment of such a condition of preparedness as would make any nation hestitate to attack us, and from our present state of wealth and unpreparedness with an aggressive commerce, conditions which, without adequate protection are a strong inducement for war, we should find ourselves in such a state of preparedness as would make any nation hesitate to attack us because we would be really ready.

A great many people, and strangely enough, those who argue against militarism, advocate a very large Regular Army—an Army of perhaps three-fourths of a million of soldiers. They do not realize that this means the establishment of a force which tends to militarism and the establishment of conditions not desirable from the standpoint of the Republic. So far as I know the opinions of the more intelligent officers of the Army, they are not in favor of a movement of this kind, but, generally speaking, they are in favor of universal military training—a trained citizenry standing behind an Army adequate for the peace of the Nation. We do not want to build up a great mercenary Army with its attendant isolated military class. We want a Regular Army of the size recommended by the General Staff—about 250,000 men. This force will be needed for garrisoning the oversea possessions, for a mobile force in the home country for purposes of home defense and service as an expeditionary force such as we used in 1898 and later. It will also serve as a training nucleus for the great mass of citizens who will come under our direction each year for military training. Back of this regular force we want a citizenry trained, armed, and ready to be soldiers, all of them, who are physically fit, but not living the lives of soldiers.

This is what we can expect under a system of universal training—the highest degree of preparedness with the minimum of regular force.

Senator BRADY. Do you think that would give us two or three lines of defense? Your Regular Army would be the first line of defense?

Gen. WOOD. The Regular Army would be ready for any expeditionary operations and as a training nucleus for the citizen soldiery. It would also furnish the reasonable mobile force in the United States and Coast Artillery troops sufficient for the coast defense in peace time. This would be, so to speak, first line.

Senator BRADY. What would be your second?

Gen. WOOD. Citizenry from 21 to 29 years of age. And these, if trained as contemplated, could be mobilized very promptly.

Senator BRADY. Then what would you do with the State militia?

Gen. WOOD. It should absolutely disappear unless the State chooses to keep armed bodies of troops. We have no use for State troops in this country. All officers and men in the State organization would be welcomed in the proposed Federal force if physically fit and the enlisted men were of suitable age.

Senator BRADY. Do you not believe we will necessarily have to have a State militia?

Gen. WOOD. I see what you are driving at. I think that it is much better to have a State constabulary.

Senator BRADY. I fully agree with you on that, but I wanted to get your views on the subject. It should be maintained in the States, by the States and, for the States' use, except in time of war.

Gen. WOOD. That is right, a State constabulary——

Senator BRADY. Do you not think there should be some scheme to bring the three together?

Gen. WOOD. No. I think the State constabulary should be kept apart and be used as a State police force, pure and simple, for the control of local disorders. Of course, in case of a great war all the police force would perhaps become, in times of emergency, a portion of the Military Establishment.

When the citizen training has been going on for eight years we shall have 4,000,000 men, less the ordinary losses from death and disease who have passed through the training. This would leave us about 3,700,000 men in the first line group available and ready for service. We shall have each year 500,000 in arms, assembled in regiments or other tactical organizations, fully equipped for immediate service. They will be distributed over the country more or less as the militia is to-day, their numbers being in accordance with the population. That is, a large city like New York would have many organizations. It will be a much better trained force than the militia and its value about three to one. It will be organized so as to constitute a well-balanced force with a proper proportion of the different arms. It will be at war strength, officered by trained officers of the reserve. We shall know exactly what we have available. Back of it will be the remaining class of the first line group, the class of 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, and 28, or about 3,200,000 men. We must have the arms and equipment for this force always ready and so distributed as to be near the organizations which are to use them. In case we need more than 500,000 men a class could be held for an additional year, so that you would have the old class and the new class, or a total of 1,000,000 men ready for immediate service. In the Civil War we had, North and South, a little over 4,000,000 men. This with one-third of our present population, no over-sea enemy and nothing like our present coastal wealth. When this is remembered I feel that the first line group, of 3,700,000 men, is not excessive. I do not think we would have to call them all out except in a great war. I think once we have completed our organization on the basis of national service and training our position will be very secure and it will be very doubtful if any nation will attack us—it would require an extraordinay combination of force to attack us with any hope of success. The arms and equipment though must be maintained; an army poorly equipped is almost as helpless as one poorly trained.

In the States you would want a good constabulary force—call it what you want, State police or State constabulary; I should call it constabulary—and depend on such a force for State purposes, because I believe a police force is less offensive to the people in the suppression of disorders than a military force. I also think the men on a force of that sort, police or constabulary, are much better fitted to handle crowds and mobs than troops. That is because of their training. The police are trained to control mobs and civil disorders and they have a much better knowledge of the best methods of doing it. Lack of this special training is, I think, the fundamental objection to using the militia against large masses of people. They are armed with weapons of destruction and are taught to use them with a view to killing an enemy. They are not trained to suppress civil disorders. It is much better to handle civil disturbances with police than with troops.

Senator THOMAS. I think your view is very strongly corroborated by the experience of the northwestern police of the Canadian Government and by the constabulary in some of our States, and the Texas Rangers.

Gen. WOOD. That is right; a handful of men handle the situation. They know their problems. It is an interesting fact, and I have found it true in Cuba and in the Philippines, where we had to do a great deal of repressive work—that is, we prevented crime so as not to have to punish for it—that there is very much less resentment when a man is arrested by the police than by troops. When the troops fire into a crowd there is tremendous excitement. When policeman No. 627 fires at a running burglar or a mob the public never think much about it because the maintenance of order is the policeman's business. People respect a trained policeman; I mean, they regard him as an instrument of the law. But when the troops come in it is quite a different thing. I think the State constabulary is what our States should come to.

Senator THOMAS. What proportion of the Regular force was the Government able to mobilize on the border?

Gen. WOOD. We virtually sent everything we had in this country down there except the Coast Artillery and here and there a regular organization.

Senator THOMAS. Perhaps my question is misleading. To what extent is the quota of troops represented in the Regular Army, or was, during this Mexican trouble?

Gen. WOOD. I should say we had between 150,000 and 155,000 militia on the border (not all at one time) and between 45,000 and 50,000 Regular troops at one time, including Coast Artillery.

Senator THOMAS. Were the regiments full?

Gen. WOOD. The regiments of Infantry have been at about half strength for the past five years except in the foreign possessions. The Cavalry and Field Artillery have been somewhat better off. The Coast Artillery has generally been near full strength.

Senator THOMAS. At present, what is the amount, speaking generally, of the deficit in the quota which we should have under the law?

Gen. WOOD. The condition as to regiments is about as follows: We had 20 regiments of Infantry before the recent increase, the oversea regiments were practically at war strength, that is, the regiments in the Philippines, Hawaii, and part of the regiments in

Panama. The home regiments averaged about 820 to 830 men, whereas their war strength—I am giving you round numbers only—is about 1,900. We had four regiments in the Philippines, four in Hawaii, and four in Panama, and one battalion in Alaska at effective strength; the balance of the regiments have been little above a war-strength battalion in numbers.

Senator THOMAS. To some extent then the Regular Army suffers from lack of force, as the militia does; that is to say, we can not get enlistments enough to fill up the ranks as fixed by the statutes.

Gen. WOOD. May I answer that somewhat in detail?

Senator THOMAS. Certainly.

Gen. WOOD. The strength of the Infantry regiments in this country is about one-half war strength. Cavalry and Field Artillery are each about 25 per cent under strength. This is in part due to the evil effects of long enlistments. The impression is still in force among the people that the long enlistment stands. You will remember that a few years ago, against the recommendations of the General Staff and a great majority of Army officers consulted at the various service schools, we were given four years' enlistment with the colors and three in the reserve. There was a great and immediate fall in enlistments after the enactment of this law. As I remember it, approximately 49 per cent. This was the direct effect of the long enlistment. Men do not want to tie themselves up for so long a period, and the better the class of men the less the disposition to engage for so long a time. Personally, I always favored an enlistment permitting transfer to the reserve as soon as the man is trained.

We were beginning to overcome the difficulty a bit through the authorizing of discharge by purchase. Moreover, times were rather hard and the labor market was congested. This added somewhat in increasing enlistments. Then came the war and with it high prices of labor; and the growing impression that there was to be no active service on the Mexican border; the effect of the professional pacifists in representing the Army as a necessary evil; lack of any particular interest in it; cultivation of the idea that the Army was a place for loafers—all these things had an effect in holding back enlistments. There was not, as expressed, that appreciation of the Army which is so necessary to secure the right kind of men. All these conditions have a great effect upon securing enlistments. Men are purely human even in the Army. They are influenced very largely by sentiment. Most men come into the Army more for the experience than for the money. When the uniform is respected by our countrymen as it should be, enlistments will increase. When the Army becomes a popular institution and its function is understood and recognized as an essential one, there will be no difficulty about enlistments. With the passage of the national-defense act we secured an enlistment contract which a few of us have been working for for years, an enlistment under which the men could transfer to the reserve at the end of a year of honest and faithful service if, in the opinion of their superior officers, they were well trained and competent soldiers. This gave a little impetus to recruiting, but, in view of the Mexican conditions, it has been considered necessary to withhold that privilege of transfer to the reserve.

The present enlistment is for seven years—three years with the colors and four with the reserve—with the privilege of furlough to the

reserve at the end of one year if a well-trained soldier. Now, if a man is transferred to the reserve at the end of a year he spends the balance of his enlistment, or six years, in the reserve. You see the point. Release from service with the colors after one year for the efficient soldier. This will give us gradually just what we wanted, a large reserve. I have gone further and said let us transfer men to the reserve the moment their superior officers decide they are well-trained soldiers. The man may have had training in some other army. He may have been taught in a military college, or he may have received training of value in the militia. The point is, that when the captain of a company and his officers decide Private A, for instance, is a well-trained soldier, we want him transferred to the reserve and put another man in his place and be training him.

Senator BRADY. I think that is a splendid suggestion.

Gen. WOOD. That is what we have been working for. But we have had to hold up the transfers to the reserve on account of the Mexican situation. The feeling has gone out among the men that we are going to hold them to long enlistments, that the privilege afforded by the law, or rather the favor or consideration permitted by the law, is not to be extended. This is having an unfortunate effect. I think it would be better to transfer every man who is well trained to the reserve. I think by doing so we would show to the public generally that a man may come in and if he is decent, intelligent, honest, and industrious, that he can be transferred (furloughed) to the reserve at the end of a year. In other words, you will lose a little at first, but you will gain in public confidence. At Plattsburg, where we have all kinds and conditions of men, a great many of the best type of men came to me, literally hundreds, in a single season, saying, "If we could enlist in the Regular Army for a short period we would like to do it and get our training with the Regulars."

Senator THOMAS. I suppose that would be possible, would it not, after the Mexican situation is wound up?

Gen. WOOD. I hope eventually it will come out in that way.

Senator THOMAS. Do you think the establishment of the $30 per month pay would prove much of an inducement?

Gen. WOOD. You would probably get some more men, but I think it would be a national misfortune to do it.

Senator THOMAS. My question is prompted by the assertion that former Secretary of the Interior, Mr. Fisher, made this morning, that the increase of pay to that sum would, in the opinion of some officials to whom he had conversed—whose opinions were given and very properly, I think—would so increase the enlistments as to give the Army many more men than it really needed.

Gen. WOOD. You can buy men. It is simply a matter of price; but it's a bad policy.

Senator THOMAS. Precisely, but would that be a sufficient price at which to buy a man—$30 a month?

Gen. WOOD. You would get more men than you get now. You would almost double the cost of the pay of the Army, and once having advanced that you never could get it back. Remember that in war you will have to pay that same price to untrained masses who volunteer.

Senator THOMAS. Do you think the advantage is greater than the disadvantage of such a proposition?

Gen. WOOD. I think the disadvantage would outweigh the advantage many, many times. I believe if the American public voiced a real approval of its Army and emphasized the sacredness of the military service and put it where it belongs, you could not take care of the men who would want to come into the service. But when a decent, clean soldier goes to a hotel and can not get a room, or goes to a theater and the woman next to him moves off because he is a soldier, in uniform, when instead of being recognized as a member of an ancient and honorable profession, he is looked down on, you have a condition which has killed enthusiasm. This attitude is one of the strongest influences against the service to-day.

Senator BRADY. You think there ought to be the proper sentiment behind the soldier?

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir. There should be.

Senator THOMAS. I fully recognize that fact and tried to cure it by the introduction of a measure for the protection of the uniform. I was only partially successful.

Gen. WOOD. It has done some good, sir. But return to the subject of a portion of public opinion concerning the soldier's occupation. The professional pacifist and peace-at-any-price man—the nonresistant, who believes that nothing is worth defending—is the man who has cultivated and built up strong sentiment against the soldier. Many of our better class of people have come to look upon the soldier as an idler because they have never given the matter of his occupation and duties serious attention. This is due largely to the fact that we have never met the issue squarely in this country, and instead of demanding universal service we have left military service to volunteers. This failing, we have gone to the bounty or the draft. During the Civil War we drafted generally after the fall of 1862. To meet the demands of the draft people of the community got together and in fact paid men to go to the front. So common was this practice that men at the front frequently spoke of the newcomers as costing so much a pound. "Here comes a bunch of seven and a half-a pound men." In other words, whatever the per capita price was. Service secured in this way resulted in an undue number of desertions, in bounty jumping, and other despicable things.

Senator THOMAS. There is no distinction between them and the men on the pension roll.

Gen. WOOD. Not a bit.

Senator BRADY. I was going to ask the same question that Senator Thomas has asked relative to the increase of pay. Ex-Secretary Fisher this morning was very emphatic in his statement relative to that matter, and in fact he used practically the same expression in reference to that which you did in reference to having the country behind the soldier, that if the wages or salaries allowed the soldiers was placed at $30 a month, we could not take care of the men that would be ready to enlist.

Gen. WOOD. Let us take it in another way. A few years ago I was in Switzerland. I met a lot of youngsters coming down the mountain one morning. I said, "Why are you in uniform? You are not on service." The men stopped and looked as though they would like to push me off the trail. After a moment's hesitation one of the party stepped to the front and said: "We are in uniform be-

cause we are proud of our uniforms. This is the uniform of the Swiss; we are always proud to wear it and we wear it on special occasions. There is a celebration down in the village which we are going to, and we are always glad to wear the uniform when there is any special occasion." I then asked: "Do you all receive military training?" This was almost too much for them. Another of the party stepped to the front and after a moment's hesitation said: "What do you mean by asking these questions? Do you not know there is not a woman in the village who would dance with a man if he did not take his military training, unless he was a cripple?"

Let us get a little of that spirit—the spirit that makes men proud of the uniform and glad to wear it. Now, as to pay. Fifteen dollars is the basic pay of the private soldier. This pay runs up to about $100 in the higher grades, and with it go clothing, food, shelter, medical attendance, and other benefits. It is much more liberal than it appears at first glance. Few people appreciate what the total value of Army pay is, and with it goes an insurance in case of accident and retired pay after 30 years' service.

Senator THOMAS. Perhaps it is fair to Mr. Fisher to say here that he coupled that statement with the further condition that an effort to secure the rudiments of a good trade or occupation should be also offered as a matter of civic training to those soldiers while in the Army.

Gen. WOOD. I do not think we should attempt the two under our proposed system of intensive training. We want to make this feature the important one, for we are wholly lacking in it, and many men will come from the farming, professional, and business classes. These men want their training as quickly as they can get it. They receive a kind of civic training too little in evidence in this country; they get it in the form of discipline, promptness, thoroughness, respect for the flag, the authorities, and the rights of others. This is the kind of civic training our youth need. The mixture of classes, races, and occupations at Plattsburg (and our training system will be but an extension and amplification of the Plattsburg system) tends to aid very greatly our work.

Take it, for instance, at Plattsburg. We had in one camp this year two bishops (one was unable to take the training), 18 clergymen of one church, 12 of another great church, and some 40 others representing other denominations. That was in one camp of 3,000 men. There were men from the ranks of labor and men from the poorer class—expenses of some paid by interested patriotic citizens. I helped many to come, as I had quite a large fund. We put them all into the same uniform, side by side—regardless of who they were; there was no bunching by class. They were assigned by fives to a company. They were then split up amongst different squads in the company. There was no such thing as recognition of social classes or keeping certain men together. Probably the finest thing about the camp was the pure democracy of that association.

Most of the men had not known each other before. Their estimate of each other was based simply upon efficiency and performance of duty. A man was sized up and valued according to his performance of the task before him. Distinctions as to wealth and social condition absolutely disappeared. They estimated each other from an entirely new standpoint—that measured by the performance of a common

duty. It was a fine elevating influence. For many of the men for the first time were consciously engaged in an effort to fit themselves for national service. The result was to fuse the various divers elements into one homogeneous mass infused with the idea of preparing themselves to better discharge their citizenship obligations from the soldier's side. This service all together served more than anything I have ever seen to wipe out the distinctions between the rich and the poor and the Jew and the Gentile. The scion of the old family and the son of the newcomer. It impressed upon all the sense of a common obligation to country.

Senator BRADY. You think a training camp such as Plattsburg is very beneficial, do you?

Gen. WOOD. I think it has been a voice to a slumbering people. I think it is the most hopeful thing I have seen.

Senator THOMAS. How many of these camps were in operation last summer?

Gen. WOOD. I will give you a general idea of the movement. There have been a number of camps. We started in 1913, the year before the war, and we had about 300 men, roughly. In 1914 we were just finishing up the second set of camps when war came. We had about 650. In 1915 we had about 3,000, and this year, from all over the country, about 17,000 or 18,000 men, and next year we are counting on about 60,000. The fine thing is that there is every class of men, all filled with the idea of universal service—service for the Nation. As the camps of 1913 were drawing to an end a movement was made to directly connect certain college presidents, who had shown great interest in the movement, with its further conduct through service as members of an advisory committee. This committee consisted of President Drinker, of Lehigh; President Lowell, of Harvard; President Hibben, of Princeton; President Hadley, of Yale; John Finley, at the head of the New York Educational Establishment; Gen. Nichols, of the Virginia Military Institute; President James, of the University of Illinois; President Hutchins, of Ann Arbor; President Denny, of Alabama; President Schurman, of Cornell; and President Wheeler, of California. Since then other college presidents have been added to the number: President Knight, of the University of the South; the director of the Catholic University in Washington; President Garfield, of Williams; and this year other college presidents representing the Rocky Mountain and southwestern colleges will be added.

This advisory body has been of tremendous service in building up the camps through indorsing the movement throughout the college world. They have kept in close touch with the camps and have visited them and made careful inspections. In a word, they stand as sponsors for the good work of the camp, the value of the training, and the idea it represents. There is a general movement toward universal service in the universities. Charles W. Eliot, president emeritus of Harvard, after most careful consideration of this subject, has just come out for universal training not only as a matter of national defense, but for the betterment of the men economically and from the standpoint of citizenship. Universal training represents an extension of the Plattsburg idea. There will be no difficulty whatever in putting it in force. Not over one-half of our men are fit to take it physically. I don't think the expense is going to be in

any way prohibitive. Transportation will be one of the big features Transportation lines on land and sea should be called upon to play their part in the game in this matter of national defense, and special rates should be secured for those who attend training camps. They are preparing themselves to defend the nation, and incidentally the property and lives of all under the flag. All transportation during the period of training should be at a special minimum rate, and I believe the transportation companies will do it. If not, Congress can take steps to meet the situation.

Senator BRADY. Do you not believe that if we are going to adopt this method of military training, or universal military training, that the American public will first have to be educated up to what it really means before it will indorse it, or do you think they are ready to indorse it at this time?

Gen. WOOD. I believe they will indorse it to-day, if presented to them properly. I have just come from St. Louis where I went to take up the question of summer camps next year, and the one thing that brought the people to their feet was a mention of universal service. It comes from the miner and the ranks of labor just as readily as from the richer classes. If you get a lot of workmen together and talk universal service, and let it be understood that by universal service you mean service under which no man, however wealthy, can buy a substitute, you will hear just one murmer from the crowd, "We are with you if you will give us real universal service. We are willing to serve the country, as willing as any one to do our full duty, but we do not want any more of this Civil War buying-substitute business." This is their attitude as I see it. They are afraid they will get some system by which the rich man can put up enough money to buy a substitute. Labor is with you, I'm sure, when you can make it absolutely clear that it is universal service for all, rich and poor. Our armies have always been filled very largely from the ranks of labor and it is an insult to the laboring man to assume that he has neither the patriotism nor intelligence to appreciate the necessity of national defense. What he wants in service is real democracy; a share and share alike, shoulder to shoulder proposition. A system under which each man who is physically fit must pay his part of the service tax in war by actual service, and not through buying another man to do it for him.

Senator BRADY. When you make every man bear his responsibility and burden?

Gen. WOOD. Absolutely. I do not believe you will have any serious trouble. I went over the Department of the East last year and was talking summer camps, I think, on about 160 or 170 occasions, at colleges, at mass meetings, at places like Lawrence, Mass., where they have 51 nationalities. I never heard an objection to universal service, when its conditions were properly explained. I talked to the district leaders in New York of different political creeds with the idea of putting before them universal service, in order to see what they thought of it. They are for it if you will give them real universal service. I think you will find that the leaders of labor are for it. They recognize the straight democracy of it. There is no way of getting away from that fact. It is the equality of obligation accompanying equality of opportunity and privilege. It is the very foundation on which the Republic rests and no one can go back of that proposition unless he does not intend to play the game.

Senator BRADY. The bill we are considering would prevent the condition that you mention about purchasing a substitute.

Gen. WOOD. Absolutely.

Senator BRADY. Every man would have to serve his time.

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir. May I make a statement about those two bills just as I see them now? With your permission I will elaborate it in correcting the testimony because it is impossible in a hearing of this sort to cover the many things that may occur to me.

Senator THOMAS. Before you go into that I would like to ask if you have made any estimates, either mental or otherwise, of the probable annual cost of universal service?

Gen. WOOD. We have made estimates, but they are largely guesswork, to be frank with you, because so much depends upon the distances that we have to move the men. A great item will be the one I have suggested, namely, the railroad rates. Steps should be taken to fix them for this service. Another important factor is the kind and amount of equipment we use.

We hear arguments in this country from some people who are always saying, "You could not have the Swiss system because Switzerland is a little country," and they say you can not have the Australian system because the population is very small. Australia has a small population, though it is a large country. Australia is a little larger than continental United States without Alaska. She has about one-twentieth of our population—about five millions. She carries on this system through having multiple training centers. For the purpose of administration, Australia is divided, as I remember it, into six military divisions or districts, each under a district commander, assisted by a district staff. Districts practically correspond to six state boundaries. These areas are again subdivided into battalion areas. These are grouped into brigade areas, the men forming a tactical brigade, with certain technical troops. The battalion areas are subdivided into small training areas. In the sparsely settled country the training areas are subdivided into training localities; the total for Australia being about 450. The training begins at 12 years of age; the first two years calisthenics, the four following advanced calisthenics, rifle shooting, and simpler military exercises. They then enter the citizen soldiery or citizen forces, where they receive about three months of intensive training and serve until they pass into the reserve. The equipment at the training centers is extremely simple, just enough for the necessary training, and of the least expensive type. We should follow this general principle. Of course, arms and straight military equipment always have to be of the standard type used by the service, but the clothing and garrison equipment could be reduced to a minimum.

I think each of the bills, the Chamberlain bill and the so-called amended or Moseley bill, have points of special excellence which must be considered in establishing our system. We could not afford to start, for instance, with the training of boys and neglect the training of men who are now of military age. We must commence immediately the training of the latter, and here the Moseley draft is especially adaptable. The excellent provisions of the Chamberlain bill for the training of the youth should be put into effect for the younger portion of the community, and when they have reached the age of citizen training (the nineteenth year) the question of giving

certain credit for this training and reducing somewhat the length of time which they should serve in the final training period (their nineteenth year) will come up for consideration. These boys will have received, if the training is properly conducted, the training of the advanced Boy Scout plus rifle shooting, better knowledge of map reading, and the elements of military drill; a training which should entitle him to receive credit on the six months' period, but in no case should the credit exceed three months, even in cases where men have served in military institutions or establishments, unless they be a regular Army, Navy, or Marine Corps, or long service in the militia.

The Australian boy gets about 100 to 120 hours a year, from his twelfth to eighteenth year. In other words, he is absorbing military training during this entire period. The training which boys have received in the Boy Scout work will be of material value. In fact, this entire Boy Scout movement could be made very much greater use of if we had among the older boys rifle shooting and the elements of military drill.

We should start at once with our six months' training for the men who are in their nineteenth year and also with the training of the younger boys. The important thing is to start immediately the training of those who are now of military age. This six months of intensive training, equaling, as it will, one and one-half years of training in the Regular Establishment, followed by a month of special training during the first month of year of service with the colors, should give us in two or three years a reasonable nucleus, something that we can depend upon. In the meantime, the Reserve Officers' Corps is being built up through the present training camps, the work at colleges, etc., and should be able to provide officers as rapidly as we can the men. Of course, of the men in training there will be thousands who show capacity and have the qualifications to make good officers. These men would be taken up at the end of or during the six months' period and pushed forward through a course of special training to fit them for the duties of officers in the lower grades and noncommissioned officers.

Senator BRADY. Whether they have had college training or not?

Gen. WOOD. Yes; there should be a minimum of three months' training for purposes of standardization. Some men who come to the training camps will be obviously material for officers almost from the start. They will have had military training at school or college, perhaps will have served for a long time in the guard, but in any case they should have three months of standardization work and additional advanced work if they are to be noncommissioned officers and officers.

Many questions will come up which will have to be determined after the system is established. It is very probable that the States will eventually feel the pressure on the part of their people for the establishment of military training in the schools of the State in order that the period of intensive training under the Federal authority may be somewhat shortened, for training under suitable conditions should be given credit. Take the graduate of the Virginia Military Institute, which (with one or two other military colleges) stands next in excellence to West Point. We should give a graduate of this institution credit for three months and also consider him as having had training

which would make it possible to immediately commence work to qualify as an officer. Pennsylvania State Military College, Norwich in Vermont, and others are of the same general type. Graduates of these institutions should unquestionably be given credit and considered as having done much of the work which would be a proper foundation for training for an officer. In a word, as soon as the people of the States have recognized that military training is going to receive some credit from the Federal authorities when their youth come up for training there will be a strong pressure in all the States to have military training become a part of public education.

Senator THOMAS. Now you can take up the bill for consideration, if you want to.

Gen. WOOD. I really have covered the general principles involved, I think.

Senator THOMAS. I did not know whether you wanted to discuss the bills in detail.

Gen. WOOD. Of the two bills I should say that Senator Chamberlain's is best designed to build up the character and physique of our future citizens, but that the Moseley draft is better for meeting our immediate needs. Senator Chamberlain's bill will produce a fairly efficient citizen soldiery in time, say after six or seven years. The Moseley draft will give us a half million trained soldiers in one year and a similar number each year following. As explained already, the Moseley draft may result in each State taking over the training proposed in the Chamberlain bill for our younger boys, thus relieving the Central Government in part of the expense. If the States do not do this, ultimately the Central Government should.

But at present we should concentrate on those who can give immediate return in service if needed. We have none too many trained instructors as it is. Once the system is in force, we shall develop promptly among those trained the necessary instructors for extending the work as far as we may desire to.

In comparing the two bills I should say that Senator Chamberlain's bill enacts into law some features which might better be left to regulation, while the amended or Moseley draft does not cover all questions that may arise. I have a tabulated comparison which I should like to insert in my hearings.

| Chamberlain bill. | Amended bill (Moseley draft). | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|
| SECTION 1. | SECTION 1. | |
| Prescribes all citizens and those of declared intention shall be liable to training from 12 to 23, inclusive. | Prescribed 6 months' continuous training in year man reaches 18 years. Section 26 prevents purchase of substitutes or release from military service on payment of money or any valuable thing. | Moseley draft preferable in that it presents many less administrative difficulties. It is more practical for immediate operation. Later we may extend so as to get effect of earlier discipline. |
| And exempts certain classes, giving routine for exemption. | Provides exemption for certain classes. | Moseley draft defective as to exemptions; Chamberlain bill much better. |

| Chamberlain bill. | Amended bill (Moseley draft). | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|
| SECTION 2. | SECTION 2. | |
| Divides those under instruction:<br>12–17, Citizen Cadet Corps;<br>18–12, Citizen Army. | Does not specifically divide or provide for training under 18, but will probably have same result, as it provides credits to be applied to the 6 months if training in schools is given prior to 18. | Moseley draft preferable for the present. It is much simpler; may have substantially same effect. |
| SECTION 3. | | |
| Divides training into three periods:<br>12–13, inclusive, 90 hours per year, without arms.<br>14–15, inclusive, 90 hours per year military training with rifle, gallery practice.<br>16–17, inclusive, 90 hours per year and 10 days' camp field exercises, target practice. | 1 month's credit allowed for 1 year in military schools approved by Secretary of War.<br>Only 4 months' credit can be earned, thus requiring at least 2 months in camp in eighteenth year. | |
| SECTION 4. | | |
| 120 hours or 20 days' camp training per year prescribed for Citizen Army for 6 years; at least 10 days in camp, anyhow. | Nothing like this in Moseley draft. See section 1 for training system. | Moseley system more practical at present. |
| SECTION 5. | | |
| Gives several different methods of putting in time—so many half days—so many full days—or so many night drills. | Nothing like this in Moseley draft, except that training in schools may be accepted for part of camp training, if Secretary of War approves school system. | Moseley draft better. Chamberlain bill goes too much into detail. |
| SECTION 6. | | |
| Citizens Army allotted to arms and corps. | Section 12 covers this..... | |
| SECTION 7. | | |
| Authorizes those who desire to enter either Citizen Army or Citizen Navy at 18. | Section 12, section 13, and section 14 authorize the President to assign to corps and departments, and to tactical units. Also to localize units for prompt mobilization. | Will have same effect, except as to option. |
| SECTION 8. | | |
| Training may be given in schools, colleges, etc., militia, Boy Scouts, similar organizations approved by proper authority. | Covered partially. See section 7, giving credits for school training. | |
| SECTION 9. | | |
| Persons over 24 who have completed training become members of reserve, no age limit on service in reserve. Provides for those declared nonefficient to take course over again. | Covered in part by section 8, which authorizes annual muster by classes. In case of call, requires youngest class first. No provision for repeating course for nonefficients. | Moseley draft defective in not requiring satisfactory service before releasing men from obligation. |
| SECTION 10. | | |
| Prohibits Federal employment to any person failing to register and perform service prescribed. | Section 20 carries same. | |
| SECTION 11. | | |
| Provides fine and confinement for failing to register and render service. | Section 20 prohibits Federal employment and section 18 private employment of any person failing to show certificate of exemption or of service. | Moseley draft is a better coercive measure. |
| SECTION 12. | | |
| Prohibits discrimination against employees by employers. | Section 19 provides penalty for employing anyone over 18 who has not a certificate of training or a certificate of exemption. | Moseley scheme better, but some system for enforcing the law should be prescribed—that is, a system of inspection, or check of those employed, or a definite report by employers with penalty for false report. |

| Chamberlain bill. | Amended bill (Moseley draft). | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|
| SECTION 13. | SECTION 2—continued. | |
| Provides penalty for such discrimination. | ..... | |
| SECTION 14. | | |
| Provides penalty for breaches of discipline. | Section 10 makes those under training amenable to Articles of War or Articles for Government of Navy. | A simpler system than Senator Chamberlain's. |
| SECTION 15. | | |
| Provides confinement not to be in jail but in custody of some person or institution. | ..... | |
| SECTION 16. | | |
| No person of notoriously bad character eligible. | Section 1 covers in exemptions but is not positive. | |
| SECTION 17. | | |
| Makes registration districts and appoints Army officers district commandants. | Section 3 gives this authority to President. | Moseley draft better. Nothing should be enacted into law which can be made subject of regulations. |
| SECTION 18. | | |
| Requires registration at 12 years of age and report of change in address to district commander. | Covered by sections 3, 4, 5, and 15. Left to President. | Moseley draft better. The authorization to use any department to keep track of trained men is good. |
| SECTION 19. | | |
| Establishes training districts for Army and Navy. | Section 13 covers very well. | |
| SECTION 20. | | |
| Physical examination and oath of enlistment. | Section 8 requires enlistment. Section 14 provides officers for all purposes, including physical examination. | |
| SECTION 21. | | |
| Authorizes President to mobilize Citizen Army when public safety demands. | Section 8 covers and requires call to be made by classes, youngest first. Call authorized only in time of war or imminent danger thereof. Exempts from call those whose creed forbids war. | Moseley draft good as to call by classes; bad as to limitation on call. Chamberlain wording much better. |
| SECTION 22. | | |
| Appointment of officers and noncommissioned officers of Cadet Corps. | No cadet force. | |
| SECTION 23. | | |
| Appointment of officers of Citizen Army by President. Arranges for a gradual development of organization extending over 4 years. | Section 31 covers in part, but method of issuing commissions should be definite. | Moseley draft incomplete. Probably the National Defense Act covers sufficiently in the reserve officer clauses. |
| SECTION 24. | | |
| Provides for promotions and seniority after system is in operation. | Not covered. | See remark opposite section 23. |
| SECTION 25. | | |
| Specifies classes eligible for commissions under regulations by President. | Nothing in Moseley draft. | See remark opposite section 23. |
| SECTION 26. | | |
| Authorizing employment of Medical Reserve Corps for sanitary supervision and examinations. | Section 14 covers..... | |

| Chamberlain bill. | Amended bill (Moseley draft). | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|
| SECTION 27. | SECTION 2—continued. | |
| Authorizes members of Citizen Army to accept commission or enlist in Regulars, Militia, or Volunteers | Present laws would cover..... | |
| SECTION 28. | | |
| Covers appointment of noncommissioned officers. | Section 31 authorizes President to make regulations. | Moseley draft better. |
| SECTION 29. | | |
| Same for warrant officers and petty officers Citizen Navy. | Same as above..... | Same. |
| SECTION 30. | | |
| Authorizes members of Citizen Army to be assigned to Marine Corps when called for service. | Section 6 authorizes the number to be trained for Army and Navy. | Moseley draft should be extended to authorize President to designate persons to take training for each service. |
| SECTION 31. | | |
| No pay. Expenses paid while training. | Section 5 covers same thing..... | |
| SECTION 32. | | |
| No uniform for first period of Citizen Cadets. Uniform authorized for other Cadet periods and for Citizen Army. | Section 5 covers uniforms for those in training. No cadets in General Staff bill. | |
| SECTION 33. | | |
| Penalty for wearing uniform by those not entitled. | Not covered..... | Section 125, National Defense Act should be extended to cover. |
| SECTION 34. | | |
| Prohibits intoxicating liquor at training centers. | Section 28 covers..... | Moseley draft, in section 29, forbids sale of liquor to any member of United States forces in uniform. |
| SECTION 36. | | |
| Prescribes issue arms, etc..... | Section 16 prescribed same..... | |
| SECTION 37. | | |
| Regular Army pay and allowances when called into service. | Section 11 covers. | |
| SECTION 38. | | |
| Pensions for disability while being trained. | Section 17 covers. | |
| SECTION 39. | | |
| Establishes section General Staff in charge. Provides 50 inspection districts. | Not covered except general authority of President as to regulations. | The General Staff section of Chamberlain bill is good. Moseley draft better on balance. |
| SECTION 40. | | |
| Regular officers detailed with Citizen Army create vacancies. | Not covered. | We shall need extra officers and noncommissioned officers. |
| SECTION 41. | | |
| Establishes a Division in Office Aide for Operations, Navy Department. | Section 31 gives President general authority to make regulations. | Moseley draft better. Unwise to make law what should be left to regulations. |
| SECTION 42. | | |
| President authorized to make regulations not inconsistent with law. | Section 31 gives President same power. | |

To sum up, I would recommend the adoption of the amended or Moseley draft, changing the eighteenth year to the nineteenth year and incorporating therein Senator Chamberlain's exemptions, his provisions for requiring repetition of the course of instruction by those rated as nonefficients, his provision for authorizing the call for service when the public safety requires such action rather than limiting the call to war or the imminent danger thereof, the authority for the President to designate those for naval service, and the increase of the General Staff to supervise the work.

I should recommend in addition a section requiring all those who have had the training in the nineteenth year to be mobilized in their twenty-first year and organized into a citizen army properly balanced as to arms and corps, equipped and uniformed, and officered by members of the Officers' Reserve Corps, except in the higher commands and important staff positions, which should be filled generally by the detail of selected regular officers. This army would have from 20 to 30 days of intensive training in camp and as much time as possible should be devoted to combat exercises. Thirty days should be secured if possible. The men then should return to their homes and ordinary occupations. They continue for the balance of the year as part of a definite organization, maintained at war strength, and fully equipped and officered. The superior officers and medical officers of the regiment or organization should keep in reasonably close touch with the men to know just what their status is as to efficiency at all times.

Provision should be made to authorize suitable members of the National Guard who obtain their State's quittance of present obligation to accept commissions in the Officers' Reserve Corps and for their employment in Federal service to aid in organizing and instructing the Federal citizen forces. There are many officers of the National Guard who have shown marked ability as organizers. Some of these are now in State pay and devote their lives to military work. Such men are needed and the Federal Government should be able to secure their services under conditions fair to them. I feel that the National Guardsmen as a class represent a high ideal of patriotism—their services have generally been given at personal loss. All must be actuated by a desire for military life and an interest in the soldier's profession or they would not make the sacrifices they have. Those who have accomplished creditable results in spite of an exceedingly poor system can be depended upon to make a greater success under a proper system. We need these men; I mean not only officers but the enlisted men who are of suitable age and physically fit.

Senator BRADY. You may look over the matter and see if there is anything further that you desire to discuss. We are very anxious to have all the information we can possibly get in this matter, and you are so thoroughly equipped that we are going to depend upon you to give us considerable information. Going back to the Australian system, which you spoke of just a moment ago, you doubtless have given that considerable study and thought.

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir; I have been over it pretty carefully.

Senator BRADY. And you are satisfied that that system is a success?

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir; of course you hear a good deal of uninformed opinion upon the Australian system. The Australian system in

limited form was put into effect in the early days of this present century.

There was considerable opposition to universal service at first, principally because it was not understood. The opposition was from the class we find here. In 1910 Lord Kitchener visited Australia, made a careful study of the military situation and recommended the adoption of a system of universal training and service. Prior to that time, training had only been compulsory for those under 20 years of age. On Lord Kitchener's advice compulsory training was extended to include those up to and including 26 years of age. Thus was the basis of the present system laid. The Australian defense act is known as the act of 1903–1912. The act was not in full effect until about 1911. There have been some minor modifications since. The system was barely beginning to be felt when the present great war broke out. One must remember that it had been in force only a short time—practically since 1911—when the war came, so you can not judge the system by the degree of training of the Australian troops which were trained only in part under this system. The system will not be in full effect for a number of years. The men coming back from the great war will form an invaluable force both as instructors and in building up a proper appreciation of the vital necessity of military training.

With reference to the system in force in Australia and the conditions under which it is applied, there is a good deal of editorial misconception. You probably have read that Australia has repudiated conscription. There was no repudiation of conscription for national service within the limits of the Commonwealth. Conscription for foreign service is what was rejected. Universal obligation for military service has been definitely adopted and by overwhelming majorities. As a matter of fact, universal military service in many of the European countries is for home service, as far as the phraseology of the law goes; so it should be remembered, as a matter of simple justice that Australia has not repudiated conscription. She has refused to accept it as applying to foreign service.

When I stated that six months was an adequate period, I considered carefully the work done under both the Australian and Swiss system. In 1908 I spent six months in Europe, most of the time in Switzerland, and made many inquiries concerning the application of the system there, the efficiency of the officers and the adequacy of the training of the men. I was convinced then, and am even more so now, that under six months of intensive training we should turn out a very efficient private soldier. Noncommissioned officers and officers require special and additional training. We find that men who have taken two or more periods of training at Plattsburg are thoroughly well grounded in the schools of the soldier and company and have become fairly well skilled in rifle practice. Indeed, they compare very favorably with the shooting in the service and are far ahead of the shooting in the National Guard. If we had a progressive course covering six months, we should turn out men, as I have stated, even better trained than the average of the men of our Regular Service. There is absolutely no question about this. There has been a great deal of misunderstanding about the European system. France does not require three years for the purpose of training her infantry. This was not the reason why she extended the period

to three years; it was because she needed one class more with the colors. She foresaw what was coming. This gave her double the number of fully instructed troops immediately available with the colors. Germany has maintained with her large population a two-year period for her infantry. No one questions its efficiency. She has three years for cavalry and field artillery. There are certain exemptions and special provisions, but I am speaking in general terms. The German soldier has gone through his training as a private soldier at the end of eight to eight and one-half months. At the end of a year one-half of the infantry and one-third of the cavalry and field artillery return to their civil occupations. The force which is left is the veteran nucleus, the trained nucleus around which the recruits are assembled for training. It is also the force ready for immediate work. Practically one-half of the army is a veteran force trained and ready. The other half is for the first eight months only partially instructed troops. Conditions in Europe, where great forces, representing different nations are in close proximity to each other, necessitate very different actions from those which confront us here. If our conditions became as acute and critical as theirs, we should probably have to hold men double the period necessary to train them in order to have a large force always immediately available. The European is not held the full period for training alone.

Senator THOMAS. He is the hold over?

Gen. WOOD. He is the hold over because he is trained and ready. These trained men form, as I have stated, the nucleus around which the recruits are gathered. Circumstances determine very largely the length of time for training. If you have plenty of highly trained officers and noncommissioned officers and can train your men in the atmosphere of war, where the psychology of the situation is a tremendous incentive to work, you can accomplish wonders in a short time. Russia is reported to be bringing some of her partly trained men near to the front to receive their final training almost within the sound of the guns. The effect is, of course, tremendous. The men who are instructing are the men who have just come from the fighting area. Their words and advice are heeded. It does not take much to appreciate the difference between this kind of training and training under conditions of peace. They know they are going in a few days to be doing the things which they are being taught. Everything tends to concentration of effort. As I have said before, training depends upon several things—capacity and suffciency of officers and equipment, intelligence of the men, the national situation, and the local conditions as to freedom from nonmilitary duty. You might have men for five years under peace conditions and under conditions where the bulk of their work would be nonmilitary, and at the end of that time have poorly trained men, for humdrum and non-military work would serve to kill their interest. Men become stale through dragging instruction over too long a period and the lack of zest. Success at Plattsburg is due to the intensity of the training, the fact that we have carefully selected officers, and that the scheme of the work appeals to the intelligence of the men. They go away keen and full of interest and are anxious to come again. They gain confidence in themselves and in their officers.

Every moment of their day is full; the work is progressive and the reasons for things done is explained as the work goes on. There is no

comparison between this kind of training and that followed of necessity at most of our scattered garrisons; in one work is systematic and progressive, in the other sadly interrupted by nonmilitary duties which destroy interest in the work and in the service.

Senator BRADY. It gave them great confidence in themselves as well as the officers?

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir; and it has been a great thing for the officers. They do not want to go back to the old regular organization again because they have had the experience of having war-strength organizations and of having nothing to do but buckle down to truly military work.

Senator BRADY. Pardon me for diverting a moment, but Secretary Fisher this morning made a very interesting statement relating to this matter, and he specially discussed the question of vocational training in the Regular Army. He favored that very much. How far do you think that could be carried to advantage?

Gen. WOOD. If we are going to give vocational training in conjunction with military training, I say, as a rough estimate, that we should have to keep the boy a year at least, perhaps more. The point to be remembered is that in my plan I desire to give this military training under an intensive method and to make the period as short as possible, so that the young man may be taken from his occupation—college, or whatever he may be doing—for the least possible time. We want to put our entire time in in giving him a knowledge of the soldier's duty; build up in him a sense of discipline and of individual obligation to the State. I do not believe in trying to combine this with industrial training. I am afraid Mr. Fisher and others do not realize how much a young man's economic efficiency is increased by this training itself, through the habits of discipline, promptness, coordination of muscle and will—the making of him a better machine, so to speak. In the present condition of the country, the main thing is to secure a number of trained men as soon as possible and to start the system with the minimum of delay. The industrial training will be taken up all the more rapidly and with better results. This is a direct effect of the military training.

Now, the professional pacifist never thinks of those things, and when I say professional pacifist I do not mean that we are not all pacifists in the sense of desiring peace, but I mean the man who thinks there is nothing worth defending, either God, country, or home. He does not believe in military training, and he presents a surprising degree of agility in side-stepping it.

I think we want our military training clean cut and distinct, and I think if we couple industrial training with military training it will make a botch job. The man when he finishes military training is going to his work so much better fitted for it, through habits of regularity, promptness, and in much better physical condition, his muscles working in so much better coordination with his will, that he will accomplish more than Mr. Fisher dreams of. He will have increased from 15 to 20 per cent in economic efficiency. He will be a better human machine. I would rather have a man who has been trained in that way. If you put him into any trade, he will do his work intelligently and thoroughly. But if you mix the two, I think you will find a double period of training necessary with inferior results in both respects.

Senator BRADY. Mr. Fisher, I think, was striving to reach the same goal that you are, only through a different channel. He was very much in favor of training along the line you suggested, only for another purpose.

Gen WOOD. But the real result would be a big mercenary Army—an Army of professional soldiers. The very antithesis of what we want. We want an Army of professional soldiers, big enough for the peace needs of the Nation, but we want back of it a citizenry trained to arms and trained under conditions which will cause the minimum of interference with their economic and educational careers.

Senator BRADY. I won't ask you to go into detail to-day, General, but in the final preparation of your statement I would be pleased to have your outline quite fully along this line what you think should be done.

Gen. WOOD. I will give it in a few words. We are not contemplating an army which will be trained and organized for a war of aggression or conquest. What we want is a citizen force back of our Regular Establishment, organized and trained so as to command the respect of the world sufficiently to make it certain an attack upon us would be costly and doubtful of outcome; an organization which would insure our voice in the world's affairs receiving consideration; one which would enable us to pursue our just policies without threat of interference. We want a system which would place at the President's call for such duty as the National Guard was called for, a force of young soldiers free from binding business, professional, and family obligations. We want a force which can be turned out without asking great sacrifices of certain classes to the advantage of others. We want no more bounties for service in war, and no more widows and orphans unless a struggle for existence demands the call of class after class. And we want a system which will call for a tax of personal service rather than a tax for the payment of others to perform service. That is where Dr. Fisher is wrong. The citizen should do his soldier duty as an obligation and not for pay. And the Army should not be expected to train men for civil pursuits beyond making them strong and reliable. Of course, when men go into service at the call of the Government—I mean service which follows their being called out as trained soldiers—they must receive such pay as the Government determines to be right and proper—something which will serve to take care of their families; but the service during training; that is, during the 19-year period, should not be paid for. It probably would be well to give a certain amount to pay for the month of intensive training which is given at the beginning of the year of service with the colors, but the pay given should be very small and should not be measured in terms of wage-earning capacity outside.

The question appeals to me as a soldier more forcibly than it does to Mr. Fisher, for whom I have the greatest respect. He does not, however, realize or appreciate the fact, nor do many people, that from the standpoint of reasonable preparedness to meet attack by any of the great military nations of to-day, this country is in effect unprepared. We need, and need immediately, a system for the training of men, and we should push forward the manufacture of munitions and equipment with all possible speed. The lessons of the present militia mobilization with its incompleteness of equipment, its shortages in all directions, extending to the present moment in many

things, in the matter of clothing, shortages in artillery, shortages in various directions, all indicating the need of a systematic and well-thought-out preparation, and that without delay.

Senator BRADY. I think the people of the Nation are very generally agreed upon that fact.

Gen. WOOD. We must not only train our young men for military service, but we must organize the industries of the country so that each will be ready to play its part. We must encourage, rather than discourage, the production of arms and munitions by private concerns.

Senator. BRADY. If we adopt this method what will become of your Regular Army? Will you be constantly changing?

Gen. WOOD. I am glad you asked that question. There are always a certain number of men who love the profession of arms and the life of the soldier. The moment all men in the country receive training the number of this class of men will be increased. There will be less prejudice against the professional soldier. The uniform will mean something because the richest man in the Nation will wear it as well as the poorest, and out of the millions who have had training there will be plenty of good men for the Regular Army—men who will be glad to follow the flag and the life of the soldier, for to many it is extremely interesting. The uniform will then be honored and respected in this country as it is not at present.

We shall have no difficulty in maintaining a sufficient Regular Army for over-sea work and have a training nucleus at home. Once this system of general training is in force, I do not think we shall have trouble forced upon us by any foreign nation. If we should have trouble, we shall have a system adequate to meet it, and meet it promptly and effectively.

Just how large the Regular Army in the home land will have to be, no one can tell. But, as our reserve of trained citizen soldiery increases and our organization of these men improves, we shall be able to reduce within reasonable limits the Regular Establishment within the continental United States. In other words, when the citizen population is trained to arms, the Regular force can be reduced. It must be remembered, however, that it will always be necessary to have a considerable Regular force for an expeditionary force and as a training nucleus.

The Regular Army will always be needed for over-sea service. Even France and Germany have regular colonial troops. We could not well afford to move garrisons back and forth from the over-sea possessions every year. Again, troops would hardly become familiar with the new and often strange conditions before they would have to return.

Senator BRADY. That is the very point I wanted to have you cover, and you have covered it very fully. But, speaking of the Regular Army, let us suppose we take the standard you suggested—250,000 men——

Gen. WOOD. I think that is a conservative estimate; certainly for the present.

Senator BRADY. Your thought would be that we should keep a Regular standing army of 250,000 men, and those men should come in for six months and go out—they would be coming and going all the time.

Gen. WOOD. Not in the Regular Army. Men in the Regular Army would be enrolled for a definite period, say for two or three years, with a reasonable opportunity to secure their discharge in case of necessity.

There would be a yearly change of most of the personnel in the citizen force in training.

Let us assume that we are boys of 19 and are going to take our training this year, beginning the first of May, because we want our six months during the good weather season, as the life is to be in camp and all our time devoted to intensive training. We receive six months of intensive training and then return to our homes. On July 1 of the year in which we become 21 we report to the regiment or other organization to which we have been assigned. It will necessarily be an organization of the arm for which our training has fitted us.

We receive from 20 to 30 days, preferably 30, of intensive training—a course of repetition. We remain in the regiment or organization until the 30th of June of the following year, the year in which we become 22. We then pass into that portion of the first line or first group of citizen soldiery which includes all men up to their 29th year. During this year of service we will assume that we are living in New York and have been assigned to the Seventh Federal Reserve Regiment with headquarters in the armory of the present Seventh Regiment.

On the 1st day of July we report to the adjutant of the regiment for duty, and when the regiments assemble we proceed to the designated training camp for 30 days of intensive training. We then return to our homes, which are in the immediate vicinity, in New York City. The regiment is fully officered and equipped and maintained at full war strength. If anything occurs during the year of our active service, we go. If our year of service passes without any call, the class of the following year takes our place. We have discharged our obligations. In case of a serious emergency, possibly requiring additional men, our class might be held for an additional year, and it, with the class coming after, would give us 1,000,000 men organized and ready. In other words, there will always be 500,000 men ready for an immediate call. More can be held if necessary. Men during their year of service will not be living in uniforms, but will be members of an organized and equipped force. They will follow their ordinary occupations, as do the men and officers of the militia to-day, the difference being that instead of having scattering drills at night and a few days of hasty instruction in camp, the organizations will be made up of men who have had six months of intensive training, followed by a month of intensive work beginning with their year of service. We have known for years that we were going to serve in our twenty-first year, and both we and our employers have made arrangements to that end. The organizations will be made up of young men who are at their physical best, and at the same time charged with the minimum of domestic and business responsibility. Our plans and arrangements have been made with the understanding that this is our year of obligation for service with the colors. It will prevent the repetition of conditions such as exist to-day, where men of all ages up to the legal limit, many of them

with most important business affairs, have been called for service. The result has been ruinous to many. The burden has been inequitably distributed, and the personnel of the organizations has not been of the best for war service.

Senator Brady. You have been speaking of the reserve.

Gen. Wood. Well, call it what you will. It will be a citizen army behind the Regular Army.

Senator Brady. Would we or not have a regular standing Army of 250,000 all the time?

Gen. Wood. Yes; and I will tell you about how they will be distributed. You will have approximately 20,000 in the Philippines. This should be necessary as long as we hold the islands; approximately 24,000 in the Hawaiian Islands. These islands are the key to the Pacific so far as we are concerned and must be held. They are also one of the most important defenses of the Pacific coast and the Panama Canal. In Panama, when the garrison is completed, we shall have a force of about 20,000. There should also be a regiment in Alaska, or approximately 64,000 or 65,000 men outside the country. The Alaska garrison is more for the purpose of maintaining order than anything else. It would not be adequate for the defense of the Territory. When conditions are more established public order should be maintained by a constabulary operating on the lines of the Canadian mounted police When we decide on the garrisoning of the country, we shall have to put in a force amounting probably to a division. This would bring the force outside the country up to about 80,000 men, of which we need consider only 65,000 at the present time. Assuming that 65,000 are outside the country, we will have left in the United States 185,000 men, of whom some 30,000 will be required in seacoast defenses. The balance will consist of the mobile army—Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, and auxiliary troops, Signal troops, Engineers, etc. All of this force for a time at least will be needed as a training force. As I have stated above, it may be possible to somewhat reduce it when we have our system of citizen training in full operation. For instance, Coast Artillery personnel will probably be greatly reduced, keeping only that portion in permanent service which represents the highly trained technical elements; the balance being filled up from each class of the citizen soldiery during its year of service. Generally speaking, however, the regular force should consist of long-service men. Under this arrangement you have your Regular Army of, say, 180,000 to 185,000 men, and back of it your citizen force of 500,000, and back of this the balance of the first-line citizen force of over 3,000,000. In other words, we would always have ready within the United States a force sufficient to meet promptly the first attack. At least 2,000,000 of the remaining first-group men should be assigned to skeleton organizations duly officered, so that they can be quickly mobilized and brought into shape in case of need. The balance of the first-line men would form a reserve with which to fill up organizations and make good the wastages and losses of war. Arms and equipment for the entire first-line group, from three and one-half to four millions of men, must be always ready, and the Officers' Reserve Corps must be sufficient to officer at once not less than two and one-half millions.

Senator BRADY. That is a very satisfactory and interesting explanation, but the point I really wanted to have you make a little clearer to me is who would constitute the brigades and regiments that you have been discussing?

Gen. WOOD. They will be made up of professional soldiers—the men who are following the career of arms because they love it. Right here I should like to say that the pay of the soldier is a good deal larger than it appears to be. The pay on enlistments is $15 a month. It runs up now to $99 a month for the master signal electrician. With this goes clothing allowance amply sufficient for the man; food, shelter, transportation on all official business; medical attendance and a pension if disabled in the service; also retired pay after 30 years of service.

So you will see, sir, that the money value is only a portion of what the man receives.

Senator BRADY. And it would not be the those who are going in for this intensive training for six months?

Gen. WOOD. No, sir; you might be able to use some of these men for the Coast Artillery troops and possibly some with the units of the standing Army on duty within the continental limits of the United States, but I should rather doubt the advisability of this being done to any considerable extent.

Senator BRADY. That is a point that I think you would do well to make very plain, because I do not believe the people generally understand it. The point is this, that the men who enlist for this six months intensive training are not compelled to be permanent soldiers or make their lives the profession of a soldier unless they want to.

Gen. WOOD. That is right.

Senator BRADY. But they have the privilege of doing that if they do wish to do it?

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir; on the general lines which I have already explained. It might be that we should find it advisable, after we had sent through a number of classes and had a reasonable reserve of trained men, to permit men during their year of obligatory service to enlist in the Regular Establishment within the limits of the continental United States under a one-year enlistment. These are matters of detail which would have to be worked out once the system is in effect. Generally speaking, the men who make up the regular organizations should be regulars serving under an enlistment of several years with the present privileges of furlough to a regular reserve if they desired after a year's service. They would be liable for service, as would any other citizen, during a certain period of their lives, but inasmuch while serving in the Regular Army they give up their entire time and energy to the service of the Government and are at all times on duty, they should, of course, be paid. The average citizen soldier, excepting the brief period of training, is allowed to pursue his regular business. The Regular gives all his time to the Government, and is not allowed to engage in any business, and is liable to be sent anywhere at any time. The citizen soldier will only be paid for periods when he is actually under arms (on duty requiring all his time).

Senator BRADY. In my judgment it is a very important question.

Gen. WOOD. Yes. I think you can assume with perfect safety when we have a large trained reserve, a citizen army in being, we

can somewhat reduce our Regular Army at home. In some of the arms a considerable proportion of the men can be very quickly trained. Take the Coast Artillery, for instance. A certain percentage of the personnel must have a high degree of technical training. Perhaps 60 per cent of it could be replaced by men of short training. They are the men who handle the shot, bring out the powder—do the heavy work that does not require a high degree of technical skill. All these places can easily be filled from the citizen soldiery. In the citizen soldiery will be found men of high intelligence for special equipment for Coast Artillery work; also service in the auxiliary troops, such as troops of the Signal Corps, Engineers, etc. It may be possible to carry a certain proportion of these men in the organizations of the mobile army, but as this force must be held always ready for expeditionary work as well as for training, I do not believe the replacements in this portion of the force will be very large—perhaps 25 per cent of full war strength. Switzerland carries this skeletonizing of the regular organization to the extreme. In fact, practically all that is maintained constantly in service is a corps of officers and a very small body of troops, the balance of the organizations being filled up from the class of the trained citizen soldiery. We shall have to feel our way along gradually and see to just what extent we can carry the filling up of our regular regiments with the citizen soldiers during their one-year period with the colors. I doubt the wisdom of this measure, except in a very limited way.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything further you desire to say, General?

Gen. WOOD. I think that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. We are very much obliged to you for appearing before us.

Gen. WOOD. I regard this whole question of national preparedness as one of such vital importance that anything I can do I shall always be glad to do.

Senator BRADY. I hope we shall have the advantage of further information from you, General.

Gen. WOOD. I shall be very glad to fill out my answers as fully as I can. I think the important thing is to accept the basic idea of universal training of some sort. It will be easy enough to work out the details.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Wadsworth is present. Senator, do you desire to ask any questions?

Senator WADSWORTH. I was going to ask, General, if it is not your opinion that no matter under what system or name it was organized, any volunteer system of recruiting in time of peace will fail in aiding the reserve force that would be available.

Gen. WOOD. Absolutely. The volunteer system can not be depended on. It is a system which will not give us either trained officers or men. It leaves everything until the moment of war. It puts the burden upon the best portion of the population. It is not only undependable but it is undemocratic.

Senator WADSWORTH. If I may interpose this remark—so much has been said about the failure of the federalization of the National Guard, or rather that the federalization of the National Guard is responsible for the evident defects, my suggestion being that no matter whether they had been National Guard or Continental Army or Federal volunteers, the same defect would be very apt to appear.

Gen. WOOD. The volunteer system would fail us, judging from the experience we have had. In the Revolutionary War we had 89,000 men in 1776; 42,000 Militia and 47,000 Continentals, or short-term regulars. In every succeeding year of that war there was a smaller force with the colors.

Senator THOMAS. You mean 1776?

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir; in 1776. Every year of that war the number of men with the colors diminished, and in 1781, although bounties were worth in land and money as much as $1,200 per man, and Rhode Island had offered freedom to the negroes if they would enlist, the Government was able to secure only 29,400 men. This had been the effect of the volunteer system. Public interest had gradually diminished. During the entire war we put in the field 396,000 men, and yet, on no single day were there 20,000 well-instructed troops available on any field of battle. Such is the history of the volunteer system in the Revolution. The response was what Washington predicted it would be. As the excitement of the early days of the struggle passed away, interest diminished.

In the War of 1812–1814 we followed the same haphazard lack of system and policy. We had short-term volunteers, bounties and subsidies, and, as you know, few successes on land. We had enough troops to have carried out our mission to the North, but, owing to our defective system, we had hard work to hold what we had. The largest British regular force in the war at any time was 16,800. We put into this war 527,000 men.

The Mexican War was a war with a weak people. We were successful, but it was not a war with an organized and prepared nation. Again, we had our troops far enough away from home and long enough in hand to give them reasonable training. A relatively small number of troops were employed and a very small proportion of them were militia. You all remember what happened to Gen. Scott at a critical stage of the campaign. He had some eleven regiments of volunteers. The enlistment period of seven of them expired. They were given an opportunity to reenlist or go home. They went home, and he remained there with a handful of troops to await reinforcements.

In the Civil War the South went to the draft the 19th of April, 1862, a year after the war began. The North followed with the draft order of August, 1862. This was accompanied by riots in various States, and we had to send troops to New York to regain possession of the State. With the draft went the bounty and that most damnable of all practices, the purchase of substitutes. According to Charles Francis Adams, we had something over 504,000 desertions out of a total of 2,763,000 enlistments. There were many professional bounty jumpers, some with records of successful bounty jumping covering years. I doubt if anywhere has desertion been more rampant than among the certain class of men who were in the service during the Civil War. Hundreds of thousands of good men responded, and it was their example and their character which carried the war through to a successful finish. We fought a people as unprepared as ourselves. It was almost two years before the outlines of well-organized and well-led armies appeared. It was nearly nine months after the battle of Bull Run before operations of importance followed in the East. We were unorganized. We scrambled through the war and eventually

built up a good Army, and at the end of it were for once, and only once in our history, organized and prepared for war.

In the 1898 campaign (the Spanish War) we did not fill our complement, as you know, and in this mobilization the militia from the Eastern Department is about 35 per cent under strength—short of the full quota. I presume it is about the same in other departments. The Regular Army is short of men. We are unable to fill either one of them up. Organizations are without the necessary equipment. No soldier could hope for success with organizations of this kind if confronted by good troops. We are confronted squarely with the question of preparedness. Just ask a soldier what would happen if we had to meet a well-trained enemy. You can imagine what would have happened in the War with Spain if that country had been a strong, well-organized power.

Our military preparedness must be founded upon a sense of individual obligation for service—upon universal service. The weak point in our military system is that we have depended upon militia. We have trusted to militia and volunteers. We have never yet been called upon to meet promptly a thoroughly equipped and well-organized force. If we had had this experience, we should long ago have abandoned these systems, which are wholly undependable under conditions of modern preparedness and organization and will not give us a force adequate in quality or promptly available. Dependence upon these systems means a wanton waste of life and treasure.

In conclusion, I wish to emphasize the necessity of prompt preparation of an adequate force of trained men with the necessary arms, equipment, and supplies for 4,000,000 men. In my opinion, there is nothing of more vital importance than that we should take measures to this end and take them immediately. We are absolutely unprepared in artillery guns and ammunition for war and will continue to be so for many years under present rate of progress. There is a more or less general misconception of the idea of the universal military training. Many appear to believe that it means large numbers of men standing in uniform—an enormous standing army. It means quite the reverse. It means the maximum number of men trained so that they may be efficient soldiers if needed. Its effect, when the system is in full operation, will be a relatively small force under arms but an enormous force of men available in case of necessity—men who are following their normal occupations but with the necessary training to be efficient soldiers if needed. Our population is increasing rapidly, and by the time the system is in effect the first line group, the men from 21 to 28 inclusive, will number, when trained, at least 4,000,000 of men. The second line group or class, to include the men from 29 to 38 inclusive, and the third line group, the men from 39 to 45. It is probable that when the system shall have been in effect long enough to reach the men of 45 that our population will be in the neighborhood of at least 120 millions. The number of men who have been trained will be very large, perhaps 17 or 18 millions. It is highly improbable that all this force should ever be called to the colors, but whether they are called to the colors or not, the training will have been of great value from every standpoint: economic, moral, and from that of good citizenship, which means national efficiency. A condition of real preparedness will have been created. The best possible insurance of

peace will have been secured. The probability of having to take up arms will be diminished directly in proportion as we are trained to do so effectively. This training will be a tremendous influence in building up a spirit of national solidarity.

I have not gone into the details of providing and assigning officers. These are details which should be left to Regulations to be promulgated by the President through the Secretary of War as the interests of the situation develop. Officers will be trained for the lower grades through the period of intensive training and subsequent periods of training. At least four millions of men will always be available, men who have had comparatively recent training, and back of them will come the men of the second and third line groups—men who have had the basic training, a training which they never will forget. In case of a struggle for national existence these men would, of course, receive a short period of training after mobilization. The vitally important thing is to commence the training of those of military age at once. Gradually we can work out the details of putting into effect a system which will reach down to and include the youth of 12 and upward for physical training. This is vitally important for the well-being of our people. These youngsters should also have a certain amount of military training, such as rifle shooting, map reading, and elementary military drill prior to the time they become liable to the period of intensive training. We shall find, undoubtedly, that this system will permit the intensive period of training to be somewhat diminished—diminished in accordance with the work each individual has done, but under no circumstances should it be diminished by more than three months. It will perhaps be necessary to arrange certain limited exemptions, incident to temporary illness or unavoidable absence. But these are matters of detail which should be handled by Regulations and not embodied in the universal service law.

I shall take advantage of your request to fill out the testimony as much as possible, including a statement of the probable cost of the system of universal training if applied on the lines above indicated. I will also embody an analysis of the two bills—the Chamberlain bill and the so-called Moseley draft.

Senator THOMAS. I move the committee do now adjourn.

(The motion was agreed to, and at 3.30 o'clock p. m. the committee adjourned until to-morrow morning, Tuesday, January 19, 1916, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

# UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING.

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 31, 1917.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
*Washington, D. C.*

The subcommittee met at 10.30 a. m., Senator George E. Chamberlain (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Thomas, Brady, the members of the subcommittee, and Lee of Maryland, and Hughes.

## STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. LEONARD WOOD, UNITED STATES ARMY.

The CHAIRMAN. Gen. Wood, the committee has called you back at the request of Senator Lee of Maryland, who wanted to interrogate you in reference to your testimony heretofore, or possibly in reference to the subject of the National Guard and the Regular Army; he is not limited in his examination. We shall be glad, Senator, to have you go ahead in any way that you see fit.

Senator BRADY. Would it not be well to have Senator Lee outline the scope of the questions he desires to ask Gen. Wood?

Senator LEE of Maryland. It would be very difficult for me to do that, Mr. Chairman. I think I had better simply go ahead with what I have here.

Senator BRADY. What I was thinking, Senator, was that you have probably got some definite idea as to what portion of his former testimony you wanted to ask him about, and also as to whether or not you have in mind bringing up some new matter. That is, I would like to know, if you can state, whether or not you expect to confine yourself to his former testimony, or whether you thought of bringing up some new subject to consider.

Senator LEE of Maryland. I can very readily state that I will have to go outside of the strict words of his former testimony, for the reason that although the general dealt with two subjects mainly, yet there are subjects that cover a pretty wide field in their collateral bearing. The general sketched a very large Army that he had in mind, some four millions of men, and then he stated in very terse language that the National Guard was a failure, and he proceeded along those lines.

Senator BRADY. I see your position. Mr. Chairman, I think it would be well to let Senator Lee proceed along his own lines.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator LEE of Maryland. General, Mayor Mitchel's committee has made a report unfriendly to the National Guard system, but in

the course of that report it makes the following quotation from the major general commanding the National Guard of New York:

It would be difficult for the most cunning mind to develop a scheme better calculated to create confusion, friction, indecision, and disorganization at a time of national stress.

The committee then goes on to say:

The prediction he then made as to the details of this confusion and disorganization presents a remarkably accurate picture of what actually did take place last June.

This refers, of course, to the mobilization of the National Guard. You were in command of that mobilization so far as the Department of the East was concerned, were you not, General?

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Gen. O'Ryan alluded to the whole business, including the relationship of the War Department to the mobilization. Do you agree with the general summary that the arrangement from the standpoint of the War Department was calculated to create confusion, friction, indecision, and disorganization at a time of national stress?

Gen. WOOD. Senator, may I ask what particular portion of the arrangement he referred to? Was he not discussing the storage of supplies?

Senator LEE of Maryland. I could not tell you that he was discussing that only. This is a general statement. I do not know what it is connected with.

Gen. WOOD. I do not, either. First, I wish to correct a statement of Senator Lee's to the effect that I recommended an Army of 4,000,000 men. No such recommendation has been made by me. What the Senator refers to is, I think, the total of men between the ages of 20 and 29, who, I said, would be available in case we had general training. Returning to Gen. Ryan's statement, I shall be very glad to make a general statement. I think, sir, that he was referring to the method of storing supplies at convenient central points.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Was there no confusion, friction, indecision, or disorganization in connection with anything except the distribution of supplies?

Gen. WOOD. There was; not friction, but a good deal of delay and a good deal of confusion.

Senator LEE of Maryland. From the standpoint of the War Department?

Gen. WOOD. There was no friction, but there was much delay. The delay was in part incident to the storage of supplies for an immense area at one central point. This mistake was fundamental, and caused delay in supplies and consequent confusion. The War Department did what it could to correct the faulty policy and to minimize delay once mobilization was ordered. It could not overcome the handicap incident to the method of storage and the failure to establish proper relations between the department commanders and the militia in time of peace. Perhaps, if I make a short statement, it will give you a line of questions and will clear up somewhat the remarks of the mayor's committee. That report has been sent me, but I have not as yet read it. I have it, I think, with me, but I have not had time to read it.

For a long time a number of officers have urged the storage of supplies for the Militia; and under "supplies" I mean clothing, arms, equipment, and everything necessary to equip the men needed to bring the Militia from peace to war strength.

Senator LEE of Maryland. May I interrupt you there?

Gen. WOOD. Certainly.

Senator LEE of Maryland. You recommended, in testimony last year before the House committee, the distribution of those supplies yourself?

Gen. WOOD. I did, sir.

Senator LEE of Maryland. To make it easy to further distribute them in an emergency and to protect them from fire?

Gen. WOOD. That is right. It was recommended that they be stored, when storage was available, in fireproof rooms in armories belonging to the organizations for which they were intended and held under the control of the inspector instructor assigned to that organization. This would have made supplies immediately available. Where such storage was not available it was recommended that they be stored at the nearest military post, arsenal, or depot; the idea being to avoid just what did happen—a very great unnecessary delay in getting supplies out.

This recommendation was not approved. For instance, the great bulk of the supplies for the Eastern Department, which has 56 and a fraction per cent of the militia of the whole United States within its limits, were stored at the quartermaster's depot in Philadelphia. The problem which presented itself on the 18th of June was the distribution simultaneously of that material to organizations called out simultaneously, including those from Alabama to Maine. Of course, it was impossible to supply or equip them simultaneously, and there was delay—a very great amount of delay—in getting the equipment to many of the organizations, and that delay was largely due to adhering to this centralized system of storage of material.

So much for the delay in getting out supplies. But, as a matter of fact, Senator, that would not have expedited the movement of the troops, because the organizations, almost without exceptions, in some States, were below the minimum peace strength. I am not saying it was not a fatally defective system, assuming that we were ready to move the troops, but the greatest delay was due to filling up these regiments. You know that throughout the department as a whole we lost, in round numbers, 30 per cent of the men, either because they failed to report or were dropped by the governors between the call and the mobilization, or because they were physically defective; and it was the filling up to minimum peace strength or above which held some organizations for several weeks. Of course, we were directed to fill them to war strength—nineteen hundred and odd for the Infantry. This we were unable to do in any instance, and in our efforts to get them up even to peace strength occurred the principal delay. But Senator Lee is quite right in assuming that, had these troops been ready, from the standpoint that the personnel was ready to move, the method of storage of supplies would have caused a very great delay, as regards the larger portion of them.

Senator LEE of Maryland. General, I will revert a little later to that loss of 30 per cent by physical examinations, etc. Meantime I

would like to ask you if you can not give us some incident or cause of confusion arising from the standpoint of the War Department's management in addition to the distribution of equipment. For instance, I was here the other day, and the major general commanding the militia of New York was testifying, and I heard him say that the War Department ordered all these New York commands—some 18,000 of them—to a central camp to be equipped, and that that, in his judgment, was a serious mistake; that the equipment should be sent to these commands where they were, in their armories, etc., and that he appealed to you and you appealed to the War Department and had that changed. Is that so?

Gen. WOOD. Not exactly, sir. Gen. O'Ryan recommended the mobilization camp—a good tract of land with a suitable country roundabout. Water had to be installed, and some difficulty was found, instant to the single line of railroad. This caused us some difficulty getting supplies in and out. I have no doubt he did apply to me to have supplies necessary to equip the troops sent to the different organizations, but this was not done, for the reasons which I have already explained, namely, the War Department had disapproved the plan. Practically all supplies were at one central place, the Philadelphia depot. Gen. O'Ryan had selected a concentration camp, and many of the New York troops were ordered there. Of course, then, the only thing to do was to send this somewhat belated material to that concentration camp as fast as it could be shipped to us. It would have been no use to have sent it to the armory and then had it transshipped to camp. The mistake made in the selection of the camp, I think, was quite a natural one; I am not disposed to criticize Gen. O'Ryan for that. It looked like a very good site. There was some difficulty in getting supplies in and out over a single railroad; but none of those things, Senator, caused essential delay in the movement of the New York troops. Supplies were slow in arriving, but other causes delayed the movements of the troops to the front. The delay in the arrival of supplies was due to the fact that they were all at one central point, and shipments were being attempted to 22 States and the District of Columbia at the same time. It was a physical impossibility to get them out of the warehouse.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Then, as it was managed, it had to be all gotten out of one warehouse and sent to another warehouse in New York, or a central camp, and then distributed?

Gen. WOOD. There was no warehouse there, Senator. It was simply put under canvas and distributed immediately to the organizations.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Was there not an actual shortage of quartermaster's supplies?

Gen. WOOD. The quartermaster's supplies were painfully short after the eighth or tenth day. That department collapsed very promptly after that, so far as prompt effective supply of troops was concerned.

I shall insert a few telegrams in the hearings which illustrate this. These are sample telegrams and show the general conditions of supply and need of distribution of reserve supplies and equipment near troops.

CAMP KANAWHA, CHARLESTON, W. VA. *June 28, 1916.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL, EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Governors Island, N. Y.:*

Shoes of entire command absolutely unsuitable. I suggested purchase of shoes in local shoe stores sufficient to give each man mustered in one serviceable pair to enter the field.

WALLACE, *Major.*

---

CAMP KANAWHA, CHARLESTON, W. VA. *June 28, 1916.*

COMMANDING GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE EAST,
*Governors Island, N. Y.:*

No proper marching shoes nor marching socks (light wool) in this entire camp, except in case of officers. About 7 per cent of rifles on hand show muzzles enlarged to point of unserviceability. Tentage good; wagons and harness new or nearly new; clothing fair; other equipment not checked yet.

SKERRETT, *Special Inspector.*

---

CAMP HOLCOMB, NIANTIC, CONN., *June 28, 1916.*

COMMANDING GENERAL, EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Governors Island, N. Y.:*

Urge that you hurry arms, equipment, and all ordnance and quartermaster property required for 1,000 infantry now at mobilization camp without clothing and equipment of any kind; also must have 600 each: Coats, breeches, and leggins, 1,000 hats, 1,200 blankets, and 1,000 meat cans, cups, knives, forks, and spoons, for the Field Artillery. Will also want slickers for them. Have tentage for infantry and artillry and sufficient blankets for infantry now in camp, but no blankets for artillery. Please hurry shipment.

COLE.

---

JACKSON, MISS., *July 2, 1916.*

COMMANDING GENERAL EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Governors Island, N. Y.:*

Regiment not at present organized, armed, and equipped for field service. Clothing and equipment in most of organizations in very bad condition; rifles practically unserviceable. Practically all enlisted men are recruits. In my opinion at least 10 days before regiment should move.

DONALDSON.

---

NASHVILLE, TENN., *June 30, 1916.*

COMMANDING GENERAL EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Governors Island, N. Y.:*

No reply to my request for authority for emergency purchase for 700 bed sacks. Recruits are arriving. We would like authority to purchase 800 bed sacks. Men are sleeping on ground; are without cots, blankets, ponchos, or tentage. Answer.

SPENCE, *Camp Commander.*

---

RICHMOND, VA., *July 3, 1916.*

COMMANDING GENERAL EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Governors Island, N. Y.:*

Service hats received were of very small sizes. Request that the following be shipped immediately: 300 size 7, 200 size 7⅛, 50 size 7¼, 50 size 6¾. Request instructions to ship 1,000 hats sizes 6¾ and 6⅞ to some place where they may be of some use.

J. B. BELLINGER,
*Colonel, Quartermaster Corps.*

---

RICHMOND, VA., *June 30, 1916.*

COMMANDING GENERAL EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Governors Island, N. Y.:*

Physical examinations nearly completed. One Infantry Regiment nearly mustered, another in progress. Equipment now on hand except machine-gun

companies and 1,500 cots. Clothing on hand except 6,000 pairs socks, 4,000 drawers and undershirts, 4,000 shoes. Above excludes Cavalry. Nothing can move inside of five days.

SKIRRETT, *Special Inspector.*

---

MONTGOMERY, ALA., *July 24, 1916.*

COMMANDING GENERAL EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Governors Island, N. Y.:*

Recommend the following articles be shipped as soon as possible in order to more completely equip troops at this camp: 48 bags water sterilizing, 2,400 cots, 4,500 mosquito bars, 150 tents (pyramidal, large), 45 escort wagons. If practicable, more escort wagons can be issued to troops on arrival at destination, as they are not needed at this camp.

SCREWS.

---

MONTGOMERY, ALA., *August 28, 1916.*

COMMANDING GENERAL EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Governors Island, N. Y.:*

Tripods for pyramidal tents, target, and tent pins have not been received. Request instructions be issued to rush tripod and tent pins; same were requisitioned for June 24 and July 22.

SCREWS.

---

MONTGOMERY, ALA., *August 31, 1916.*

COMMANDING GENERAL EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Governors Island, N. Y.:*

Cots requisitioned for June 24 and July 22 needed badly at this camp. Two thousand cots will take care of present needs.

SCREWS.

---

EXTRACT COPY OF TELEGRAM REPORTING DEPARTURE OF ALABAMA CAVALRY.

MONTGOMERY, ALA., *December 9, 1916.*

COMMANDING GENERAL EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Governors Island, N. Y.:*

First Cavalry and hospital detachment National Guard, Alabama, departed from mobilization camp December 9, 1916. Short 2,200 caliber .30 ammunition; short 3,500 caliber .38 ammunition. Organizations have no horses, no wagon transportation, no mules.

KAEMFER.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Was there not considerable difficulty in securing a certain class of blank forms which were necessary?

Gen. WOOD. There were delays in that respect; yes, sir. All those defects of the system are very apparent. But the point to be emphasized, I think, is that even if the War Department had been properly organized and ready to handle this mobilization, the regiments were not full and the men were not trained, and even if we had delivered them their equipment in 24 hours we should have still had organizations only 20 per cent trained and absolutely unready for field service.

The shortage of blank forms was due partially to an inadequate suuply, partially to delay in the mails, and partially to the fact that many were spoiled by the militia. I shall insert sample telegrams relating to this subject.

CAMP WHITMAN, GREENHAVEN, N. Y., *June 30, 1916.*

The ADJUTANT,
*Governors Island, N. Y.:*

Request that militia organizations here be supplied immediately with books and blanks for regimental and company administration after muster in. None are on hand.

TOWNSEND, *Mustering Officer.*

RICHMOND, VA., *July 3, 1916.*

CHIEF MUSTERING OFFICER EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Governors Island, N. Y.:*

Many muster rolls and forms spoiled comma request sixty muster rolls for three comma one hundred forms on comma sixty detachment muster in rolls form four comma twelve field comma staff and band form five comma thirty muster in rolls individual officers form twelve.

A. M. SHIPP.

Senator LEE of Maryland. General, is it not a fundamental mistake to hold the citizen soldiers, whose contribution to the defense of the country was voluntary, to as high a degree of responsibility as you would professional soldiers or the War Department?

Gen. WOOD. I do not think any of us have, Senator, who have handled this feature of the situation intelligently and fairly. I have always made one very general statement, and if it meets the committee's approval, in order to indicate the character of the statement, I would like to introduce in this hearing extracts from several public addresses on this question of the militia made months ago, to show just what my attitude as an officer of the Army has been toward the whole matter.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, they may be included.

Gen. WOOD. They show my attitude. I have always said this about the militia: That the men were entitled to the highest credit for their individual sacrifice of time and money and vacation; that there was no criticism whatever to be made of officers or men as individuals, from the physical, moral, or any other standpoint; that we were attacking a vicious, undependable system, and not attacking the men who have, with the best of intentions, come under its influence. This is the whole thing in a nutshell. I have not a word of criticism of the officers and men. They have done all that men could do under a bad system.

PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.

[Delivered by Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood, United States Army, before the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York Mar. 22, 1916.]

It does not seem to me that any argument is needed to convince men of ordinary intelligence that under the new conditions preparation is more important than ever before. It seems almost an insult to have to tell intelligent men these things. They are self-evident to the most casual student of affairs. If any of you gentlemen will sit down and consider carefully and thoughtfully the problem which would confront the United States in case of hostilities, the great problem of defense, and attempt to solve it, I think the need of action will be brought home to you very quickly. The dangers of the situation and the need of thorough organization and preparation are clearly evident to every one who has given this matter even the most superficial consideration.

Such weapons as the Federal Government has must be its weapons and not the weapons of any State, nor under even a limited degree of State control. Those who know the militia and understand and appreciate the handicaps under which it labors realize that it has done all that could be expected under a fatally defective system, a system which makes a high degree of efficiency absolutely impossible. The officers and men are good. The Regular Army to-day, put under administrative control of 48 different governors, would soon cease to be a dependable force. The militia should be transferred absolutely to Federal control. Attempts to continue control by the States and provide control by the Federal Government in time of emergency through dual oaths of enlistment will not, in my opinion, accomplish what we desire, which is a militia which is Federal, whose control is vested absolutely in the Federal Government, and whose instruction, discipline, and personnel are Federal and not

State matters. In time of emergency we want men and not lawsuits. We want a weapon which is certain and dependable. In my opinion, not less than 90 per cent, and perhaps more, of the personnel of the militia want to establish such a condition as I have outlined above. They desire earnestly to be Federal soldiers.

I have just returned from Texas, and I found everywhere among the militia a strong sentiment for transfer to Federal control. We must have a Regular Army adequate for the peace needs of the Nation, which includes the garrisoning our over-sea possessions, an adequate mobile force at home and adequate coast artillery for our seacoast defenses. We must also have an absolutely first-class Navy, ready at all times for immediate and effective action. It must have all the elements required by a great fleet.

Gentlemen, to accomplish these ends requires time. Time is a great and determining element. The fact that we have unlimited resources in the way of men and money is an assurance only to those who do not understand that neither men nor money are of much value without time for organization and preparation. Our condition is understood thoroughly by all nations. Generally speaking, it is more thoroughly understood by the intelligent observers of foreign nations than it is by the people of this great Republic.

[Engineers, Brooklyn National Electric Light Association, March, 1916.]

THE MILITIA.

We must also maintain small garrisons in Alaska and Porto Rico. Alaska is a tremendously rich country, and we are just beginning to know something of its resources. These over-sea garrisons will amount to something like 60,000 men. We have a relatively small number of men in the United States. The mobile army amounts to about 31,000. About 13,000 or 14,000 comprise our Coast Artillery. These are roughly the total line forces within the United States. Our Regular Army must be maintained in the highest condition of efficiency, well supplied, and thoroughly equipped. There must be reserves of men and material. We need many more officers. We need at least 1,200 additional Regular officers to work with the militia, schools, and colleges as instructors.

The National Guard has accomplished about all that officers and men can accomplish under a defective system. It is the system that is at fault and not the officers and men. The officers and men have done creditable work, but are working under a system which renders efficiency impossible. There are 128,000 men in the National Guard in the entire country, and it is very complimentary to say that 60,000 could be gotten out in 30 days in efficient condition. They are under 48 commanders, governors of States, who exercise complete and full authority over the guard. The men of the guard are good, the governors are good, but the system unworkable. If you should take the Regular Army and put it under 48 commanders, it would go to pieces very quickly.

Those of us who are actively interested and have made a study of the question know that the correct solution would be to have them under Federal control, and we are recommending and urging a complete and absolute transfer of the militia to the National Government. We do not want to lose these men and officers; we believe they should come into the national service.

Senator LEE of Maryland. General, how long has it been your opinion, or have you given expression to the idea, that this was a vicious and undependable system? Did you have that opinion when you were Chief of Staff?

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir; I think I can show you that very conclusively.

Senator LEE of Maryland. You did not express it for publication?

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir; very many times.

Senator LEE of Maryland. As Chief of Staff?

Gen. WOOD. As Chief of Staff. You will find it running all through my talks at college commencements, etc., on military train-

ing. You will find it is never a criticism of the men; you will find an equally strong criticism of the volunteer system. And you will find the strongest support of these opinions among the veterans of the Grand Army who have had war service. They all recognize the defects of these systems; they mean untrained men and officers when war comes.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Can you state whether that opinion was held by your successor as Chief of Staff?

Gen. WOOD. I could not speak for him, sir.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Is that opinion held by the present Chief of Staff, so far as you know?

Gen. WOOD. I do not feel authorized to speak for him, because I have never discussed this with him; but, judging from his public testimony here, I should say yes.

Senator LEE of Maryland. So the last three Chiefs of Staff, who have had to administer the National Guard law, looked upon it as a vicious and undependable system?

Gen. WOOD. Well, not vicious in the moral aspect, but vicious in its effect upon public safety. I think that is unquestionably so. It does not provide either an adequate defense or a dependable force.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Now, is it at all possible for the human nature, even the disciplined human nature, of an Army officer to fairly administer a law or a system which he looks upon as vicious and undependable?

Gen. WOOD. Yes. I think, sir, if you had been at our headquarters for the first 10 days in June you would have thought it was. We stayed there on an average of 19 hours a day, and some of us had our meals brought to the office. I assumed responsibility for the expenditure of somewhere from $700,000 to $800,000 in order to buy things for these men in open market and start them off with some absolutely necessary transport equipment—auto trucks, horses, and mules.

Senator LEE of Maryland. General, suppose that system was better than you thought, and that by enthusiastic support you could have improved it while you were Chief of Staff, was it not too late to put in work to improve the system after the call of the President?

Gen. WOOD. When I was Chief of Staff I did, I think, more in the way of giving the militia a chance, probably, than any other officer of the Army had attempted. I insisted—this sounds a little personal, perhaps, but I want to emphasize this so you will understand my situation very clearly—I insisted on Gen. O'Ryan's being admitted to the War College. It was not generally approved in the service. I wanted to give him a fair trial. We sent officers out to Leavenworth to take the course there.

The CHAIRMAN. Officers of the guard?

Gen. WOOD. Officers of the guard. You will find that at all the guard functions, which I attended, I always supported them strongly. I wanted to give them just what you are driving at, a very thorough trial, and I honestly believe we have given the system as fair a trial as any system ever had.

Senator LEE of Maryland. General, how can you say that, when the Dick law was in operation practically on the date of the mobilization, and the law of June 3, which the Militia Bureau says will make very material improvements, was not in practical and actual

operation at the time of the call? How can you say that they were given a fair trial, with all the defects that the Militia Bureau has pointed out in their report to be corrected by the present law?

Gen. WOOD. I am not speaking of the future. I am speaking of the things up to the time the mobilization was ordered, and am saying that we had given them every possible chance. I do not know what is going to happen next year.

Senator LEE of Maryland. You gave them all the chance you could under the old Dick law?

Gen. WOOD. Under the system then in force; yes.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Gen. Warfield, the present adjutant general of Maryland, tells me that adverse criticisms during the mobilization and since make it hard for the officers to maintain their organizations. He says that men are not reenlisting or taking the proper interest in the organizations when they read in the papers every day uncomplimentary remarks by the Regular officers. He goes on:

> My belief is that if the Army officers had given the National Guard the loyal support it deserved, and had held out the helping hand as they should have done, the men would be returning from the border with a feeling of satisfaction, and their patriotism not dampened.

My observation, General, has been that the Regular officers who were on the border—the younger men—cooperated very vigorously with the National Guard officers in increasing the discipline of the National Guard units. That is your impression, is it not?

Gen. WOOD. Everywhere; both on the border and at home. I insert here a few extracts from a letter of an officer on the border which shows what has been tried and what has been accomplished:

> Our troops here after six months training are, I should say, in pretty fair shape. Theye were in very poor shape generally when called out. They worked hard from colonels to privates, and a finer bunch of people I don't expect to see; but they are not an Army yet. The privates are O. K., not having so much to learn, but as you go further up the deficiencies become more and more apparent. The officers are not yet equal to their positions, and I don't see how they ever can be with the little instruction and practice they get at their home stations.
>
> We have had to rob the regular regiments of officers, sergeants, clerks, cooks, blacksmits, farriers, etc., in order to get the National Guard regiments in their present fairly good condition. Only a month ago a colonel had to be told that he could draw rations and forage for his regiments at a station other than his own when he was on a practice march. This is only an incident to show what simple matters are not known.
>
> * * * * * * *
>
> If we are to hold to the National Guard as defined by the defense act our Militia Bureau will have to change its plans materially. The troops arrived here absolutely ignorant of the simplest details of administration. I do not believe that 10 per cent of the companies had either an officer or man who knew how to make out a morning report, sick book, or ration return—all were ignorant of the handling of the rations, and in some companies men were assessed as much as $5 for the support of the mess. Articels of war were unheard of in some outfits, and Army Regulations an obscure mystery. Only yesterday I had to show a lieutenant colonel how to make out a survey report, and all the captains of a regiment how to make their returns of ordnance.
>
> * * * * * * *
>
> Of course, if this (two divisions?) goes into Mexico we will arrange somehow. But the fact remains, as I have stated above, so far as raising, organizing, training, and equipping this force, our salvation will be that the enemy is worse off than we are in all respects. He will have us skinned a mile on scouting and information.

Senator LEE of Maryland. But Capt. Burns, who testified here the other day, and other guardsmen who have been here, gave the impression that this support, which they had received from the line officers on the border, was not the characteristic of the War Department officers; that the guard felt that they had not been fairly treated by the War Department officers. Have you any remark to make on that?

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir; I have a very decided remark to make. The guard is coming home, not with its patriotism dampened, but is coming home a sadder and a wiser organization. They have learned the folly of the system. They had been drugged by unintelligent praise, misled by false statements, and led to believe that they really could promptly render effective service. Many of the men of the guard are not going to reenlist. Officers are resigning in large numbers and they are doing it, not because they are any less patriotic, but because they are intelligent enough to know that if they are to be real soldiers they must go to a sound system. They are not going to see the country betrayed by depending longer upon a broken reed. That is why the guard officers and men are resigning. I do not believe, sir, that you can locate a dozen instances where any man of standing and reputation will come out and say that he has not received cordial support from the officers of the Regular Army. If we had not given them cordial support, really nursed them into the field, helped them in every way, made out their papers, and done everything for them, many of them never would have gone. On the border, officers have been assigned, grade for grade, man for man, to militia companies (this is outside of my bailiwick, and I only speak from hearsay) to aid in instructing the militia. The Regular Army has given it as fair a chance, has helped it as loyally as any man here has ever aided any cause in his life, and any statement to the contrary is not a statement of the National Guard as a whole, nor does it represent the National Guard opinion, nor is it a statement of fact.

Now, I have dealt with over half of the guard of the country. We have had to send them and bring some of them back. We sent officers to live with them and muster them out. In many instances we have had to take their papers from the beginning of their enrollment in the Federal service and go over them all in order to get them out in good order. There is not a criticism to make of their spirit or intention, but they were not soldiers. They were often absolutely ignorant of their duties, and to have put them up against reasonably good troops would have been murder.

When the call came it was necessary to immediately purchase horses and mules for artillery and cavalry and for draft purposes in order that organizations might not arrive on the border absolutely immobile and helpless. From the few available regular officers in the department, boards were organized. These boards practically took over the entire matter of selecting and buying horses, branding them, and turning them over to the organizations. The officers purchased trucks and other needed elements of transportation. They worked continuously, night and day, without regard to hours. If their own reputation had depended upon the success of their efforts they could not have been more earnest or more vigorous. I wish

to emphasize this fact because any statement to the contrary is not only untrue but it is malicious.

Senator LEE of Maryland. General, you were in command of National Guard forces on July 26, 1916?

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir.

Senator LEE of Maryland. I saw in a local paper at that time a quotation from a speech of yours, which was delivered at Fort Terry on July 26, to the boys' training camp.

Gen. WOOD. I remember; you wrote me about it.

Senator LEE, of Maryland. It reads as follows:

> Now, we have had the militia system always. It has always been a failure, not because the men are poor or the officers poor. They are just as good as any other portion of the population, but the system is defective. We feel that the State militia must eventually belong to the Federal Government absolutely and without any conditions whatever. You see the difficulties we have had in mobilizing so many men on the border. In this great eastern department, with 56 per cent of the militia of the whole country in it, we have in four weeks gotten 54,000 men on the border and that is all. These men are largely recruits, and there are many wholly untrained men.

Did you consider it encouraging the guard to declare that it was a failure, while you were endeavoring to recruit for it, and in command of this mobilization?

Gen. WOOD. No, sir; I did not consider it as encouraging the guard. but I considered it a matter of obligation to tell the truth. I was not speaking there to the press, and only when I received your letter did I realize that any reporter had been present. It was a boys' camp; the boys had asked me to tell them something about the militia mobilization, and it was on a military reservation. I am entirely responsible for every word I said, and it was perfectly true, but it was not said for publication at that time.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Well, it got out, General, and must have reached the public at large.

Now, I want to call your attention to that general question of recruiting. In your report on the mobilization you criticized the Natioanl Guard because it did not recruit up to the war strength.

Gen. WOOD. But do I criticize the guard, sir, as an organization? I simply say that the recruiting was unsuccessful. We have the same thing in our regular service, so far as recruiting goes.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Anyway, you criticized them because they did not recruit up to war strength, whether that was criticism of the guard or of the system. Now, I want to ask you whether or not, all over this country, in the various States, there had not immediately sprung up, under State systems, on the call of the President, guard recruitment systems?

Gen. WOOD. In some States, Senator, yes: a very quick response; and in others almost none. In Kentucky, for instance, recruitment was so slow that in one regiment of Infantry they put in some 36 from a reformatory institution to fill the regiment up. We fortunately found that out and had them promptly taken out. That regiment lost in men about as fast as it gained. I do not remember the exact figures of its physical disability, but they ran very, very high. In a New Hampshire regiment we had the same difficulty. The men went out at one end about as fast as they came in at the other, because of physical defects. This general condition existed all over

the country to a greater or less extent. Some of the older States, which had what you might call crack organizations, like the Seventh New York or Squadron A and the Cadet Corps of Boston and others in the South, had a waiting list of recruits, and these filled up to above minimum strength pretty quickly. Massachusetts, for instance, was able to send some 2,500 recruits right on the heels of her first troops, but that was during the moment of enthusiasm. Within a month we began to struggle desperately for recruits, and we sent parties, as you know, all over the sections of country from which the regiments came.

In Pennsylvania, for instance, to give you an illustration of the fact that we did play the game, we selected, on the recommendation of the adjutant general of the State, certain popular officers who were no longer on the active list, but who had belonged to various Pensylvania regiments then on the border. Those officers were recalled to active service (Federal service, of course) and they were put at recruiting work in districts where they knew the people and where their former regiments came from, and where presumably they were popular. We made very strong efforts to get recruits from every section of the department.

Finally we established the recruiting rendezvous at our own posts in order that all the inconveniences at mobilization camps might be done away with; that is, they were sent to the military posts along the seacoast and elsewhere, where there were sanitary surroundings and good quarters. We hoped that the letters that they sent home would be encouraging. They had not been encouraging, I feared, at mobilization camps, where the cooking was poor and where there were many other unpleasant conditions. I say unpleasant because they were unable to take care of themselves; they were as a class almost wholly green men in all which related to field service and life in camp.

The recruiting at first was done by the States. They made a strong effort to fill up their organizations.

Senator LEE of Maryland. The States generally?

Gen. WOOD. Briefly, immediately upon mustering into the Federal service, efforts were made to recruit the regiments to war strength as rapidly as possible. A number of States secured and forwarded with comparatively little delay very considerable numbers of recruits, especially Massachusetts and New York and several others. The Federal recruiting parties, composed of militia officers and men, were mustered in as soon as selected and recommended by the State's adjutant general. These detachments were sent throughout tht States, recruiting principally in the areas from which the regiments came. Every effort was made to aid and stimulate their work, and the States were requested to cooperate to the greatest extent possible in this work. The men in the recruiting parties were militiamen—not inexperienced men but men who knew the situation and the personnel of the guard and that which had been in it. After a time it became apparent that this recruiting was not sufficiently successful to warrant the expense incident to its maintenance, and most of the recruiting parties were discontinued and recruiting for the guard made a part of the work of our regular recruiting. The States were notified of this change and the reason for it, and

were asked to send to our recruiting officers or recruiting rendezvous or stations all men whom they could recommend or secure for enlistment in the guard. That they might do this work effectively and intelligently, they were furnished with a list of all recruiting stations, rendezvous, officers, etc. Under that system, I think, throughout the whole Eastern Department we only secured a few recruits. Do you remember, Maj. Kilbourne, how many there were?

Maj. KILBOURNE. I asked Capt. Rockwell, who had charge of it, and he said the recruiting rendezvous had reported only three men since the date that we discontinued recruiting.

Senator LEE of Maryland. What was that date?

Maj. KILBOURNE. We discontinued recruiting November 22, sir. The last report is November 22.

Senator LEE of Maryland. That effort did not begin until the latter part of July?

Gen. WOOD. It began on July 5. The fact that we should have a big recruiting problem was appreciated from the first. Under the dual control incident to our militia system the troops had to be transferred from State to Federal control as well as the property. During the actual muster we could not have recruiting parties scattered over the States—organizations had to assemble for muster in. And the recruiting for Federal service had to be done by Federal officials. As soon as the muster had progressed far enough the following telegram was sent:

GOVERNORS ISLAND, N. Y., *July 5, 1916.*

*To adjutant general of each State and District of Columbia (22 in all); also to all senior assistant mustering officers (22), and to Col. Buffington, New York City, and Lieut. R. M. Danford, East Haven, Conn.:*

Pending decision on draft resolution by Congress, recruiting for organizations called into service of United States may be conducted at mobilization camps or by recruiting parties sent to advantageous points in area from which organizations have come but not beyond State limits.

Recruiting parties may consist of any officers and enlisted men now in United States service; Regulars, National Guard, or duly mustered Organized Militia.

Civilian physicians may be engaged to make prescribed physical examination when no medical officer in Federal service is available. Payment for examination, one recruit, $1; two recruits same day, $1.50; three recruits same day, $2; four recruits same day $2.50, and 40 cents for each recruit over four examined same day. Where Army posts are near, recruits should be taken there for examination in preference to examination by civilian physician.

Regular Army recruiting officers will advise as to details on request.

Recruits accepted in States where ample troops are still at mobilization points, will be sent to such points and there join organizations or, if assigned to organizations already forwarded, will be attached to others for equipment, training, and shipment to border.

Where all organizations called have been forwarded, or where organizations in camp are too few to permit proper care, accepted recruits will be sent to rendezvous designated in separate message to-day.

It is imperative that no chance be taken of poor administration, sanitation, supply, or discipline, in any camp due to lack of necessary officers and men to handle same efficently and timely notice must be given these headquarters when change to rendezvous system becomes advisable.

SIMPSON.

We called upon adjutant generals of States to recommend officers for recruiting and on July 12 issued a printed memorandum which follows; attention is especially invited to paragraph 21:

HEADQUARTERS EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Governors Island, New York City, July 12, 1916.*

Memorandum:

The following instructions from War Department furnished for the information and guidance of all concerned:

INSTRUCTIONS FOR RECRUITING OFFICERS.

1. The commanding officer of any mobilization camp or rendezvous may designate an officer as recruiting officer for each organization at such camp or rendezvous, such details being limited to officers of the National Guard or Organized Militia in the service of the United States.

2. Adjutants General of States have been instructed to nominate not to exceed three officers per regiment and one for each separate battalion or other separate unit and, for each officer so nominated, one sergeant, one corporal and one private, for duty in connection with recruiting other than at camps. Adjutants General are requested to submit prompt report by mail on receipt of this order, stating in each case the station he recommends for each officer and the area to be covered. This will invariably be within limits of the State.

3. In submitting this recommendation he will inform this office of the area from which recruits for each organization can probably be obtained most promptly.

4. Whenever practicable officers of the Medical Corps should be recommended for this duty to avoid employment of civilian physicians for examination.

5. If it be necessary to detail officers not of the Medical Corps these should preferably be assigned to areas near regular army posts, if any, in order that recruits may be taken to these posts for physical examination.

6. Where recruiting officers are not medical officers and no medical officer in the U. S. service is available, civilian physicians will be employed at prescribed rates to examine recruits. (See A. R. 1484.)

7. Details for recruiting duty other than as specified in Par. 1 will be made from these headquarters.

8. Each recruiting officer will be informed by these headquarters when detailed of the total number of recruits it is desired that he should enlist for each organization; this number may be changed as recruiting progresses.

9. Each recruiting officer will be informed when the mobilization camp of his State is to be discontinued and the rendezvous system adopted.

10. Officers detailed as recruiting officers will make request on the Department Quartermaster direct for funds required, submitting estimates.

11. Officers traveling on recruiting duty are entitled to mileage, enlisted men on recruiting duty will receive transportation and commutation of rations under A. R. 1223. Recruits sent to rendezvous will be furnished transportation and subsistence under A. R. 1224. Recruiting officers will apply for authority to pay commutation of quarters to enlisted men of recruiting parties as contemplated by Par. 2, G. O., 13, W. D., 1916. Where office space can not be obtained without renting action will be taken under G. O., 34, W. D., 1915. Instructions concerning method of subsisting recruiting parties and applicants for enlistment will be found on form No. 105, Q. M. C.

12. On receipt of detail, recruiting officers will proceed to points selected accompanied by not to exceed three enlisted men who have been duly accepted into the U. S. Service. If armories are available the recruiting office will be established therein; if there be no armory permission will be requested to utilize the office of the local U. S. Army Recruiting Officer; if neither of these be available effort should be made to secure office room in any public building of the national government, state government or city government before resorting to renting of office.

13. Recruiting officers of the U. S. Army have been requested to assist recruiting officers of the National Guard and it is advised that the latter consult the former when in doubt as to any detail.

14. Information of the establishment of a recruiting station should be furnished the local press with request that it be given prominent notice. The same action should be taken with respect to the press of other cities and towns within each recruiting area. Advertising except by placard on station will be avoided where reasonable publicity can be obtained without it.

15. Request has been made for a supply of the following orders, circulars and forms for recruiting officers. Pending receipt of these, recruiting officers may use forms provided for recruiting of militia or of regular Army, obtaining

same from State authorities or from Army recruiting officers, amending the oath[1] to conform to Sec. 70, National Defense Act, approved June 3, 1916, and making minor changes where necessary.

FURNISHED BY THE ADJUTANT GENERAL OF THE ARMY.

General Order #66, W. D., 1910, Rules for Examining Recruits.
Instructions for the General Recruiting Service, U. S. Army (A. G. O., May 22, 1914).
Bulletin #3, W. D., 1914. Expendable and Non-Expendable Articles, Class A and B.
G. O., #17, W. D., 1916. Price List of Clothing.
G. O., #34, W. D., 1915.
G. O., #13, W. D., 1916.
Correspondence Index Book (A. G. O.).
List of Blank Forms and Books (A. G. O.).

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 22[2] | 59 | 78 | 135 | 196 | 265 |
| 25 | 61 | 95 | 140 | 260 | 380 |
| 29 | 61-1 | 99 | 141 | 262 | 383 |

FURNISHED BY THE QUARTERMASTER GENERAL OF THE ARMY.

Circular #28, Q. M. C., 1913, Class "A" Supplies.
Circular #31, Q. M. C., 1914, List of Blank Forms.
Circular #10, Q. M. C., 1915, List of Items.
Notes on Recruiting, Q. M. C., Jan. 26, 1912.
Following forms:

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 22 | 65 | 104 | 180 | 213 | 2213 U. S. Dept. Labor. |
| 42 | 99 | 105 | 200 | 217 | 4 Pay Dept. |
| 45 | 102 | 160 | 201 | 409 | 330 W. D. Public. |
| 56 | 103 | 165 | 210 | 1656 | Q. M. C. |

FURNISHED BY THE DEPOT QUARTERMASTER, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Transportation Requests, Q. M. C. See page #67, Circular #31, Q. M. C., 1914.

These forms will be distributed promptly when received. Thereafter recruiting officers will apply direct to the proper office of the War Department for forms needed. If expedition is necessary, request should be made for shipment in small packages by special delivery mail.

16. General authority is given to enlist for particular organizations as contemplated in Par. 877, A. R. Recruiting officers administer the oath required by Sec. 70 of the National Defense Act approved June 3, 1916. No further oath will be required.

17. Recruiting officers of the Regular Army may make enlistments for the National Guard or for particular organizations thereof sending those enlisted to their organizations or to the designated rendezvous as contemplated in Par. 19 hereof. Recruiting officers of the National Guard may accept for enlistment any applicants for enlistment in the Regular Army, sending them to the proper U. S. Army rendezvous; information as to this rendezvous may be obtained from the U. S. Army recruiting officer.

18. Recruiting officers will fill out descriptive and assignment cards for all recruits enlisted for the National Guard down to the 19th line below the double line across the form on the front page, initialling the same on margin opposite the 19th line; this in addition to signature in place prepared. This will not be done in case of recruits accepted for service in the Regular Army.

---

[1] The following is the form of oath required by law.
"* * * I do hereby acknowledge to have voluntarily enlisted this ——— day of ———, 19—, as a soldier in the National Guard of the United States and of the State of ———, for the period of three years in service and three years in the reserve, under the conditions prescribed by law, unless sooner discharged by proper authority. And I do solemnly swear that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the United States of America and to the State of ———, and that I will serve them honestly and faithfully against all their enemies whomsoever, and that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and of the governor of the State of ———, and of the officers appointed over me according to law and the rules and articles of war. * * *"
[2] Amended for National Guard.

19. A National Guard recruit will be forwarded at once to his organization if it be still within the State; otherwise to the mobilization camp or designated rendezvous. When delay is unavoidable the regulations for hire of quarters and for contract for subsistence authorized for recruiting officers U. S. Army apply. The description and assignment card will be mailed the commanding officer of the rendezvous the same day that recruit is forwarded.

20. Orders will issue from these headquarters designating the senior recruiting officer for each state to whom weekly report will be made by telegraph by each recruiting officer in that state of the number of enlistments made and for what organizations. The senior recruiting officer of each state will promptly consolidate these reports and telegraph the consolidated report to these headquarters.

21. The assistance of State authorities in interesting men of their States in applying for enlistment at the established recruiting stations will materially aid the completion of the State organizations and will be greatly appreciated.

## RECRUITING RENDEZVOUS.

22. On arrival at rendezvous recruits may be attached to organizations of the garrison for quarters, rations and training. When the number is too great for this method to be followed recruits will be organized into provisional companies and the necessary officers and enlisted men detailed from the regular garrison to administer such companies.

23. Acting non-commissioned officers may be appointed in recruit companies from members thereof and the chevrons of this temporary grade may be issued gratuitously.

24. Recruit companies may be assigned to vacant barracks if such be available or placed in camp as the commanding officer may determine.

25. Commanding officers of rendezvous may require descriptive lists to be prepared to accompany recruits forwarded to destination, or may forward the original descriptive and assignment cards with slips firmly attached, showing such portions of the soldier's record at rendezvous as cannot be entered on the descriptive and assignment card. The following are of especial importance: Ordnance issued; quartermaster property issued; clothing issued; number of typhoid prophylaxis treatments, with dates; records of summary courts, if any.

26. Sufficient record of each recruit will be retained to reproduce the more important features of his record in event of loss of record en route to organization.

27. Recruits will be vaccinated on arrival at rendezvous if not already protected, and will be given at least two treatments of typhoid prophylaxis before being forwarded to organizations.

28. Recruits will be thoroughly instructed as to requirements in respect to venereal prophylaxis.

29. Commanding Officers of rendezvous will cause their staff officers to keep separate account of property for National Guardsmen. Special requisitions will be made for articles needed after consulation with camp property officers as to individual property which will be shipped from camp to rendezvous.

30. Recruits will be equipped at rendezvous with the clothing and other individual quartermaster equipment of Equipment "C" and the individual ordnance equipment prescribed in the Unit Accountability Manual.

31. Intensive training will be given recruits to include the school of soldier and squad in infantry drill and some small arms practice if a range be available; this without regard to the arm for which enlisted.

32. Post commanders are authorized to discontinue any routine instruction which will interfere with the proper discipline instruction, equipment and forwarding of recruits.

33. Especial attention will be given to cleanliness of recruits. Frequent bathing will be enforced, and on the day prior to departure for the border, each recruit will be required to bathe and wash all underclothing.

34. Commanding officers will report to these headquarters when 100 or more recruits have been equipped, and will recommend an officer and (if there be not sufficient recruits in the shipment capable of acting as non-commissioned officer) not to exceed three non-commissioned officers or privates of the regular garrison to conduct the recruits to their organization. Orders will issue from these headquarters.

35. The officer detailed to conduct the recruits will take with his the records of soldiers forwarded.

36. Prior to departure a sufficient examination will be made by the surgeons to detect any incipient contagious or infectious disease, and in case of doubt those suspected will not be entrained.

37. Commanding officers of rendezvous are authorized to hold recruits found especially fitted for duty as acting non-commissioned officers or clerks until the final shipment from the rendezvous. They will inform organization commanders when such action is taken.

38. Recruit rendezvous designated for the National Guard recruits of the several states in this department are as indicated below:

Maine—fort in Portland Harbor to be selected by Coast Defense Commander.
New Hampshire—Fort Constitution, Portsmouth.
Vermont—Fort Ethan Allen.
Massachusetts—a fort to be selected by Coast Defense Commander, Boston.
Rhode Island—fort to be selected by coast defense commander Narragansett Bay.
Connecticut—Fort H. G. Wright, N. Y.
New York Infantry, Fort Hamilton; all other recruits, Fort Totten.
New Jersey—Fort DuPont, Del.
Delaware—Fort DuPont, Del.
Maryland—Fort Howard.
Virginia—Fort Myer.
Kentucky—Fort Thomas.
District of Columbia—Fort Myer, Va.
Tennessee—Fort Oglethorpe, Ga.
North Carolina—Fort Oglethorpe, Ga.
Georgia—Fort Oglethorpe, Ga.
Florida—Fort Barrancas.
Alabama—Fort Barrancas, Fla.
Mississippi—Jackson Barracks, La.
South Carolina—Fort Moultrie, S. C.
Rendezvous for Pennsylvania and West Virginia will be designated later.

39. Recruiting offices for the regular army are now established at the following points:

RECRUITING OFFICES.

1. 467 Broadway, Albany, New York.
2. Post Office Building, Atlanta, Georgia.
3. 400 E. Fayette St., Baltimore, Maryland.
4. 3 Tremont Row, Boston, Massachusetts.
5. 298 Main St., White Bldg., Buffalo, New York.
6. 301 W. Trade St., Charlotte, North Carolina.
7. Third & Market Sts., Bergner Bldg., Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.
8. Prichard Bldg., Huntington, West Virginia.
9. 405½ W. Depot St., Knoxville, Tennessee.
10. 139 E. Main St., Lexington, Kentucky.
11. 640 W. Jefferson St., Louisville, Kentucky.
12. 126 N. Court St., Memphis, Tennessee.
13. 523½ Broadway, Nashville, Tennessee.
14. 266 Market St., Newark, New Jersey.
15. 890 Chapel St., New Haven, Connecticut.
16. 337 St. Charles St., New Orleans, Louisiana.
17. 25 Third Ave., New York City, New York.
18. 1229 Arch St., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
19. 627 Smithfield St., Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
20. 19 Monument Sq., Portland, Maine.
21. 402 Westminster Bldg., Providence, Rhode Island.
22. 820 E. Broad St., Richmond, Virginia.
23. Campbell Ave. & Henry St., Ferguson Bldg., Roanoke, Virginia.
24. 35 Barnard St., Savannah, Georgia.
25. 130 N. Washington Ave., Scranton, Pennsylvania.
26. Bastable Bldg., Syracuse, New York.

DISCONTINUANCE OF MOBILIZATION CAMPS.

40. When mobilization camps are discontinued or when organizations are too few to care for recruits for organizations at the border, the property officer of the camp will ship to the designated rendezvous all property pertaining to

the individual equipment of the soldier of any class, including ponchos, shelter tents, personal ordnance equipment of soldiers, mosquito bars, blankets and other bedding, extra cots and tentage. Camp property officers will communicate with commanding officers of rendezvous as to supplies needed and make shipment of articles in advance of abandonment of camps when needed articles can be spared. In case expedition of supplies is needed shipments will be made to rendezvous by express.

41. When mobilization camps are abandoned articles pertaining to the equipment of organizations and any articles of personal equipment which may be reported as not desired at rendezvous will be shipped to the proper staff officers of the station on the border of organizations forwarded. Ammunition will be forwarded to the same destination. Efforts should be made to ship by carload lots and the Department Quartermaster will be notified of the number of cars needed. He will be notified also when shipments are made, car numbers, and destination of shipment being given in each case.

42. Where organizations forwarded to the border are known to have complete Equipment "C," the property pertaining to that equipment remaining in camp at the time of its abandonment will be returned to the Depot from which received. The same action will be taken with respect to medical supplies and ordnance stores, except as specified in the preceding paragraphs.

43. In case of doubt as to the proper destination of any property, report will be made to these headquarters.

44. When instructions for the abandonment of a camp are received the senior assistant mustering officer, or in his absence the senior line officer present, will report to these headquarters the names of all officers and enlisted men in camp, in order that orders may issue in each case.

ARMY REGULATIONS.

45. Attention is invited to the requirements of Army Regulations, paragraphs 153, 224, 840–877, 1115–1124, 1152, 1181, 1203–09, 1213, 1218, 1224, 1225, 1230, 1232. 1380, 1382, 1412, 1475, 1476, 1478 and 1484.

By command of Major General Wood:

EDWIN F. GLENN,
*Colonel, General Staff, Chief of Staff.*

Official:

W. A. SIMPSON,
*Adjutant General, Adjutant.*

We worked in thorough cooperation with the States from the first, and the States aided at our request by sending recruits to the United States recruiting stations and to rendezvous at the various posts. Recruiting had practically stopped at this time. The reason for it was that interest was dead. There was a general feeling that there was to be no active service.

Senator LEE of Maryland. That was later on, of course?

Gen. WOOD. That was after the first excitement had passed.

Senator LEE of Maryland. They could not find out until they had been down at the front about a month that the lack of active service had interfered with recruiting.

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Now, General, regular officers like Maj. Gen. Barry, and militia officers, one from Illinois, Capt. Burns; the adjutant general of New York, Gen. Stotesbury; the adjutant general of Florida, Gen. Foster, and others have stated that there was a natural, spontaneous recruiting under the National Guard system and in and by the National Guard itself immediately on the call of the President on the 18th of June. I saw that going on myself, in Maryland. Now, that spontaneous and immediate recruiting took place at the time when the most of the recruits were available, but unfortunately it was stopped by an order of the department. I have

here a copy of your telegram to The Adjutant General, dated June 20, two days after the call of the President, in which you quoted an inquiry which you had received from the adjutant general of Florida, and the result of which was that the War Department issued an order, through you, stopping that National Guard recruiting.

Gen. WOOD. Would you mind reading that, Senator? We had a telegram about every two minutes for the first 10 days.

Senator LEE of Maryland. I will read both. This is your telegram:

GOVERNORS ISLAND, N. Y., *June 20, 1916.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY,
*Washington, D. C.*

The following telegram received:

"St. Augstine, Fla., June 20. Existing Federal regulations covering recruiting for war require lieutenant and detail of enlisted men remain at home stations and recruit to war strength, while mustering regulations prescribe that full peace strength must be presented to mustering officer before organizations can be mustered in. How may these requirements be reconciled with regard to presence of all commissioned officers at time of muster? By direction governor. Foster, adjutant general, Florida."

Instructions requested.

WOOD.

Two days afterwards Gen. Mills acted on this as follows:

[Second indorsement.]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
MILITIA BUREAU, *June 22, 1916.*

TO THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:

1. It is recommended that the commanding general, Eastern Department, be advised to answer the question of the adjutant general of Florida in substance as follows:

"Company should recruit to maximum possible not to exceed statutory maximum while at home station."

Parenthetically I will say at that point that of course they were all immediately taken from their home station to the camp, and they could not do that. [Continuing:]

All members of company must present themselves for muster as required by law, none to remain at home station for recruiting purposes. After organization is mustered into service of United States any additional recruiting necessary will be conducted by Federal agencies in cooperation with the State authorities.

A. L. MILLS,
*Brigadier General, G. S., Chief of Bureau.*

Gen. WOOD. That is right. When they were mustered into the Federal service they were Federal troops, and naturally the recruitment of Federal troops is a Federal duty. We did, however, cooperate fully with the States, and many of our recruits were obtained through that State cooperation and assistance.

Senator LEE of Maryland. The Federal authorities finally only recruited 15,000 men, I understand.

Gen. WOOD. I know. The recruiting stopped after the first burst of enthusiasm, as it always has throughout the history of this country.

You remember this happened during the Civil War. There was active service and plenty of it. I shall insert extracts from Mr. Lincoln's statement of 1863 with reference to his draft order, as it sets forth very clearly conditions which must always pertain under our haphazard system, or lack of system.

It is at all times proper that misunderstanding between the public and the public servant should be avoided; and this is far more important now than in

times of peace and tranquillity. I therefore address you without searching for a precedent upon which to do so. Some of you are sincerely devoted to the republican institutions and territorial integrity of our country and yet are opposed to what is called the draft or conscription.

At the beginning of the war, and ever since, a variety of motives, pressing, some in one direction and some in the other, would be present to the mind of each man physically fit for a soldier, upon the combined effect of which motive he would or would not voluntarily enter the service. Among these motives would be patriotism, political bias, ambition, personal courage, love of adventure, want of employment, and convenience, of the opposites of some of these. We already have and have had in the service, as appears, substantially all that can be obtained upon this voluntary weighing of motives. And yet we must somehow obtain more, unless we relinquish the original object of the contest, together with all the blood and treasure already expended in the effort to secure it. To meet this necessity the law for the draft has been enacted.

You who do not wish to be soldiers do not like this law. This is natural, nor does it imply want of patriotism. Nothing can be so just and necessary as to make us like it if it is disagreeable to us. We are prone, too, to find false arguments with which to excuse ourselves for opposing such disagreeable things. In this case, those who desire the rebellion to succeed, and others who seek reward in a different way, are very active in accommodating us with this class of arguments.

It is clear that a constitutional law may not be expedient or proper. Such would be a law to raise armies when no armies were needed. But this is not such. The republican institutions and territorial integrity of our country can not be maintained without the further raising and supporting of armies. There can be no army without men. Men can be had only voluntarily or involuntarily. We have ceased to obtain them voluntarily, and to obtain them involuntarily is the draft—the conscription. If you dispute the fact and declare that men can still be had voluntarily and in sufficient numbers, prove the assertion by yourselves volunteering in such numbers and I shall gladly give up the draft. Or, if not sufficient number, but any one of you will volunteer, he for his single self will escape all the horrors of the draft and will thereby do only what each one of at least a million of his manly brethren have already done. Their toil and blood have been given as much for you as for themselves. Shall it all be lost rather than that you, too, will not bear your part?

I do not say that all who would avoid serving in the war are unpatriotic; but I do think every patriot should willingly take his chance under a law made with great care, in order to secure entire fairness. This law was considered, discussed, modified and amended by Congress at great length, and with much labor, and was finally passed by both branches, with a near approach to unanimity. At least, it may not be exactly such as any one man out of Congress, or even in Congress, would have made it. It has been said, and I believe truly, that the Constitution itself is not altogether such as any one of its framers would have preferred. It was the joint work of all, and certainly the better that it was so.

The principle of the draft, which simply is involuntary or enforced service, is not new. It has been practiced in all ages of the world. It was well known to the framers of our Constitution as one of the modes of raising armies, at the time they placed in that instrument the provision that "the Congress shall have the power to raise and support armies." It has been used before in establishing our independence and it was also used under the Constitution in 1812. Wherein is the peculiar hardship now? Shall we shrink from the necessary means to maintain our free Government, which our grandfathers employed to establish it, and our own fathers have already employed once to maintain it? Are we degenerates? Has the manhood of our race run out?

With these views, and on these principles, I feel bound to tell you it is my purpose to see the draft law faithfully executed.

Senator LEE of Maryland. General, if it was known that that recruiting outburst would be temporary, was it not fatal to stop recruiting on the 22d?

Gen. WOOD. We did not stop it. They (the militia) were then Federal troops. We asked the cooperation of the States and took hold of the recruiting because they were Federal organizations and

we had to conduct it. The States were urged to assist, as I have previously indicated.

Senator LEE of Maryland. The instrumentalities were removed that were carrying on the recruiting?

Gen. WOOD. No, sir. We used them to the fullest extent. You will see that the last portion of that telegram says "in cooperation with the State authorities." We mustered in recruiting officers as rapidly as the States gave us their names. In Florida, where the regimental commander organized recruiting parties on his own initiative, his action was promptly approved and the necessary expenses authorized. In this, as in every other case, where action was in good faith though not in accordance with regulations, we sustained their action.

Senator LEE of Maryland. That did not take place until a month later.

Gen. WOOD. The State authorities worked with us from the first day, and they never withdrew their assistance. We called upon them to assist us in every possible way. I will put into the record, with the permission of the committee, the correspondence with some of the different States, and in answer to Gen. Foster's general declaration, I will either read to the committee, or, in order to save time, I will insert in the record what we describe as the Florida correspondence. It is absolutely typical and answers every question you have raised.

(The correspondence referred to is here printed in full as follows:)

ST. AUGUSTINE, FLA., *June 21, 1916.*

COMMANDING GENERAL EASTERN DEPARTMENT U. S. ARMY,
*Governors Island, N. Y.:*

Governor directs me report that pursuant order of Secretary of War Second Regiment Infantry, National Guard Florida, has been designated for muster into United States service. Acting under existing mobilization regulations and references mentioned in your telegram to goveror, this regiment is under orders move from respective home station. Commencing 5 p. m. this afternoon, all units will reach mobilization camp at State camp, Florida, by 4 o'clock to-morrow afternoon, and personnel, having been physically examined by Government standard, will be immediately ready for muster in. Proposals were invited and contracts have been let for transportation and subsistence. Regiment has complete peace strength. Clothing, arms, and equipments except overcoats. At this hour it has full complement of officers, headquarters company, with band and mounted scouts, sanitary detachment, and 12 companies. Enlisted strength at noon to-day 10,006, and is being rapidly recruited to full war strength. First Regiment Infantry, although not under orders for mobilizing, is available. Unless advised to contrary will assume that course pursued as outlined in this telegram has your approval.

FOSTER, *Adjutant General Florida.*

---

STATE CAMP, JACKSONVILLE, FLA., *June 25, 1916.*

COMMANDING GENERAL EASTERN DEPARTMENT UNITED STATES ARMY,
*Governors Island, N. Y.:*

Supplementing last telegram regarding physical examinations, it should be understood that enlisted personnel of regiment was physically examined in accordance with Government standard prior to original enlistment, as they have taken oath under national-defense act and do not require to be mustered in. State authorities have understood that use of form 10 for second physical examination would not be required and that result of such examination could simply be recorded on Form 1. To use Form 10 would involve enormous amount of clerical labor and greatly delay movement of regiments.

FOSTER,
*Adjutant General Florida.*

STATE CAMP, FLA., *June 26, 1916.*

COMMANDING GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE EAST,
*Governors Island, N. Y.:*

Governor directs me to request authority to purchase in open market here sufficient quantity substantial shoes approximating Army standard. This is necessary in order to carry out your instruction of this date as to sending regiment to front at once.

FOSTER,
*Adjutant General Florida.*

---

STATE CAMP, FLA., *June 25, 1916.*

COMMANDING GENERAL EASTERN DEPARTMENT UNITED STATES ARMY,
*Governors Island, N. Y.:*

The equipment and clothing for Second Infantry National Guard, Florida, not having arrived as provided for under subparagraph B, paragraph 455, Army Regulations, the governor directs me to request that all quartermaster's supplies for field use of war-strength regiment, as set out in Table 6, General Order, No. 39, for department 1915, less quantities for peace-strength equipment, as set out in Tables 8 and 9, Infantry Equipment Manual, Organized Militia, peace, 1914, be furnished, except that with regard to following listed articles full war-strength number is required: Drawers, shoes, stockings, woolen undershirts, waist belts, water-sterilizing bags, surplus kit bags, and mosquito bars. Request that clothing be supplied in size tariffs as per Table 6, General Order 17, War Department, 1916.

By direction governor.

FOSTER,
*Adjutant General Florida.*

---

STATE CAMP, FLA., *June 26, 1916.*

COMMANDING GENERAL, EASTERN DEPARTMENT, UNITED STATES ARMY,
*Governors Island, N. Y.:*

Replying to your telegram asking when regiment can entrain, it has been here since Thursday but none of the stores mentioned in subparagraph B paragraph 455, Army Regulations, have arrived, although ordnance is said to have been shipped. Forms No. 10 for physical examinations have just arrived within last hour, and muster-in rolls are not yet here. In this situation do not see how regiment can be moved Tuesday if previously given instructions as to preliminaries are to be complied with. Shoes are urgently required. The peace strength personnel of this regiment is partially trained at par, it is thought, with average National Guard troops, but it now has in camp about seven or eight hundred untrained and unequipped recruits. If it is necessary to move the regiment within next few days it is recommended that the partially trained peace strength be sent forward and that authority be given to organize depot battalion to train the recruits who should be held here.

By direction of the governor.

FOSTER, *Adjutant General.*

---

STATE CAMP, FLA., *June 27.*

COMMANDING GENERAL EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Governors Island, N. Y.:*

Request to know procedure in case of individual enlisted men who decline to take new oath under national-defense act to qualify as National Guard in Florida regiment. There is total of 17 in two companies.

HOLLY.

---

STATE CAMP, FLA., *June 27, 1916.*

COMMANDING GENERAL EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Governors Island, N. Y.:*

Following conditions exist second Florida infantry mobilizing here regiment organized according to law except as follows no machine gun company or platoon and enlisted strength each company includes two negroes as cook physical examination officers completed none rejected; of eleven hundred seventy five enlisted men examined to date one hundred thirteen rejected one hundred

twenty four doubtful doubtful cases will be reexamined mostly under wright except one thousand enlisted will be passed by surgeons officers and men passed by surgeons are physically sound but some officers and majority of men are undeveloped and poorly set up of twelve hundred thirty six men in ranks at inspection five hundred eighty one have had no military training and only five hundred fifty nine considered by their officers sufficiently instructed to take part in simple movements in school of company one company unable to execute drill under arms drill of three companies very good three companies good five companies fair only with physically defectives eliminated organizations will contain satisfactory material but company officers and men will require four to six weeks intensive training under able instructors to fit them for field service companies supplied with sixtyfive sets equipment sufficient additional ordnance equipment on hand to equipment regiment at war strength no additional quartermaster equipment on hand 8 days after order entire regiment in much need of underclothing and shoes officers not provided with field equipment at personal expense field officers have not provided themselves with mounts sufficient escort wagons and harness on hand but no animals of any kind railroad to camp will facilitate entrainment of organization excellent facilities for transferring animals to and from cars excellent stable capacity fifty animals in my judgment regiment should remain here until properly equipped if necessary to obtain able instructors to facilitate training for field service it might then be sent forward.

JENKINS.

---

STATE CAMP, FLA., *June 27, 1916.*

COMMANDING GENERAL EASTERN DEPARTMENT, UNITED STATES ARMY,
*Governors Island, N. Y.:*

Governor directs me advise you that none of the quartermaster's supplies expected here from Government depots for equipment of war strength of regiment have been received. Men have been five days in the field without blankets, cots, or camp equipage, except as to peace strength available from State sources and supplied in accordance with existing mobilization instructions for peace strength. It is trusted that the shipment of these badly needed supplies will be faciliated.

FOSTER,
*Adjutant General, Florida.*

---

STATE CAMP, FLA., *June 29, 1916.*

COMMANDING GENERAL EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Governors Island, N. Y.:*

Request supply all necessary blank forms for discharge 600 men Florida regiment on account physical disqualification, as ordered by telegram, 26th instant.

HOLLEY.

---

STATE CAMP, FLA., *June 29, 1916.*

COMMANDING GENERAL EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Governors Island, N. Y.:*

Information requested as to disposition of men not citizens and who have now declared their intentions to become citizens enlisted in National Guard and militia.

HOLLEY.

---

August 24, reported ready to move except for machine guns.
War Department orders did not permit move at that time.
Left October 3, 1,134 strength, no machine guns and only two animals—those were private mounts.

Senator LEE. General, let me read here an order by Acting Secretary of War Robert Shaw Oliver, dated September 11, 1911. He outlines the exact system that these National Guard people sought

to put in operation instinctively, of having local officers remain behind, with a suitable detail of enlisted men, to continue recruiting:

WAR DEPARTMENT,
*Washington, September 11, 1911.*

The GOVERNOR OF FLORIDA,
*Tallahassee, Fla.*

SIR: I have the honor to request that your State adopt the following war-recruiting system, modified in details so as best to meet local conditions, that copies of the recruiting plan as finally completed and adopted be filed at the headquarters of the territorial division in which the several mobilization camps are located, and that you transmit another copy to the Adjutant General of the Army for file in the War College Division of the General Staff:

"An officer of each local organization will be designated as recruiting officer for war. He will keep himself informed of all the requirements of his office and he will, by application to the adjutant general of the State, Territory, or District secure the necessary blank forms.

"In their annual inspections, Federal inspectors will report whether or not local organizations are prepared to meet the requirements of this paragraph.

"When a local organization is called into the service of the United States, its recruiting officer will at once begin to recruit the same up to war strength.

"When the local organization goes to the State mobilization camp the recruiting officer will remain behind with a suitable detail of enlisted men and continue recruiting, forwarding all recruits to the State mobilization camp. The recruiting officer and his party will rejoin their proper organization before the latter leaves the mobilization camp.

"Each regiment and separate battalion will, before it leaves its State, Territory, or District, establish a recruiting party to recruit for its organization during the continuance of the war.

"A general recruiting party for all militia organizations of the State, Territory, or District, will be maintained at the State mobilization camp.

"All recruits will be forwarded through the State mobilization camp where they will be thoroughly examined physically, fully armed and equipped, and instructed as far as time permits."

Very respectfully,

ROBERT SHAW OLIVER,
*Acting Secretary of War.*

Gen. WOOD. Senator, I think I can make that clear. We will take a regiment in western New York; we will say it is scattered in half a dozen different towns. We want to muster it in the Federal service. It is called to the regimental rendezvous in order that every man and officer might be mustered there (we could not send a mustering officer off to catch these recruiting parties); but the moment the regiment came into camp and was mustered into the Federal service its officers and men were available for any detail we saw fit to make; and then it was that we used these officers as Federal mustering officers. Their personality and influence were not changed by the fact that they had come into the Federal service. It was still William Smith of Syracuse; nobody knew whether he was Federal or State. Once we had mustered them in and they were under our orders, then we sent them out and used them as we saw fit, as recruiting agencies, and we invoked the aid of the State in assisting these men.

Senator LEE of Maryland. General, I know just what took place in Maryland, and I can detail it to you. Our First Regiment, for instance, which has companies stationed all through the counties, stayed at home points for two days and went then to Laurel, the central camp. They were there about eight days waiting for equipment. At the end of the eighth day, at 11 o'clock at night, by lantern light, I saw the equipment being distributed to these troops, who

entrained for Texas the next day. Now, they tried to send men back from Laurel to their company stations to recruit, and they were not allowed to do that. They started their advertisements, but they had to call them in; and no recruiting system was put into operation at all for our State until the latter part of July.

Gen. WOOD. I will make inquiry concerning that, Senator. I am sure you are in error.

Senator LEE of Maryland. I wrote to you then and urged that instead of using a few staff officers, who naturally knew little of line-officer duty, that you employ the old sergeants and enlisted men who knew the localities but who had been turned out by reason of physical defects, or having families, and start them as recruiting officers; and you wrote me back in answer to that suggestion that it was practically too late; that the real trouble was that there was no interest; and that the condition in Maryland was the same as that which existed in every other State.

Gen. WOOD. That is right. May I insert the substance of the correspondence in the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it may go in.

(The substance of the correspondence referred to is here printed, as follows:)

The telegram authorizing recruiting, already quoted in full in the hearing, was sent to Maryland on July 5. On July 10, on the mustering officer's recommendation, Maj. Robert Parke Bay, of Maryland, with four men was ordered to establish a recruiting station at Baltimore; on July 12 the printed instructions as to recruiting were prepared and on the same date the adjutant general of Maryland was telegraphed to submit names of officers for additional parties—one officer and three enlisted men for every battalion, a very generous allowance—he was asked also to recommend stations. As soon as this was done the officers and men were mustered in July 26. From that time on we granted every request for travel and aided the recruiting officers in every way possible. We changed stations and officers on recommendation of the officers themselves or of the State. Recruiting parties were continued until the officers themselves agreed that it was useless. When discontinued the States were asked to send men to our established stations to be enlisted. From beginning to end we spared neither trouble nor expense and the States were given every encouragement except for the short interval when recruiting had to be interrupted for the purpose of transferring the officers from a State to a Federal status. That the enthusiasm died out at this time is no more the fault of the War Department than of the several State militia organizations. It was merely a fact. The claim that the States could do better unaided is not borne out by results. We continued to enlist some recruits as long as we continued the Federal parties. As soon as they were discontinued and the adjutant general asked to send applicants to the Army recruiting stations nothing further was accomplished. The last week of recruiting when parties were still at work in 11 States we got 85 recruits; from that date on only 2 were enlisted.

(The following are the letters mentioned by Senator Lee and my reply thereto.)

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON COAST DEFENSES,
*August 5, 1916.*

Maj. Gen. LEONARD WOOD, United States Army,
*Commanding Department of the East, Governors Island, N. Y.*

MY DEAR GENERAL: I take the liberty of writing you on the following subject—recruiting for the National Guard of Maryland—and desire to make the following recommendations:

First. That each company officer be communicated with and requested to designate, out of men who were formerly in his company but were not accepted *for various* reasons, the most efficient for use as members of a recruiting party

in the section of the State from which that company came, and that proper steps be taken to appoint from such recommended men recruiting parties to cooperate with the recruiting officers now in the State.

Second. That the recruiting officers be authorized to go from point to point on regular schedules.

Third. That short advertisements, indicating the advantages to the recruit and the necessity for the Government of increasing the Maryland National Guard regiments now at the front, be circulated in advance of dates when the recruiting parties will be at given points.

The reasons for these recommendations are, generally speaking, as follows: The entire National Guard of Maryland was ordered to Texas, and is now stationed at Eagle Pass. There are no enlisted men or commissioned officers left in the State, except three staff officers, who have not necessarily been connected heretofore with recruiting. These officers are now at various points in the State, but so far as my observation goes they have not been afforded the necessary facilities to effectually carry out recruiting for the National Guard of Maryland.

One of these above-mentioned staff officers, a very industrious and earnest man, is now located at Silver Spring, Md., in Montgomery County, where I live, and which is a point tolerably central to half a dozen of the counties of the State. This officer has no local knowledge, and he has one recently recruited man from Baltimore with him, who sits outside the door of the local armory and, together, they excite some little interest in the village. In the course of a week no recruits have been secured. This is in no sense the fault of the officer, as he is doing his best under the circumstances. He has my entire sympathy.

The National Guard has heretofore recruited itself, and it is now absolutely necessary to either get some members of the guard from the frontier to return and do recruiting work or some of those formerly connected with it to take this work up. It would be very inadvisable to bring back any men from Eagle Pass, where they are receiving the most admirable instruction and cooperating in the best of spirit with the regular forces there. The two principal causes why men were left behind and not taken to Eagle Pass were physical defects or having dependents that they could not leave, or the latter condition added to a business opportunity that could not be fairly sacrificed. Thus some good men of this class remain in Maryland and could attend to these duties for two or three weeks or long enough to ascertain what can be done.

I recommend that an order be passed by the Secretary of War giving the authority to recruiting officers for the sole purpose of recruiting service to waive physical defects of enlisted men, mentioning them by name or by class or indicating the purpose for which they are to be enlisted. Also a modification of the order with reference to dependents, for this same purpose, and that such men as may be available be enlisted temporarily and employed temporarily, and that the whole matter be put in definite shape, the men being advised of the length of time they would be required. The best form to fix this time would be by having the waiver of the defects or the dependents merely for the specified time. I presume that three weeks would be about the proper time to indicate, at the end of which time, or other specified time, the enlisted man could be discharged, as desired.

I beg leave to call your attention to the order of the President, copy of which was sent you by the department under date of June 18, which says that these National Guard organizations should be raised to the maximum strength as soon as possible. That order is still in force, I believe. In the same order you were directed to muster certain staff officers into the service for the purpose of proper camp administration and to muster them out again when their services were no longer required. It is clear, therefore, that this recruiting should be attended to effectively, in view of the order of the President, and that for other purposes in connection with the mobilization there had been a temporary mustering into the service.

In my judgment, unless something effective and practical is done in connection with this recruiting for the National Guard of Maryland, certainly so far as the rural districts are concerned, that it is merely a waste of Government funds and not calculated to bring about the result of securing recruits as directed in the order of the President. I have seen Gen. Mills in this matter, and write you on his statement that you are the proper officer to consider the recommendations made.

The situation in Maryland probably differs from that in many other States in that the entire personnel of the National Guard, with very few exceptions, as above stated, is now out of the State.

Respectfully, yours,

BLAIR LEE.

---

PLATTSBURG, N. Y., *August 8, 1916.*

MY DEAR SENATOR LEE: Your letter received, and I have sent it down to headquarters to the officer in charge of militia affairs with instructions to give this matter careful consideration. We are working now through officers of the National Guard, who are serving as recruiting officers. The real trouble is there is no interest in border service, as the outlook for active service does not seem to be very probable. The condition you speak of in Maryland is found in every State.

Sincerely, yours,

LEONARD WOOD.

Hon. BLAIR LEE,
*United States Senate, Washington, D. C.*

Senator LEE, of Maryland. General, the adjutant general of Florida says in a letter to me dated January 6:

I have no hesitancy in saying that if this system of recruiting had not been interrupted—

Which they had under that order of Secretary Oliver—

the organization of the National Guard in this State would have been mustered in at full war strength.

What would you say to that?

Gen. WOOD. I would say it is not so, sir. It is absolutely incorrect and we have the evidence here to prove it. As shown in the above telegrams concerning recruitment in Florida, these telegrams indicate just what occurred. It is typical of the situation not only in Florida but also in other States. Gen. Foster's action and activities are clearly apparent. The situation there was somewhat difficult; the cause of the difficulties being as indicated in the above-cited telegraphic correspondence.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that the Gen. Foster who was quite active with reference to the National Guard legislation here?

Gen. WOOD. He was, I understand, one of the lobby that was here at that time, trying to put through the present militia law.

Senator LEE, of Maryland. Is not the National Guard an automatic recruiting body? Its recruiting has not actually cost the Government anything, up to the time they were called into the Federal service?

Gen. WOOD. No, sir.

Senator LEE, of Maryland. Take our Maryland case: When everyone of the National Guard were ordered out of the State, there was nobody left there to recruit.

Gen. WOOD. I think, Senator, there were some officers, were there not?

Senator LEE, of Maryland. Three staff officers.

Gen. WOOD. I thought so.

Senator LEE, of Maryland. I saw one of them, and he had one newly enlisted man from Baltimore to assist him, and neither one of them had ever seen the place before, and knew nothing about the local people.

Gen. WOOD. Was the officer an intelligent man?

Senator LEE, of Maryland. He was a very able man and a very earnest man. Of course, that was started six weeks after the call in June, after the enthusiasm had died down, as you say. It was too late to be effective.

Gen. WOOD. I think the real trouble, Senator, in the recruiting was that there was a large number of physically defcetive men. A great number were excused by the governors. Take a typical regiment; take your own State. We have the figures here, I think, for Maryland, and I think they average up very well with the militia as a whole. I will be glad to insert them in the record, with the permission of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, that will be done.

(The statement referred to is here printed in full as follows:)

MARYLAND.

| | Prescribed war strength. | Maximum strength attained. |
|---|---|---|
| Infantry | 5,759 | 3,014 |
| Cavalry | 103 | 89 |
| Field Artillery | 176 | 132 |
| Sanitary troops | 157 | 149 |
| Total | 6,195 | 3,384 |

| | |
|---|---|
| Dates of departure June 30 to July 7 (unusually prompt): | |
| Animals | 15 |
| Machine guns | 4 |
| Strength last armory inspection | 2,057 |
| In State service date of call | 2,209 |
| Number of men excused by the governor or other State officials before muster in | 106 |
| Discharged for disability | 263 |
| Remaining after physical examination | 1,954 |
| Number who declined to subscribe to oath of dual obligation | 77 |
| Strength at departure | 3,252 |
| Recruits enlisted after departure | 26 |

Senator LEE of Maryland. General, Gen. Barry, who is not friendly at all to the National Guard system, but who is obviously an officer of marked ability and frankness, has said, in his report with reference to this National Guard recruiting, that it is a State proposition and can best be handled by the State agencies. I will read from his report, on page 133 of the report of the Militia Bureau on the mobilization of the Organized Militia and National Guard of the United States, 1916:

With the State troops regiments in large cities and companies in smaller communities are essentially local; the personnel of any such organization belong to a limited neighborhood. The home town entertains an intense interest in them; the men of the organization retain interest in the town; and to maintain proper strength the recruits, due to local pride, are most easily obtained locally.

To recruit for such organizations the best results are most likely to be obtained by men well acquainted in the various neighborhoods whence come the organizations; they know the population and by what feeling it is animated. Methods successful in one State may not succeed in another. Of these and other conditions the State authorities are best informed and they can best take advantage of them.

Recruiting for the National Guard should be conducted by the State authorities, they to secure applicants for enlistment through solicitation by National Guard retired or reserve officers, county and other officials, or by such other methods as may be deemed expedient and to send all accepted applicants to a previously selected and centrally located State recruit depot.

In Maryland, after stopping the enlistments which the guard were conducting themselves for the two days they remained at their home stations by this order of the War Department of June 22, a month or six weeks intervened, when an enlistment system was adopted under your authority which sent out men without any local knowledge whatever, either the officers or the enlisted detail. That is a fact, is it not?

Gen. WOOD. No; there was no such period of delay; as shown by statements above concerning Maryland, it will be seen that three carefully selected officers were detailed to recruit for the organizations. The list above shows general results. Troops could not be kept at home stations to be recruited to full strength because of the urgency of the situation.

Senator, may I add further that the system you recommend is exactly the one we established in Pennsylvania, and which I have already described to you—picking out the best of the retired officers and locating them in their own towns, which, by the way, were the towns from which the organizations came?

Senator LEE of Maryland. When was that done?

Gen. WOOD. That was done in the Pennsylvania organization.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Was it not done a month or two too late?

Gen. WOOD. No; I do not think so, assuming that the men were qualified to recruit. I will supply for the record a statement of the dates when the officers were detailed in the different States.

(The statement referred to is as follows:)

| State. | Number of officers. | Date detailed. | Total recruits enlisted. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Alabama | 11 | Aug. 5 | 544 |
| Connecticut | 7 | July 26 | 24 |
| Delaware | 2 | ...do.... | 36 |
| District of Columbia | 6 | Aug. 29 | 754 |
| Florida | 4 | July 21 | 63 |
| Georgia | 11 | July 27 | 304 |
| Kentucky | 11 | July 24 | 423 |
| Maine | 3 | July 21 | 26 |
| Maryland | 5 | July 24 | 26 |
| Massachusetts | 19 | July 26 | 227 |
| Mississippi | 3 | July 21 | 146 |
| New Hampshire | 3 | July 29 | 15 |
| New Jersey | 10 | July 20 | 252 |
| New York | 50 | Aug. 14 | 858 |
| North Carolina | 11 | July 21 | 361 |
| Pennsylvania | 30 | July 26 | 510 |
| Rhode Island | | | 1 |
| South Carolina | 8 | July 21 | 135 |
| Tennessee | 6 | July 22 | 287 |
| Vermont | 3 | July 21 | 24 |
| Virginia | 10 | ...do.... | 246 |
| West Virginia | 3 | Aug. 4 | 542 |

The dates given are those in which the final details were furnished. In some States, among them Maryland, Florida, New York, and District of Columbia, recruiting parties were out before these dates. All adjutants general and senior mustering officers were notified the authority to recruit on July 5 and all adjutants general were called upon to nominate recruiting parties on July 12. The officers were mustered in as soon as recommendations were received. Rhode Island had nearly its full complement, so no officers were mustered in for that State. The adjutant general was asked to have applicants sent to the United States recruiting officer. The result in this case—when the State *was left to* itself—indicates what might have happened in other States without

Federal assistance and impetus. Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania had already assembled and sent forward large numbers of recruits prior to the detail of these special recruiting parties.

Senator LEE of Maryland. But, General, speaking generally, this substitute for the natural system which the guard had adopted itself, either under local laws or under this order of Secretary Oliver, was suspended by the order of Gen. Mills, just mentioned, and was not formally renewed for six weeks or a month?

Gen. WOOD. No, sir it was not suspended except for the period necessary to muster. When all these organizations were mustered into the Federal service they ceased to be State organizations; the men and officers were Federal; and it was the same men and the same officer who went out recruiting in the towns where they were known and respected, and no one knew whether they were operating for the State or for the Federal Government. The whole thing, Senator, is that the interest petered out after the first 15 or 20 days. The States which sent the largest contingent of recruits were Pennsylvania, New York, and Massachusetts. They had a system of selecting men in advance whom they knew would come, and they promptly sent forward large numbers—Massachusetts something like 2,500 recruits. These were received and sent forward by officers who had been mustered into the Federal service. They were militia officers acting after muster into Federal service. I think we can show you that we not only did nothing to check recruiting, but that we did everything to aid it. Am I not correct, Maj. Kilbourne, in saying that our efforts in one State cost us $400 to get one recruit?

Maj. KILBOURNE. I can get those figures exactly. In New Hampshire we spent about $872 before we got one recruit.

Gen. WOOD. The average cost per recruit for that State was $200. We went all over the State, but it was very difficult to enlist men. Interest had waned.

When the entire militia of the Nation was called there was a general feeling that there was to be active service on a large scale. Men responded, as they always do, in the moment of enthusiasm. A number of States where arrangements had been made to fill up regiments in case of emergency were able to gather quickly and forward large numbers of recruits. This is especially true of Massachusetts, New York, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and a number of other States. But those States where no such arrangements had been made had considerable difficulty in filling up their contingents, because interest in the situation rapidly faded out, and the feeling that there was to be active service was replaced by a feeling of less certainty. Recruiting became exceedingly difficult, and the difficulty increased as time went on and it became evident that it was to be largely garrison duty—important, but not furnishing the element of excitement which influences many men to enlist. It is absurd and unfair to try to place responsibility for the lack of recruits upon any action taken by the Federal Government incident to the transfer of troops from State to Federal control. Carefully selected officers did everything possible to secure recruits. The reason they did not get them was that public interest had diminished. It is a story as old as the life of the Nation. A rush first, and the moment the novelty has worn off a bit there is a let up. This is especially true in this instance

when it had become apparent that the service was to be garrison and partol duty and not active field service.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Will you agree to this proposition, that if anything interferes with the automatic enlistment of a National-Guard force, on a call of the President for a comparatively brief period, that interference has practically stopped the enlistment?

Gen. WOOD. The whole thing is a gamble, yes—anything that interferes with it in the first burst of enthusiasm—because the enlistment is not based on a general sense of obligation. It is largely emotion, and it falls promptly once the excitement has worn off.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Under those circumstances, and in view of the effect of the War Department order of June 22, is it fair to criticize the guard for not having enlisted up to war strength?

Gen. WOOD. Not the guard; not a bit. It is the system always; the system absolutely.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Why the system?

Gen. WOOD. For this reason, sir: It is a system which leaves everything to be done by that delightful method of confusion which you have so ably brought out by your questions. There is no sufficient organization; there is no certainty as to who is coming. That is why we damn the system. We do not know whether the men are going to be enthusiastic; whether their moral scruples will permit them to respond to the call; whether they are opposed to the action of the President in calling out troops. We have no certainty whatever as to the response; it is chance when we want certainty. That is why we dislike the system and condemn it. We know certainly that most of the men who will respond will be untrained in great part. I want to introduce into the record, if I may, in substantiation of that point certain correspondence with Representative McKellar of Tennessee. It consists of certain letters addressed to him by constituents protesting that he had understood that the militia of Tennessee was ready to respond immediately, and describing the heterogeneous mass of ununiformed, undisciplined men that were then being sent to the front without arms, equipment, or training. The possibility of this condition being general is the reason we dislike the system. There is no intention to reflect upon the men or the officers. It's a kind of referendum in a crisis. The President calls for men. Organizations are at half strength. The response depends upon the popularity of the proposed move. No one knows how many are coming or what will be their condition as to training and fitness. It is a gamble, and the stake may be the life of the Nation. It is a gamble. No certainty when there should be the greatest possible certainty.

(The correspondence referred to is here printed in full, as follows:)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
*Washington, June 30, 1916.*

Gen. H. P. MCCAIN,
*Adjutant General, War Department.*

DEAR GEN. MCCAIN: Inclosed please find two letters, one from Mr. Mallory and the other from Mr. Beecher, two of our best citizens in Memphis, which letters explain themselves.

I do not see how this could have happened, and I would be glad for you to look into it and let me know.

*Very truly, yours,*

K. D. MCKELLAR.

MEMPHIS, TENN., *June 28, 1916.*

Hon. K. D. MCKELLAR,
*Washington, D. C.*

MY DEAR MC: What I have seen and read in the newspapers in the last few days in reference to the preparedness of our militia has brought to my mind vividly the conversation I had with you in your office one evening while you were here recently, and over and over in my mind the thought comes: Can it be possible that you are being misinformed on this most vital question to every American citizen?

Night before last I witnessed the Memphis troops leaving here for Nashville—a fine lot of young men; however, to me it indeed was a pitiful sight. Not of a disregard of our Government of its duty toward these young men in the ill-prepared and seemingly indifferent way in which the Government was caring for them.

I can not say it for a fact, but I am told that the uniforms these men wore were winter uniforms, although they left here in midsummer; doubtless some high official in the military service in Washington will excuse the efficiency of our preparedness on this point by saying a light-weight uniform will be furnished them. There were many men in line dressed in their citizen clothes, from a well-tailored suit to the gresy clothes of the laborer; they wore straw hats, derbies, and caps, truly a motley sight. Possibly some high military official in Washington will give us an excuse that uniforms will be furnished these men when they reach camp; yet our militia has been mobilizing here in the city for eight days.

I have not attempted to draw to you a real picture as it presented itself to me of the above departure of our troops, and yet I wish to say that during yesterday I heard many of your close friends describe the situation with far more concern than I have attempted to tell it to you here. The above is not from hearsay; it actually happened under the eyes of fully 50,000 of the citizens of Memphis.

I am inclosing you a clipping from the Cincinnati Enquirer of June 25 describing the failure on the part of some high military official in Washington in reference to the Ohio troops; I also inclose you a clipping from the New York Times of June 26 showing the failure of some high military official of our Government to meet the situation for the New York troops.

Mr. Billings, who has been in the employ of this company for the last three months and who lives in Chicago, has just received a letter from one of his friends who is a member of Machine Gun Troop A of the First Cavalry of Illinois, stating that his command is unable to go forward, they being unable to secure any machine guns for their command, and this, too, after $25,000 had been raised by public subscription to purchase these guns.

Mac, I am giving you this information not in the way of criticism personally, but I do think it is time for the proper parties in Washington to wake up, set aside politics, and give the proper parties the Government support that the Mexican situation demands; for certainly from what has transpired in Memphis the papers can not be far wrong in the news they are giving the world about our utter unpreparedness. A situation sad to think of with the conditions that have confronted this nation since August 1, 1914.

He who fools himself unconsciously is working a misfortune for some one.

Most truly, yours,

B. L. MALLORY.

---

MEMPHIS COTTON EXCHANGE,
*Memphis, Tenn., June 28, 1916.*

Hon. K. D. MCKELLAR,
*Washington, D. C.*

DEAR SIR: When you were here a couple of weeks ago I listened with interest to your statements as to the militia being prepared. The call to arms has disproved all of this. The Memphis companies are without adequate equipment to a considerable extent, and the same is true of New York and several others. This is all due to the rottenness of State politics. No officeholder cares in time of peace whether the militia is properly equipped, and personally I would like to see the various States deprived of any voice or control over military matters in this State where office seeking occupies all the time of our politicians.

Yours, truly,

B. B. BEECHER.

[Second indorsement.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, MILITIA BUREAU,
*July 6, 1916.*

TO THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:

It is recommended that an investigation be made to determine the responsibility for the neglects and failures alleged in the inclosed letters and clippings.

A. L. MILLS,
*Brigadier General, G. S., Chief of Bureau.*

[Third indorsement.]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
*July 8, 1916.*

To the COMMANDING GENERAL, EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Governors Island, N. Y.*

For report.
By order of the Secretary of War.

P. C. HARRIS, *Adjutant General.*

[Fourth indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Governors Island, N. Y., July 10, 1916.*

Respectfully returned to The Adjutant General's Office, War Department, Washington.

1. The within letters and newspaper clippings set forth conditions which have not been unusual in the mobilization of the militia, even in the States where the militia is best prepared. I doubt if the responsibility for these conditions can be specifically charged to any person or persons. It is the fault of a system and of a policy under which we have proceeded for years. The militia has been called to the colors at full war strength. A good many were unable to respond to the call and were discharged from the militia immediately prior to the mobilization, and new men were taken in. It was, moreover, necessary to increase the strength of most of the regiments from peace strength to war strength, which resulted in taking with them to the mobilization point as many new men as possible. Probably 85 per cent of these men were green men without previous training. Naturally, as only peace-strength equipment and clothing is, as a rule, kept with the organizations, they were without sufficient uniforms or equipment for the additional men, and, as they represented many of the walks of life from which the militia is drawn, their clothing varied.

2. The necessary additional uniforms and equipment were ordered sent to the mobilization camps. Consequently the new men, the additional recruits, were without uniforms or equipment and proceeded to the camps in the clothes they had at the time of enlistment. The delay in securing the equipment was incident to the unsound policy which has resulted in the storing of equipment and arms at central points often remote from the troops to be supplied. For instance, practically everything for this department was stored in Philadelphia at the quartermaster's depot, with rather limited railroad-yard facilities, and decidedly limited space for rapid handling of this vast amount of material. The area to be supplied by this depot covered the territory from Maine to Alabama. The building was literally crowded; it was a physical impossibility to get it out and distribute it so that there would be anything like a simultaneous issue. Near-by States got there supplies more promptly than the remote, but these, in some instances, suffered delays incident to difficulty in getting at the supplies, it being necessary to ship to other States first in order to get rid of the mass of supplies before others could be gotten at. It has been urged repeatedly that regiments should maintain in their armories the necessary supplies and equipment to bring them to war strength, wherever the armories had secure storage rooms, and that where such was not the case their supplies should be stored in the nearest depots, military posts, or arsenals, so that under conditions such as necessitated the recent order to mobilize the militia of the country simultaneous shipment could be made promptly from as many points as possible.

3. Only about 64 per cent of the militia at peace strength have had a year's service. The rest is new and largely uninstructed, and when it is remembered that from the older personnel a considerable number of men have been

discharged for business and family reasons prior to going to the camps of mobilization, and a considerable number found, on physical examination after muster, to be deficient, and that the war strength of the regiment is something over twice the peace strength, in other words, that practically 60 per cent of the war strength of the regiment is new, the delay in filing up and equipping the regiments will be understood, also the appearance of a large number of men without arms or equipment in the regiments en route to the State mobilization camps.

4. With reference to machine guns: We have been without an adequate supply of machine guns for the Regular Army and militia for years, and have had absolutely none for Volunteers. In order that the machine-gun companies belonging to the regiments going to the border may have the very modest allowance of four guns per regiment (which is about one-sixth what they should have if the companies were organized in accordance with modern practices) we are to-day stripping the seacoast of the machine guns assigned to them for land defense.

5. With reference to uniforms: The cotton uniform is not kept in reserve for war purposes, nor should it be. It will be found entirely unsuitable for campaign purposes within the continent of the United States, even on the border. It does not give adequate protection from the sun and is cold and uncomfortable at night. Our troops during our frontier service, much of it along the border, wore wool, and they would come to it again in case of campaign. There is no ground for complaint about the uniform.

6. The defects in training, organization, morale, and transportation were not visible to the writers of these letters. The whole mobilization, from the standpoint of military efficiency, has been a pronounced failure. We are sending men to the front, clothed in uniform, bearing arms with which a large portion of them are almost wholly unfamiliar. They are not trained soldiers in any sense. To send them against a well-trained enemy would be to sacrifice them without a chance of their success. It is not the fault of any particular person or persons. It is the result of a system under which the Nation has treated the whole military question with indifference for generations. The existing condition can only be remedied, first, by having trained men behind the organizations to fill them up promptly; second, by having the supplies and equipment, either in the armories or near at hand, where they can be gotten at and distributed promptly; third, by thoroughly training officers and noncommissioned officers of the militia in their duties through adequate periods of field training, indoor work alone will not do it; fourth, by having adequate reserve supplies sufficient to equip the Regular Army and militia to war strength and to equip volunteers; fifth, by placing the militia under direct Federal control.

In view of the lack of training and the defective system, the method of storage, etc., the mobilization has been all that could have been expected. Every soldier of intelligence who has studied the question expected things to happen just about as they have. Quartermaster's supplies in certain lines have been exhausted for some time, although the mobilization is only about half complete, because there was no adequate reserve of supplies and no method of effective system for promptly providing them from the manufacturer. There was no effective system for promptly providing animals for mounted organizations. This was thoroughly well known. It has been necessary to buy new animals and to send them green and unbroken to be handled by men equally green and unbroken, ignorant of their care either at home or in the field. The whole system points to lack of organization, lack of foresight, and lack of preparation. Our officers and men in the Regular Establishment, staff as well as line, have, as a class, obtained rather remarkable results, everything considered.

7. There is nothing unusual to investigate in this report. It is a statement of facts and of general conditions of unpreparedness, a condition which varies only in degree.

8. In closing, I wish to emphasize the fact that no criticism can fairly be made of either officers or men of the militia. It is the system. Certain especially good organizations have in part overcome it, but these are limited in number.

WOOD, *Major General Commanding.*

Senator LEE of Maryland. General, may I ask you this question? Would you consider any cunning device of a mind unfriendly to the National Guard, or would you consider any natural mistake of the

War Department in managing the National Guard—either of those—part of the National Guard system?

Gen. WOOD. I would not call cunning devices of an unfriendly mind part of the National Guard system. We were lacking in the Supply Corps in effective management of certain features necessary for effective and prompt guard mobilization. I am entirely frank in stating so. I refer to the system of storage, failure to have supplies in sufficient quantity, or plans made adequate to secure them.

Senator LEE of Maryland. That is a very important statement, because you consider all of the omissions, if any, of the War Department as part of the National Guard system?

Gen. WOOD. If they result from the system they must be a part, because the machinery by which the War Department reaches out and gets hold of the militia, and the conduct of militia affairs, is necessarily a part of the militia system, in the sense that it is the means through which we bring the militia into the Federal service. No such trouble could occur under a system of universal training.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Now, General, right there, you say "the means by which it reaches out and gets hold of it"?

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir.

Senator LEE of Maryland. But suppose, blindly and mistakenly, it reached out and did not get hold of it.

Gen. WOOD. As it has frequently in the past.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Is that the fault of the National Guard system?

Gen. WOOD. That is the fault of the National Guard system absolutely. There is no sufficiently certain method of getting hold of the militia; we don't know what or how much we are going to get.

Senator LEE of Maryland. I wanted to get that statement from you, because it throws a great light on what you have been talking about.

Gen. WOOD. If you wish it, let me go into that a little more fully.

Of course, you are very familiar with the old law of 1792, under which all men between 18 and 45 were made members of the military force of the United States.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Which law was a dead letter for over a hundred years.

Gen. WOOD. Yes. That law required so many days of training each year, and it was a Federal proposition, really. That was replaced by the Dick law of 1903, with modifications, I think, of June, 1906, 1908, and 1910; May and April, also, in 1914—April, as I remember it. The system was further amplified by minor modifications based on those laws, in the shape of orders, always with the idea of bettering the condition of the guard and improving its efficiency. But, unfortunately—and this statement applies to the department itself—while we assigned inspector-instructors to groups of different guard regiments and guard organizations all over the Union and assigned at each department headquarters an officer in charge of militia affairs, we did not coordinate sufficiently this machinery. Those inspector-instructors, for instance, had no relation whatever with department headquarters. They were controlled entirely by the Bureau of Military Affairs of the War Department. Up to the time of mobilization the department commander had passing through his

office certain reports concerning the militia, their training, their strength, their equipment; but he was not in a position to go out and inspect in person the militia or to keep himself sufficiently in touch with it; that is, from the standpoint of an officer acting as an inspector. He was not in a position to carry out corrective measures. At the date of mobilization he had suddenly thrown upon him the entire problem of mobilizing the militia. All these inspector-instructors from the Gulf to Maine and from the Ohio to the coast reported for instructions. Then for the first time the department commander came into intimate contact with the militia. In other words, it was a system under which a maximum of change was required when the minimum was desirable.

Senator LEE of Maryland. That is, when the national emergency took place?

Gen. WOOD. Yes; and for the first time the department commander was in a position of official responsibility and had the authority to go into the militia situation. Up to that time it was a thing from which he was in effect excluded, so far as any detailed knowledge or administrative control went.

That led, of course, to an added burden of work on department headquarters; for the first time these instructor-inspectors reported to the department. I have urged for some time that instructor-inspectors should be on the staff of the department commanded and that all supplies necessary to bring militia from peace to war strength should be stored as are our supplies for Regular troops of the department—under the control of the department commander—and that instructor-inspectors should report to him. Then, if he is not fully informed as to the militia, it will be his fault; you have a fixed responsibility; you can make him responsible. But, under the system as it is, the situation is as though you were assigned to command the North Atlantic Fleet and were never allowed to go aboard it except as a guest or to know what the condition of the ships was except as the result of friendly or personal inquiry or through reports sent by the ships' officers. There was no personal touch.

Senator LEE of Maryland. You are talking about the depots now?

Gen. WOOD. I am talking about the instructor-inspectors, who should really be on the staff of the department commander, because the moment mobilization is ordered the department commander becomes solely responsible for the mobilization of the militia; that is, its assembly, physical examination, and muster into the Federal service. That is his work.

Senator BRADY. But he has no official control of it up to that time?

Gen. WOOD. Not a vestige of real control of any kind. He causes an inspection to be made once a year under general War Department orders to see what the amount and condition of the militia equipment is. This inspection is known in advance and it amounts to very little. The condition at this mobilization was one under which the department commander was suddenly called upon to take charge of the mobilization of approximately 132,000 troops. He and his staff then for the first time began to have that degree of contact and control which they should have had long before, and would have had under a sound system of organization and arrangement for mobilization. At the moment of mobilization there occurred the greatest

amount of change. The department commander, hitherto without control or detailed knowledge, was suddenly called upon to assume full responsibility.

The CHAIRMAN. But you had no authority to do it?

Gen. WOOD. Not a bit of authority.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Is there not authority in the new law for that?

Gen. WOOD. No, sir. In my opinion there is no sufficient authority. As a matter of practice, the system, with all the defects, which were brought out in this mobilization, is still in effect. There is a little more Federal supervision, but there is still dual control, and this is the fatal defect of the whole system. The new law may operate to diminish somewhat the degree of dual control, to amplify a little the powers of the Federal Government, to control somewhat the action of the State, but it has not given the Federal Government that clean-cut, unquestioned control which it must have if the force is to become a well-trained, promptly available military asset. In the last analysis about all that the Federal Government can do is to withdraw financial aid. The department commander is still left without that contact and supervisory power which he should have. He is not only without this power from the standpoint of the new law, but he is carefully excluded from it as a representative of the War Department. The instructor-inspectors are still acting under the order of the Militia Division. There is still that pronounced failure to recognize the defects of the system and its method of control through the War Department—the defects which made this mobilization a farce and might have made it a tragedy if we had had to meet an effective enemy. I am claiming that the department commander should be, so far as the militia in his department goes, and so far as State control will permit him to go, exactly in the position that he is with reference to Regular troops—he should be the superior instructor-inspector of the War Department, and he should be charged with full official responsibility for seeing that those troops are always fully equipped and ready to move; and if they are not, it should be shown that he has made the requisitions upon the War Department and done everything in his power, and the responsibility placed exactly where it belongs.

I will submit a brief statement relative to the old law and the new: new:

AUTHORITY GRANTED TO FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OVER THE NATIONAL GUARD BY THE DICK BILL AND ITS AMENDMENTS AS COMPARED TO THAT GRANTED BY THE ACT OF JUNE 3, 1916.

| DICK BILL. | NATIONAL-DEFENSE ACT. |
|---|---|
| *Control of system of organization of National Guard units.* | |
| The regularly enlisted, organized, and uniformed active militia in States, Territories, and District of Columbia who have or shall participate in annual appropriation shall constitute the "Organized Militia." The organization should be the same as that prescribed for the Regular Army. (Sec. 2, act May 27, 1908.) | The organization of the National Guard, including the composition of all units, shall be the same as that prescribed for the Regular Army. The President has power to prescribe particular unit or units as to branch or arm of service to be maintained in each State, Territory, and District of Columbia. (Sec. 60.) |

*Maintenance of troops other than those authorized.*

| | |
|---|---|
| No specific regulations. | No troops shall be maintained other than those authorized under act of June 3 (sec. 61).<br>NOTE.—Does not preclude organization and maintenance of State police or constabulary. |

*Strength of the National Guard.*

| | |
|---|---|
| No defining terms, except that no State shall be entitled to the benefits of appropriations unless the number of its regularly enlisted, organized, and uniformed active militia shall be at least 100 men for each Senator or Representative in Congress to which the State is entitled. (Sec. 2, act June 22, 1906.) | (*a*) The law prescribes that the number of National Guardsmen in each State one year from date of passage of act of June 3 shall be 200 enlisted men per Senator and Representative in Congress, and in each Territory and the District of Columbia such number as is prescribed by the President. (Sec. 62.)<br>(*b*) Each subsequent yearly increment shall not be less than 50 per cent until the total peace strength will correspond to 800 enlisted men per Senator and Representative. (Sec. 62.) |

*Exemption from militia duty.*

| | |
|---|---|
| Exemptions authorized without regard to age and other limitations; includes same classes as act June 3, except as noted under defense act. (Sec. 2, act Jan. 21, 1903.) | Exemptions as to classes same as Dick bill, but includes artificers and workmen in navy yards. All exemptions are from militia service in combatant capacity, subject to regulations prescribed by President, but no person so exempted shall be exempt from militia service in any capacity that the President shall declare to be noncombatant. (Sec. 59.) |

*Disbandment of organizations.*

| | |
|---|---|
| Nothing. | No National Guard organizations whose members shall be entitled to and shall have received compensation under act of June 3 shall be disbanded without the consent of the President. (Sec. 68.) |

*Training.*

| | |
|---|---|
| (*a*) *Number of drills.*—It is required that organizations furnished with material of war, unless excused by governor, to assemble for drills or target practice at least twenty-four times per year. Duration of such drill periods not prescribed. (Sec. 18, act Jan. 21, 1903.) | (*a*) *Number of drills.*—Each company, troop, battery, and detachment in National Guard shall assemble for drill and instruction, including indoor target practice, not less than forty-eight times each year. (Sec. 92.) |
| (*b*) *Duration and character of drills, attendance.*—Nothing. | (*b*) *Duration and character of drills, attendance.*—Credit for assembly for drill or indoor target practice shall not be given unless there shall be in attendance a number equal to or in excess of a minimum to be prescribed by President, and duration of each assembly or drill for which credit |

(c) *Encampments, etc.*—Organizations furnished with materials of war, unless excused by governor, required to participate in practice marches or camps of instruction at least 5 consecutive days per year. (Sec. 18, act Jan. 21, 1903.)

(d) *Joint Army maneuvers, etc.*—Secretary of War is authorized upon request of governors to arrange for joint encampments, maneuvers, etc., with Regular Army. During such period militia is to receive same scale of pay as Regular Army. (Act. Apr. 21, 1910.)

is given shall be at least 1½ hours and character of training such as prescribed by Secretary of War. (Sec. 92.)

(c) *Encampments, etc.*—Organization shall participate in encampments, maneuvers, including outdoor target practice, at least 15 days each year, unless such organization shall have been excused from participation therein by Secretary of War. (Sec. 92.)

(d) *Joint Army maneuvers, etc.*—Under regulations prescribed by President, Secretary of War is authorized to provide for joint encampments, maneuvers, etc., with Regular Army. During such period National Guard is entitled to same scale of pay as Regular Army. (Sec. 94.)

*Inspections.*

(a) The Secretary of War to cause to be made by officers detailed by him, at least once each year, inspection of organizations of the militia. (Sec. 14, act May 27, 1908.)

NOTE.—The supervision of this inspection was delegated to department commanders. (Par. 354, Regulations Organized Militia, 1910.)

(b) Reports of inspection were forwarded to department commanders who, after examining same and adding such remarks as they desired, were forwarded to Chief Division Militia Affairs. (Par. 357, Regulations Organized Militia, 1910.)

Secretary of War shall cause an inspection of the National Guard to be made at least once each year by inspectors general, and if necessary other officers of the Regular Army for purpose of determining general conditions of organizations. (Sec. 93.)

*Appointment of officers.*

(a) *Right of appointment of officers.*—Right reserved to the State. (Art. I, sec. 8, Constitution of the United States.)

(b) *Appointments subject to limitations.*—Nothing.

*Appointment of officers in District of Columbia and Territories.*—The commanding general, District of Columbia, shall be appointed and commissioned by President. (Sec. 7, act Mar. 1, 1889.)

President of the United States may appoint adjutant general of the Dis-

(a) *Right of appointment of officers.*—Right reserved to the State (Art. I, sec. 8, Constitution of the United States.)

(b) *Appointments subject to limitations.*—1. Age, 21–64. (Sec. 58.) 2. Selection of those recommended for commissions in National Guard limited to certain classes. (Sec. 74.) 3. Those recommended for commissions subject to mental, moral, and physical examination by board of three commissioned officers, composed of Regular Army or National Guard, or both, appointed by Secretary of War. (Sec. 75.) 4. Those commissioned must be subscribers to oath of office as prescribed in section 73, national defense act. (Sec. 74.)

*Appointment of officers in District of Columbia and Territories.*—Adjutant general of District of Columbia appointed by President, with such rank and qualifications as he may prescribe. (Sec. 66.)

Adjutant general of Territory shall be appointed by President, with such

trict of Columbia. (Sec. 9, act Mar. 1, 1889.)

In Territories officers of militia shall be appointed in such manner as may be provided by the governor and legislative assembly of each Territory. (Sec. 1857, R. S.)

rank and qualifications as he may prescribe. (Sec. 66.)

*Elimination of officers.*

No method specified.

(*a*) The moral character, capacity, and general fitness for service of any officer may at any time be determined by a board of three officers, and if findings are unfavorable to officer and approved by appointing official authorized to appoint such officer, the officer in question shall be discharged. (Sec. 77.)

(*b*) Vacation of commission for absence without leave for three months. (Sec. 77.)

(*c*) Sentence of general court-martial. (Sec. 77.)

(*d*) Resignation. (Sec. 77.)

*Limitations of State authorities in acceptance of resignations of officers.*

No limitations.

Congress by national-defense act, having assumed control respecting qualifications of officers (sec. 75) and continuity of their services (sec. 77), it has been held that in time of peace the assent of the War Department is required to the separation of an officer from the National Guard by resignation. (Dec. J. A. G., July 28, 1916, p. 5, bul. 34.)

*Enlistments.*

(*a*) Age, 18 to 45 years. (Sec. 1, act May 27, 1908.)

(*b*) *Enlistment period.*—None prescribed.

(*c*) *Qualifications.*—None prescribed.

(*d*) *Oath of enlistment.*—None prescribed.

(*a*) Age, 18 to 45 years. (Sec. 58.)

(*b*) *Enlistment period.*—Enlistment period shall be six years, divided as follows: First three years in active organization, remaining three years in National Guard Reserve; privilege of continuing in active service during entire enlistment period authorized. (Sec. 69.)

(*c*) *Qualifications.*—Qualifications for enlistment shall be same as those for Regular Army. (Sec. 69.)

(*d*) *Oath of enlistment.*—Oath of enlistment prescribed. (Sec. 70.)

*Discharge of enlisted men.*

No provisions.

(*a*) Enlisted men to be discharged in such form and with such classification as prescribed for Regular Army. (Sec. 72.)

(*b*) The discharges in times of peace prior to expiration of term of enlistment may be given under regulations prescribed by the President. (Sec. 72.)

*Accounting for property.*

| | |
|---|---|
| (*a*) Secretary of War authorized to procure by purchase or manufacture and issue, necessary equipment of all kinds required for equipping Organized Militia. (Sec. 13, act 1908.) | (*a*) Adequate provision for protection and care of property to satisfaction Secretary of War essential, condition precedent to issue thereof. (Sec. 83.) |
| (*b*) Prescribes law in procedure of disposition and replacement damaged property, etc., and that the money value of property lost or destroyed through carelessness or neglect be charged against allotment to State. (Sec. 4, June 22, 1906.) | (*b*) Prescribes law in procedure of disposition and replacement of damaged property, etc., and that the value of property lost or destroyed through carelessness shall be charged to accountable State, Territory, or District of Columbia, and to be paid by funds therefrom other than Federal. (Sec. 87.) |
| (*c*) Nothing. | (*c*) Penalty for failure to comply with law reference reimbursement Federal Government for property charged to the State, is disbarment from participation in appropriations until reimbursement has been made. (Sec. 87.) |
| (*d*) All stores to be annually accounted for by governors of States and Territories and commanding general of District of Columbia, as prescribed by the Secretary of War. (Sec. 3, act June 22, 1906.) | (*d*) Accountable officer for funds and property shall be appointed, designated, or detailed by governor of each State and Territory, and commanding general of the District of Columbia, subject to approval by the Secretary of War. Returns for property and funds shall be rendered by such officer so appointed under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of War. (Sec. 67.) |

*Detail of officers and noncommissioned officers of the Regular Army to duty as instructors of the National Guard.*

| | |
|---|---|
| Upon the application of the governor of any State or Territory furnished with material of war the Secretary of War may, in his discretion, detail one or more officers or enlisted men of the Army to report to the governor of such State or Territory for duty in connection with the Organized Militia. Such assignments may be revoked at the request of the governor of such State or Territory, or at the pleasure of the Secretary of War. (Act Mar. 3, 1911.) | (*a*) The Secretary of War shall detail officers of the active list of the Army and may detail one or more enlisted men to duty with the National Guard. (Sec. 100.)<br>(*b*) Officers so detailed may accept commissions in National Guard in discretion of President. (Sec. 100.)<br>NOTE.—Under paragraph 28, letter Militia Bureau, November 1, 1916, No. 210651, inspector-instructors are informed that the matter of their being commissioned in National Guard organizations must originate with State authorities. In the said letter, under paragraph 25 (h), inspector-instructors and noncommissioned officers on duty with the National Guard will not be relieved from duty at the request of State authorities except for cogent reasons. Any charges arising against them will be investigated and they will be given ample opportunity to reply thereto before action looking to their relief will be taken by the War Department. |

*Discipline.*

| | |
|---|---|
| (*a*) The discipline of Organized Militia shall be the same as that prescribed for the Regular Army. (Sec. 3, act 1908.) | (*a*) Discipline (which includes training) of the National Guard shall conform to the system prescribed for the Regular Army. (Sec. 91.)<br>(*b*) System of courts-martial and procedure thereof, limits of punishments, etc., are prescribed. (Secs. 107 to 108, inclusive.) |

*Passing of officers to the National Guard Reserve.*

| | |
|---|---|
| Nothing. | (*a*) Officers of National Guard rendered surplus by disbandment of their organizations shall be placed in National Guard Reserve. (Sec. 77.)<br>(*b*) Officers, on own application, may be placed in National Guard Reserve. (Sec. 77.) |

*Noncompliance with existing laws and regulations.*

| | |
|---|---|
| The annual allotment to any State, Territory, or District of Columbia shall be available only under such conditions as may be prescribed by Secretary of War to secure general increased efficiency of Organized Militia. (Act Apr. 27, 1914.) | Any State failing or refusing to comply or to enforce within time limit fixed by President any requirements of act or regulations promulgated thereunder the National Guard thereof will be deprived as the President may direct from further Federal support. (Sec. 116.) |

Senator LEE of Maryland. Under the old Dick law there was no money furnished for these inspectors to go to see the State troops.

Gen. WOOD. It is furnished now, sir.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Under the new law——

Gen. WOOD. No; under the old law, Senator, if you will pardon me. We appropriated some millions of dollars to aid the various States in militia matters, and out of this money they appropriate certain amounts for the mileage of these officers. That was, as a rule, from money given by the Federal Government to the State.

Senator LEE of Maryland. That was reconverted to a Federal purpose?

Gen. WOOD. Yes; after being given to the State.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Gen. Barry recognized that these instructors, who should be the active agencies for improving the discipline of the militia, should be separated from the inspectors of the militia. Do you agree with that?

Gen. WOOD. May I state it a little more fully than you have?

Senator LEE of Maryland. Yes.

Gen. WOOD. The reason for that recommendation was as follows: It is undesirable to have a man who has been instructing a group of organizations to also inspect them. It is practically calling upon an officer to inspect and report upon his own work. We have overcome this difficulty by having men inspect the regiments instructed by others. I have submitted a very full recommendation, setting forth what I believe to be a sound policy with reference to the rela-

tions which should exist between the department commander and instructor inspectors, as follows:

(The recommendation referred to is here printed in full, as follows:)

HEADQUARTERS EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*June 22, 1915.*

From: Department commander.
To: The Adjutant General, United States Army, Washington, D. C.
Subject: Relationship of department commander with the Organized Militia.

1. With reference to your letter of June 3, 1915 (2245346–C), informing me that the Secretary of War had disapproved the recommendations contained in my letters of January 5 and March 15, 1915 (ED 12507–B and 12507–E), I wish, in view of the apparent misconception of the subject matter of my letters, as indicated by the reply above referred to, to submit the following statement; not, however, with a view of requesting further consideration of my recommendations, as I can but conclude from the tone of the letter that no further suggestions are desired. Your letter of June 3 does not, in my opinion, clearly reply to the questions which I have brought up. My letter of January 5 in no way discusses the relationship of the Organized Militia with the War Department. That letter (Jan. 5) was as follows:

"12507–B.

"1. In view of the necessity for arranging well in advance the schedule of events in the North and South Atlantic Coast Artillery districts, I request that the department commander be authorized to take up directly with the authorities of the United States Military Academy and Organized Militia of the Coast Artillery Reserves, the question of dates for their annual encampments.

"2. This is necessary in order that the details may be properly worked out and all concerned informed well in advance. It is desired that these headquarters be furnished as soon as possible with a copy of the Annual Instruction Order for Coast Artillery Troops.

"3. It is proposed to authorize the commanding officers of the North and South Atlantic Coast Artillery districts (subject to the general supervision of these headquarters) to transfer, as may be needed for temporary service, boats and artillery material from one defense command to another, also such personnel as may be required for service as umpire, etc. I believe that this procedure is advisable in order that the commanding officers of these districts may be given a proper measure of responsibility for the efficient conduct of practice and instruction, throughout the limits of their commands. The procedure outlined is in 'general accord with the recommendations submitted by Gen. Bailey, prior to his relief from the command of the North Atlantic Coast Artillery district,' and, as will be seen, requested that in view of the necessity of arranging well in advance the schedule of events in the North and South Atlantic Coast Artillery districts, that the department commander be furnished with a copy of the Annual Instruction Order, C. A. C., and that he be authorized to take up directly with the authorities of the United States Military Academy and the Organized Militia within the limits of the department, the question of dates for these exercises. This was most desirable in order to make the necessary arrangements well in advance, as this instruction has to be carried out through the cooperation and with the assistance of regular troops of the department. In order to avoid as much as possible interference with their regular program during the outdoor season, it is important to know in advance what is to be done in connection with instruction of the militia. This was clearly and specifically stated, and I believe that the wisdom and desirability of such procedure is obvious."

2. On February 6, no formal information having been received, the request for information was renewed. In the meantime I had been in Washington and understood from Brig. Gen. Mills, Division of Militia Affairs, that these requests were under consideration and that the policy would be approved. See letter of February 6, these headquarters (12507–C). On March 15, a memorandum was furnished the Chief of Staff in the form of a letter (12507–E), stating, what I believe, should be the relations between the department commander and the Militia of the department, and pointed out the desirability of the department commander being consulted by the War Department with reference to the establishment of the various camps, etc. This letter was as follows:

"Replying to your memorandum of February 8, 1915:

"First. As to the memorandum of the Secretary of War of January 30, 1915. I fail to understand his interpretation of the first paragraph of my letter of January 5, 1915 (12507–B, ED, 2227754, A. G. O.). This paragraph states what is desired. This does not, as I understand it, in any way affect the relations between the Federal Government and the National Guard, but tends to make the department commander the Secretary of War's representative to a greater extent than is the case at present. Under the existing system the character and amount of the instruction is prescribed, and properly, by the Secretary of War through the Division of Militia Affairs of the Chief of Staff's office. In order to carry out these orders it is necessary to furnish officers, in some instances troops, a well as funds for mileage. Troops of the department, however, must be instructed and have a certain amount of field training. Under the procedure at present in force, instead of referring to the department commander the plan of instruction of the Militia within the department, with a statement of the officers and organizations to be instructed and directing him to arrange for the prescribed instruction—the first information is generally a letter of instruction from the War Department directing the department commander to arrange for camps at certain posts or places within the department for certain periods of time. This is sent to the department commander generally without any previous reference to him or any preliminary inquiry as to funds or to the department orders and arrangements for the instruction of regular troops. What was recommended was that the department commander, once he has been informed as to what troops are to participate, the amount and kind of instruction, the period for which they will be available, etc., be allowed to take the matter up with the State authorities within the department with a view to arranging the details, i. e., the exact time and dates for the different organizations, in order that there may be the minimum of interference with the plans for instruction of the troops of the department. It is understood that instruction of the Militia, because of its occupations, must in a general way take precedence over the instruction of the regular troops as to time; but, under the scheme proposed, measures could be taken to avoid to a large extent conflict in arrangements. Moreover, there is at each department headquarters an officer in charge of militia affairs, who in case the regular division is called into the field becomes the department commander, and if the Militia is to be mobilized is charged with this work. He at present has little contact with the Militia and the Militia are, with the exception of the brief period of joint instruction every other year, largely cut off from official contact with the department commander and department authorities. This is not a sound policy, neither does it tend to the establishment of that thorough knowledge of the Militia by the department authorities, nor to the establishment of those relations which should exist; nor does it tend to build up a condition which would facilitate the mobilization of the Militia in case of sudden emergency. When the present Division of Militia Affairs was organized as a division of the office of the Chief of Staff the general situation concerning the Militia was such as to necessitate a considerable measure of concentration. It was not the purpose at that time to continue indefinitely such degree of centralization, but rather to gradually place the department commanders in a position of close contact with the Militia within the limits of their departments, once the existing conditions were corrected.

"In my opinion the inspector instructors should be attached to department headquarters through the office of the officer in charge of militia affairs, who should have general supervision over their discharge of duty, so far as such supervision may be necessary. These officers are now without any direct connection with headquarters, and neither the department commander nor the officer in charge of militia affairs have any relations with them which either warrants an exercise of supervision or authorizes the securing of information concerning actual conditions in the militia.

"The procedure recommended will facilitate the work of militia instruction and tend to build up those relations between the militia and the department authorities which will enable the latter to become thoroughly familiar in time of peace with conditions existing within the militia and not render it necessary to familiarize themselves with militia conditions at the moment of mobilization when all is confusion. In any case it is believed that department commanders should be authorized to deal directly with inspector instructors in all matters which pertain to mobilization. At present the department commander has no

authority to call upon the inspector instructors for information upon this subject. In other words, a condition exists which does not tend to that degree of preparedness for mobilization which should exist, but rather to one which renders it difficult for the department commander to familiarize himself with conditions which would be of vital importance to him in case a prompt mobilization of the militia were necessary. It is an unsound administrative situation and prejudicial to the prompt mobilization of the milita. To accomplsh this, the authority immediately charged with the mobilization must be thoroughly familiar in advance with everything pertaining thereto, including the conditions as to the equipment and preparedness of the troops.

"As an illustration of existing conditions four letters of instructions have recently been received relative to camps of instruction, as follows:

"(*a*) For Infantry officers at the several State camps.

"(*b*) For Cavalry officers at Fort Ethan Allen, Vt., and Fort Oglethorpe, Ga.

"(*c*) For Field Artillery officers at Tobyhanna, Pa., and Anniston, Ala.

"(*d*) For medical officers and noncommissioned officers of the Organized Militia and medical officers of the Reserve Corps at Tobyhanna, Pa., and Fort Oglethorpe, Ga.

"The places and times for these camps have been selected without any reference of the matter to these headquarters or any knowledge by the militia division of the plans for the field work of the troops of the department or of available funds for moving officers. As a matter of fact, the department is without mileage funds necessary to send officers to these camps as instructors. It can be readily seen that orders issued in this manner cause confusion and do not tend to the best results. The method of procedure fails to in any way consider the plans of the department as to its regular work. I think such disregard is unnecessary."

The final paragraph of this letter states explicitly the situation and points out the desirability of the department commander knowing something of what is intended. The department commander is charged with the instruction and efficiency of the regular troops of his command, and he has certain duties in connection with the militia, and I believe that good administration indicates clearly the desirability of his having the fullest possible information well in advance so that he may make the necessary plans.

3. There was nothing in these recommendations, so far as I can see, that involved the relationship of the Federal Government and the Organized Militia. With reference to the statement in paragraph (*b*), letter of June 3 (A. G. O., 2245346–C, HED 12507–F), "also he is charged with the elaboration of plans for the mobilization of militia when called into the Federal service, which responsibility, by the way, has not yet been met." On February 13 the department commander forwarded to the Secretary of War a report of the officer in charge of militia affairs, Eastern Department, requesting certain information, in order that this very question of mobilization of militia could be intelligently taken up (12672–A). This letter has neither been acknowledged nor any reply to the questions therein asked received. The matter of elaborating plans for the mobilization of militia in this department is a comparatively simple one, but in view of the questions raised by the officer in charge of militia affairs I deemed it wise to obtain the decision of the Secretary of War on what seemed to be important points before these plans were taken up. With reference to the statements made in subsequent portions of your letter of June 3, I believe that I am reasonably familiar with the relationship which exists between the Federal Government and the militia. Many of the existing regulations were prepared under my general supervision. Nowhere in my letters, within referred to, is there the most remote suggestion or implication that the War Department could give orders to governors of States, much less that the department commander could do so, nor is there any thought or suggestion of interfering with or diminishing the dignity of communication of the Federal Government with the governors of States. The advisory capacity of inspector-instructors is fully understood. What was clearly indicated was that the department commander and the officer in charge of militia affairs, should, without in any way originating policy, be the senior representatives of the War Department in its dealings with the militia authorities within the limits of the department, and that the officers on duty within the department limits should be attached to the office of the officer in charge of militia affairs in order that there might be a fuller understanding and more complete cooperation. I believe that this policy is sound and that its initiation would tend greatly to improve the efficiency of the work being done. There was no question what-

ever raised concerning the formulation of policy by the department authorities; in fact, it was clearly stated that it must be originated by the Secretary of War, nor was there any suggestion concernnig the allotment of funds to the different States by department commanders.

4. In submitting this letter I wish to state most positively that it is not submitted in any spirit of controversy, but simply with a view to clearing up on the records what I can only conclude from your letter of June 3 is an entire misconception of the purpose of my recommendations. My object was to establish what I believed to be a greater degree of cooperation, more helpful relationship, and thorough understanding between the department commander, his principal assistant in militia matters, and the militia authorities of the various States.

LEONARD WOOD,
*Major General, Commanding.*

(Mailed June 26, 1915, a. m.)

Senator LEE of Maryland. You agree with Gen. Barry on that?

Gen. WOOD. Oh, yes; in principle. We take the inspector from one State or one district and send him to inspect the work of the inspector in another. For instance, if I was assigned, we will say, to the Second Maryland Regiment or the Fifth New Jersey, and Senator Lee were assigned to another one, as inspectors, I would inspect his regiment and he would inspect mine, so that there might not be too much of the personal equation.

Senator BRADY. It certainly would not be proper to have a man inspect his own work.

Gen. WOOD. No; certainly not.

Senator LEE of Maryland. That has been the system up to date?

Gen. WOOD. No, sir. As a rule, instructor-inspectors do not inspect troops which they have instructed. For several years I have been trying to secure action placing the instructor-inspectors on the staff of the department commander with relations as set forth in the above letter. You will not find the detailed instructions governing the duties of instructor-inspectors in the militia law. You will find these in general orders and circulars. In brief, the department commander should be the superior inspector and the senior representative of the War Department in all matters relating to the militia within the limits of his department. His contact should be so close and so intimate that when mobilization is ordered he will be as familiar with the militia and its equipment and training as with the regular troops under his command.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Gen. Barry says in his fifth item, on page 136, report of October 19, 1916:

The position of inspector-instructor should be abolished. There should be two classes of officers on regular duty with the National Guard—one, instructors; and the other, inspectors.

An instructor should be assigned from the Regular Army to each regiment, or other independent unit, of the National Guard. When suitable mobilization camps are selected and the administrative staff of such camps, composed of regular officers, assisted by staff officers and noncommissioned officers of the National Guard, there would be no necessity for taking instructors away from their regiments in order to perform staff duties at mobilization camps just at the time when their services are most needed with their organizations.

In other words, these instructors were taken from that and made mustering officers.

Gen. WOOD. They had to be, sir. We were very short of regular officers, as you know. Moreover, they were well informed on local conditions.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Gen. Barry continues:

The instructor should accompany the organization wherever it goes and might be given suitable rank therein when the organization is called into Federal service.

Inspectors of the National Guard should be carefully selected from officers on the active list of the Regular Army. They should be assigned to department headquarters, and their sole duty should be to inspect the National Guard organizations within the department and the instructors thereof.

Only by having these two classes—instructors and inspectors—will it be possible to make anything like an efficient machine out of the various and varying units of the National Guard.

Senator BRADY. What is your opinion about that, Senator Lee? Do you not believe that should be done?

Senator LEE of Maryland. Absolutely; but under the present arrangement it is a Federal condition and not a National Guard condition, not a local condition.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it a deficiency in the law or a deficiency in not enforcing the law that we have?

Senator LEE of Maryland. I should say it was a failure of sound military judgment somewhere, either in the War Department or in legislation.

Senator BRADY. Is it not a failure of some of the States to pass the law?

Senator LEE of Maryland. The States had nothing to do with it. They were the victims of the omission. The effect was upon the State troops. This system of instruction and inspection was vital to the discipline of the National Guard, and yet it was defective.

Senator BRADY. Do the laws of the States permit the National Government to inspect in that manner?

Senator LEE of Maryland. The States could not take the Regular Army system and remodel it. That must come from Congress and the War Department.

Senator BRADY. Do you not believe, Senator Lee, that what we really need in this matter is cooperation between the States and the National Government, and out of this chaotic condition to bring in something that will be really beneficial in the way of military endeavor?

Senator LEE of Maryland. Senator, I think that, so far as I can judge, there has been no lack of willingness to cooperate on instruction by the States. I think Gen. Wood so testified.

Senator BRADY. I feel that way myself about it; but, with all the cooperation that we have been able to give between the States and the Government, it seems to me we still lack something in the way of law.

Gen. WOOD. Senator, may I state right here, in order to clarify this discussion as much as possible, that these instructor-inspectors, when they go to a State, report to the adjutant general of the State and are under his exclusive orders? The department commander has nothing to do with them—no control over them in their relations with the militia. They act under the orders of the adjutant general of the State, and when they report they report to the adjutant general, and, as a matter of courtesy to the governor, they are on his staff, and the department commander has nothing to do with them.

Senator BRADY. I remember when I was governor of my State that the adjutant general would bring the report of the inspection to the executive office and preserve it.

Senator LEE of Maryland. General, if this group of officers report to the adjutant general of the State of Maryland as instructor-inspectors from the War Department, the adjutant general of Maryland would hardly have the authority or the relationship to say, "You gentlemen can not be instructor-inspectors."

Gen. WOOD. He can not properly say that.

Senator LEE of Maryland. He could not say, "I am going to stop some of you from inspecting and make you instructors, and I am going to have one of you merely an inspector." He could not do that, could he?

Gen. WOOD. He can not do that. Their general functions are fixed by War Department orders. Your idea is not a bad one at all. The reason that we have had to combine the functions is due to the shortage of officers.

Senator LEE of Maryland. I would respectfully agree with Gen. Barry's recommendation that they should have the single function.

Gen. WOOD. Of course, Senator, we should not need as many inspectors as we do instructors.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Very few inspectors; say one for a State.

Gen. WOOD. Of course, that would depend upon the number of organizations to be inspected and the arm. If this scheme which I have outlined is accepted, i. e., attaching instructors to the staff of the commanding general of the department, it should be done. Our regular inspector general and his assistants would make the detailed inspection of the militia, just as they do in case of the Regular troops, and the function of these other officers would be principally that of instructors. I hope this plan will be approved. The fundamental objection to the present militia system is that these troops are really State organizations, they are not Federal. The whole system in its working and results is founded on uncertainty and clouded by obscurity. We do not know what we have as a military asset. It depends too much on State action. This is the crucial defect. I am not disposed to criticize, as I have repeatedly said, either officers or men. They have done the best they could under the defective system. It is the system that we are after. National defense must be by national troops, not State.

Senator LEE of Maryland. General, I will submit for your inspection and insert in the record War Department Bulletin No. 58, dated August 2, 1916, being a telegram from Gen. Funston.

(The bulletin referred to is here printed in full, as follows:)

WAR DEPARTMENT PRESS BULLETIN No. 58.

AUGUST 2, 1916—*10.30 a. m.*

Following telegram has been received from Gen. Funston:

"I wish to call attention of the War Department to the carnival of lying being indulged in by many of the correspondents who accompanied the State troops to the border. I have never seen nor heard of anything that approaches it for sheer maliciousness and shamelessness. While there are honorable exceptions, many of these correspondents are men of no judgment or balance and have had so little experience in the world that they seem to have no sense of balance or proportion.

"Ordinary inconveniences or deprivations that to a man of real soldierly instincts are merely subjects for jokes are magnified into most distressing stories. They persistently neglect to say anything about the excellent and creditable

things that they see, and if they can see nothing to find fault with, they manufacture lies out of whole cloth. The effect is to distress needlessly the families and friends of the members of the State organizations and to make people of other nations think we are a degenerated race of sissies and mollycoddles, incapable of being made into soldiers. I have endured these pests as long as I propose to and shall hereafter bar offenders from camp and prohibit them from accompanying troops on the march."

Senator LEE of Maryland. I will ask you whether or not that did not have a discouraging effect upon enlistment. I do not mean the bulletin; I mean the rumors.

Gen. WOOD. The report of alleged bad conditions and inconvenience?

Senator LEE of Maryland. Yes; the "carnival of lying" about the conditions of the troops, their food, etc.; whether that did not have an effect upon enlistment.

Gen. WOOD. I do not believe it would have deterred you or the average man who intended to serve the Nation. I believe it deterred a good many feeble-hearted ones.

Senator LEE of Maryland. In this connection I will put into the record a telegram which I sent Gen. Bliss, and his answer on the same subject.

(The telegrams referred to are here printed in full as follows:)

JULY 28, 1916.

Maj. Gen. TASKER H. BLISS,
*El Paso, Tex.*

You are quoted in papers here as stating your intention to recommend to the Secretary of War that all guardsmen on the border who are discontented with camp life be sent back home as soon as the military exigency permits. The guard is doing good work on the border and knows it and is being well handled, I hear. Any recommendation or action yielding to alleged discontent or discrimination as to service would be injurious to discipline and improvement. I can not believe that you made such a statement and consider it merely an attempted attack from some persons hostile to the development of the National Guard and trying to use your name for false ends. Please telegraph me collect whether or not you made the statement alleged.

BLAIR LEE.

---

COLUMBUS, N. MEX., *July 28, 1916.*

Senator BLAIR LEE,
*Washington, D. C.:*

The only statements made by me in reference National Guard conditions on border are to be found in my daily reports to Secretary of War. Anything else is a lie. The universal spirit of cheerfulness and contentment in the National Guard troops is the finest thing I ever saw.

TASKER H. BLISS.

Senator LEE of Maryland. I call your attention to the item of the cost to the Government of recruiting 154,230 men serving on the border, from the National Guard, out of which total 139,230 were recruited by the guard itself, without cost to the National Government—deducting 15,000 recruited by the Federal Government.

Gen. WOOD. That was preliminary to the call, principally; yes, sir.

Senator LEE of Maryland. A large number accrued to the guard after that, because the Government only recruited 15,000.

Gen. WOOD. We had in the entire National Guard throughout the Union, when they were called out, something over 138,000.

Senator LEE of Maryland. This is a small item. The cost of recruiting the Regular Army is $19 a man; so, if the National Guard system recruited 139,230 men, it saved, from the standpoint of a Federal recruiting agency, $2,511,800 to the National Government. But is not that an item worth considering, from the standpoint of a system?

Gen. WOOD. May I state your case, to see if I understand it clearly?

Senator LEE of Maryland. Yes, sir.

Gen. WOOD. You stated that the National Guard had in its ranks through its own efforts 139,000 men, in round numbers?

Senator LEE of Maryland. Yes, sir.

Gen. WOOD. Those men were recruited, as I understand it, as members of State organizations prior to the President's call?

Senator LEE of Maryland. No, sir; I beg your pardon. Those were the men who went to the border and were accepted by the Federal Government.

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir. They were recruited by the States, most of them, prior to the Federal call. They were part of the Organized Militia when called. As you know, about 50 per cent of the militia—I am quoting here the statement of the Department of Militia Affairs; it does not quite hold true in this department—about 50 per cent of the men who were on the rolls of the guard, for one cause or another, were not sent to the border. Some were rejected for physical reasons, some were excused by the governors after the call—improperly, as they had no authority to do it—and others failed to respond. So, whatever the cost of the 139,000 men originally was, you would have to double it, so far as the effective returns to the Federal Government were concerned. Of course, that was done as State organizations, recruited as they ordinarily are; and I have no doubt that they got the individual man more cheaply than we could the Regular soldier. As recruits for the militia came from the immediate vicinity of the organization's headquarters, there is no cost of maintenance en route, railroad transportation, etc., which are charged against the Regular recruit. When we have universal service, recruiting, its cost and its uncertainties, will be a thing of the past.

Senator LEE of Maryland. I think you misunderstand what I mean, General, because I am dealing with figures of the finally accepted men who went to the border and served. There were 154,230 of these men.

Gen. WOOD. Yes; about that number, I think.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Now, deducting from that number the 15,000 that the Federal instrumentalities recruited and which are stated in the report, it leaves clearly and unmistakably, out of the finally accepted men, 139,230 that must have been enlisted by the activities of the militia themselves.

Gen. WOOD. All right, sir.

Senator LEE of Maryland. If you multiply this by the average cost to the United States Army of enlisting a man, $19, this item alone has saved the Government $2,511,800. I will concede that there is something still to be deducted from that. There is the cost of transportation, equipping, handling, and feeding the number of men that

were rejected, which must have been a very large number, either 20 per cent or 30 per cent—there were practically none in some commands and 50 per cent in others; we will say 20 per cent—allowing $40 a head as the cost of each, there was a cost of $1,256,000 that should be deducted from the other saving to show the net saving of the Guard system to the National Government as a recruiting agency.

On this question of supplies, General: When you thought it your duty to criticise the National Guard system at that time you were really very active and very complimentary to the summer camping system, which you yourself had had a great deal to do with starting; and there has been some criticism in connection with the failure to have equipment on hand for the National Guard and the Regular Army; that this equipment had been diverted from the depots to the Plattsburg and other camps. I will read from a statement in a local newspaper:

When the matter of issuing this equipment to the training camps at Plattsburg, Fort Ogelthorpe and other places was under consideration at the War Department, it is said, officers of the militia division saw what it meant to the National Guard and made a strenuous but unsuccessful protest against it. The War Department overruled the protest and decided to issue the clothing, failing, apparently, to see the point made by the militia division. (Washington Evening Star, June 26, 1916.)

Now, is it not a matter of fact that distribution was made before the call, from the storage places to these summer camps, and decreased the available supply of equipment?

Gen. WOOD. The request for the distribution of supplies for the summer camps was made, I think, in April. It was made by order of the War Department. At that time there was no authority vested in the department commander to move anything from a depot, nor is there ever such authority until the militia is called into the Federal service or a great emergency. There was at that time, of course, no anticipation of this call of the militia. The summer camps had been going three years, and each year we had shipped to the mobilization camp a month or two in advance, in order that they might be prepared, overhauled, and cleaned up and promptly available, the necessary equipment for the training of the estimated number of men. Last year we looked forward to a large number, and the recommendation went out in routine form, probably some time after mid year, requesting the department to make the necessary shipments of supplies. That it did reduce the amount of available reserves of arms and equipment is, of course, self-evident; but that there was any anticipation or thought or intent to cripple the militia it is unnecessary to state is wholly untrue and unreasonable.

On February 3, 1917, the following memorandum was sent to department quartermaster, department signal officer, department surgeon, department Ordnance officer. Their replies are given below:

It was stated in the hearing before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs that the equipment needed for the National Guard had been deflected by Gen. Wood for use at Plattsburg.

Please look this up with reference to your department's equipment, and give me a brief memoranda on it. The general has charged me with gathering the necessary data to extend his hearings on this point as requested by the committee.

C. E. KILBOURNE,
*Major, General Staff.*

No supplies nor equipment, pertaining to the Medical Department, in the knowledge of this office, were diverted from the National Guard by Gen. Wood for use at Plattsburg camps.

CHAS. RICHARD,
*Colonel, Medical Corps, Department Surgeon.*

OFFICE DEPARTMENT SURGEON,
*Governors Island, N. Y., February 5, 1917.*

[First indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS, EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*February 5, 1917.*

To COMMANDING GENERAL, *Eastern* DEPARTMENT.

1. There is no record in this office of such action.

O. B. MITCHAM,
*Colonel, Ordnance Department, D. O. O.*

---

HEADQUARTERS EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*New York City, February 6, 1917.*

From: Department signal officer, Eastern Department.
To: Maj. Kilbourne, Governors Island, N. Y.
Subject: Signal Corps equipment.

1. Practically every item of Signal Corps equipment issued in connection with the 1916 instruction camps at Plattsburg, N. Y., was ordered shipped to the camp prior to the call of the Presiden of June 18, 1916. The only exceped items consisted of some photographic material, which is not issued to troops, one radio pack-frame equipment, and some message books; these were supplied the camp after the call.

2. Every issue of Signal Corps property to these camps was made under specific orders of the Chief Signal Officer of the Army.

3. No Signal Corps equipment needed for the equipment of the National Guard was deflected by any office of these headquarters for use at the camps.

4. The Chief Signal Officer of the Army undobutedly considered the Signal Corps equipment at the camp available for use elsewhere in case of emergency, and such as he ordered shipped elsewhere was immediately so shipped.

CARL T. HARTMAN,
*Major, Signal Corps.*

---

FEBRUARY 13, 1917.

Memorandum to Maj. Kilburn. In re shipment of equipment from supply deport No. 1, at Philadelphia, to Plattsburg instruction camp in 1916.

1. The records of the department quartermaster's office indicate as follows, to wit:

(*a*) Letter No. 354, Plattsburg, dated April 13, 1916, from department quartermaster to Quartermaster General requested authority to call on the proper depots to ship such quantities of articles as were enumerated in an attached list to Plattsburg Barracks, N. Y., for use at the military training camp. The amounts on the list were based on a maximum camp attendance at any one time of 3,600. Authority was requested at the same time to increase the call if the numbers to attend the camp were increased. The request in this letter was granted.

(*b*) Under date of May 11, 1916, Maj. Lawton, Quartermaster Corps, in absence of the officer designated camp commander at Plattsburg Camp, requested that equipment for 1,800 men, in addition to the 3,600 already estimated for, be shipped to reach Plattsburg by June 20, 1916. The depots affected were notified by these headquarters under date of May 18 to make this shipment. Under dates of May 22 and May 23 the depot quartermaster, Philadelphia, stated that he could not supply from stock certain articles required for the training camps, such as blankets, cots, pyramidal tents, but that these could be supplied from the stock pertaining to field supply depot No. 1, in which ample supply is stored, if authorized by the Secretary of War.

(*c*) Under date of June 1 a letter was written from these headquarters to the Adjutant General of the Army requesting that such supplies as were re-

quired at the training camp at Plattsburg, N. Y., which could not be supplied by the designated depots be furnished from the supplies stored in field supply depot No. 1 as recommended by the depot quartermaster, Philadelphia, Pa., these supplies to be returned to field supply depot No. 1 upon completion of the camp. The Quartermaster General, under date of June 7, 1916 (second indorsement on the letter), stated that no objection was seen to authorizing certain supplies available at field supply depot No. 1 being used for this purpose, and that they should be returned to that depot after having been inspected for serviceability, such as had become unserviceable to be replaced by new supplies.

(*d*) The recommendation of the Quartermaster General was approved by the Secretary of War in the third indorsement No. 2408987, dated June 12, 1916.

2. It will be seen from the above that the shipment of supplies to the training camp at Plattsburg from those stored in field supply depot No. 1 was approved and, it is understood, the shipments were made before the call of the President for the mobilization of the National Guard on June 18, 1916.

3. When these supplies were needed for the issue to the National Guard the blankets were shipped from Plattsburg to the points designated by the depot quartermaster in Philadelphia, and other blankets which were purchased in the open market were issued to instruction camp.

4. All shortages in cots, tentage, etc., at the instruction camp at Plattsburg were supplied as far as practicable from the posts in the department or by purchase.

5. The use of the supplies pertaining to field supply depot No. 1 do not in any manner affect the supplying of the National Guard, as those supplies which were required by the Quartermaster Corps to issue to the National Guard were returned for that use.

6. The maximum equipment shipped to the instruction camp at Plattsburg was for 8,400 men and had all of this equipment been supplied by the Quartermaster Corps from its depots it should not have affected the supplying of the National Guard by the Quartermaster Corps, as the total number of the National Guard mobilized amounted to approximately 135,000 men.

7. The small amount of supplies used at Plattsburg from field supply depot No. 1 to make up what the Quartermaster Corps could not furnish from its supplies at the depots pertaining to the Regular Army could not possibly have materially affected the supplying of the mobilized National Guard.

8. By comparing the date of the call for the mobilization of the National Guard with the dates of the shipments of supplies from field supply depot No. 1 to Plattsburg Barracks it will be seen that the statement that the supplying of the National Guard had been impeded by the department commander ordering supplies from field supply depot No. 1 to Plattsburg Barracks is not correct for the following reasons, to wit:

(*a*) The ordering of the supplies from field supply depot No. 1 to Plattsburg was authorized by the Secretary of War.

(*b*) That this ordering antedated the President's call for the National Guard.

(*c*) That the supplies pertaining to field supply depot No. 1 necessary for the National Guard were shipped to them from the camp at Plattsburg.

J. B. B.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Was it not rather a lack of foresight? Because you testified yourself that for three years we had been confronted by a serious condition of things on the border.

Gen. WOOD. No, sir; there was no lack of foresight, as we had reason to believe that reserves were ample for the militia at war strength plus the Regular Army demands and some in excess. As to the border situation, that has been serious since 1912. At least such is my opinion; not a condition of great national danger, but locally serious.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Our whole Regular Army had been assembled on the border and had been watching this situation?

Gen. WOOD. That is right; practically all our mobile army in this country.

Senator LEE of Maryland. It was so imminent, so to speak, that *certain com*manders were warned officially by War Department letters

of the 11th of May, of a probable call of the militia. Was that official notice sent out to all the department commanders?

Gen. WOOD. I have no recollection of receiving anything other than the letter of May 11 to which I have already referred. This was simply a letter of instructions as to forms. The instructions were carried out.

The summer camps were started in 1913. Equipment was furnished, as I have above explained. The troops were ordered to the border in 1911; I think that was the first order. They were partially withdrawn and they sent again in 1912, and they were very largely added to late in 1912. I was chief of staff at the time, and that was done in order that the incoming administration might find the instrumentality, so far as the Regular Army was concerned, at hand and immediately available for the carrying out of any policy that it decided upon.

With reference to supplies and the shortage, I will quote now from memory, and insert in substantiation of what I say a letter which is official and correct.

You will find, sir, that on the 17th day of last January the Quartermaster General of the United States Army, in testifying before the House Military Committee, in reply to questions stated as given in the following communication:

[Eighth indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*December 29, 1916.*

To The ADJUTANT GENERAL OF THE ARMY:

1. Inviting attention to the memorandum of the Department Quartermaster (7th Ind.—especially par. 12). It is concurred in as are the general conclusions embodied in the 7th indorsement. The department has not been able to supply the troops either promptly or within reasonable time, and had it been necessary to send the militia at war strength to any field of immediate activity, they would have gone largely unprepared so far as the Quartermaster General's Department was concerned.

2. In January, 1916, the Quartermaster General stated as follows, in reply to a question by the chairman of the House Military Committee (see page 24, House Military Committee, Jany. 17, 1916):

"Question. Is there any extra equipment, over and above the equipment you have for the Regular Army and the National Guard?

"Answer (by the Quartermaster General). Yes, sir; we have, or could purchase in a short time enough to equip, I should say, 250,000 men."

Later in the same hearing (page 25) he said:

"This together with the 100,000 now equipped in the Regular Army, the 130,000 in the militia who are now equipped, and the supplies that we have in the storehouses, say for 150,000 men, would give us an equipment of clothing and equippage for from 600,000 to 700,000 men in ninety days."

Later he says:

"We have sufficient clothing to equip 150,000 men in the depots and storehouses."

This was in addition to the equipment of the Regular Army which was 100,000 and the equipment of the militia which was estimated to be 130,000.

Further on in the same hearing, on the same page, he says:

"In ninety days we ought to have equipment for 600,000 to 700,000 men, with sufficient deliveries to maintain those who are now or may be equipped."

Up to the present time we have mobilized not more than 160,000 militia, and the Regular Army is 109,000, at home and abroad, and the militia in service to-day, which is far under 160,000, is not yet equipped.

3. If these statements were even approximately correct, it is not understood why supplies were not promptly forthcoming, as the total number of militia mobilized was (as already stated) not in excess of 160,000 men, and the Regular Army within the continental limits of the United States amounted to, roughly,

from 75,000 to 76,000 men, of whom only 46,000 or 47,000 were sent to the border. Generally speaking, these were reasonably well equipped so far as the Quartermaster Department was concerned.

4. Mobilization indicates the necessity for radical changes in the methods of supply, and the maintenance of an adequate reserve supply, so distributed as to be promptly available and within easy reach of organizations. It is believed that the amounts spent for express and special freights, combined with other charges incident to delay of mobilization were in excess of what suitable buildings for reserve militia supplies at posts conveniently situated, would have cost. (In this connection attention is invited to 3rd Ind. of report submitted this date, with reference to report of the board of officers, distribution and storage of militia supplies $\left(\frac{\text{AG 2417794}}{\text{J}}\right)$. These reserve supplies, at least to the extent of an amount adequate to supply deficiencies and equip the men necessary to bring the militia to war strength, should be under the immediate control of the department commander, through his proper staff officer. For instance, the supplies for New York should either be stored in fire-proof armories of the regiments to which they are to go, or should be stored on Governors Island, so that they can be distributed in periods measured not by weeks, but hours.

5. It took us, even at first, longer to get supplies for certain regiments than it took the great armies of France and Germany to mobilize, get their equipment, and reach the battle field. It is now six months after the call for mobilization, and troops are still unsupplied, as applications from the Southern Department for supplies here and elsewhere, clearly indicate. The supply situation is, from the standpoint of military efficiency, exceedingly bad.

LEONARD WOOD,
*Major General, Commanding.*

The following is the memorandum of the Department Quartermaster on supply by his corps:

[Seventh indorsement.]

OFFICE QUARTERMASTER, EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*December 11, 1916.*

TO COMMANDING GENERAL, EASTERN DEPARTMENT.

1. In my opinion the Quartermaster Corps failed fundamentally to perform the functions with which it is charged by statute and by paragraph 455 (b), Army Regulations, 1913, and the fact that the State authorities had not equipped their troops as provided by paragraph 455 (a), Army Regulations, 1913, simply intensifies, in my opinion, the failure of the Quartermaster Corps to perform its functions as the supplying of the equipment for the minimum strength of National Guard organizations was also the duty of the Quartermaster Corps.

2. So far as I was, or have been, able to discover, the Quartermaster Corps had, at no time previous to the departure of the National Guard organizations of the Eastern Department for duty on the border, furnished the equipment which it was required to furnish under paragraph 455 (b), Army Regulations, 1913, without requisition.

3. In fact, I am quite certain that not a single National Guard organization pertaining to the Eastern Department, no matter how well equipped by the State authorities on the basis of the minimum strength of organizations, left for duty on the border fully equipped as required by regulations and this condition was unquestionably due to the failure of the Quartermaster Corps to perform its functions.

4. After a lapse of weeks and months from the date of the call of the President on June 18, 1916, the Quartermaster Corps had still failed to equip the organizations of the National Guard pertaining to the Eastern Department on the basis required of it by paragraph 455 (b), Army Regulations, 1913.

5. Whatever responsibility may lie with the State authorities for their failure to comply with paragraph 455 (a), Army Regulations, 1913, so far as they controlled its execution, I fail to see its pertinency to the feature of the Quartermaster Corps to comply with paragraph 455 (b), Army Regulations, for, had the Quartermaster Corps complied promptly and efficiently with the latter, the National Guard organizations would have received immediately

equipment for 918 men, which is the difference between the peace strength of a National Guard Infantry Regiment, which is 918 enlisted men, and the war strength of the same, which is 1,836 enlisted men, not including sanitary units (per tables of organization).

6. This would have equipped the peace strength of the organizations, though they had no equipment whatsoever in their possession, and permitted their being forwarded immediately to the border for duty as the minimum strength of organizations was the basis set by the War Department, so far as personnel was concerned, for muster into the Federal service and, when equipped, for forwarding to the border for duty. When the recruits necessary to bring these organizations up to the war strength had been obtained, they could have been equipped and sent to their organizations on the border.

7. The failure of the State authorities to comply with paragraph 455 (a), Army Regulations, 1913, and the use of such supplies as were shipped by the Quartermaster Corps to remedy this failure of the State authorities, does not, in my opinion, warrant the deduction that "as a result, no doubt, articles were obtained that were not as good a quality as the standard samples, but which, under the circumstances, were the best that could be obtained," because the quality and character of articles which were purchased by the Quartermaster Corps and furnished to some of the National Guard organizations were so flagrantly below any standard of quality or of suitability for the purposes intended that they should never have been purchased at all, even if the failure to do so eliminated completely the equipment or these troops with these articles.

8. I desire to state further that I am of the opinion that suitable articles of a quality at least equal to that of the standard samples could have been purchased, and that the responsibility for not making such purchases must lie with the Quartermaster Corps.

9. Perhaps the statement that "the organizations in question have undoubtedly long ago been properly equipped" is correct, but from the impressions which I have received as to the completion of the equipment of the National Guard organizations pertaining to the Eastern Department since they left the territorial jurisdiction of this department, I am of the opinion that this statement is not correct and that many of these organizations are not yet completely equipped as they should have been equipped by the Quartermaster Corps, without requisition, under paragraph 455 (b), Army Regulations, 1913, at the time of the call on June 18, 1916.

10. The fact that "no further complaints have been received" is not, in my mind, retroactive, and does not relieve the Quartermaster Corps of its failure to perform promptly and efficiently its functions at the time that they should have been performed.

11. I do not desire my remarks to be construed as a criticism of individuals but of the results which flowed from the failure of any individual who failed in any particular to perform the functions with which he was charged with intelligence, efficiency, and promptness.

12. I recommend, in the interest of the service and for the efficient and economical administration of its business, that no further correspondence be continued on particular reports of the failure of the supply departments to perform their functions efficiently and promptly during the late mobilization of the National Guard troops but that a general investigation and report be made, using particular cases as exhibits for such investigation and report.

13. "When there is medicine to be taken there is no use playing with the spoon," and I make the above recommendation because I consider that the Quartermaster Corps—not necessarily specific members of it—failed absolutely to perform its functions efficiently for the supplying of the troops of the National Guard of the Eastern Department, which were mobilized under the call of the President dated June 18, 1916.

14. There is much work of the Quartermaster Corps yet to be done toward settling indebtedness of the Federal Government in the Eastern Department incident to their mobilization and which may amount to millions of dollars.

15. Hence my recommendation in the 12th paragraph, because I wish to avoid the excessive and, to my mind, absolutely unnecessary amount of correspondence now existing in the transaction of the business of the Army and with the hope that, by transacting this business as a whole instead of piecemeal, it will greatly reduce the amount of correspondence necessary to perform this duty.

BELLINGER,
Col., Quartermaster Corps.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Who was that, General?

Gen. WOOD. Gen. Aleshire. As a matter of fact, I sent a regiment of Alabama cavalry to the front recently short 1,100 horses which it was to receive on the border, so it was hardly fair to call it a shortage; short saddles for a number of troops; bridles, I think, for seven; sabers for three; they had not a machine gun, a machine gun animal, or machine gun pack equipment. These I suppose they got on the border. This was the fault of the Regular Army supply corps; there is no question about that. These green, uninstructed troops were wholly unprepared for service when they got there. They were admirable gentlemen, but they were not soldiers; and they went to the theater of presumptive operations against a possible and presumptive enemy. Otherwise they would not have been sent there. There in the presence of the enemy they are to be introduced to their horses, practically untrained, and receive a large portion of their equipment. Their total unfitness for immediate service is apparent. Complete equipment for this organization should have been received by it in its camp, and it should have had as many days training as possible before going to the border.

Senator LEE of Maryland. You took a position before the House committee last year that troops of Cavalry that had no mounts and Artillery that had no horses should not be sent to a front and provided with horses in the presence of an enemy?

Gen. WOOD. No, sir; before this committee.

Senator LEE of Maryland. General, I think the condition of these National Guard organizations was "horseless," and your opinion was against supplying unmounted Cavalry and batteries with horses and other equipment, presumably in the presence of an enemy?

Gen. WOOD. The so-called mounted organizations—Cavalry, Field Artillery, and certain auxiliary troops, such as Signal Corps troops—were, in general terms, without horses. They were without adequate machine guns as a rule; they were without proper Field Artillery equipment in many instances.

The following correspondence deals with the supply of equipment of the First Alabama Cavalry and indicates its condition as to supply when it left for the front:

NOVEMBER 24, 1916.

From: Department Commander.
To: The Adjutant General of the Army.
Subject: Equipment of First Alabama Cavalry.

1. Attention is invited to the following telegram:

"MONTGOMERY, ALA., *November 22, 1916.*

"Reference your telegram June 22 report First Cavalry National Guard Alabama entirely equipped with clothing and quartermaster supplies. Reasonably well equipped with ordnance. Some shortage still exists as regards spurs, bridles, and saddles. Ordnance arriving in broken lots daily. Recommend moving of regiment to border now. Request all ordnance not already shipped be sent to regiment on border to complete its equipment.

"KAEMPFER."

2. Is it not possible to equip this regiment promptly and send it to the border fully equipped? The mobilization of the militia now has been going on for some months and it would seem not unreasonable to request that the Ordnance Department supply this regiment promptly unless there is an actual shortage of reserve equipment.

3. The attached copy of letter, which has just been received, confirms the above-quoted telegraphic request.

LEONARD WOOD.
*Major General, United States Army.*

[First indorsement.]

Special 2486488. A. G. O., Nov. 27, 1916. To The Chief of Ordnance.

[Second indorsement.]

ORDNANCE OFFICE, *December 14, 1916.*

To THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, U. S. ARMY:

1. All of the articles involved in the shortages of ordnance equipment reported within, except some bridles, spurs, and saber scabbards, were shipped to the 1st Alabama Cavalry on or before December 5, 1916. It is expected that the excepted articles will be supplied in the near future.

2. This office has been informed that these troops departed from Mobile, Ala., for Fort Sam Houston, Texas, on the 9th instant, and directions have been given to have the articles still due the troops shipped to that place.

WILLIAM CROZIER,
*Brig. Gen., Chief of Ordnance.*
By S. B. BABBITT,
*Col., Ord. Dept.*

[Third indorsement.]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
*December 15, 1916.*

To the Commanding General, Eastern Department, inviting attention to the preceding indorsement hereon.

By order of the Secretary of War.

WM. M. CRUIKSHANK,
*Adjutant General.*

[Fourth indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*December 19, 1916.*

To THE ADJUTANT GENERAL OF THE ARMY:

1. Noted.

2. The First Regiment of Cavalry, Alabama National Guard, left for the border with the following shortages in equipment:

| | |
|---|---|
| Saber scabbards | 264 |
| Nose or feed bags | 616 |
| Saddles | 264 |
| Saddlebags | 264 |
| Bridles | 440 |
| Halters | 704 |
| Complete equipment of machine guns. | |
| Field ranges | 15 |
| Horses | 1,100 |
| Complete equipment of mules, riding, pack, and draft. | |
| Complete equipment of wagon transportation. | |

LEONARD WOOD,
*Major General, Comdg.*

[Fifth indorsement.]

A. G. O., Dec. 20, 1916. To the Chief of Ordnance.

[Sixth indorsement.]

ORDNANCE OFFICE, *January 11, 1917.*

To THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:

1. At the time the First Regiment of Alabama Cavalry was transferred to the border part of the bridles were en route to the mobilization camp and necessary steps were taken to locate this material and divert its shipment to

the San Antonio Arsenal. The remaining articles of horse equipment required to complete the equipment of this regiment of Cavalry were shipped from the Rock Island Arsenal to the commanding officer, San Antonio Arsenal, under date of December 7, 1916, and the balance of the saber scabbards required was shipped from the Springfield Armory to the commanding officer, San Antonio Arsenal, under date of December 16, 1916.

2. The necessary instructions have been given for the machine-gun troop of this regiment to be equipped upon its arrival in the Southern Department.

3. In view of the above, it is believed that the equipment of the First Alabama Cavalry with ordnance stores is now complete.

WILLIAM CROZIER,
*Brig. Gen., Chief of Ordnance.*
By S. B. BABBITT,
*Col., Ord. Dept.*

Senator LEE of Maryland. What did you have to do in that respect when this call was made?

Gen. WOOD. We were told first not to send organizations to the front until they were reasonably ready. On the heels of that came an announcement that the department was going to purchase horses in the West, and that they would be sent to the border and the troops equipped when they arrived there. In the meantime, in response to certain confidential urgent communications, and feeling that it was simply folly to have Field Artillery arrive on the border without horses and Cavalry arrive on the border without mounts, especially Field Artillery, as they could not move their guns, we bought enough horses to give each gun and caisson a team sufficient to drag it into position, and we provided every regiment of Infantry that was short of transportation with at least two motor trucks or a few animals; and we bought a number of thousand horses and mules for the Cavalry and Artillery that was sent with the first rush, because to send troops down without mounts or transportation under the grave conditions that appeared to be threatening seemed unwise and to indicate a lack of appreciation of the fact that without transportation and mounts they would be of little use and might be quite helpless. It was the old condition of the Spanish War over again. It was the inefficiency, absolute, startling, and complete, of the supply departments. In only one staff department were the conditions markedly improved, so far as I know, and that was the medical. The Engineers are line troops.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Did not the medical people send out timely circulars in advance, May 10, 1916?

Gen. WOOD. I could not tell you that offhand.

Senator LEE of Maryland. The reports so indicate.

Gen. WOOD. That department showed the effects of the lessons of 1898 in greatly improved handling of the sanitary situation. The Quartermaster's Department and the Ordnance Department showed little improvement, as I saw them. I can say, sir, without fear of successful contradiction, that there is not and has not been on the border since the call for mobilization in June a single organization, either militia or regular, which is at war strength and fully equipped for modern war, with the possible exception of here and there an individual field hospital or ambulance company. I will add here certain extracts from our records showing delays, shortages, and difficulties in procuring supplies; also a statement showing shortages in certain State organizations on October 31, over four months after the call. These indicate conclusively the breakdown in the

supply departments referred to before and suggest very clearly the frightful catastrophe that would have overtaken us had we been called upon to mobolize not only the militia, but great numbers of volunteers to meet a swift and strong attack from a real military power.

NORTH CAROLINA.

CAMP GLENN,
*Morehead City, N. C., June 28, 1916.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL, EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Governors Island, N. Y.:*

No equipment or clothing required to be sent to this camp by subparagraph B, paragraph 455 A. R. has been received period neither has this office, with exception of blankets, been notified that any has been shipped period the third NC Infantry is due here July first. but there is no tentage to shelter them period unless these supplies are expedited it will be some time after mustering before they are equipped for the field period Neither have any books or blank forms been received by The Adjutant General of the Army for the regimental and company administrations, as required by paragraph 14, mustering regulations.

PARSONS.

---

CAMP GLENN,
*Morehead City, N. C., July 20, 1916.*

COMMANDING GENERAL, EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Governors Island, N. Y.*

Request that seven hundred cots, seven hundred ponchos, thirty-five hundred mosquito bars be sent this camp period cots and ponchoes needed to complete equipment; mosquito bars need to supply entire command.

HUNT.

[Second indorsement.]

DEPOT QUARTERMASTER,
*Philadelphia, Pa. July 28, 1916.*

TO COMMANDING GENERAL, EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Governors Island, N. Y.:*

1. The following articles remain due on requisition in favor of the senior mustering officer, Camp Glenn, Morehead City, N. C.:

46 hat cords, Cavalry. Can be supplied about Aug. 5th.
2,858 ponchos. Can be supplied about Aug. 10th.
381 bags, surplus kit. Will be supplied Aug. 4th.
2,914 bars, mosquito. Will be supplied about Aug. 20th.
2,914 cots. It is expected that this item will be supplied in small lots from time to time between this date and Aug. 15th.

It is expected, however, to make shipment of 440 cots and 493 ponchos about Aug. 1st. This latter to cover the request made in original telegram herewith.

G. M. S. & PENROSE.

---

CAMP GLENN,
*Morehead City, N. C., Aug. 18, 1916.*

COMDG. GENERAL, EASTERN DEPARTMENT.
*Governors Island, N. Y.:*

Have shortages necessary to complete equipment C for this command, as given in my report mailed July thirty-first, been ordered furnished period Shoes and trousers needed period list of clothing unissued giving sizes was forwarded July thirtieth was same furnished clothing depot for information and guidance in furnishing supplied needed.

HUNT.

---

CAMP GLENN, *Morehead City, N. C., Sept. 20, 1916.*

COMMANDING GENERAL EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Governors Island, N. Y.:*

Railroad authorities have all transportation ready for moving this command. Overcoats, sweaters, and underclothing to completely equip now on hand, but no woolen coats or breeches have been supplied. * * *

Telegram was sent July 22nd to the mustering officer at Camp Glenn, North Carolina, directing him to furnish immediately report indicating the shortages and equipment of the North Carolina troops, and he submitted a 5-page list of the articles necessary for the equipment indicating the shortages from peace to war. The following essential articles are extracted therefrom:

| Article: | Shortage, war strength. |
|---|---|
| Axes and helves | 226 |
| Bags, surplus kit | 411 |
| Bars, mosquito | 6,005 |
| Bed sacks | 5,890 |
| Blankets, olive drab | 6,721 |
| Buckets, galvanized iron | 282 |
| Clothing— | |
| Breeches, pair | 5,001 |
| Drawers, pair | 6,204 |
| Laces, shoe, extra, pairs | 8,212 |
| Leggins, canvas, pair | 2,093 |
| Shirts, flannel, o. d | 4,284 |
| Shoes, marching, pair | 4,988 |
| Stockings, pair | 8,272 |
| Undershirts | 5,916 |
| Cots | 3,325 |
| Overcoats | 6,005 |
| Pins, tent, shelter | 11,409 |
| Tents, shelter, half— | |
| Dismounted | 3,201 |
| Mounted | 247 |
| Tentage: Heavy tents, complete— | |
| Pyramidal, large | 286 |
| Pyramidal, small | 132 |
| Gloves, woolen, o. d | 3,863 |

As late as August 24th the quartermaster depots which should have furnished the articles indicated on this 5-page list had not succeeded in supplying them, though many of the articles were ordinary commercial articles.

SOUTH CAROLINA.

CAMP MOORE, STYX, S. C., *July 10, 1916.*

COMMANDING GENERAL EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Governors Island, N. Y.:*

Request express shipment of five hundred number one leggins; twenty-five number one, seventy-five number two slickers; six hundred number one shirts; one hundred forty number one and six each breeches, cotton; one forty-four size seven, ninety-six sizes seven one-eighth, and seven one-quarter each hats; five hundred ponchos; five hundred cots; forty size six one-half C and D each; twenty sizes seven and seven one-half EE each, and twenty size eight EE shoes.

GRAHAM.

[First indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*July 11, 1916.*

TO DEPOT QUARTERMASTER,
*Philadelphia, Pa.:*

1. Requesting shipment by express of those articles which can be supplied.
2. Following report is desired: (*a*) What articles can not be furnished now? (*b*) Approximate date supplies can be furnished, if at all.

By command of Maj. Gen. Wood:

_____ _____,
*Adjutant General, Adjutant.*

PHILADELPHIA, PA., *July 25, 1916.*

COMMANDING GENERAL EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Governors Island, N. Y.:*

Quartermaster General advised South Carolina still short of supplies, and directs this office to call on you for quantities and articles required to complete equipment. Please furnish information early date.

PENROSE.

GOVERNORS ISLAND, N. Y., *July 26, 1916.*

SENIOR ASSISTANT MUSTERING OFFICER,
*Columbia, S. C.:*

Wire depot quartermaster Philadelphia direct quantities and articles of all supplies still short and required to complete equipment. Send mail copy thereof to these headquarters.

SIMPSON.

---

MOBILIZATION CAMP, STYX, S. C., *August 4, 1916.*

From: Mustering officer.
To: Commanding general, Eastern Dept., Governors Island, N. Y.
Subject: Shortages in equipment.

1. In compliance with your telegram of July 27th, 1916, the enclosed lists of shortages in equipment from various organizations in this camp, except Troop A, Cavalry, which I have been unable to obtain.

2. None of the essentials can be purchased in this vicinity. Few of the minor articles could be purchased, but only at retail prices; and then they might have to be procured from Charleston or Atlanta, which is impracticable.

J. MALCOLN GRAHAM,
*Captain, 19th Infantry.*

5 inclosures.

The inclosures to this letter consist of lists of shortages, separately by organization, which cover nine pages and include the following, to wit:

| | |
|---|---|
| Bars, mosquito | 2,465 |
| Hats, service, with tying cord | 904 |
| Laces, shoe, prs | 1,200 |
| Cots | 817 |
| Pins, tent shelter | 4,850 |
| Ponchos | 1,316 |
| Slickers | 63 |
| Tents, shelter halves | 535 |
| Tents, shelter halves, mounted | 98 |
| Shoes, marching | 1,444 |
| Head nets, mosquito | 208 |
| Tents, pyramidal | 39 |
| Tents, pyramidal, small | 49 |
| Breeches, prs | 784 |
| Drawers, prs | 730 |
| Shirts, O. D | 784 |
| Undershirts | 730 |
| Blankets | 100 |
| Hats, service | 74 |
| Leggins, canvas, prs | 30 |

TENNESSEE.

NASHVILLE, TENN., *June 28, 1916.*

From: Senior assistant mustering officer.
To: Commanding general, Eastern Department.
Subject: Progress of mobilization.

2. "No quartermaster equipage, clothing, or shoes, or supplies have been received. A message was received from the depot quartermaster, St. Louis, saying, 'Can not make shipment clothing for a few days. Will advise.' There have been issued to troops about twenty-two hundred bed sacks and blankets and tentage for an equal number of men, while the strength of the command is over twenty-five hundred enlisted men. There is an actual shortage for troops in camp of bed sacks, blankets, and tents for three hundred men. The blankets are not absolutely necessary, because during this weather ponchos and shelter-halves can be used in their place; however, Tennessee has no cots, and to keep the men from sleeping on the ground I advised the camp commander to purchase in open market sufficient bed sacks or mattress covers to supply the men who had no bed sacks. There are three or four hundred in camp without uniforms of any kind. There is a shortage in equipment, such as water cans,

garbage cans, and other minor supplies. From this it can be seen that no troops can leave this camp until these quartermaster's supplies and clothing, including shoes, are received and issued, unless in the direct emergency."

W. N. HUGHES, Jr.,
*Captain of Infantry.*

---

NASHVILLE, TENN., *June 28, 1916.*

Quartermaster's Department, United States Army, W. H. Hughes, capt. Infantry, senior mustering officer, commanding general, Eastern Depart., Governors Island, New York:

No clothing or quartermaster's supplies received from any depot. Blankets, clothing, and sheets badly needed to equip troops in camp. Not possible to send any units forward until shoes are received.

HUGHES.

---

GOVERNORS ISLAND, N. Y., *June 30th, 1916.*

DEPOT QUARTERMASTER,
*St. Louis, Mo.:*

Following telegram received from adjutant general Tennessee: "No clothing or quartermaster's supplies received from any depot. Blankets, clothing, and sheets badly needed to equip troops in camp."

BELLINGER.

---

NASHVILLE, TENN., *June 29, 1916*

COMMANDING GENERAL, EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Governors Island, N. Y.:*

Request authority for emergency purchase for 700 bed sacks; no cots nor blankets in camp; absolutely necessary to keep men off of ground; recommended by chief surgeon. Please expedite answer.

SPENCE,
*Camp Commander.*

---

GOVERNORS ISLAND, N. Y., *June 30, 1916.*

GENERAL SPENCE,
*Nashville, Tenn.:*

Depot quartermaster, Saint Louis, has been telegraphed regarding your supplies and directed to authorize purchase of bed sacks, as requested, unless he can ship you by express same or cots and blankets. He will telegraph you direct on this subject.

SIMPSON.

---

GOVERNORS ISLAND, N. Y., *June 30, 1916.*

DEPOT QUARTERMASTER,
*St. Louis, Mo.:*

Commanding officer, mobilization camp, Tennessee National Guard, requests authority for emergency purchase for seven hundred bed sacks, stating no cots or blankets in camp. Surgeon recommends men be kept off ground. Have you shipped by express supplies for this State? If so, on what date? If not, when shipment will be made. Please telegraph information immediately, and also telegraph to camp commander station regarding supplies for his troops. If you can not ship him by express cots or bed sacks and blankets, please telegraph him authority to purchase seven hundred bed sacks, as he requests, and get him cots and blankets by express as soon as posible.

SIMPSON.

---

ST. LOUIS, MO., *July 1, 1916.*

DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
*Eatern Department, Governors Island, N. Y.:*

Your wire reference Tennessee Militia; have authorized commanding officer purchase seven hundred bed sacks and will ship him seven hundred blankets by express to-day. No cots on hand and have cleaned up market for immediate delivery.

STANLEY.

MOBILIZATION CAMP,
*Nashville, Tenn., July 1, 1916.*

From: Senior asst. mustering officer.
To: Commanding officer, Eastern Department.
Subject: Progress of mobilization.

2. No quartermaster stores, clothing, or shoes have been received to date, and the command is still lacking in tentage, blankets, and bed sacks.

W. N. HUGHES, Jr.,
*Captain Infantry.*

---

NASHVILLE, TENN., *July 3.*

COMMANDING GENERAL EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Governors Island, N. Y.:*

Six hundred blankets received from Philadelphia depot and seven hundred from St. Louis depot to-day by express; a small shipment of quartermaster supplies marked for issue to camp surgeon were received yesterday and to-day; no other supplies have been received from depot quartermaster, St. Louis, nor has any advice been received by any official in camp as to when any will be shipped; supplies are still urgently needed.

HUGHES.

---

GOVERNORS ISLAND, N. Y., *July 3, 1916.*

CHIEF MUSTERING OFFICER,
*Nashville, Tenn.:*

These headquarters have telegraphed depot quartermaster, St. Louis, to telegraph direct to your camp information regarding the shipment of supplies now due troops there. Please inquire if any of the camp officials has received a communication on this subject from St. Louis, and telegraph these headquarters immediately if supplies have not yet been received; and if not, when they are expected to arrive.

SIMPSON.

---

NASHVILLE, TENN., *July 3, 1916.*

COMMANDING GENERAL EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Governors Island, N. Y.:*

Request authority to purchase shoes in the open market in broken lots.

BORCHES,
*Capt. Quartermaster.*

---

JULY 3, 1916.

CAMP QUARTERMASTER.
*Nashville, Tennessee:*

Your request to purchase shoes disapproved. St. Louis depot directed furnish supplies.

SIMPSON.

---

GOVERNORS ISLAND, N. Y., *July 3, 1916.*

DEPOT QUARTERMASTER, *St. Louis, Mo.:*

Please telegraph immediately information called for in telegram these headquarters dated June thirtieth regarding supplies needed for Tennessee National Guard in camp at Nashville, Tenn. Have you shipped the supplies for this guard to its mobilization camp? If so, when was shipment made, and was it made by express? If not yet made, when will shipment be completed? Have you communicated direct with chief mustering officer that mobilization camp furnishing information regarding shipment these supplies? Camp quartermaster requests authority to purchase shoes in open market. If you can express them shoes immediately, please do so, and telegraph these headquarters time shipment will leave St. Louis. If you can not express them shoes immediately, please notify these headquarters to that effect.

SIMPSON.

NASHVILLE, TENN, *July 8–16.*

COMMANDING GENERAL EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Governors Island, N. Y.:*

Five thousand seven hundred and twenty-four pair of drawers from St. Louis depot received. When unpacked, forty-five hundred developed to be boys' sizes, largest size thirty-two inch waist; practically none of these drawers can be used.

HUGHES.

---

GOVERNORS ISLAND, N. Y., *July 9, 1916.*

CHIEF MUSTERING OFFICER,
*Mobilization Camp, Nashville, Tennessee:*

Reference your telegram reporting unusable articles of equipment furnished from Saint Louis depot, you will return all such immediately by exress to depot quartermaster Saint Louis. Telegraph him direct the articles which you need to reasonably equip your command as indicated by Major Brady, furnishing him sizes required. He has been directed to supply these immediately by express and to notify these headquarters of such articles he can not supply.

SIMPSON.

---

GOVERNORS ISLAND, N. Y., *July 9, 1916.*

DEPOT QUARTERMASTER,
*Saint Louis, Missouri:*

Chief Mustering Officer, Mobilization Camp, Nashville, Tennessee, reports "Forty-five hundred of the fifty-seven hundred twenty-four pairs of drawers received from Saint Louis depot were boy's size, largest size thirty-two inch waist; practically none of these drawers can be used." Major Brady, department inspector, reports "following additional vital items needed before troops will be reasonably equipped for transfer; four hundred bedsacks, ten hundred twenty-eight ponchos, ten hundred fifty-two shelter halves, sixty-five pyramidal tents. Also twenty-five hundred drawers and five thousand pairs socks to replace unsatisfactory items just received." Please communicate directly with Mustering Officer, Mobilization Camp, Nashville, Tennessee, and supply immediately by express the articles necessary to equip this command. He has been directed to return the unusable articles by express. Please telegraph these headquarters when you will be able to make this shipment and specify such of the articles indicated as your depot can not now supply with date on which you will be able to supply them.

SIMPSON.

---

GOVERNORS ISLAND, N. Y., *July 10, 1916.*

DEPOT QUARTERMASTER,
*Saint Louis, Mo.:*

No reply yet received to telegram sent from these headquarters yesterday regarding prospective shipment of supplies from your depot to mobilization camp, Nashville, Tennessee. Please telegraph these headquarters immediately when you will be able to ship articles indicated in that telegram specifying articles which your depot will not be able to supply immediately and date upon which you will be able to supply them.

SIMPSON.

---

ST. LOUIS, Mo., *July 11, 1916.*

DEPARTMENT COMMANDER, EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Governors Island, N. Y.:*

Can not supply Tennessee drawers, ponchos, tent pins, and pyramidal tents. Ponchos contracted for delivery three or four weeks. Tents and drawers due from Philadelphia. Time delivery not known. Remainder articles called for will be shipped to-morrow.

STANLEY.

NASHVILLE, TENN., *Sept. 1, 1916.*

COMMANDING GENERAL,
*Governors Island, Eastern Department, N. Y.:*

A number of cases malaria have appeared in this camp; mosquito bars requisitioned for July seventeenth have not been received. They are urgently needed for the proper protection of the command, as mosquito pests is bad; twenty-five hundred needed for present strength.

COX.

---

GOVERNORS ISLAND, N. Y., *September 1st, 1916.*

DEPOT QUARTERMASTER,
*St. Louis, Missouri:*

Mobilization camp at Nashville, Tennessee, reports a number of cases malaria have appeared in camp. Mosquito bars requisitioned for July seventeenth have not been received. They are urgently needed for the proper protection of the command, as mosquito pests are bad. Twenty-five hundred needed for present strength. Please expedite, advising.

SIMPSON.

---

GOVERNORS ISLAND, N. Y., *September 6th, 1916.*

DEPARTMENT QUARTERMASTER,
*San Antonio, Tex.:*

It is contemplated sending the Tennessee troops to the border. They are short twenty-five hundred mosquito bars and fifty large pyramidal tents. Could these or any part thereof be supplied to troops on arrival from available stock on hand in your department? Please wire reply.

HORTON, *In Charge.*

---

QUARTERMASTER, *Governors Island, N. Y.:*

Reply telegram to-day, no mosquito bars or pyramidal tents, large, in stock this depot.

WILKINS.

---

MISSISSIPPI.

Telegram received at Governors Island, N. Y.:

JACKSON, MISS., *Sept. 15, 1916.*

The COMMANDING GENERAL EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Governors Island, N. Y.:*

Reference requisition equipment for Mississippi forwarded; several articles not yet received. One hundred pyramidal tents, large, asked for; board officers now find all unserviceable except forty-one; minimum number absolutely necessary one hundred and thirty-eight pyramidal large, and thirteen wall, complete. Request depot quartermaster expedite supply balance requisition, but especially tentage, ponchos, and shelter halves by express, advising when delivery can be expected.

PICKERING.

---

GOVERNORS ISLAND, N. Y., *September 16.*

DEPOT QUARTERMASTER, *St. Louis, Mo.:*

Following telegram received senior mustering officer, Jackson, Mississippi: "Reference requisition equipment for Mississippi forwarded; several articles not yet received. One hundred pyramidal tents, large, asked for; board officers now find all unserviceable except forty-one; minimum number absolutely necessary one hundred and thirty-eight pyramidal, large, and thirteen wall, complete. Request depot quartermaster expedite supply balance requisition, but especially tentage, ponchos, and shelter halves, by express, advising when delivery can be expected." It is requested that shipment of these supplies be expedited.

SIMPSON.

STATE MOBILIZATION CAMP,
*Jackson, Miss., Sept. 16, 1916.*

From: The senior asst. mustering officer.
To: The commanding general Eastern Department, Governors Island, N. Y.
Subject: Requisitions, equipment, N. G. of Miss.

1. With reference to my telegram, dated September 15th, on the above subject, there is forwarded inclosed herewith req'n No. 2, covering the balance or the unfilled portions of req'n No. 1, dated July 15th, 1916, and telegraphic requests.

2. Requisition No. 1 did not cover the following, which were asked for by telegraph, viz:

1,890 mosquito bars.
892 hat cords, Inf.
1,529 hats, service.
1,662 belts, waist.
1,341 ponchos.
100 tents, pyramidal, complete.
54 tents, wall.
19 canvass latrine screens.
1,320 shelter-tent halves.
2 tents, storage.

3. As per my telegram of the 15th instant, it has been necessary to increase the number of pyramidal tents to 138 and reduce wall tents to 13.

4. In view of the fact that it is required that the Miss. troops be fully equipped before proceeding to the border, it is recommended that prompt steps be taken to supply the balance of the equipment due. The depot quartermaster, St. Louis, advises in telegram dated the 15th inst. that "No ponchos or pyramidal tents on hand; few sweaters." Although the St. Louis depot is designated as the depot of supply for Mississippi, it is requested that the pyramidal tents, ponchos, sweaters, and other articles covered by the inclosed requisition, not on hand at St. Louis, be furnished by some other depot.

5. To facilitate matters, a copy of this requisition has been sent direct to the D. Q. M., St. Louis.

RICHARD R. PICKERING,
*Capt., Infantry.*

[Q. M. C. Form 160.]

REQUISITION No. 2.

SEPTEMBER 16, 1916.

126 Bags, surplus kits.
2 Ladles, soup.
26 Pans, dish.
8 Desks, field, small.
1 Pannier, veterinary.
8 Pouches, music, O. D.
730 Powder, calcum, chloride, cubes.
390 Rope, picket line ¾".
32 Salt, rock, lbs.
15 Stretchers, shoe.
908 Sweaters.
1,890 Towels, face.
2 Typewriters, Remington, No. 10.
1,890 Bars, mosquito.
892 Hat cords, Infantry.
1,662 Waist belts.
1,341 Ponchos.
1,320 Shelter tents, halves.
138 Tents, pyramidal, large, complete, with poles, tripods, and pins.
13 Tents, wall, complete, with poles, ridges, and pins.
2 Tents, storage, complete, with poles, ridges, and pins.
19 Latrine screens, canvas.

CHAS. L. DULIN,
*Capt. Q. M. C., N. G. Miss. Camp, Quartermaster.*

Approved:

GEO C. HOSKINS,
*Colonel 1st Inf. N. G. M., Camp Swep Taylor, Jackson, Miss., Commanding.*

Telegram received at Governors Island, N. Y.:

JACKSON, MISS., *September 22, 1916.*

The COMMANDING GENERAL EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Governors Island, N. Y.:*

Depot Quartermaster, St. Louis, reports no mosquito bars available. Procurable in New Orleans at price not to exceed one dollar and ten cents each. Request Depot Quartermaster, New Orleans, purchase one thousand eight hundred and ninety bars and ship here immediately.

PICKERING.

---

GOVERNORS ISLAND, N. Y., *October 2, 1916.*

DEPOT QUARTERMASTER, *St. Louis, Mo.:*

Reference first indorsement these headquarters, September nineteenth, requisition equipment Mississippi, please advise at once what has been shipped to date and date remainder will be shipped.

SIMPSON.

---

ALABAMA.

MONTGOMERY, ALA., *August 17, 1916.*

Colonel J. B. BELLINGER,
*Quartermaster Corps, Eastern Department, Governors Island, N. Y.:*

Can buy in local market four thousand mosquito bars at sixty cents each, delivered within two weeks from date of order; good material, approved by mustering officer here; please answer.

HUBBARD, *Adjt. General.*

---

GOVERNORS ISLAND, N. Y., *August 18th, 1916.*

DEPOT QUARTERMASTER, *St. Louis, Mo.:*

Following telegram received adjutant general, Montgomery, Alabama:

"Can buy in local market four thousand mosquito bars at sixty cents each. Delivery within two weeks. Good material, approved by mustering officer here." Requisition submitted to your depot calls for four thousand one twenty-eight mosquito bars. Advise by wire if you have supplied any, and if so, amount, or if you consider purchase in local market at price quoted above advantageous.

SIMPSON.

---

GOVERNORS ISLAND, N. Y., *August 21, 1916.*

Adjutant General HUBBARD,
*Montgomery, Ala.:*

Your telegram seventeenth, purchase locally four thousand mosquito bars sixty cents each, delivery within two weeks; material approved by mustering officer approved. Certify bill to Depot Quartermaster, St. Louis, for payment.

SIMPSON.

---

ST. LOUIS, MO., *August 21, 1916.*

DEPARTMENT COMMANDER EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Governors Island, N. Y. City.:*

Your wire eighteenth, recommend purchase locally of four thousand mosquito bars at sixty cents for Alabama militia; certified bill to be sent this office for payment.

STANLEY.

---

MONTGOMERY, ALA., *August 28, 1916.*

COMMANDING GENERAL EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Governors Island, N. Y.:*

Tripods for pyramidal tents, target, and tent pins have not been received. Request instructions be issued to rush tripod and tent pins; same were requisitioned for June twenty-fourth and July twenty-second.

SCREWS.

It was reported by the mustering officer of these headquarters that supplies had been furnished the Alabama troops which were inferior quality and appeared to be secondhand, causing the following communication to be sent:

HEADQUARTERS EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Aug. 22, 1916.*

TO SENIOR ASSISTANT MUSTERING OFFICER,
*Mobilization Camp, Montgomery, Ala.:*

1. You will examine the articles reported in this communication as being of inferior quality and secondhand and report to these headquarters promptly the actual condition of these articles.

In case you find hats or shoes either secondhand or of inferior quality, a few samples, not exceeding half a dozen pairs of shoes and a half dozen hats, should be sent to these headquarters by official parcel post or express as exhibits to your report.

3. Please expedite action on this matter. By command of Major General Wood.

A. G. JENKINS,
*Adjutant General, Adjutant.*

---

OFFICE SENIOR MUSTERING OFFICER,
*Mobilization Camp, Montgomery, Ala., August 28th, 1916.*

TO COMMANDING GENERAL, EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Governors Island, N. Y.:*

1. I have examined the articles reported in the enclosed communication, and find that the hats and shoes are an inferior quality, and hats marked NGP appear to be secondhand. I am sending by parcel post, this date, two pair shoes, brand "Hardware," and six hats. All of these articles were received in the first shipment of quartermaster supplies and were issued in cases where the troops had no hats or shoes of any description. The shoes above referred to are not only too heavy but in number of cases have worn out after about three weeks' wear.

2. The quartermaster has noted the inferior quality of the hats and shoes above mentioned prior to the receipt of this communication, and intended to take the matter up officially with the department as soon as all supplies requisitioned for had been received. Will also state that this matter was called to the attention of Major James F. Brady, C. A. C., inspector, on his arrival at this camp August 23, 1916, which he noted.

3. In all cases where shoes and hats of an inferior quality was issued, company commanders were notified to note same, and at the proper time survey proceedings would be instituted, or report made to the department, with the view of rectifying same. I recommend that in all cases where issue were made of these inferior articles that the regulation shoes and hats be exchanged for same. This can be accomplished as stated above, i. e., company commanders have records of these issues.

4. A shipment of regulation shoes, spec. 1206, 1,714 pairs, was received by the camp quartermaster August 23, 1916, and, as far as practicable, in cases where the shoes, brand "Hardware," referred to above was issued and have not been worn, same will be exchanged by him. The quartermaster has in stock not issued approximately 200 pairs of "Hardware" brand shoes and about 900 hats, samples of which were forwarded by parcel post this date.

In the first shipment of shoes received there was a mixture of regulation russets and commercial brands "Reliance," "Master," "Hardware," "East," and "Endurance," boxes marked "Hamilton-Brown Shoe Company."

WM. P. SCREWS,
*Lt. Col., 4th Inf., N. G. Ala.*

Shipment is being made this date by parcel post of six pairs of shoes and six hats as exhibits in support of mustering officer's report, dated August 28th, 1916.

ALBERT B. KAEMPFER,
*Captain, Infantry, Mustering Officer.*

---

HEADQUARTERS EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*December 2nd, 1916.*

To the ADJUTANT GENERAL OF THE ARMY:

1. These samples have been examined at these headquarters and their *quality found to be* very inferior.

2. It is believed that their purchase was a waste of Government funds, and that more suitable articles could have been purchased.

3. The following items of clothing are being forwarded to the office of the Quartermaster General under separate cover, and it is recommended, after examination, that the articles be returned to depots from which supplied:

Samples received from mobilization camp, Montgomery, Alabama:
1 pair shoes, black.
Samples received from mobilization camp, Nashville, Tennessee:
1 pair drawers (summer).
1 hat, service.
1 shirt, c. d. wool.
1 pair shoes, black.
4 pairs shoes, russet.
1 pair stockings, cotton.
Samples received from mobilization camp, Fort Thomas, Kentucky:
1 pair shoes, russet.
2 pairs shoes, black.
1 hat, service.

LEONARD WOOD,
*Major General, Commanding.*

---

MONTGOMERY, ALA., *October 20, 1916.*

COMMANDING GENERAL EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Governors Island, N. Y.*

Reference your telegram October nineteen all outstanding requisitions for clothing and equipage for Cavalry regiment have not been filled. When requisitions now outstanding are filled regiment will be fully equipped. Shortage at present approximately as follows: Eighteen paulins, large, fifteen hundred shelter ten halves complete with poles and pins, two thousand socks, fourteen hundred fifty leggings, eight hundred breeches cotton sizes one to twenty, one thousand breeches, woolen, sizes one to twenty-four; seven hundred coats, woolen, size three to seven; eight hundred coats, cotton, size one to seven; six hundred olive drab flannel shirts, size two and three. Packers' list has been received on seven hundred drawers and one hundred twenty pairs shoes. Requisition now being forward for eight hundred pairs shoes, one thousand undershirts to care for probable recruits.

KAEMPFER.

---

MONTGOMERY, ALA., *October 21, 1916.*

COMMANDING GENERAL EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Governors Island, N. Y.*

Referring to your endorsement eighteenth, clothing requisition for needed to equip Cavalry and recruits. Eight hundred breeches, cotton, size one to twenty. Eight hundred seventy-six coats, cotton, sizes one to six. Request rush shipment.

KAEMPFER.

---

MONTGOMERY, ALA., *October 26, 1916.*

COMMANDING GENERAL EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Governors Island, N. Y.*

Over fifty per cent of this command is still without uniform clothes of any description; it is an urgent need of both cotton and woolen uniforms.

R. E. STEINER,
*Colonel.*

---

MONTGOMERY, ALA., *November 1, 1916.*

COMMANDING GENERAL EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Governors Island, N. Y.*

Reference your telegram October 28th, calling for report on supplies shipped Oct. 25th, following articles are lacking: Two hundred thirty-nine breeches, wool; eighty-six coats, wool; six hundred shirts, flannel. Other supplies of this shipment received on October 28th and Nov. 1st.

KAEMPFER.

REPORT CALLED FOR BY ADJUTANT GENERAL OF THE ARMY.

OFFICE QUARTERMASTER, EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*November 16, 1916.*

From: Department quartermaster.
To: Commanding general, Eastern Department.
Subject: Data relative to business Quartermaster Corps in supplying National Guard called into Federal service.

With reference to the letter from the Adjutant General of the Army, No. 2457329, dated September 21, 1916, calling for certain information in connection with the mustering into the Federal service of the National Guard organizations covered by the call of the President dated June 18, 1916, I submit the following replies to that portion of the letter of the Adjutant General of the Army which pertains to the business of the Quartermaster Corps, to wit:

(*f*) 1. I enclose a memorandum marked "A" indicating the dates upon which the National Guard organizations left their State mobilization camps for the border.

2. There was delay in moving the National Guard organizations to the border, and such causes for this delay as are attributable to the business pertaining to the Quartermaster Corps are considered to be the following, to wit: First. The failure of the Quartermaster Corps to function promptly, accurately, and efficiently under that portion of paragraph 455–1. (*b*) which states that "The Federal supply departments concerned will ship at once to the senior mustering officers at the proper State mobilization camps, without requisition, etc., etc." The cause for this failure appeared to be due to the fact that the commanding officers of the field supply depots were not specifically and promptly notified of the issue of the President's call, and had not received specific instructions to begin shipment when so notified. In this connection the commanding officers of these field supply depots should be given instructions to report immediately by telegraph to the department commanders whose troops they are to supply for detailed instructions as to the sequence in which their organizations are to be supplied. Such instructions would have obviated the delay caused in the Eastern Department by supplies being shipped to mobilization camps at which troops had not arrived before they shipped supplies to mobilization camps at which troops had arrived. Second. The failure to have sufficient supplies in stock to equip completely the National Guard organizations between peace-strength and war-strength. Third. The apparent lack of arrangements to insure a prompt supply of essential personal equipment of a suitable kind and quality to promptly supply the deficiency between the stock on hand and the amounts of these articles necessary to supply the National Guard organizations between peace and war strength.

(*g*) 1. The National Guard organizations as a whole were not equipped, as was contemplated by Army regulations, to their peace strength.

2. Such equipment as they had in their possession and which had been furnished by the Quartermaster Corps was the same as that furnished for the Regular Army.

3. One of the material causes for the delay in supplying National Guard organizations was due to the fact that supplies furnished to equip National Guard organizations from peace to war strength were used to make good their shortages of equipment to peace strength.

(*h*) First. The necessary equipment and supplies to be furnished by the Quartermaster Corps were not on hand in the depots designated to supply the National Guard organizations located in the Eastern Department, for these depots reported that they did not have certain supplies and were unable to supply them. Second. Considerable delay was caused in moving organizations to the border, due to this lack of supplies, and the length of this delay would have been greatly increased had the War Department not directed that the troops should be forwarded to the border without waiting for supplies to equip them beyond the absolutely necessary minimum for a short period of field service.

(*i*) First. I do not consider that any material delay was occasioned in moving the troops, due to a lack of adequate transportation facilities, provided the available, and in my opinion entirely suitable, facilities had been used. Second. There was a delay in moving the troops when it was determined that they must be moved in tourist's sleeping cars, because the total number of tourist's sleepings cars in the United States was not sufficient to move all of the troops as soon as they were ready to be moved. Third. I do not con-

sider that any unnecessary hardship was caused by lack of provisions or accommodations, but the reports received on the troop-train movement indicate that, in a few cases, some inconvenience was caused due to the lack of experience of the officers in charge of the troops and the troop trains in obtaining provisions and in utilizing them and the troop-train accommodations to their maximum efficiency.

*Résumé.*

The deficiencies in the transaction of the business of the Quartermaster Corps during the mobilization of the National Guard under the presidential call of June 18, 1916, were in general as follows:

1. Failure of paragraph 455–1b A. R. 1913, to function.
2. Failure to provide promptly suitable animals for mounts and draft.
3. Failure to have the National Guard troops equipped with clothing for peace strength.
4. Failure to have on hand sufficient clothing and certain other supplies to equip the troops from peace to war strength.
5. Failure to obtain prompt deliveries of suitable supplies to make up the shortages in supplies necessary to equip the National Guard from peace to war strengh.
6. The purchasing of supplies of clothing wholly unsuitable in character and quality.
7. The most essential supplies which were not on had for issue and which, in some cases, were not supplied for several months afterwards are as follows, to wit:

Bars, mosquito.
Cots.
Drawers.
Hats.
Ponchos.
Shirts.
Shoes.
Tent pins.
Tents, pyramidal.
Uniforms, cotton.
Uniforms, wool.

Samples of some of the articles of clothing furnished by the St. Louis depot and shipped to mobilization camps in the Eastern Department are forwarded under separate cover for your information.

J. B. BELLINGER,
*Colonel, Quartermaster Corps.*

GEORGIA.

WASHINGTON, *D. C., July 10, 1916.*

COMMANDING GENERAL EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Governors Island, N. Y.:*

Following message repeated to you for investigation and report: "Representative Vinson, of Georgia, telephoned this afternoon asking whether something could not be done to correct deplorable condition of mobilization camp at Macon, Georgia. He states there are five thousand troops there. At least fifty per cent are supposed to sleep on ground in rainy weather because of lack of cots, and governor has been forced to buy all cots in State of Georgia. He also states that soldiers at Macon are not supplied with shoes and other equipment."

McCAIN.

---

GOVERNOR'S ISLAND, N. Y.,
*July 11, 1916.*

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL OF THE ARMY,
*Washington, D. C.:*

Replying to yours tenth concerning shortage cots and shoes Georgia mobilization camp. No cots have been available in quartermaster depots either at Philadelphia or Saint Louis for some time, due to failure to maintain adequate reserve. Every possible effort is being made here to purchase in open market. Day before yesterday all available cots in hands of Coast Artillery at Scriven were ordered to this camp as an emergency measure, and yesterday morning the balance required were purchased in open market in

New York and shipped by express and should now be in hands of officers on the ground. Donaldson, inspector, reported satisfactory sanitary condition, and that while clothing of troops arriving was in bad condition there was ample on hand, but not yet issued to supply all concerned.

WOOD.

---

Telegraphic instructions were immediately sent to Ft. Scriven, Ga., and Ft. Moultrie, S. C., to ship immediately by express all available cots to mobilization camp at Macon, Ga. Other goods were purchased in the open market.

Some 2,600 cots were purchased in open market in New York City, and enough of these, with those sent from the posts indicated above, were shipped to Macon, Ga., to meet the needs of the situation.

HEADQUARTERS EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Governors Island, New York City, July 18, 1916.*

From: Department commander.
To: The Adjutant General of the Army.
Subject: Shortages.

1. The depot quartermasters at Philadelphia and at St. Louis have reported to these headquarters that they can not furnish the following class of articles for the troops now in the State mobilization camps, viz:

Philadelphia depot shortages:
- Prs. breeches.
- Hats.
- Ornaments.
- Shirts.
- Bed sacks.
- Cots.

St. Louis depot shortages:
- Drawers.
- Hats and cords.
- Socks.
- Waist belts.
- Bed sacks.
- Cots.
- Mosquito bars.
- Ponchos.
- Pyramidal tents.

2. It is stated that some of these articles can be furnished when received from contractors, but no date is indicated when they will be available.

3. These articles must be supplied these troops before they can be forwarded to the border, and, as the depots can not furnish them, authority is requested for these headquarters to purchase them as near to standard specifications as possible.

LEONARD WOOD, *Major General.*

---

These headquarters being informed by the depot quartermasters, Philadelphia, that it was impossible to state when mosquito bars could be furnished, went into the open market and purchased mosquito bars as follows, to wit:

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aug. 23, 1916, | 1,200 | bobbinette mosquito bars with frames, at $1.39 each | $1,668.00 |
| Aug. 23, 1916, | 350 | bobbinette mosquito bars with frames, at $8 dozen | 233.34 |
| Total | 1,550 | bobbinette mosquito bars with frames. | |

It being impossible to purchase any more bobbinette mosquito bars an order was placed for 5,000 mosquito bars of the best cheesecloth, at $1 each, which were delivered within ten days of the placing of the order.

Not only did this action of these headquarters obtain prompt delivery of mosquito bars which permitted regiments that were being held in mobilization camps for this article to be forwarded to the Mexican border for duty immediately after receipt of mosquito bars, thus saving the Government $1,000 a day for retaining these troops in their mobilization camps at home, but resulted

in an actual saving to the Government of approximately $18,850 on the price paid for these mosquito bars, as the contract price of the Quartermaster Corps for bobbinette mosquito bars at this time was about $4.20.

*Call of the President for mobilization of the National Guard June 18, 1916—Outstanding deficiencies Oct. 31, 1916 (4 months and 12 days after the call).*

| | Alabama. | District of Columbia. | Florida. | Georgia. | Kentucky. | Mississippi. | New Hampshire. | New Jersey. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Animals: | | | | | | | | |
| Horses | | | | | | | | 61 |
| Mules | | | | | | 30 | | 162 |
| Bars, mosquito | 4,128 | | 1,860 | | 1,890 | 1,890 | 248 | |
| Belts, waist | | 750 | 50 | | | 1,662 | | 383 |
| Bed sacks | 1,380 | | | 500 | 1,890 | 1,890 | | 3,516 |
| Breeches, pairs | | 2,000 | 425 | | | | 1,000 | 482 |
| Cots | 3,000 | 100 | 500 | 600 | 1,890 | | | 3,516 |
| Drawers | | 750 | | | | | | 1,286 |
| Hats | | 2,000 | 150 | | | | | 565 |
| Hat cords | | 500 | | | | 892 | 141 | 525 |
| Ornaments | | | | | | | 67 | |
| Pins, tent | 35,000 | 1,500 | | | 15,896 | | | |
| Ponchos | 2,182 | 1,300 | 1,100 | | 1,321 | | | 508 |
| Tents, pyramid | 383 | | | | 282 | 100 | | 341 |
| Shirts, olive drab | | 2,000 | 200 | | | | 318 | 908 |
| Shoes | | 2,010 | | | | | 150 | 400 |
| Socks | | | | | | | | 1,200 |

| | New York. | North Carolina. | Pennsylvania. | South Carolina. | Tennessee. | Vermont. | West Virginia. | Total. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Animals: | | | | | | | | |
| Horses | 36 | 238 | 61 | | | | 490 | 886 |
| Mules | 88 | 220 | 95 | 111 | | | 44 | 750 |
| Bars, mosquito | 1,237 | 3,087 | | 2,465 | 2,398 | 262 | 118 | 19,583 |
| Belts, waist | | 196 | | 865 | | | 31 | 3,937 |
| Bed sacks | 1,237 | | | 1,465 | | 262 | | 12,140 |
| Breeches, pairs | | 145 | | 784 | | | | 4,836 |
| Cots | 1,170 | | | 650 | | | | 11,426 |
| Drawers | | 197 | | 914 | | | | 3,147 |
| Hats | | 44 | | 674 | | | | 3,433 |
| Hat cords | 67 | 870 | | 830 | | | | 3,825 |
| Ornaments | | | | | | | | 67 |
| Pins, tent | | 1,724 | | 1,200 | 5,000 | | | 60,320 |
| Ponchos | | 564 | | 700 | 340 | 246 | | 8,261 |
| Tents, pyramid | | 16 | | 45 | 24 | | | 1,191 |
| Shirts, olive drab | | 304 | | 784 | | | | 4,514 |
| Shoes | | 988 | | 1,025 | 750 | | | 5,323 |
| Socks | 191 | 244 | | 250 | 117 | | 98 | 2,100 |
| Wagons, E. W | 4 | 15 | | 2 | | | | 21 |

The foregoing show some of the shortages of the troops on official record in this department.

Recently an officer who had been on duty with Gen. Pershing's expedition informed an officer of my staff that the troops were suffering for lack of winter clothing; that the temperature frequently fell below freezing; that their requisitions for winter clothing had not been honored, and that the troops of Pershing's expedition felt that they were being sacrificed in order to favor the militia on the border. This officer stated in addition that as he passed along the border he found that this was not so; that both the Regulars and the militia on the border were suffering similarly from a lack of proper clothing.

These statements can readily be confirmed by reference to the reports made by the commanding general, Southern Department, to the War Department.

Senator LEE of Maryland. You are talking about the Regular Army?

Gen. WOOD. The Regular Army, just the same as the militia, so far as equipment goes. The Regulars are instructed men, with instructed officers, and are available to the limit of their number and

equipment; the militia are not. The Regular Infantry in this country has been at or below half war strength for the past five years, and we have been short, as you know, of Artillery. The only radio company in the Canal Zone was ordered north with its wireless equipment.

The condition of the Field Artillery material is shown by the following extract from an indorsement by the Chief of Ordnance:

I assume this is in addition to that in the hands of troops.

4. The following is a statement of the Field Artillery material and machine guns completed and under manufacture:

| | Batteries available for issue. | Batteries under manufacture. |
|---|---|---|
| 3-inch gun | [1] 15 | 20 |
| 3.8-inch howitzer | 7 | 8 |
| 4.7-inch gun | [2] 5 | 5½ |
| 4.7-inch howitzer | [2] 11 | 13 |
| 6-inch howitzer | [3] 5 | 6 |

[1] 6 converted batteries.
[2] 2 batteries of each in store at Fort Williams, Me. } Set aside for Eleventh Provisional Regiment of Heavy Field Artillery.
[3] 2 at Watervliet Arsenal.

It is expected that the batteries under manufacture, with the exception of the 3.8-inch Howitzer batteries, will be completed within the year.

* * * * * * *

WILLIAM CROZIER,
*Brigadier General, Chief of Ordnance.*

For machine guns, as you know, we had to go to the British Government. They let us have some 240 or 250 of one of the best light guns made, the Lewis gun. These were not what we got for the troops going to the border.

I insert a letter from the Chief of Ordnance as to our machine-gun supply.

JUNE 22, 1916.

From: The Ordnance Office.
To: The Adjutant General of the Army.
Subject: Status of machine-gun supply.

1. Fifty-four regiments of the Organized Militia have properly approved machine-gun organizations, and of these 44 are completely equipped, including four guns each, 5 regiments have no equipment, and 5 require the automatic machine rifles with tools, accessories, spare parts, and pack outfits, but have the personal equipment.

2. Ninety-nine complete Infantry regiments and 3 complete Cavalry regiments have been ordered mobilized, so that 58 regiments, which will shortly be in the Federal service, are without machine guns.

3. The records of this department show that there are available at ordnance arsenals, general supply depot No. 1, Schuylkill Arsenal, at the base, Columbus, N. Mex., and the seacoast forts intended for provisional regiments of Coast Artillery, a total of 141 machine guns, of which 69 are Benet and 72 Maxim, model of 1904; deducting 6 which are counted as being on hand at the base, Columbus, N. Mex., leaves 135; of these, 45 are required for the equipment of nine new regiments to be organized under the national-defense act in the immediate future. This leaves 90 guns, of which 18 are Benet and 72 Maxim, model of 1904.

4. It is considered important that at least 18 Benet guns and 22 Maxim should be retained for replacements during repairs of guns in service and for other special demands. This number is, of course, inadequate, but the entire supply is so small that it is thought it should be reduced to a minimum.

5. In addition to the above, there are in the United States 67 Maxim automatic machine guns, model of 1904, in the hands of Coast Artillery troops and

now assigned to land defense of seacoast fortifications, and 25 Colt automatic machine guns, which are of an old model, but might be used in emergency.

6. It will be seen from the above figures that the supplying of four machine guns to each militia regiment to be mustered into the service is impossible even if the Colt guns be used and the Maxims at seacoast fortifications be applied to that purpose. It is therefore recommended that for the present the machine-gun organizations of militia still to be equipped be furnished two guns each instead of four.

7. It is also recommended that this office be given authority to direct turning in of all Maxim automatic machine gun equipment from seacoast fortifications to such arsenals as may be most advantageous in order that with the pack outfits they may be made ready for assignment to such machine-gun organizations as may be formed, including those pertaining to provisional regiments that may be formed for Coast Artillery, none of which have been provided for. The seacoast organizations which are now on duty on the border are not formed into regiments and have no machine-gun equipment.

8. It is further recommended that similar authority be given to this office to have the 30 machine guns, with pertaining equipment, now at seacoast fortifications and originally intended for the equipment of provisional regiments of Coast Artillery, turned in to arsenals for overhauling and application of equipment of nine new regiments to be formed in the regular service.

WILLIAM CROZIER,
*Brigadier General, Chief of Ordnance.*

"Recommendation to reduce guns to be issued to militia regiments is disapproved on informal recommendation of the Chief of Ordnance, as additional guns have since been secured."

Two hundred and forty Lewis guns were secured.

The recommendation referred to follows:

[Fourth indorsement.]

ORDNANCE OFFICE, *July 15, 1916.*

TO THE ADJUTANT GENERAL OF THE ARMY:

1. The final recommendation of this office intended that action should be taken as has now been done, namely, that the militia regiments should be provided with four machine guns each, and that the Maxim automatic machine guns, caliber .30, model of 1904, at Coast Artillery posts should be turned in to arsenals. The total number of machine guns now available after having purchased those which could be secured, is still very limited.

WILLIAM CROZIER,
*Brigadier General, Chief of Ordnance.*

The CHAIRMAN. Why, was not that troop down at Carrizal, which was annihilated by the Mexicans, armed with machine guns? The Mexican troop had machine guns.

Gen. WOOD. I do not know, sir; I think they had them. We have adhered to a gun which, I believe, has received very general condemnation—the Benet-Mercie—and we have been experimenting with one gun after another for years. But it is the old story of not accepting the best in the world and at least starting even with the other fellow; and if a crisis came again to-morrow you would have to do exactly the same thing and if it came any time within the next year you would have to do the same thing. You would have to go to some foreign government or suspend some foreign contract and use a gun which does not use our ammunition or depart entirely from your present method of procedure, in order to have sufficient effective guns for a force of several hundred thousand men.

The CHAIRMAN. If we happened to be at war with that power, we would be in a bad situation, would we not?

Gen. WOOD. We would. I would like to go into this question of modern arms and equipment a little more, because this is where, as I see it, the blame falls largely on the supply departments of the Regu-

lar Army. The militiaman, if he had the equipment, would be worth little as a soldier unless well trained; but the regular soldier, while well trained as a rule, has not the equipment and arms which modern war demands. The organization of the British company to-day at the front is 250 men and 6 officers. There are in each company 8 machine guns—Lewis guns. There are no Infantry regiments at the front in the British Army; the brigades are made up of battalions. The brigade consists of four battalions. Each battalion has about 1,000 rifles. There are 4,000 rifles in the brigade. There are 128 Lewis guns in each brigade in the British Army on the western front and back of each brigade a company of 16 Vickers—a splendid gun of heavier type; there is no better heavy gun. This is the gun we have adopted, but there is just as marked a distinction between the two types of machine guns as there is between heavy and light field artillery, and they are interdependent. The light gun goes with the rush forward with the line; the heavy gun is more in the rôle of the heavy artillery—it is not moved as readily. Now, the British, with the experience of the war, have 144 machine guns for about 4,000 rifles.

Senator BRADY. We have no such provision as that?

Gen. WOOD. We have no such provision. Our recent machine-gun board recommended 6 machine guns of the Vickers type for an Infantry regiment of, in round numbers, 1,750 rifles, as against 72 which the British now have for 2,000 rifles, and, by the way, I am informed that they are going to greatly increase the number.

Now, our proposed machine-gun equipment after all the experience of this war is six Vickers per Infantry regiment. The experience of the great war is an open book to the whole world, so far as machine guns, their number, type, and uses go. Both the light and the heavy guns have their functions and both must be had. We must build each in time of peace and should have a reserve of at least 30,000 of them ready. We, especially, shall need them, as our attitude at first will be a defensive one. It must be a gun using our rifle ammunition and must be built in time of peace. We can well afford to adopt the best heavy type, the Vickers, and must also adopt the best light in the proportion of about eight light to one heavy. If we don't act and act promptly, we shall be caught as we were in the Spanish War and in the present mobilization. We shall be without this all-important weapon.

Senator HUGHES. When you said a while ago that the Regulars were equipped, you meant that they were trained; you did not mean that they had the equipment?

Gen. WOOD. They had not the full equipment, arms, and appliances needed in modern war.

Senator HUGHES. I understood you to say that the Regulars were thoroughly equipped.

Gen. WOOD. They were thoroughly trained, as a rule, not equipped.

Senator HUGHES. That is what I thought you meant.

Gen. WOOD. Yes; we are building in this country a number of very good machine guns.

Senator BRADY. Have we developed a first-class type of machine gun?

Gen. WOOD. The Lewis gun has been adopted practically unanimously as the light gun of the British service and is being built for

the French; and I think it is safe to say, when you see great nations struggling for life adopt a gun, that they are not adopting it lightly.

Senator THOMAS. May I ask a question which is somewhat foreign to the examination of Senator Lee? The experiments that have been made by Army officers upon the Lewis gun recently have resulted in its rejection, have they not?

Gen. WOOD. The experiments made under conditions prescribed by the Ordnance Department; but the experience which one board, the board that convened at Plattsburg, had, was unanimously in favor of the Lewis gun. This test closely simulated service in war conditions.

Col. Lewis was very anxious that his own country should use his gun, and in 1911 and 1912 he offered its free use to our Government. This offer was made to me in my official capacity as Chief of Staff, representing the Secretary of War. The offer was unconditional. Nothing came of it, as it was rejected after test under conditions which indicated very clearly a failure to appreciate the very distinct uses and functions of the light and heavy machine guns. The rejection has delayed our securing this most excellent gun, which is easily the best of the light type of gun. We may find a better one later. When it comes we should get it.

Senator THOMAS. I was very much surprised, in view of the fact that it seems to be used with great effect on the battle fields of Europe, where it is said to be superior to any other gun, that it should have resulted so unfortunately here.

Gen. WOOD. It is, I think, a great misfortune that the ordnance test did result unfortunately. I think that a succession of tests in the hands of line officers of the Army of actual experience with machine guns, under service conditions, would have had a different result.

Senator BRADY. The fact that the British Government has adopted that gun in time of war seems to be a complete recommendation for the gun.

Gen. WOOD. I think that when a highly intelligent people, struggling for life, adopt, after more than a year of use, a weapon to the exclusion largely of others, and give it an eight to one predominance as against their own gun, the Vickers, it is pretty safe to take serious notice of what they have done.

Senator BRADY. As a matter of fact, has not our Ordnance Department practically rejected the Lewis gun?

Gen. WOOD. On two or three occasions; yes, sir—under tests prescribed by the Ordnance Department.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand it has done it again recently.

Gen. WOOD. Again recently; yes, sir.

Senator THOMAS. Were the recent tests made by men who were unfamiliar with the use of machine guns?

Gen. WOOD. The Lewis gun, on the occasion last referred to, was rejected on the reports of previous tests. There was no actual test of the gun on this occasion. The board was not composed of men who had ever handled the Lewis gun. I doubt if any of them had any service familiarity with it. The Lewis machine gun has stood, on thousands of occasions, the test of actual war, of perhaps the

greatest war the world has ever seen, and that it is an effective gun, and does meet the test of war, and it is for war that we are building guns, is evidenced by the fact that Great Britain is building the gun in enormous quantities in England, and as rapidly as possible in this country. We may, and undoubtedly will, have some day a better light gun than the Lewis, probably a better heavy gun than the Vickers, but they are both excellent, dependable guns, and we should have a large supply of each, about eight light guns to one heavy.

Senator THOMAS. Does that not indicate, without using harsher terms, a good deal of unwisdom in selecting men to make the test?

Gen. WOOD. That I could not say.

Senator BRADY. I think it is hardly fair to ask Gen. Wood to pass upon a question of that kind.

Senator THOMAS. I can speak, at all events.

Senator BRADY. That is right; you and I can speak, but Gen. Wood is not in a position to speak.

Senator THOMAS. It would seem to me that a test made under such circumstances is no test at all.

Gen. WOOD. The situation is this: You have two types of machine gun. You have got a gun which some people say is not a machine gun. They call it an automatic. It is a gun which one man can carry, which does not require a tape, a tape feed, or an ammunition box. Under the present method of attack, a trench is blown up and perhaps a huge crater formed, or a trench is captured, and you have to seize it and organize against the counter attack. In other words, you have to establish very promptly fire superiority—a great volume of fire. You can not run forward with heavy guns sitting up on tripods. Your men have got to drop into shell holes, with any sort of cover, and if they have got a gun that they can lie prone on their stomachs and fire, a gun they can carry themselves, that is the gun they will all turn to. There are a number of these guns. The British have turned to the Lewis, and they have built it as a result of two and a half years of experience. We have adopted the Vickers, and it is an excellent gun, the best of the heavy type; but that is more a gun for defensive positions. The important thing is that we must have some kind of a light gun. If we go on waiting to develop the best kind of a gun in the world we never shall have it, because there never will be a best. The best of to-day is the second best of to-morrow. We must get something now.

Senator BRADY. Nevertheless, it is a fact that at the present moment, while the British Government, engaged in the throes of war, is manufacturing and using that gun as much as they can, the American Government, in time of peace and preparing for war, is rejecting that same instrument of war.

Gen. WOOD. That is correct, sir. I believe we are to give it another trial some time next spring.

Senator LEE of Maryland. General, the reports of the major generals in command of the departments of the Army are very interesting matter, and of course you are familiar with your own report. I will call your attention to some features in the reports of the other generals in command of the departments and ask your views, with the idea of seeing whether you concur with them or not.

Maj. Gen. T. H. Barry, commanding the Central Department, in speaking of organizations as affecting preparedness, states (p. 130 of the report issued by the Militia Bureau):

> In no State was the National Guard prepared to take the field at once. In most cases this unpreparedness was mainly due to the faulty system under which the National Guard is organized, supplied, and controlled. In others, the State authorities were partially responsible.

I understand that to mean that in other cases—not the most—there was some responsibility on the State authorities, but that in most cases the unpreparedness was due to national organization and control. Do you understand that from your experience? Is that about the way it happened in your department?

Gen. WOOD. No, sir. I should lay emphasis on the word "control" in Gen. Barry's report. The unpreparedness of the militia was fundamentally due to lack of sound training. They were not trained soldiers and could not effectively perform their military functions against an efficient enemy. Training depends very much upon State interest. In some States interest in the militia has been very slack, as indicated by lack of appropriations and preparations to take care of the militia, armories, etc. State sentiment is lukewarm or indifferent. In such a State you find poorly prepared militia. There was slowness and shortcomings on the part of the Federal Government in providing the necessary equipment, but I want to emphasize again that even had this equipment been ready the militia could not have gone to the front as an effective force. They were largely untrained, largely recruits.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Under the militia clause of the Constitution the National Government has a power to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining militia forces—all of those three powers. Your opinion is, therefore, that the National Government has omitted to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining?

Gen. WOOD. It can provide, but it has no power to really insist.

Senator LEE of Maryland. That is a constitutional question. If it can "provide," it should be able to insist.

Gen. WOOD. If you can remove it absolutely from State control, then you would have a Federal organization.

Senator LEE of Maryland. If we can provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, then we can enforce it?

Gen. WOOD. You can if you can take it from the State authorities. The States have the power to govern.

Senator LEE of Maryland. You think that we can not enforce it upon or through State authorities?

Gen. WOOD. You can not do it.

Senator LEE of Maryland. That is your opinion as a constitutional lawyer?

Gen. WOOD. That is my opinion as a soldier.

Senator LEE of Maryland. I will take that question up a little later with you, General, and make a comparison between the militia clauses of the Swiss constitution and our Constitution, and show that the Swiss have succeeded in getting these things done by the Cantons.

Gen. WOOD. Very well, sir.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Gen. Barry further says (p. 132), referring to this cutting out of so many physically unfit men:

I recommend that the officers and enlisted men of the National Guard be examined physically at least once a year by medical officers of the United States Army, and that men found physically unfit be discharged at once.

That could have been done at any time, under the power and discretion of the Federal Government?

Gen. WOOD. That could be done, and that is an excellent suggestion.

Senator LEE of Maryland. It could have been done at any time, could it not?

Gen. WOOD. I doubt, sir, whether it could have been done until they had come under the new law.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Were there not pretty complete powers of inspection under the old Dick law?

Gen. WOOD. They were fairly extensive, but the adoption of Federal standards was left to State authorities, and we accepted their certificates as to whether they had examined their men.

Senator LEE of Maryland. You did not have to accept it; you could turn the company down if it did not suit you?

Gen. WOOD. We could turn them down if they did not suit us; but I do not think of any instance where medical officers were ever sent into the State to examine the men in time of peace except as a result of some special report.

Senator LEE of Maryland. That was simply a Federal omission?

Gen. WOOD. No, sir; there was no power to do more than withdraw assistance.

Senator LEE of Maryland. You will not say that it would have been unlawful under the provisions of the Dick law to have had a medical inspection?

Gen. WOOD. I think we could have had it.

Senator LEE of Maryland. You will admit, though, that if there had been timely medical inspection by Federal authority of the militia, this loss could have been nearly totally avoided?

Gen. WOOD. All that were then physically defective; yes. The men who were excused by the governors and those who failed to respond would not have been covered; but otherwise, yes.

Senator LEE of Maryland. You testified in your direct testimony that the governors could excuse men. Do you want to qualify that? They can not, without Federal consent, under the present law?

Gen. WOOD. Not after the men have accepted the dual oath, if the new law proves to be constitutional.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Certainly.

Gen. WOOD. That, of course, is a condition that we are now approaching.

Senator LEE of Maryland. On this subject of physical requirements Gen. Barry suggests (p. 133):

Some modification should be made in the physical requirements for admission of National Guard officers and men when the organizations are transferred to Federal service. It is unreasonable to require the same physical standard of a field officer of 20 years' service as is required for a young recruit. Many excellent officers can not pass the required eye test without their glasses, but can see perfectly with glasses. Regulations should be prepared showing the deviation from the standard permitted under certain circumstances. The requirements should also be modified for officers and men of mature years and long service.

What can you say as to the fact that men of long service were cut out, evidently by some of the details of these regulations?

Gen. WOOD. That is right; yes, sir.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Which could be modified in the interests of general efficiency?

Gen. WOOD. I do not think so, Senator.

Senator LEE of Maryland. You do not think so?

Gen. WOOD. No, sir. Except for very minor defects in the case of officers of experience.

Senator LEE of Maryland. You do not agree with Gen. Barry on that recommendation?

Gen. WOOD. Not entirely on that; no, sir. I do on certain things, Senator.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Let me read along, and maybe you will agree with it:

> Whether or not the physical requirements governing acceptance of officers and enlisted men are modified as above suggested, it is highly desirable that department commanders be given authority to waive minor defects in weight, height, eyesight, etc.

Gen. WOOD. We had that this year; yes, sir.

Senator LEE of Maryland. He continues:

> The fact that during the early part of the past mobilization all such applications for waiver had to go to the War Department resulted in the loss of many desirable officers and men and in considerable delay and dissatisfaction all around.

Gen. WOOD. I assumed I had authority and accepted many, where, for instance, there was slightly defective eyesight or a few teeth gone, or something of that sort, that evidently would produce no disability.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Gen. Barry makes strong recommendations for acquiring suitable tracts of land for mobilization purposes, or using military reservations. He says (p. 134):

> Except in the comparatively rare cases where suitable tracts of land are owned by States and set aside for the training and mobilization of the National Guard, existing Army posts and United States reservations within the State should have been utilized wherever practicable. This would greatly have expedited the mobilization of 1916.
>
> Sites for future mobilization should be selected with the utmost care by a board of specially qualified officers. Accessibility, good railroad connections, a reasonable amount of drill ground, and a target range permitting practice up to 600 yards are absolutely essential. The fact that the mobilization camp would be the logical place for the assembling and training of newly formed regiments and of unassigned recruits should also be considered and, if practicable, the ground available should include areas of varied terrain suitable for field training of recruits and small units.
>
> Upon the selected site should be built the necessary office buildings and suitable storehouses for ordnance, quartermaster, and other stores. These buildings should be permanent.

All that is good, is it not?

Gen. WOOD. I would put it this way, Senator: It would be excellent for the training of men who must be brought to the colors after war had commenced; but if our system is to be maintained and be effective the organizations must always be at strength (have sufficient reserves) so that they will be ready for immediate mobilization. To assume that under conditions of modern preparedness,

as to possible attack on us, we are to send our troops to a camp, for instance, to be drilled and instructed and given target practice, of course, means that they would not be available promptly. What I recommended in a similar report (which I will, with your permission, put into the record), is that our organization should be so maintained as to numbers, equipment, and efficiency that we can mobilize it just as we do our Regular troops. For instance, if we decide to remove the garrison from Fort Ethan Allen, we will telegraph the commanding officer, "Take your regiment and go to Texas." Take a New York regiment, for instance. We want to be able to wire the colonel, "Take your regiment and proceed to El Paso." He should have with him, in the first place, a certain number of men suitably instructed and ready. He should have also back of him a list of men who have passed through the regiment or other regiments, who are listed as efficient, as a reserve; and he should have at his armory, or at the neighboring military post, the necessary equipment. We found this year that it was better to mobilize regiments where they had a good armory, at the armory.

In this connection I cite the following letter of October 1, 1916. Attention is especially invited to the statement of the Adjutant General transmitting statement from the Chief of Ordnance, that his (ordnance) supplies were exhausted June 27 by the mobilization of the militia up to that date:

From: Department commander.
To: The Adjutant General of the Army.
Subject: Mobilization of militia, Eastern Department, for period ending July 31, 1916.

1. The inclosed supplementary report to the one forwarded July 17, 1916, is submitted.

2. Briefly reviewing the situation presented attention is particularly invited to the following salient points:

(*a*) Thirty per cent of the number of enlisted men in the State service at the date of the call of the President, June 18, 1916, were discharged because of physical disability. Such a proportion of ineffectives is amazing when it is considered that Delaware and North Carolina are the only States in this Department that have not adopted the standards of the Regular Army physical examination prior to entry into the service. The lax methods, in this connection that must have been employed are well demonstrated in the cases of Georgia and Kentucky, both of which States average for each organization presented 50 per cent physical rejections and the unnecessary monetary loss incident thereto in the way of "pay, clothing, and keep" of such men, they being entitled to such from the date they responded to the call of the President, will be a considerable item. As the mobilization has proceeded, the paramount idea seems to have been on the part of the States to simply supply men regardless of their physical qualifications or disqualifications. In many instances a strong effort has been made to bring about the mustering into the service of physically unfit men and to prevent the mustering out of the service of those who are physically unfitted for active duty.

(*b*) Of the total number responded to the call of June 18, only July 31 there remained in mobilization camps in this department practically 34 per cent. Departures have been delayed primarily because of lack of equipment and secondarily the inability of organizations to recruit to the authorized minimum peace strength. This feature as well as the number of recruits received for organizations that have been forwarded to the Southern Departmnet, which is 7.5 per cent of the number required to recruit such organizations to our war strength, is believed to be a result of increasing in probability of immediate active service, but regardless of the cause the facts as stated remain.

(*c*) With reference to shortages, especially in the Ordnance and Quartermaster Departments, this developed early in the mobilization, and has indi-

cated a condition of serious shortage in these departments. The Adjutant General on June 27 telegraphed these headquarters as follows:

"With reference to your request for authority to communicate directly with depots in matter of ordnance material, Chief of Ordnance reports mobilization of militia has practically exhausted small reserve supply in hands of his department, and that it is essential that limited amount of stores remaining on hand should be held subject to order of War Department to meet most urgent needs."

This statement is significant and indicates very clearly what would have happened had we had occasion to meet an enemy who was prepared or meet a force of any strength. This matter will be handled more in detail in the final report. Serious shortages also developed in the Quartermaster Department in the very early stages of the mobilization and indicated the department was almost wholly unready to meet the demands of war, even under conditions of minor gravity, in the military sense, which characterized our possible clash with Mexico.

(*d*) The system of furnishing horses through collecting them in the Middle West and sending them to the frontier to be assigned to untrained mounted organizations on arrival has been a pronounced failure and should never be resorted to again. Mounted organizations have been held for months without horses awaiting shipment to the border. On arrival it will require additional months to train the men for the mounted service, and an equally long time to train the mounts. These organizations should have had their horses assigned to them in camp and their training conducted there. To assemble the men and animals of mounted organizations in the theater of war and in the immediate presence of a presumptive enemy, in my opinion, is a most unwise and hazardous procedure.

3. The evidence as gathered for the period as covered by this report serves only to emphasize the correctness of the statements made in the previous report and has fully justified the recommendations made in preceding years to the effect that reserves of men and animals must be provided in time of peace. Arms and equipment sufficient to arm and equip regiments at war strength must be kept in the armories or in depots under Government control as near as possible to the troops concerned. The present system of concentrating supplies has been an absolute failure, has caused much delay and a great and unnecessary outlay of money incident to shipping by express, etc. This department has been stripped of medical officers, cooks, bakers, and technical troops in a desperate effort to take care of and render more efficient this largely untrained, largely unequipped force of militia. This mobilization has demonstrated a condition which should never be allowed to occur again, and has shown conclusively that we could not have possibly met even a small well-prepared force with any hope of success. It is not the men and officers in the militia who are at fault, but rather the system. If this demonstration of entire unreliability and workability of our present militia system proves to be sufficient to bring about the adoption of a sound, rational system, the lesson will be well worth what it cost.

LEONARD WOOD,
*Major General, United States Army.*

## RECAPITULATION.

[Figures herein are subject to correction. This tabulation is based on reports received in some cases from Federal officers and in others from National Guard authorities, and neither correspond with previous reports. This is especially true for columns 1, 3, and 4, but even these columns are believed to be correct to within 3 per cent. At the present time appropriate action toward correcting discrepancies is being taken.]

| Organization. | 1 | | 2 | | 3 | | 4 | | 5 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | On rolls of organization at date of call. | | On said rolls who reported in response to call. | | On said rolls who were excused or released from service by governor or State officials, either before or after reporting. | | Such members who failed to pass the final physical examination. | | Former members of Organized Militia who applied for enlistment on or after the date of call. | |
| | Officers. | Enlisted men. | Officers. | Enlisted men. | Officers. | Enlisted men. | Officers. | Enlisted men. | Officers. | Enlisted men. |
| Alabama | 170 | 2,670 | 169 | 2,286 | 3 | 184 | 7 | 633 | 2 | 220 |
| Connecticut | 140 | 2,470 | 137 | 2,457 | 2 | 82 | 4 | 369 | ..... | 236 |
| Delaware | 29 | 430 | 29 | 425 | 1 | 34 | ..... | 148 | 1 | ..... |
| District of Columbia | 90 | 1,891 | 85 | 1,730 | ..... | 114 | 3 | 322 | ..... | 108 |
| Florida | 48 | 653 | 48 | 574 | ..... | 5 | 3 | 165 | 9 | 101 |
| Georgia | 182 | 2,637 | 179 | 2,386 | 10 | 975 | 8 | 208 | 14 | 333 |
| Kentucky | 169 | 2,279 | 169 | 1,987 | 1 | 35 | 21 | 848 | 4 | 203 |
| Maryland | 157 | 2,146 | 157 | 2,056 | 3 | 103 | 4 | 234 | 5 | 220 |
| Massachusetts | 277 | 4,572 | 275 | 3,413 | ..... | ..... | ..... | 169 | ..... | ..... |
| Maine | 55 | 998 | 55 | 961 | ..... | 38 | 5 | 284 | 2 | 83 |
| Mississippi | 49 | 957 | 49 | 951 | ..... | ..... | ..... | 2 | 5 | 185 |
| New Hampshire | 70 | 1,082 | 68 | 1,021 | 7 | 237 | 4 | 245 | 2 | 38 |
| New Jersey | 190 | 2,857 | 188 | 2,795 | 1 | 389 | 12 | 274 | 1 | 308 |
| New York | 702 | 13,397 | 678 | 12,823 | 28 | 1,127 | 12 | 790 | 13 | 931 |
| North Carolina | 186 | 2,535 | 185 | 2,381 | 9 | 136 | 10 | 669 | 1 | 201 |
| Pennsylvania | 619 | 9,427 | 614 | 8,743 | 13 | 864 | 21 | 1,175 | 14 | 828 |
| Rhode Island | 17 | 476 | 17 | 379 | ..... | 39 | ..... | 9 | (1) | (1) |
| South Carolina | 95 | 1,364 | 95 | 1,262 | 4 | 88 | 7 | 318 | 16 | 249 |
| Tennessee | 107 | 1,788 | 107 | 1,552 | 1 | 243 | 3 | 487 | 7 | 140 |
| Vermont | 57 | 803 | 57 | 768 | 1 | 85 | 2 | 77 | 2 | 45 |
| Virginia | 135 | 2,225 | 136 | 1,984 | 4 | 54 | 3 | 474 | 11 | 170 |
| West Virginia | 52 | 987 | 47 | 742 | 8 | 31 | 1 | 169 | ..... | 37 |
| Total | 3,596 | 58,644 | 3,544 | 53,676 | 96 | 4,863 | 130 | 8,069 | 109 | 4,631 |

RECAPITULATION—Continued.

| Organization. | 6 | | 7 | | 8 | | 9 | | 10 | | 11 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Such applicants who failed to pass the final physical examination. | | Without former service who applied for enlistment in organization. | | Such applicants who failed to pass the final physical examination. | | With former service in the United States Army, Navy, or Marine Corps, who applied for enlistment. | | Such applicants who failed to pass final physical examination. | | In organization at time of muster who failed to take oath as National Guard as prescribed in new national-defense act. | |
| | Officers. | Enlisted men. | Officers. | Enlisted men. | Officers. | Enlisted men. | Officers. | Enlisted men. | Officers. | Enlisted men. | Officers. | Enlisted men. |
| Alabama | ..... | 53 | 2 | 1,848 | ..... | 529 | ..... | 56 | ..... | 17 | ..... | 103 |
| Connecticut | ..... | 1 | ..... | 247 | ..... | 15 | ..... | 71 | ..... | 2 | ..... | 230 |
| Delaware | ..... | ..... | 1 | ..... | ..... | ..... | 2 | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... |
| District of Columbia | ..... | 18 | ..... | 594 | ..... | 104 | 1 | 63 | ..... | 10 | ..... | 7 |
| Florida | 1 | 22 | ..... | 718 | ..... | 187 | 1 | 21 | ..... | 3 | ..... | 16 |
| Georgia | 1 | 89 | 2 | 2,060 | ..... | 236 | 1 | 66 | ..... | 2 | ..... | 30 |
| Kentucky | ..... | 95 | 1 | 1,876 | ..... | 969 | 3 | 72 | ..... | 22 | ..... | 193 |
| Maryland | ..... | 26 | 5 | 1,484 | ..... | 358 | 2 | 79 | ..... | 4 | ..... | 77 |
| Massachusetts | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | 1 | 1,139 |
| Maine | ..... | 16 | ..... | 376 | ..... | 98 | ..... | 21 | ..... | 6 | ..... | 40 |
| Mississippi | ..... | 68 | ..... | 678 | ..... | 201 | ..... | 27 | ..... | 3 | ..... | 136 |
| New Hampshire | ..... | 2 | 4 | 755 | ..... | 100 | ..... | 9 | ..... | 3 | ..... | ..... |
| New Jersey | ..... | 40 | ..... | 1,856 | ..... | 255 | ..... | 140 | ..... | 12 | 6 | 336 |
| New York | ..... | 66 | 4 | 5,548 | ..... | 1,223 | 6 | 329 | ..... | 28 | 7 | 442 |
| North Carolina | 1 | 44 | ..... | 1,674 | ..... | 517 | ..... | 42 | ..... | 9 | ..... | 5 |
| Pennsylvania | ..... | 94 | 11 | 6,171 | 1 | 1,168 | 4 | 380 | ..... | 26 | ..... | 417 |
| Rhode Island | (1) | (1) | (1) | (1) | (1) | (1) | (1) | (1) | (1) | (1) | (1) | (1) |
| South Carolina | 1 | 50 | 13 | 1,369 | 1 | 405 | 2 | 40 | ..... | 2 | ..... | 319 |
| Tennessee | ..... | 21 | 3 | 1,476 | ..... | 326 | ..... | 91 | ..... | 4 | 1 | 552 |
| Vermont | ..... | ..... | 1 | 473 | ..... | 53 | 2 | 11 | ..... | 1 | ..... | 17 |
| Virginia | ..... | 17 | 5 | 1,182 | ..... | 240 | 1 | 44 | ..... | 8 | ..... | 211 |
| West Virginia | ..... | 9 | ..... | 145 | ..... | 31 | ..... | 13 | ..... | 1 | ..... | 130 |
| Total | 4 | 731 | 52 | 30,530 | 2 | 7,015 | 25 | 1,575 | ..... | 163 | 15 | 4,400 |

[1] No record.

Senator LEE of Maryland. That is what I understood Gen. O'Ryan testified here. You agree with him about that.

Gen. WOOD. Let me just state this. It will be a little roundabout. We sent a good many regiments to the moblization camps above New York. They spent a day or so getting ready to move up there, and a day or two getting into camp. Conditions were not wholly sanitary; the men were not familiar with camp life, most of them; they had poor cooks. They were there just about long enough to get more or less knocked out and upset in every way. Then they were hustled onto trains and sent off. Toward the end of the mobilization we all came to the conclusion that it would have been better to mobilize them at the armories, to contract to feed them at hotels and restaurants, and put them on trains, with their equipment, and send them to the front; that as it was they only lost efficiency and really learned nothing. There was great confusion, and there were very few officers to instruct them.

As to mounted troops, we must also pursue a somewhat similar system if we are going to have an effective and promptly responsive force. We must have the animals. It is easy enough to get them. Have your options secured on your horses and pay so much a year.

When your mounted troops are called out, simply reach out and exercise your option and avoid all this delay and confusion.

Senator LEE of Maryland. I would like to call to your memory the provision for horses in the Swiss system.

Gen. WOOD. That is a very good one.

Senator LEE of Maryland. They put a horse out with the individual man, who after a certain number of years becomes the owner of that horse.

Gen. WOOD. This is a modification of that.

Senator LEE of Maryland. It is subject to inspection. The horse is thus maintained for a number of years, always available for military purposes, without expense to the Government.

Gen. WOOD. We can do the same thing.

Senator LEE of Maryland. I do not believe they do that for their artillery horses.

Gen. WOOD. I think what we would have to do here is simply to secure options on our horses, so that we can reach out and get them whenever we want them. Some must always be with the organization for training and drill.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Coming back to this camp suggestion of Gen. Barry's.

Gen. WOOD. There is much in it that is admirable, Senator.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Do you not think there is use for it in connection with annual mobilizations, no matter what force you have, whether you have a militia, or the Army that you have in mind, or whether you have just the Regular Army which Gen. Barry prefers? He is a perfectly frank soldier, and he thinks all reliance should be put on the Regular Army. But whatever Army you have, ought it not to be mobilized annually, as the Swiss do?

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir. In Europe, speaking generally, including, of course, Switzerland, they have field maneuvers, as we did in Massachusetts in 1909. We covered 2,000 square miles of an old, well built-up State. We had military operations all over this area. We have maneuvers every year about Plattsburg—last year with six or eight thousand men out at one time. We pay the damages and pay the rentals for camps, and we find it is much more economical and it gives us greater terrain. The great objection to these training-camp sites is that the officers soon become familiar with every nook and cranny in them, and every advantage and disadvantage of terrain, and the maneuvers eventually reduce themselves more or less to a farce. You need a great deal of terrain to operate in. For instance, you can start your opposing forces 30 or 40 miles apart and have them go through all the preliminary arrangement for contact that we have in actual war. You see at once how much more advantageous it is.

Senator LEE of Maryland. It is like hunting with a bird dog that knows the ground where the coveys are against one that does not?

Gen. WOOD. Absolutely.

Senator LEE of Maryland. On this subject of blanks Gen. Barry says:

> A complete supply of blank forms needed upon muster in and for the routine administration and supply of the entire State National Guard after its muster into the Federal service should be kept on hand at all times in the various *armories* or mobilization camps.

Gen. WOOD. That is right. May I say something with regard to that?

Senator LEE of Maryland. Certainly.

Gen. WOOD. All the supplies for the militia should be obtained just as are supplies for the Regular troops. They should use the same forms, with a rubber stamp, for intsance, "Militia of Maryland," and requisition on the department ordnance officer or department quartermaster. By doing that you gradually make those troops more and more a part of the departmental force.

Senator LEE of Maryland. On this subject of horses Gen. Barry says that the National Guard organizations were practically immobile units so far as field service was concerned.

Gen. WOOD. That is absolutely true, sir.

Senator LEE of Maryland. They are going to go back to that under present conditions?

Gen. WOOD. They will go back to it unless we establish the system I have spoken of, of having options on the horses. In other words, establish a condition which will give us an immediately available reserve of horses. It is quite as necessary to train horses as it is to train men. The idea that you can mount so-called Cavalry organizations made up of half-green men on all-green horses and send them into a campaign with any hope of success is indicative of the most profound ignorance of the requirements of service. The same is true to a lesser extent of the Artillery horse. He must be a selected horse and have had some training.

Senator LEE of Maryland. On the subject of machine guns, Gen. Barry believes very strongly with you, that all regiments should be properly equipped. He touches again on the subject of blanks. Evidently that is an important matter.

Gen. WOOD. There was a delay in connection with blanks; and in that connection blanks should be kept at each department headquarters, ample for that entire department. In fact, they should be kept as far as possible with the militia organizations themselves and be immediately available.

The CHAIRMAN. That is for muster in and final muster out?

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir. We had a good deal of delay incident to the receipts of forms. Fortunately it did not, as a rule, delay the movement of troops, because they were not ready; but if they had been ready it would have delayed them.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Col. Frederick, who is chief mustering officer of the central department, says in his report (p. 137):

> The muster in of the National Guard of this department was greatly handicapped by the shortage of necessary blank forms and delay in the receipt of additional blank forms requested by telegraph. Telegrams showing the numbers and amounts of forms required were sent your office on June 20, June 21, and June 24. Some of the forms asked for did not arrive at these headquarters until July 20. This office appreciates the fact that, due to the urgency of the situation and the large number of troops ordered mustered in, the delay in receipt of forms was unavoidable, but for future mobilization there should be kept on hand at all times at department headquarters or at designated mobilization points the maximum number of blank forms that can be used.

That is absolutely correct?

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Gen. Funston, in his report as major general commanding the Southern Department, said (p. 139):

There was a serious lack of blank forms of all kinds, which resulted in delays in the preparation of records and reports and in the instruction of the National Guard in the use of these forms.

Gen. WOOD. Senator, I think all those questions of shortage of supplies, equipment, clothing, blanks, etc., can be accepted as pertaining to any department except the medical. I do not think they are subject to question; I mean that I think they obtain in every territorial department.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Here is a general matter to which he refers, which is not a matter of blanks, but is a matter of condensing and clarifying a very important process, namely, mustering in. Gen. Funston says (p. 139):

The main fault which still remains, and which demands radical treatment, is the process of muster in, which is too complicated and takes too much time and labor. The mere fact that there are so many regulations condemns it. The process must be simplified so as to be applicable in a real emergency. The troops when called out should be ready for muster in. An emergency being real, the troops offered by the State should be accepted at once and sworn into Federal service. It would seem that this desirable condition can be brought about by an insistence in peace times on the physical requirements and by the abolishment of the present complicated property accountability and transfer. Federal inspection in peace times should include a physical examination. With the new provisions of the national-defense act as to pay and property responsibility, it would seem that a peace accountability could be devised which would avoid any inspections, inventories, and transfers of property on mobilization.

It has been suggested that there should be on hand at all times and kept up to date in each company office a separate muster-in roll for each member. The record of each officer and man should be entered on a standard mobilization form similar to a descriptive list. Space should be provided for the use of the medical examiner of the Regular Army. The national-defense oath should be found somewhere on this roll. These ready-to-use muster-in rolls should be in triplicate (one original and two carbons), and the three held together in a perforated sheet. Checking of these muster-in rolls and of the descriptive lists should be a duty of the organization commander and of the Federal inspector. The latter should also examine and check the enlistment papers on file in the company office.

General, in connection with the loss in number by physical examination I want to call your attention to an extract from "The Organized Militia Regulations of the War Department," 1910, page 117:

* * * *Provided*, That in such States or Territories or the District of Columbia as shall have adopted a standard of physical examination for enlistment and reenlistment of the Organized Militia, approved by the Secretary of War, such militia shall be deemed under the law "fit for military service," and shall be duly mustered into the service of the United States as such. Under these conditions, as soon as practicable after such muster in, without interfering with the supreme duty of the militia—the defense of the country—and in such a manner as not to prevent their employment against an enemy, a physical examination will be made by a medical officer of the Army, detailed for the purpose, who shall note all cases of defect and cause the same to be entered on the muster roll against the name of each individual, stating in each case whether the defect so noted existed prior to the muster in of the soldier. * * * (Par. 460, Army Regulations, 1910.)

Also the following from report by Capt. Gibson, inspector instructor, September 14, 1916:

* * * The views held by Army surgeons as to the standard required of recruits and those held by civilian doctors are so wide apart as to bear little resemblance.

You will observe that the above regulation wasted no time on an effort to reconcile standards in an emergency, but, in a way not to interfere with "the supreme duty, the defense of the country," examinations to protect the Government against false pension claims was provided. New regulations or orders were passed for this mobilization of June 18, 1916, requiring a strict examination. It eliminated many men and caused much delay. Why was the new system introduced at that crisis, General? The examination provided in 1910 Army Regulations, just read, would have met the requirements of section 115 of the new law, would it not?

Gen. WOOD. This was done, Senator, to protect the Federal Government against claims for pensions for disability which existed at time of muster into the Federal service, disability which may have arisen since the State examination or been overlooked by the State officers. The emergency was not such as to justify omitting this precaution. That it was necessary is evident from the large number of rejections, averaging 20 per cent of all men in the guard, even after muster in and not counting those dropped by the governors and those who failed to appear. The details as to physical conditions at the time of entrance into Federal service are the basis for future claims. Much of our accounting system in the matter of payments is complicated, but there are requirements, many of them, of the Treasury Department. The new system, as you call it, was not new. There was nothing in the new regulations which prohibited the elimination of the unfit for service once they were in the Federal Service, but there was much which prohibited their being sent to the front. They were not fit to serve as soldiers, and had they been sent would have further swollen our present pension list.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Especially when it was required to exclude from service an experienced man for the technical reasons, as mentioned by Gen. Barry, this entire change of system rapidly decreased the trained men that were available in the National Guard.

Gen. WOOD. I doubt, Senator, if there is anything in which I disagree with you about shortages of our Government supplies or anything I could admit more frankly than I have as to our shortage of equipment. It is the unfit condition of the militiaman when he came to the colors and the fact that he is not in condition for service which led to the rejection of these men; nothing else.

Senator LEE of Maryland. That is under the old law. I will go on now with another one of these reports. I should like to go back to that camp question. In connection with camps for mobilization purposes generally, by reason of the billeting system being unknown in this country and particularly objected to by our institutions and people, does it not make it more necessary for us to have permanent camps for military assemblage?

Gen. WOOD. For the training of men, Senator, who come to the colors after war begins. Those camps, I think, we need, and we have a number of them scattered over the country. I refer to places such as Pine Plains and the larger State camps.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Are they really not needed at all times for all military assemblages? Take any troops we may have, no matter how good their training may be, they will get out of condition in a short time, will they not?

Gen. WOOD. We need training camps at all times. We are trying to get them now for our summer training. We have some, and need more. We need areas for our United States military training camps for youths; that is, tracts not big enough for maneuvers, but large enough for the purpose desired, and so situated as to permit the troops to work over the surrounding country.

Senator LEE of Maryland. The increased length of service in France to three years did not strike me as justifying the inference you made, or somebody else here made, that it takes three years to make soldiers.

Gen. WOOD. I stated just to the contrary. As a matter of fact, that particular increase in length of service was incident to the situation menacing Europe.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Did they not simply want an increased force?

Gen. WOOD. They wanted 200,000, or whatever the number was, additional men with the colors.

Right here I should like to bring out one point in this connection. In a recent discussion with a very eminent and well-informed French officer, who has been charged with the training of some of these troops, I asked him how long after calling a man to the colors, I mean a new recruit, he would be willing to send him to the front? He answered four and one-half months; men with four and one-half months of training are not fully trained, but they can be sent mixed in with other men. The increase of a year was simply to give more men with the colors and was not for the purpose of increasing the instruction period.

Senator LEE of Maryland. I will go ahead with the report of Brig. Gen. William L. Sibert, Western Department. Gen. Sibert says:

The War Department, by letter of May 11, 1916, notified these headquarters of a probable call for the militia of this department. The necessary blank forms for muster in were at the same time furnished.

You said you did not receive that notice?

Gen. WOOD. Lieut. Keene, who was on duty in the militia office, does not recollect any letter indicating that the militia were to be called, nor do I. A letter was received with reference to certain blanks and forms which should be on hand in case the militia would be called. There was no warning—simply a routine letter telling us what should be done under certain conditions. There was nothing to indicate any immediate call of the militia.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Did you receive any notice from the department about May 11, 1916, that the militia would probably be called for in your department?

Gen. WOOD. Capt. Keene does not recall any such letter nor do I. You apparently refer to a letter notifying us the militia would be called probably at a latter date and to have the regular forms and things ready. I do not remember, Senator, any such letter.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Brig. Gen. Sibert says:

Upon receipt of notification a mustering officer was selected for each State and a chief mustering officer for department headquarters.

I should like to emphasize this:

These officers were furnished copies of mustering regulations and were directed to study them so as to familiarize themselves with their duties.

As a result of this process—

The various duties devolving upon the governors of States and others in connection with recruiting, transportation, and subsistence during the mobilization were promptly, harmoniously, and successfully carried out.

That seems to be rather a contrast with your experience in other departments, and I want to ask why, if you know why, was this particular department singled out and given this preliminary notice? Why all of them should not have had this preliminary notice?

Gen. WOOD. I think the letter I refer to above must have gone to the others. In the Eastern Department we had made a study of the question of mobilization for a year before and had submitted to the Bureau of Militia Affairs a very extensive set of recommendations to govern muster, and many of them were adopted. So far as the machinery of mustering in went, we had no difficulty once the regiments were up to minimum strength.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Let me call your attention to this other remarkable statement. It looks as though these western people were superior in some way.

Organizations were required to recruit to the minimum prescribed by the President's call before leaving company rendezvous.

That let them stay at the company rendezvous and have a chance to recruit where they were able to recruit.

The necessary equipment, funds, quartermaster, ordnance, and medical stores furnished by Federal supply departments were so promptly delivered that in many instances they reached the State mobilization camps before the troops began to arrive.

Gen. WOOD. Admitting this to be the case, this doesn't prove anything as to the efficiency of the mobilization and the system, as a whole; the same was true in some instances in the Eastern Department; generally, the supplies were slow in coming. The efficiency of the mobilization and system is measured by the time required to start well-equipped and well-instructed units to the front.

Senator LEE of Maryland. The report goes on to say in another place:

The transformation from peace, or below peace, strength to war strength created confusion.

That was rather a bad policy, was it not, increasing these units to war strength?

Gen. WOOD. Of course, the idea in doing that was to comply with orders and have as large organizations as possible. We had to give it up eventually. I do not think a single organization, with the exception of one or two from Rhode Island and a few Medical Corps units went from the eastern division with war strength. This difficulty would all be obviated by a system of training all young men who are physically fit.

Senator LEE of Maryland. The New York Times says a number of organizations went from New York with war strength.

Gen. WOOD. I do not know of any except some hospital and sanitary detachments. Those are not fighting organizations. I think that possibly one Signal Corps unit went at full strength.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Look at this further and remarkable statement from Gen. Sibert's report:

The supplies, equipment, etc., so far as lies within the responsibility of the State, were generally ample and indicated a proper degree of preparedness.

Would that not indicate that all other States could have been gotten up to the same condition with proper attention?

Gen. WOOD. It depends on State interest in supplying what lies within the scope of State authority. All equipment and everything is furnished originally by the Federal Government. Some States did more than others in securing it. There is no uniformity under State control.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there not this difference between the western and many eastern departments, or many of the Eastern States, that the West has paid particular attention to the National Guard, and has built very extravagant armories not only in the larger but in some of the smaller cities?

Gen. WOOD. They have done a good deal of that, but I think that statement must be analyzed, and the arrival of troops from the Western Department on the border and their condition, strength, and efficiency and training known before we can admit that statement, in fairness to the organizations from other States and departments.

I will insert a brief statement showing the date of departure of the organizations of the Eastern Department during the 10 days following the President's call.

The date of departure, strength of organizations, completeness of equipment, and thoroughness of instruction are the index of the organizations' efficiency. The date of arrival upon the border depended upon the distance to be traveled. Many of the organizations from the northern portion of the Eastern Department went south via Chicago, and consequently had several days more on the road than organizations from the Central, Western, and Southern Departments.

The following National Guard organizations in Eastern Department were en route to border stations in Southern Department 10 days after the date of call:

| | Date of departure. |
|---|---|
| Massachusetts: | |
| Brigade headquartes | June 27. |
| Ninth Regiment Infantry | Do. |
| Second Regiment Infantry | Do. |
| Eighth Regiment Infantry | Do. |
| Fifth Regiment Infantry | Do. |
| First Squadron Cavalry | Do. |
| First Regiment Field Artillery, First Battalion | Do. |
| First Regiment Field Artillery, headquarters and Second Battalion | June 28. |
| First Battalion Signal Corps | June 27. |
| Ambulance Company No. 1 | Do. |
| Field Hospital No. 1 | Do. |
| Vermont, First Regiment Infantry | Do. |
| Connecticut: | |
| First Regiment Infantry | Do. |
| Second Regiment Infantry | Do. |
| Troop B, Cavalry | Do. |
| First Company Signal Troops | Do. |
| Ambulance Company No. 1 | Do. |
| Field Hospital No. 1 | Do. |

| | Date of departure. |
|---|---|
| New Jersey: | |
| First Regiment Infantry | June 26. |
| Troops A and C, Cavalry | June 27. |
| Battery A | Do. |
| Battery B | June 26. |
| Ambulance Company | June 27. |
| First Field Hospital | Do. |
| New York: | |
| Twelfth Regiment Infantry | June 28. |
| Fourteenth Regiment Infantry | June 27. |
| Second Battalion, First Field Artillery | June 28. |
| Ambulance Company No. 3 | Do. |
| Field Hospital No. 1 | Do. |
| Seventh Regiment Infantry | June 27. |
| Seventy-first Regiment Infantry | Do. |

The first organization en route in Eastern Department was Battery B, New Jersey Field Artillery, National Guard, which left at 11.30 p. m., June 26, 1916.

Senator LEE of Maryland. You would not question this statement of fact, though?

Gen. WOOD. No, sir; but Gen. Sibert may look at it from a different standpoint.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Here is another statement from the Western Department report:

The changes in laws, methods of procedure, and the adoption of new blank forms have rendered the present mustering regulations practically useless, and have been the source of much confusion, delay, and extra paper work on the part of those connected with the work of mobilization.

Do you agree with that?

Gen. WOOD. That is right in all which relates to increased work.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Here is a further statement, and one which apparently strikes right between the eyes the order of the War Department stopping the enlistment under the Oliver order of 1911. Gen. Sibert says:

Companies should be recruited to war strength before leaving company rendezvous.

Gen. WOOD. To war strength?

Senator LEE of Maryland. Yes; the report is clear. It says:

Companies should be recruited to war strength before leaving company rendezvous.

In other words, he agrees with Gen. Barry that the natural place to enlist a militia company is at its home.

Gen. WOOD. I should agree with that statement, providing there was no hurry in getting them to the border and the regimental organizations not too much scattered. You understand, of course, the condition under which these troops were called. First came the call, then there began to come orders, with more and more punch behind them, to get these men off. These orders follow:

WASHINGTON, D. C., *June 18, 1916.*

COMMANDING GENERAL EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Governors Island, N. Y.:*

Following telegram to all governors except Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico sent this date, repeated for your information and guidance: "Having in view the possibility of further aggression upon the territory of the United States from Mexico and the necessity for the proper protection of that frontier, the President has thought proper to exercise the authority vested in him by the

Constitution and laws and call out the Organized Militia and National Guard necessary for that purpose, I am in consequence instructed by the President to call into the service of the United States forthwith through you, the following units of the Organized Militia and National Guard of the State of (State designated), which the President directs shall be assembled at the State mobilization point (location named) for muster into the service of the United States (units designated). Organizations to be accepted into Federal service should have the minimum peace strength now prescribed for Organized Militia, the maximum strength at which organizations will be accepted and to which they should be raised as soon as possible is prescribed in section 2, Tables of Organizations United States Army. In case any regiment, battalion, or squadron now recognized as such contains an insufficient number of organizations to enable it to conform at muster to Regular Army Organization Tables, the organizations necessary to complete such units may be moved to mobilization camp and there inspected under orders of the department commander to determine fitness for recognition as Organized Militia by the War Department. Circular 19, Division of Militia Affairs, 1914, prescribed the organizations desired from each State as part of the local tactical division, and only these organizations will be accepted into service. It is requested that all officers of The Adjutant General's Department, Quartermaster Corps, and Medical Corps, duly recognized as pertaining to State headquarters, under Table 1, Tables of Organization, Organized Militia, and not elsewhere required for duty in State administration, be ordered to camp for duty as camp staff officers such number of these staff officers as the department commander may determine may be mustered into the service of the United States for the purpose of proper camp administration, and will be mustered out when their services are no longer required. Where recognized brigades or divisions are called into service from a State the staff officers pertaining to these units under Tables of Organization, United States Army, will be mustered into service, and also the authorized inspectors of small arms practice pertaining thereto. Except for these two purposes of mobilization camp service and of the prescribed staff service with tactical unit officers of State headquarters under Table 1, above mentioned, will not be mustered into service at this time. If tactical divisions are later organized the requisite additional number of staff officers with rank as prescribed for division staff will, as far as practicable, be called into service from those States which have furnished troops to such divisions.

"Acknowledge."

Mobilization points referred to in above telegram are those designated in records your department. The units designated to each State for mobilization include all recognized units of land Organized Militia in State except coast artillery companies and infantry organizations not utilized by State as part of local tactical division to which it pertains under circular 19, Division Militia Affairs, 1914. Itemized list of units designated for each State follows by mail. For States which have adopted standard of medical examination prescribed for Regular Army the officers and enlisted men will be mustered for service without further medical examination previous to such muster. Immediately after, as an administrative measure, all officers and enlisted men will be medically examined and any found disqualified for the military service will be immediately discharged by you. Officers and enlisted men from States which have not adopted standard medical examination prescribed for Regular Army will be examined before muster into service. No State adjutant general will be mustered into service and no staff officer except as indicated in above telegram to governors. Any State staff officers mustered into service by you will be immediately discharged upon termination of their particular duties relating to mobilization and transfer of property. Dental surgeons will not be mustered into service. Organizations mustered into service must conform in organization to section 2, Tables Organization, United States Army, 1914, strength as indicated in telegram to governors. On completion of muster into service of Organized Militia and National Guard, Secretary War directs you telegraph report giving following information for each separate unit presented for muster: Numerical strength of each, physical condition personnel of each, number of enlisted men in each actually in State service at date of call, also the condition, sufficiency, and serviceability in each unit of its arm, clothing, personnel, and field service equipment. To date no National Guard recognized as such under new defense act.

By order Secretary War.

McCAIN.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *June 23, 1916.*

COMMANDING GENERAL EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Governors Island, N. Y.:*

The Secretary of War directs that the moment any complete unit has arrived at a State mobilization camp within your department and the mustering officer has reported the regiment, separate battalion, or other separate unit pertaining to the State's quota reasonably equipped for field service, you will communicate by wire with Gen. Funston to ascertain the place on the border to which that organization should be sent, and on receipt of work from him you will direct your quartermaster to arrange for the departure of that organization to that point without a moment's unnecessary delay, and you will issue the necessary orders. You will understand the moment a regiment or other unit is ready to move it is to go without delaying for the arrival at the mobilization camp of the rest of the tactical unit to which it belongs, to whatever extent necessary, the organization into higher units will be completed on the border wherever necessary. The transformation from the present Organized Militia to the National Guard recognized under the new law may be completed after arrival on the border. You will advise this office by wire the moment an organization is reported to you as ready to go to its destination. the hour and date of its departure, and its strength in officers and men. Organizations will take with them such field transportation as accompanies them to mobilization camps and such as may be furnished them while there. When otherwise ready to move they will not be delayed on account of any shortage in field transportation, which will be supplied them after arrival on border. On departure of organization for border you will notify Gen. Funston of the shortage, if any, in this transportation. Secretary of War enjoins on you grave importance of utmost promptness in these movements. Acknowledge.

McCAIN.

---

WASHINGTON, D. C., *June 23, 1916.*

COMMANDING GENERAL EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Governors Island, N. Y.:*

Following telegram sent to-day to all mustering officers mobilization points:

"Secretary War has ordered department commanders to send to points designated by Gen. Funston each regiment, separate battalion, or other separate organization the moment it is reported by you as reasonably ready for field service. The organization must not delay on account of shortage in field transportation, which will be supplied after arrival on border. You are ordered not to delay any report on any tactical unit on account of other units belonging to the same higher tactical organization not being present or ready. Acknowledge."

McCAIN.

---

WASHINGTON, *June 25, 1916.*

COMMANDING GENERAL EASTERN DEPARTMENT.
*Governors Island, N. Y.:*

Grave necessity for additional troops on border. Various requests being made to delay movement of State organizations until the larger tactical units are organized at State camps. Organization of these units will be perfected on border. Meanwhile Secretary of War repeats previous order that organizations move as soon as each is ready regardless of additional recruits which will follow organization to border.

McCAIN.

In addition to the above-quoted telegrams Gen. Wood informed the committee that there was a telegram even more urgent which came in code and which he did not consider should be placed in the record:

GOVERNORS ISLAND, N. Y., *June 25, 1916.*

The ADJUTANT GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY,
*Washington, D. C.:*

Acknowledge telegram 25th requesting expediting movement troops to front. Am doing everything possible to carry out the wishes of the department. Inspectors are at work mustering, and medical officers are directed to

work without regard for hours. Organizations which report themselves ready are not ready as a matter of fact, and it would be a very dangerous experiment to send them until we have completed the absolutely necessary equipment. Most of the organizations going will be in the neighborhood of peace strength or a few hundred over. This will be better than to try to send a larger number of recruits. As it is, not over 30 per cent of the enlisted personnel will represent instructed men. In accordance with telephonic information, will proceed at once to the inspection and purchase of horses and mules for New York, New Jersey, and Massachusetts, and will add to this authorization Rhode Island, which I find needs about 650 horses, and has most of them where they can be quickly gotten. Am keeping in touch with Gen. Funston.

WOOD.

---

WASHINGTON, *June 27, 1916.*

Reference your telegram 25th instant, mounted organizations may be considered reasonably ready, if otherwise acceptable, even if they do not have mounts. Arrangements have been made for supply of mounts on reaching border.

McCAIN.

---

HEADQUARTERS EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Governors Island, New York City, July 26, 1916.*

On July 15 the following telegram was received from the War Department:

"Secretary War directs that all militia organizations that have not left mobilization camps be held there until completely equipped and ready in every respect to move. Acknowledge."

In answer to a question to the War Department as to whether this meant that organizations were to be brought to war strength and completely equipped with transportation and mounts, the following answer was received from The Adjutant General of the Army, Washington, D. C.:

"JULY 21, 1916.

"With reference to question as to whether horses will be furnished to militia organizations at mobilization camps, you are notified that horses have been contracted for for delivery on the border. Horses needed at mobilization camps will be hired to meet necessities of hauling while in those camps. Troops will be moved to their border stations as soon as ready and at not less than minimum peace strength, and when tourist cars are available. Notify quartermaster general when tourist cars will be needed in time to have such equipment assembled at mobilization camps."

On July 25, 1916, the following telegram was received from The Adjutant General of the Army:

"Reference instructions this office July 15 that militia organizations be held at mobilization camps until completely equipped, and your telegram July 18, complete equipment, except transportation and mounts should be furnished enlisted men these organizations."

Senior assistant mustering officers will be governed by the foregoing in reporting troops ready to be sent to the border.

By command of Maj. Gen. Wood.

GEO. T. BARTLETT,
*Colonel, General Staff, Chief of Staff.*

Official:
W. A. SIMPSON,
*Adjutant General, Adjutant.*

**Of course, if we had not been under orders to get a force down to the border as quickly as possible, we could have held the organizations at their home stations and perhaps filled them to the required strength, but instructions required the movement be made as soon as possible. In most cases mobilization camps were so near the home of the organizations that there was no trouble in recruits joining. Such was the pressure to get the troops on the border that trucks, horses, and mules were bought in order that they should have some *trans*portation on arrival.**

Senator LEE of Maryland. On the subject of recruiting and blanks I observe a memorandum by Gen. Mills, under date of September 4, 1915, in which he makes a plea for a system of recruiting in case of a war call. I will read the following clauses:

5. It is the understanding of this office:

(*a*) That the Organized Militia is in the United States service from the time of its appearance at the place of company rendezvous. (See Opinion, Judge Advocate General, June 18, 1915.)

(*b*) That while the Organized Militia is in the United States service, recruiting is conducted not by the State but by the War Department.

(*c*) That existing orders providing for the recruitment of the Regular Army do not fully provide for conditions that may arise in the recruitment of the Organized Militia in the United States service.

6. As illustrating the character of recruiting problems to be solved, the following situations are presented:

(*a*) With the appearance of each unit at its company rendezvous, recruiting to war strength will presumably begin. Federal blank forms will be needed. How will these be supplied and how will the recruiting officers be instructed in their use?

(*b*) In view of the large number of recruits to be secured, it will probably be necessary for each company of a regiment to do its own recruiting. A. R. 840 provides for recruiting by regiment or post only.

(*c*) If a unit not fully recruited is ordered to its mobilization camp, will it leave a detachment behind to get additional recruits?

The Mills memorandum continues:

Senator LEE of Maryland (reading): Who will compose such detachments? How will the recruiting officer learn his duties? The memorandum of the War College division suggests these matters be provided for in the order or proclamation calling the militia forth. Would it not be better to give these instructions now?

Evidently there was a difference of opinion between Gen. Mills and the War College, the latter desiring to put the plan for recruiting off to the time of emergency. Gen. Mills wanted to provide for it in advance, did he not?

Gen. WOOD. We met that as far as we could by using our instructor-inspectors and officers of the Regular Army as mustering officers; in fact, our correspondence by telegram, meeting the emergencies as they arose, was enormous. The whole thing, Senator, points to the need of the fixing of responsibility for all this sort of thing on the department commander in time of peace.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Gen. Mills in this memorandum says further [reading]:

(*d*) The act of April 25, 1914, provides for recruit rendezvous and depots. Who compose the personnel of these establishments? What methods do they apply in regard to recruiting, training recruits, disbursing public funds, etc.? How do they learn their duties?

7. It is again recommended that an order be issued covering, as far as possible, the details of the recruiting system to be put into effect when volunteers are raised or the Organized Militia called into the United States service. Confusion must result if the issue of these instructions is delayed until the emergency occurs.

Gen. WOOD. What is the date of that, Senator?

Senator LEE of Maryland. September 4, 1915.

Gen. WOOD. That, I think, is all covered in subsequent regulations. I will put those in the hearing.

Senator LEE of Maryland. The fact that Gen. Mills uses the word "again," "is again recommended," indicates a previous effort on his part to establish a system for recruiting on a call.

Gen. WOOD. That was in 1915.

Senator LEE of Maryland. "That an order be issued covering * * * the details of the recruiting system," etc., indicates that this controversy between him and the General Staff in making this preliminary preparation was somewhat of old standing.

Gen. WOOD. He was a member then of the General Staff himself.

Senator LEE of Maryland. But he was only one. Of course, the responsibility was on the Militia Bureau to do these things in a way, or to suggest them, because the General Staff sent the inquiry to Gen. Mills.

Gen. WOOD. The Chief of the Militia Bureau was a member of the General Staff, ex officio, and assistant to the Chief of the General Staff, and his recommendations went to the Chief of Staff and were promulgated by the Chief of Staff in the name of the Secretary of War and by his order.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Any unpreparedness, so to speak, would be on the Militia Bureau. That office would be responsible if there was unpreparedness in respect to the militia?

Gen. WOOD. In certain features; in shortage of forms, and so on, but not in the matter of arms and equipment for new men or for training of the militia or in case the militia regiments were not full. Senator, I think there is certainly no disposition among the officers of the Army to shirk the responsibility for the shortcomings which are evident and which I have referred to right through. I refer to those which relate to shortage of supplies, equipment, etc.

Senator LEE of Maryland. I asked the Secretary of War for the previous information on this subject, and he gave me, in response to this request, an order of April 24, 1914, three days after you went out of office as Chief of Staff—I think you went out about April 20. That evidently was an order passed by Gen. Wotherspoon. I will put it in the record. It is as follows:

The Chief of Staff directs The Adjutant General to send to adjutants general all blanks that the militia need to prepare their organizations preliminary to offering them for acceptance (if there are any such blanks), and that the other blanks be distributed to mustering officers.

If the discussion was about the preparation and distribution of blanks, was it not rather rough on the Militia Bureau to say, "if there are any such blanks"? This order would seem to indicate that instructions to prepare blank forms, etc., had been suggested and had been urged by the Militia Bureau. Any explanation as to why it was not carried out and the blank forms prepared would seem to be acceptable. This order, April 24, 1914, should be taken into consideration with the only other published matter that bears on the question from Gen. Mills, namely, this report of September 4, 1915.

The CHAIRMAN. These general deficiencies with reference to mobilization and transportation, are they not deficiencies that invariably follow the attempted mobilization of a peace army to a war footing? Is that not true?

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir; especially where there is dual control and general unpreparedness and you have to reach out and take things over in a critical moment. There would not have been any excuse if these troops had been as fully under our control as are the Federal troops.

The CHAIRMAN. Take the British Army, for instance, as I read about it; they have the same difficulties in mobilization that our own Army has had; that is, they did not have trained men to handle the transportation facilities; they did not have a trained soldiery, so they had the same difficulties whipping it into a system, and it took them practically a year and a half to do it.

Gen. WOOD. That is right. But their regular army, known as the expeditionary force, was like our own Regular force, ready, and it went promptly. Their supply departments, like our own, failed, and they had to create the great munitions commission as a special commission because the old supply departments, dyed-in-the-wool, wedded to methods, and thinking mostly of departmental entourage, did not meet the demands of the situation. They had the same experience we had. If we had gone on with this war, if it had been a real war, we would have had to shake things up and form some commissions, including big business men with wide experience and energy, or fail disastrously.

Senator BRADY. To put business methods into the organization?

Gen. WOOD. To get the cobwebs out of the supply departments and put some punch into them to convert them from a wheelless vehicle into something that will move easily and smoothly. That is the purpose of the General Staff; that is why we want to see the coordinating powers of the General Staff increased instead of crippled. The power of the General Staff will be to a great extent the measure of the Army's efficiency.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Gen. Wood, you are pretty well committed by your statements, both official and otherwise, to an approval of the Swiss military system, are you not?

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir; adapted, I have always said, to this country. Of course our State arrangements make it a little more difficult of application.

Senator LEE of Maryland. On January 27, 1916, you approved the Swiss system before the Military Committee of the House, and later, on page 772 of the House reports, you say:

> The system which I believe we should adopt is one similar to that adopted by Australia and Switzerland.

Again, at page 777, appears the following answer by you:

> Gen. WOOD. Yes. Take the Swiss system. Their armed rate is about 12 per 1,000,000, against a rate of 124 per 1,000,000 here. Taking these figures into consideration it would seem that their military training has done some good. They are running their entire military establishment for about $7,000,000 a year. They could put a quarter of a million men in the line in 48 hours and they would have 200,000 more in reserve. This is done by means of acceptance of the general principle that every man owes something to the nation's service. That is what we will have to come to.

In Senate Document 360, of the last session, I published some direct information from the Swiss military authorities. It took them 10 days to get out 200,000 men. You are a little too complimentary, then?

The CHAIRMAN. The territory there is so much smaller than ours.

Senator LEE of Maryland. They say themselves it took them 10 days to get out the 200,000 men.

Senator BRADY. What are you reading from?

Senator LEE of Maryland. I was reading from Gen. Wood's statement to the House committee of last year.

Gen. WOOD. I am taking the official report. It would take 36 to 48 hours to mobilize the first 220,000.

Senator LEE of Maryland. You approved, in that way, the Swiss military system, and as late as November 1, 1916, you wrote an introduction to a book on the Swiss system by Kuenzli, in which you described that system as excellent?

Gen. WOOD. Excellent in principle.

Senator LEE of Maryland. I want to compare with you the militia clause of the United States Constitution and article 21, the equivalent in the Swiss constitution. Of course you are familiar with our militia clause, so I will not read that. I will print them in the record opposite each other.

The Swiss military clause read as follows:

So far as military reasons do not prevent, corps of troops shall be formed from soldiers of the same Canton. The composition of these bodies of troops, the maintenance of their effective strength, the appointment and promotion of their officers shall belong to the Cantons, subject to general regulations which shall be issued to them by the Confederation. (Art. 21.)

[Extract from Constitution of the United States, 1787.]

Congress shall have power:

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of the officers and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress. (Sec. 8, Art. I.)

Congress shall have power:

To make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers. (Sec. 8 of Art. I.)

The words "general regulations" in the Swiss constitution, article 21, seem to take the place of "discipline prescribed by Congress" in our Constitution?

Gen. WOOD. I have analyzed that. I have the full Swiss law. The idea I have been trying to drive home in reference to the Swiss system is that it rests primarily upon the universal training.

Senator LEE of Maryland. You certainly emphasized that.

Gen. WOOD. Yes; the citizenship obligation, the better bodies from the training, the better morals from the self-control resulting from the discipline and respect for law and the constituted authorities. A more efficient man from the economic standpoint, because of the habits of promptness and thoroughness and the habit of doing things as told and when told; a better citizen and a better national spirit. These are some of the results which will come from universal training and obligation for service. There are some points where we must modify the Swiss system to fit our conditions.

Senator LEE of Maryland. What I wanted to bring your mind to and your constitutional conscience to is the dual control feature of the Swiss constitution.

Gen. WOOD. That is unsound and defective in Switzerland if it exists so as to in any way hamper full Federal control.

Senator LEE of Maryland. There is more dual control in the Swiss constitution than in ours, is there not?

Gen. WOOD. I think I can disprove that. I will not enter into an argument, however, with so able a constitutional lawyer as you are, Senator.

Senator LEE of Maryland. I will reread these words to you from the Swiss constitution:

The composition of these bodies of troops, the maintenance of their effective strength, the appointment and promotion of their officers, shall belong to the Cantons.

Gen. WOOD. Under the direction of the federal government.

Senator LEE of Maryland (continuing):

Subject to general regulations which shall be issued to them by the Confederation.

Subject to "the discipline prescribed by Congress" is what we say.

Gen. WOOD. We do not prescribe discipline under the new law; we can not; the governors can refuse to accept it.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Then it is a constitutional question in your mind?

Gen. WOOD. It is, indeed.

Senator LEE of Maryland. So far as the wording of these two constitutional articles is concerned, the Swiss constitutional provision seems to give more dual control that we have.

Gen. WOOD. I will answer that, Senator, in full.

Senator LEE of Maryland. If we can show that in training her army Switzerland has solved constitutional questions; as a matter of fact, if we can show they have got an efficient army, and that under their laws and constitution they have more dual control than we have, then Switzerland has solved your control doubts, has she not?

Gen. WOOD. You will have to state the latter part of your question again. Switzerland has, as I understand their law, what is in effect absolute Federal control, and I think you will find that such control is made effective by Federal orders and regulations, and we have no effective Federal control. Every Swiss has to be trained in effect under Federal, not under cantonal, instructions, and he is a well-trained man, and when he responds to call he will probably be an effective soldier.

Senator LEE of Maryland. The Swiss officers are appointed by the Cantons, are they not?

Gen. WOOD. They are under certain restrictions. You will find the Federal Government fixes the standard.

Senator LEE of Maryland. For all basic units all officers are appointed by the Cantons.

Gen. WOOD. I shall have to look that up.

Senator LEE of Maryland. We find that in the Swiss law.

Gen. WOOD. Then it is a mistake.

Senator LEE of Maryland. It operates, does it not?

Gen. WOOD. I do not think you are right in the assumption that the Federal Government does not exercise control.

Senator LEE of Maryland. I will read you the section of the Swiss law, section 156, which is as follows:

156. The Cantons appoint the officers of the basic units and the officers of infantry that are on the staffs of fusileer battalions composed thereof.

The Federal Council appoints officers of battalion staffs, and also company officers when the company is formed of men from different Cantons.

Gen. WOOD. The Federal Government fixes the qualifications of the officers absolutely.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Certainly, just as we can; just as this present law proposes to do. The Swiss system gives a very rigid process of selection, involving the approval of superior officers.

Gen. WOOD. I know.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Diligent service as a private and as a noncommissioned officer, and schooling of noncommissioned officers, and a school for commissioned officers, from all of which processes the candidate for commission has to issue successfully, and then he gets a commission from his Canton. And there is only one case in which the Canton can not give the commission, and that is where a Canton does not provide the proper number of qualified officers.

Gen. WOOD. But they all do that, as a rule.

Senator LEE of Maryland. No; I think you are wrong about that. On rare occasions a Canton fails to have qualified men to appoint, and then the appointment goes outside of that Canton.

Gen. WOOD. The Federal Government prescribes all the qualifi cations for officers.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Yes; as our Federal Government can under the act of June 3.

Gen. WOOD. And the control of the Swiss Federation in military matters is practically absolute. No Canton has any voice when once a condition of war exists.

Senator LEE of Maryland. General. I have got to go upon the laws and constitution as published. The Swiss Army is prepared in time of peace, and the commissions issue then. Now, I will call your attention to these statutes a little more in detail so you will appreciate them. It is of vast importance to us if we can operate successfully a militia system with State responsibilities, dual control, as a safeguard to the liberties of the country, the Swiss having created an efficient army under equivalent provisions of their constition, and I will therefore proceed and call your attention to more details.

Gen. WOOD. Let me answer that in detail in written language, if you please.

The comparison of the Swiss and American Constitutions, made in Senate Document 360, Sixty-fourth Congress, first session, pages 9 and 10, to my mind is misleading.

In Switzerland the army consists of the able-bodied trained citizens of the nation, and all Swiss must perform military service. (See sec. 1.) In the United States the Army consists only of the officers and enlisted force authorized by Congress, and the Constitution makes a marked distinction between the Army and the militia.

In Switzerland the Federal Council is in charge of military establishments. In the United States the President is Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy but not of the citizen force (militia), except when called into actual service of the United States. Consequently the Federal control in Switzerland is continuous over all military forces, while in the United States Federal control over the militia is only when it is called into the service of the United States, and the Constitution limits this call into the service of the United States to three purposes—enforcing the law, suppressing insurrection, and repelling invasion.

In Switzerland the Cantons have authority over the military forces of their territory in so far as this is not limited by the Federal constitution or laws, and military instruction of every kind is under the control of the federation. In the United States the States have absolute government of the militia when not called into Federal service, and this includes also the training of the militia.

In Switzerland the composition of the troops, their recruitment, and the appointment of their officers belongs to the Cantons subject to general regulations which are issued to them by the federation. In the United States the appointment of officers, the authority of training the militia, and the government of the militia when not called into the service of the United States for one of the three specific purposes stated above is expressly reserved to the States.

In Switzerland there is no limitation to the general regulations which may be issued by the confederation. In the United States, when the militia is not called into Federal service, Congress has power to provide only for organizing, arming, and disciplining this citizen force, and the debates of the constitutional convention show that the power so extended in respect to discipline was to be interpreted as limiting the central Government to prescribing the character of drill in order that the forces of all the States might be drilled under the same rule of tactics.

The Swiss system makes a fair distribution of the military burden—the United States system is as inequitable a plan as could be devised.

In a word the Swiss constitution and laws call for universal training of all physically fit citizens and give the Central Government continuous control over the citizen army; the United States Constitution and laws do not provide for this training and limits complete control to actual hostilities or internal trouble (or the imminence thereof), thus delaying effective action until the time when the troops are needed in a crisis.

It has been held that Congress has never exercised its full power over the armed forces of the United States. It is true Congress has never exercised its full power to raise and support armies; if it had it would have put into operation a law such as has been put into operation in Switzerland, i. e., make effective a system by which all citizens would be trained for military duty. On the other hand, it is believed that Congress has exercised full power over the militia and has even gone beyond its power in the so-called national-defense act.

During the discussion in the last session of Congress of the various bills and amendments submitted as to military legislation there was much said about the powers of the Federal Government over the militia, and the decision in the case of Houston *v.* Moore was quite frequently cited. It seems to have been lost sight of that this case involved merely the question of punishment by the Central Government or by the State of a militiaman who refused to respond when called to service under a call authorized by the Constitution. The case in no way had to do with the appointment of officers, with governing the militia when not in the service of the United States, with training the militia, or with any other of the greater points under consideration. The decision of the Supreme Court in this case was the broadest interpretation of the Constitution ever made on the subject and was dissented from by Chief Justice Story, who has always been considered the ablest of our constitutional lawyers.

Some of the militia clauses of the national-defense act are, in my opinion, an infringement of the Constitution. The dual oath requires the officers and enlisted men to obey both the President and the governor. Under the Constitution the President has no right to govern the militia except when called into the service of the United States. The authority given the President to appoint officers to command militia units, the system of courts-martial prescribed, the requirements for the adjutants general of States to make certain specific reports, all can be interpreted only as a government of the militia when not in the service of the United States, and consequently are unconstitutional. The Supreme Court undoubtedly would sustain any militiaman who refused to be governed by these sections of the law and who appealed from the sentence of any court-martial appointed thereunder. At least these points are open to question.

The law contains no means for enforcing its provisions. To my mind a distinct evidence of the recognition of the law's weakness appears in the provision that States which do not conform shall be refused their portion of the Federal allotment. In other words, Congress gives the State militia money and if the State militia does not obey the law takes the money back again. No other punishment is provided. Doubtless the framers of the law recognized that no other punishment could be enforced.

The law may be made inoperative in any State by the governor, who is the commander in chief of the militia of that State. If the governor provides no recruiting machinery the number of the militiamen required by the law can not be obtained. If the governor pays no attention to the requirements of the law as to qualifications of the National Guard officers and proceeds to appoint some

men not having those qualifications, those men are officers of the militia regardless of any action the Central Government may take, since the appointment of the officers of the militia is expressly reserved to the States. If the governor gives orders to his officers and militia contradictory to those given by the President, the militia, both officers and enlisted men, are under orders to obey the governor as well as the President, and, since the Constitution gives the government of the militia to the States when it is not in the service of the United States, then the logical duty of the militiamen is to give the orders of their governor precedence.

In my opinion, the national defense act promises to produce a political force rather than a military force unless, due to the individual patriotism of its members, this is prevented. The resignation of over 600 militia officers and the general statement that the present enlisted men are not willing to reenlist for such service is an indication that the militia itself does not intend to permit a system so disastrous to continue. It certainly should be recognized by every Congressman that, with 800 militiamen in each congressional district, all of them voters, and all eligible to hold offices of trust and profit, local elections and even general elections may be controlled by such a body. Even the election or reelection of a Congressman may be dependent upon his attitude toward the militia and his efforts to obtain greater privileges for that class of citizens.

I am confirmed in this opinion by the minority report of the military committee in 1912 when similar legislation was in contemplation, and quote that report as follows:

**"The minority making this report is convinced that the legislation proposed by the pending bill is not only unwise, but that it is dangerous in the extreme. Rather than enter upon a legislative course that will inevitably entail upon the General Government an enormous expense, which may be found in dire emergency to have been wasted, a course that will surely lead to the creation of a great military force that will become so powerful politically that Congress will be no more able to resist its demands than it has been to resist the demands of the far less compactly organized and manageable army of pension applicants and their friends, this minority would favor a reasonable increase of the Regular Army, leaving the States to maintain their own troops in their own way and at their own expense without any aid whatever from the United States."** (Rept. 1117, Pt. II, 62d Cong., 3d sess.)

I could wish that the minority report had contained a recommendation for a Federal citizen army; I believe that such would be the recommendation to-day.

The foregoing will indicate why I am unable to agree with Senator Lee that the militia under our Constitution may be made the same as the Swiss army under the constitution of Switzerland, though a comparison of selected sections may seem to justify the belief that there is similarity. A careful consideration of the whole situation, especially as the two systems operate in practice, shows them to be utterly dissimilar and irreconcilable.

Senator BRADY. Does not the Swiss Government require universal service in training?

Gen. WOOD. It does.

Senator BRADY. Do you not believe that would have a material effect in the control of the National Government over the soldiers of the National Guard, or whatever it may be called in that country, by the National Government?

Senator LEE of Maryland. Senator, in view of having granted this great power of universal conscription to the central government the Swiss have taken precautions for the preservation of their liberties of a very radical kind. Those precautions, I want to call your attention to in detail, and they are precautions that can easily be taken in this country and do not stand in the way of a universal service if the precautions are taken. I am going to call attention to that right now.

I will call your attention to Senate Document 360, of which I sent you a copy, Gen. Wood, and to a statement in a lecture on page

61, delivered by Capt. Wiley Howell, of the United States Army, to the field officers' class at Fort Leavenworth, Kans. He states the conditions as to officers as follows:

OFFICERS.

The method by which officers are developed is interesting. Should a recruit show particular ability, it is noted on his record by the instructors of the recruit school, and this report goes forward also to the commandant of the military forces of his Canton. The following year, when the noncommissioned officers' schools are formed, the recruit is directed to attend. He can not ask for this order and is bound to obey it unless excused by proper authority. These especially chosen recruits assemble, to the number of about a hundred, at the designated place, and there they are put through a grilling course of instruction calculated not only to teach but to try out the metal of the man.

At the end of the course, if he has been found satisfactory, he is appointed a corporal.

All noncommissioned officers are eligible for appointment as commissioned officers, but can not be admitted to the school for commission candidates until they have passed a certain amount of time as drill masters in the recruit schools and have received the recommendations of their superior officers.

The candidates for the commissioned grade report under orders after the completion of the recruit school course and undergo a course of instruction which is principally theoretical, and includes lectures, recitations, and examinations. At the end of the course those who are found qualified are commissioned as second lieutenants and proceed to their homes.

Capt. Howell omits one very important thing just there: These commissions issue from the Canton. The Cantons commission the line officers of the basic units according to the Swiss law of 1907, section 156. I will read that section right into the statement. It is as follows:

The Cantons appoint the officers of the basic units and the officers of infantry that are on the staffs of fusileer battalions composed thereof.

The Federal Council appoints officers of battalion staffs, and also company officers when the company is formed of men from different Cantons.

Section 157 is as follows:

When a Canton is not in position to furnish to its organizations the prescribed quota of officers and noncommissioned officers, the Federal Council assigns to it supernumerary officers and noncommissioned officers of other Cantons.

Gen. WOOD. The Federal Council does that.

Senator LEE of Maryland. But that is the exceptional condition. My advices are, from men who have been in the Swiss Army, that it sometimes, but rarely, happens that a Canton can not furnish its proper number of officers. Sometimes the Cantons have not got the men with the military education, and then the Federal Council steps in and gives that Canton officers from some other Canton, and then there is always trouble in the Swiss Assembly. There are representations on the floor and a special row made over it; in other words, it is such an exceptional thing that it makes a political question nearly always whenever it is done. And it is very important, because that is the real crux of the whole militia system under our Constitution.

Gen. WOOD. I think the distinction, the very sharp distinction, between the two is that Switzerland requires, in the first place, of all males of a certain age and physical condition a prescribed course of training, which is Federal and not cantonal, and the Cantons have to do it under the Federal law. Every officer's examination is fixed and prescribed in exact terms by the Federal Government—

also his course of training—and in time of war or threatened war the Federal Government assumes full control of all the cantonal resources of every kind and description. There is no State or cantonal line left. But that I have answered above.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Will you answer a hypothetical question, Gen. Wood?

Gen. WOOD. I will, sir.

Senator LEE of Maryland. That if the Swiss have solved the dual control, namely, the appointment of officers by the Canton, can we not solve it under our Constitution?

Gen. WOOD. No, sir; I do not think we can. We can, however, solve our military problem by creating a citizen Federal force, and this we should do.

Senator LEE of Maryland. You would not admit that when our only effort to solve it is in the late act of June 3, 1916?

Gen. WOOD. No, sir; because our State organizations are very different. I doubt if we can do it. I will make my answer brief at this time and give you my reasons in writing. I think that was one of the great weaknesses in the Civil War, namely, the State appointment of officers. It led to political chicanery of all sorts.

Senator LEE of Maryland. In doing so, General, bear in mind some few of the other leading powers. Swiss laws give the Cantons as follows a few of the many instances of dual control:

SEC. 151. (Swiss military law.) The Cantons have control of the matriculation of men compelled to perform military service. The registry thereof is at the base of all military control.

SEC. 152. The Cantons designate arrondissement commanders charged with the maintenance of the rolls and in general all military relations with men performing obligatory service.

SEC. 153. The Cantons form battalions of infantry, squadrons of dragoons, companies and battalions of the landstrum, etc.

SEC. 156. The Cantons appoint officers of the basic units, etc.

SEC. 162. When a Canton does not fulfill its obligation, the Confederation supplies it with the missing funds.

Senator LEE of Maryland. I do not think you can look back in this matter; you must look forward.

Gen. WOOD. That is what I want to do.

Senator LEE of Maryland. To complete efficient exercise of Federal power under Article I, section 8 of the Constitution. You admit there has never yet been complete exercise of Federal power of Congress under that clause?

Gen. WOOD. You mean assuming what? There is no limit of the power implied in that clause. The war powers of the Nation know no limit.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Article I of section 8 provides "for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia," that Congress shall have that power. Now, is there any limit to the provision that Congress can make to effectively organize, arm, and discipline the militia?

Gen. WOOD. That is a constitutional question in which you have attempted to involve me in argument for some time, and I am not going to enter into it now.

(NOTE.—See discussion in full in preceding answer.)

Senator LEE of Maryland. Before you come to a conclusion I should like to refer you to the further provision in that Article I,

section 8, "Congress shall have power: To make all laws necessary and proper to carry into execution the foregoing powers," and the leading case of McCullough *v.* Maryland.

Gen. WOOD. All right, sir.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Which contains a strong decision by the Supreme Court on the implied powers necessary to carry out the express powers of the Federal Government.

Gen. WOOD. I should like to place you in command of a department in a mobilization program under dual control, then ask you to express your frank opinion on the subject.

Senator LEE of Maryland. I should like to be put in command before the mobilization and get the thing going right on the Swiss basis.

Gen. WOOD. If you understood the dangers of our present system you would wipe the system out.

Senator LEE of Maryland. We have in this record the militia definition of our Constitution and article 21 of the Swiss constitution, and I must now pass from questions of Swiss law with you to questions of Swiss efficiency.

Gen. WOOD. All right, sir.

Senator LEE of Maryland. I quote from report of Capt. Charles W. Exton on the mobilization of a part of the Swiss Army in June, 1915.

Gen. WOOD. I have been there, and I believe it is very efficient.

Senator LEE of Maryland. It is favorable to the Swiss mobilization system, and I will put them in the record in their order, as follows:

[From report of Capt. Chas. W. Exton, U. S. Army attaché at Berne, on mobilization of part of Swiss Army, June, 1915.]

MOBILIZATION OF PART OF A DIVISION, SWISS ARMY, JUNE, 1915.

Before taking up the subject of the mobilization proper, it may be of interest to state that at the beginning of the present European war divisions of the Swiss Army were mobilized and disposed for the protection of the country's neutrality.

These troops remained in service until November, 1914, when several divisions were demobilized, the other divisions remaining in service till March, 1915, when they were relieved. The same divisions were relieved in June by the same number of remoblized divisions. * * * (S. Doc. 360, p. 50.)

REPORTING OF THE TROOPS.

There was no confusion; as all details had been properly arranged. * * * (S. Doc. 360, p. 51.)

OBSERVATIONS.

*Equipment.*—The equipment of all arms and including special troops was complete in every detail and in excellent condition.

Whenever troops are demobilized in Switzerland the equipment is thoroughly renovated and repaired before putting in the storehouse.

The rolling kitchen, so common in Europe, was used by all troops except the mountain troops. The mountain troops used camp kettles and a small combination stove and fireless cooker—four to each company. All equipment of the mountain troops was at such size and shape as to be easily packed on a pack saddle.

The transportation pertaining to a company of infantry and troop of cavalry consisted of one ammunition caisson, one baggage wagon, one rolling kitchen, and one farm wagon (requisitioned). * * *

*Horses.*—The horse in Switzerland is a valuable animal.

Those horses regularly belonging to the military department have been purchased with great care, principally in England, Austria, and Germany.

Since the war began, however, some have been purchased in the United States. All new horses are sent to remount depots, where they are carefully trained by experienced horsemen. The general appearance of all horses is excellent.

The horses requisitioned for service at mobilization, as well as those in the hands of the individual cavalryman, have also been selected with care and were all in excellent condition when reported for service. * * * (S. Doc. 360, p. 52.)

*The soldier.*—The appearance and work of the soldier during the few days of mobilization showed him to have so benefited by his previous training in service as to make the Swiss Army probably the best-trained army, for its size, in the world to-day.

Every man seemed thoroughly familiar with his duty, which he performed more or less as a matter of business.

The discipline appeared excellent and of the character that is cheerfully accepted rather than maintained by force. The relation between officers and men was quite intimate at times, yet there was at the same time such an observance of details as might be found only in the German Army.

As a matter of fact everything about the Swiss Army, especially their thoroughness as to details, seems modeled after the German Army.

*The officers.*—An officer of the line should never be judged except after some considerable service either in campaign or at maneuvers—yet from the work observed during mobilization and from conversations with Swiss officers during the past three months, it is believed that the Swiss officers will, especially since their service during past year, compare favorably with the officers of any army in the world.

It must me remembered that the Swiss officers are selected from the educated men of Switzerland, and among them are found the leading men of every profession and business—and when one considers that in order to have reached the grade of second lieutenant he must have spent at least 336 days at intensive military training, 144 days of which is principally school work, one realizes the seriousness with which the service is accepted and the standard of thoroughness which may be attained in such a militia system. * * * (S. Doc. 360, p. 53.)

[From letter of Maj. Edw. P. Lawton, U. S. Army military attaché at Berne in August, 1914, on Swiss mobilization.]

The test of war can alone show the degree of efficiency attained throughout the army, but the apparent smooth working of the machine at the time of mobilization and observation of the army generally lead me to believe that it is an ideal system for the country, and I only wish that we could install something equally as effective in our country.

The day mobilization was ordered by the executive council; war mobilization posters were pasted in every café, restaurant, railroad station, and other public places throughout Switzerland. The next day found nearly every man in ranks fully armed and equipped; the day following they were at or near the frontiers. Every man had his arms and equipment with him at his home; practically every farmer had a Government horse, which latter were started for the rendezvous with the personnel. Sentries and outposts appeared like magic at every station, railroad bridge, and public building throughout the country. Everything seemed to work without a hitch. * * * (S. Doc. 360, p. 58.)

[From lecture by Capt. Willey Howell, U. S. Army, January 7, 1916, on Swiss Army.]

With a population of 3,750,000, Switzerland is able to mobilize within 24 hours an army of 240,000 trained soldiers.

Forty-eight hours later a second line of defense can be placed in the field numbering over a quarter of a million, a total of nearly half a million soldiers, fully armed and equipped and well trained, in three days.

And this wonderful defensive strength is obtained at a cost of less than $9,000,000 per annum. * * * (S. Doc. 360, p. 59.)

* * * There are 15 per cent more names on the rolls than are required to fill the company. This in order that the company will always be full when turned out. (S. Doc. 360, p. 62.)

[From report of Col. Bell, November, 1911, on Swiss Maneuvers.]

* * * To the unpracticed eye, accustomed only to see troops in parade and moving with the precision of the parade ground, the maneuvers of the Swiss Army may be misleading, but to the trained soldier, who can separate at a glance the essentials from the nonessentials, it is apparent that the Swiss is a man who has received an excellent training in fieldwork, and while he may be far from perfect in many things, mostly because of the shortness of the time at his disposal, there is nothing essential that has been omitted in the instruction required of him, so when the time arrives that his services are needed, his country has reason to believe this training will be sufficient to enable him to defend her intelligently and to the best of his ability.

A professional soldier may, of course, find much to criticize about the niceties of military training, but there is something about this army which impresses him with its potential power, and makes it more to be dreaded than some regular military establishment which shows more skill and precision in exercises, but does not possess the endurance, education, and wonderful patriotism, which could endure anywhere. One short campaign or good skirmish would correct the few faults or deficiencies observed, and would make the Swiss Army a magnificent fighting machine. * * * (S. Doc. 360, p. 65.)

4. Recruiting officers from the ranks. Promotion to second lieutenant from the ranks takes place only after 12 months of arduous work in the practical performance of a second lieutenant's military duties. As the candidate officers command each other in turn under severe and capable instructors, the best men are readily picked out. Mental examination is practically eliminated, a certificate from a good school being sufficient proof of general education. The whole effort is bent to seeing if the candidate has the military qualities that make a good officer. * * * (S. Doc. 360, p. 69.)

[From report of Col. William Cary Sanger, 1900.]

THE MILITIA OF SWITZERLAND.

If proof were needed that a land can train all its citizens for the efficient and intelligent performance of that work which must be done when war comes, and at the same time escape the evils of what is to-day called militarism, that proof can be found in the Republic of Switzerland. A Republic with the strongest democratic tendencies, with a constitution not unlike our own, with intense local pride and cherished local traditions, with an inbred conviction that the central authority must not unduly encroach upon the rights of the Cantons, with a worthy love of peace and its blessings, without the slightest thought of adding a foot to their territory, but with an intense love of country and a cheerful willingness to perform every duty which their citizenship entails, they have evolved and developed a military system which has given them the best militia in the world. It is of the greatest interest to us that in organizing this splendid body of "citizen soldiers" they have worked along the lines laid down by the men who framed the Constitution of the United States. * * * (S. Doc. 360, p. 69.)

You would not question any of these statements as to the efficiency of the Swiss Army, would you?

Gen. WOOD. As far as I know it is an effective army.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Although you do not concede the constitutional points, you do concede the efficiency of the Swiss Army?

Gen. WOOD. I decline to involve the military mind in the legal controversy, sir. I admit the excellence of the Army.

Senator LEE of Maryland. The constitutional or dual control features?

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir. The big point relating to the Swiss system, and which I have been trying to emphasize, is the universal service and the sense of obligation for national service which that training builds up. It is universal everywhere, and the boys get physical training and grow up under the moral obligation to give service to the Nation.

Senator BRADY. And you must take into consideration the fact that Switzerland is about the same size as Massachusetts.

Gen. WOOD. It is about the size of one of our large counties in the West.

Senator BRADY. And about the same population?

Gen. WOOD. I have, in my discussions, in the final analysis, preferred the Australian system. I emphasize those two points in the Swiss system, universal service and the upbuilding of national solidarity and character.

Senator BRADY. Do you not think we should adopt an American system?

Gen. WOOD. I think any system will have to be adapted to our people and national genius. We can not copy any system exactly.

Senator BRADY. Australia, with a larger area than the United States, has less population than New York City, has it not?

Gen. WOOD. Not a great difference.

Senator BRADY. Neither one of those systems would be applicable to the United States?

Gen. WOOD. It is the principle of universal military training I have been insisting on. I have always said any system must be adapted to our conditions.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, the system of no other country would suit ours?

Gen. WOOD. Not exactly; we should have to shape it to our own people and conditions.

Senator LEE of Maryland. I want to call your attention to an arrangement that might favor increased instruction of the National Guard. Would it not be entirely possible, supposing Congress to pass a law providing all the means for organizing, arming, and disciplining under the militia clause of the Constitution of, say, 300,000 men coming to the age of 19 years as militia in the several States, with proper provisions to make the same sure, to immediately supply inspectors and instructors, commissioned and non-commissioned officers, by consolidating all existing Regular Army units at war strength and thus freeing half of the officers for this purpose, or nearly half? In other words, if you consolidate the Army units to war strength would you not immediately free a lot of instructors and inspectors for any form of army you might agree on?

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir; you would release a number of officers immediately.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Have you any suggestions whereby the Army and Navy and the National Guard enlistments can be made larger and reasonably sufficient without conscription?

Gen. WOOD. No, sir; either conscription or an enormous increase in pay.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Those are the two alternatives, as you see it—either conscription, universal service, or an enormous increase in pay?

Gen. WOOD. I am for the universal service, even if I knew we were never to have a war, for its moral and physical training and building up of the citizenship-responsibility idea, which is so largely lacking in this country.

Senator LEE of Maryland. If it were incorporated in our laws that no one should hereafter receive a commission in any Federal land

force who had not served as a private or noncommissioned officer in the Army or National Guard, would that not encourage enlistment in both forces?

Gen. WOOD. I do not believe so. It would be a cheap appeal to—what shall we call it—to the sentiment against the highly educated officer. It would be a blow at West Point.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Not necessarily; but would it not be an illustration of the great principle of serving the flag as a private?

Gen. WOOD. I do not know.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Following the flag under obligation to serve?

Gen. WOOD. Every man who is going to be an officer should have basic military training unquestionably, but whether no man should be an officer who had not been a private is a question. I think we should lose many of our best officers in time of war; that is, lose all officers, for instance, in the great supply and transportation departments, railroad men and all that class.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Of course, we can make exceptions in those services, as they do in Switzerland. Those people are excused from general service in Switzerland.

If it were the law that after a certain date in the future no male person could qualify for any Federal civil-service position who had not at some time served or offered to serve in the National Guard or in the United States Regular Army or Navy, would that not encourage enlistment in all forces?

Gen. WOOD. I think that would; yes; but I think that should be put on broader terms. I should say that no man should be eligible to those appointments who had not undergone his physical training, unless unable to take it because of recognized disability.

Senator LEE of Maryland. I do not think you ought to cut out men who had offered who were physically efficient.

Gen. WOOD. I am quite agreeable to that.

Senator LEE of Maryland. What is the number of untrained men, in your opinion, that can be added to a trained company without crippling it for immediate service?

Gen. WOOD. You mean service in action?

Senator LEE of Maryland. Your standard is to put a unit up against the most perfect European military body with its military equipment. That is your standard. I want to get that comparison for everything.

Gen. WOOD. None. I assume you mean absolutely untrained men. I understand also in the fighting line. They might be added as cooks or wagoners or something of that sort.

Senator LEE of Maryland. The National Guard is kept, by reason of the War Department policy, or other reasons, as scant or skeleton in strength, or 65 men to the company, is it not?

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir.

Senator LEE of Maryland. It is inevitable there could be training only for 65 men, so under your theory they are immediately rendered incapable of immediate service when you require them to increase to any extent for war purposes?

Gen. WOOD. Any addition to the uninstructed—over half of them are uninstructed, anyway—would simply add to the embarrassments and inefficiency of the organization.

Senator LEE of Maryland. No matter how well the 65 men might have been trained, the policy of the War Department in handling these men, or our law, makes it impossible for this mobilization to turn out troops that could go up against an enemy on your standard?

Gen. WOOD. Absolutely; if you refer to filling the company up with untrained men.

The CHAIRMAN. That applies also to the Regular Army, does it not?

Gen. WOOD. Our policy in the Regular Army is sound. We believe in having a well-trained reserve sufficient to bring the Regular organizations to full strength and to maintain them at full strength for at least six months. Only recently did we secure legislation which makes a reserve possible. We are now transferring, after a year's service, hundreds of well-trained men to the reserve. During the present emergency the transfer has been temporarily suspended. As I have stated, and as you will find in my report on the militia mobilization, I said the sending of these well-meaning, uneducated, untrained Americans to the front would have meant their slaughter in case they had to meet an even moderately effective enemy.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Could there be any other effect than to make a company of 65 men recruited to 150—95 green men added—unfit for immediate service against a disciplined enemy?

Gen. WOOD. You are right.

The CHAIRMAN. That also applies to the Regular Army, does it not?

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir; to any organization without well-trained reserves.

Senator LEE of Maryland. The militia system had nothing to do with that?

Gen. WOOD. Nothing, except as it prevents to a certain extent universal training. Its existence makes our people think they have a valuable military force.

Senator LEE of Maryland. That is not a part of the militia system?

Gen. WOOD. Exastly; it is a part of the militia system, and I regret to say of the Regular Army system.

Senator LEE of Maryland. It is a part of our whole system?

Gen. WOOD. Both; and defective in both services alike.

Senator BRADY. If the criticism lies against the militia, it would lie against the Regular Army also?

Gen. WOOD. It is a criticism of the failure to provide any system of training of reserves.

Senator BRADY. And it shows the necessity for some action along those lines?

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir; that is what we have been arguing for for years.

Senator LEE of Maryland. You criticize the National Guard, however, which is maintained on the same skeleton basis, on the theory that its units must be instantly ready for service against fully disciplined bodies?

Gen. WOOD. Its units should be, but as a matter of fact, to be perfectly frank, of even the 65 men who are there I doubt if 25 per cent of them are well-trained soldiers. That is my honest opinion.

Senator LEE of Maryland. You differ from some other officers?

Gen. WOOD. I have been very generous in the expression of my public opinions about the efficiency of these men. I have tried to put it as far as I could on the militia side.

Senator LEE of Maryland. You differ from these other major generals, because I think Gen. Barry said 60 per cent were trained men.

Gen. WOOD. Unhappily, then, I do differ very radically.

Senator LEE of Maryland. You really did not see these men except as they were getting off?

Gen. WOOD. No; but I take that simply on their record. Of course you must judge an organization by its general record in the past. Sixty-four per cent of the men had had a year or more of service; 36 per cent had had less than a year of service. Now, a year or more of service in the guard may mean something or it may mean almost nothing. It depends altogether on the character and the amount of their instruction, and we know it is very short. That is the system. I am not criticizing these men; I am criticizing the system.

Senator LEE of Maryland. I heard here a criticism the other day of the Third Tennessee Regiment by Gen. O'Ryan. He said that regiment lacked a good deal of the aspect of discipline that you require from garrison troops or from Regular Army troops; that they had the fundamental capacity of being good soldiers; they could march and they could shoot and they had the determination which makes good soldiers. Under a little target practice they developed into a wonderful shooting body and won second prize, I think.

Gen. WOOD. Those mountaineers are nearly all good shots. They are apt to be good shots. And there again you meet just what I said in the last hearing, that the time required to develop troops depends on several things: First, the intelligence of the men, the conditions of training, the psychology of the moment, and the capacity of the officers. If you get a regiment such as I had in the Spanish War, the so-called Rough Riders, made up of men who had had experience with the rifle and with horses and knew how to live in the open and who were more or less of the fighting type, you could make soldiers out of those fellows very quickly; but when we speak of system we have to apply it to the generality of American citizens.

Senator LEE of Maryland. How many men were assembled under call of the President for the Spanish War?

Gen. WOOD. We assembled about 56,000 Regulars first and last, and 232,000, as I remember it—these are just recollections of the hazy past—volunteers and militia who were called and transferred into volunteers. About 280,000.

Senator LEE of Maryland. How long did it take to get those people together?

Gen. WOOD. We were months getting the men and equipping them. In a war with a great power we would have lost much of our territory in that time.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Has the War Department, under a call of the President, ever gotten together as many men in less time than assembled under the call of June 18, 1916?

Gen. WOOD. I think so. At least not more in the first 80 days; within two and a half months after Mr. Lincoln's call, for example.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Then this was the most prompt of responses, under this old Dick law?

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir; it is the first time we ever practically called out everything. We have not yet filled our quota. In this department we are just 35 per cent short of our quota.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Somebody testified the other day that it would take three months for volunteers to get into the position for receiving training.

Gen. WOOD. I think that was a mistake. We sent our volunteer regiments to the Philippines with an average period of about four months' training. But there again you had the conditions to which I have referred before. You had in many regiments a nucleus of men who had a little training—about 250 men per regiment—who had had some previous military experience. There were a number of Regular officers. There was the attraction of foreign service which drew to those regiments those adventurous, hardy types which usually make good soldiers. These regiments were gotten into a fairly good shape in an average period of from three to three and a half months. But we had in addition to this nucleus of trained men some Regular officers and others who had had some training.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Do you think the Swiss system of getting officers from the ranks, testing all as noncommissioned before giving them commissions, is a good one?

Gen. WOOD. Where you have universal service, and the training of many men and officers, that would have to be the system in most instances; particularly were we to have real national service all men would serve for a time as privates. In the Civil War the North had 127,000 officers and the South, roughly speaking, had 65,000 or 66,000 officers. There were nearly 190,000 officers in that war in four years—about 190,000, in round numbers. Now, West Point, since 1802 up to date, has only graduated some five thousand three hundred-odd officers. It is my belief that when we have universal service the bulk of our officers must come up through a course of training, such as exists in Switzerland, or through some special system of training of the officer body, such as the Officers' Reserve Corps such as we are working on now.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Do you not think that if the men were compelled to go through the gateway of service as privates or noncommissioned officers, which is the same thing, before they get any commission it would very much strengthen the enthusiasm and democracy of all of our forces?

Gen. WOOD. Let us analyze that statement. Every boy at West Point serves as a private in the ranks, and he has experience as a private.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Let me qualify the question by saying in the ranks, where he is under the supreme obligation of obedience to the President on call. The West Pointers have to answer that call?

Gen. WOOD. They have to answer it, of course, and under this system of universal training, which we have been urging so strongly, every man must serve as a private and must serve as a noncommissioned officer, and his selection beyond that depends on efficiency in the training camp. This idea is embodied in a set of regulations, which we have just sent forward and had approved by the General

Staff for the government of the military training camps. Every man must serve as a private.

Senator LEE of Maryland. I call your attention to the following extracts from a report on the Swiss Army by Lieut. Col. George Bell, November, 1911:

Recruiting officers from the ranks. Promotion of second lieutenants from the ranks takes place only after 12 months of arduous work in the practical performance of a second lieutenant's military duties. As the candidate officers command each other in turn under severe and capable instructors, the best men are readily picked out. Mental examination is practically eliminated, a certificate from a good school being sufficient proof of general education.

Gen. WOOD. The practical feature is marked in the German system also.

Senator LEE of Maryland (reading):

The whole effort is bent to seeing if the candidate has the the military qualities that make a good officer.

Gen. WOOD. That is exactly what we are doing in this Officers' Reserve Corps in the training camps. That is what we are doing in part in the selection of officers from civil life.

Senator LEE of Maryland. How can the training camps give evidence of service of a genuine sort or service in command of men? The time is short; it is only 30 days.

Gen. WOOD. We give more hours under arms in 30 days than a man gets in the average militia organization in three years, and the course recommended is three months.

Senator LEE of Maryland. You have been actively interested in the training camps, have you not?

Gen. WOOD. There is nothing in the world that has interested me more.

Senator LEE of Maryland. And all of those men in the military camps are favorable to your plan of universal service, are they?

Gen. WOOD. They are, because they are sensible men.

Senator LEE of Maryland. They have been so educated?

Gen. WOOD. They have been so educated, but it would be unfair to say of such men as George Wharton Pepper, Robert Bacon, Mr. Stimson, and many of our good friends, that their intelligence is so limited that they have not acted on the basis of reason.

The CHAIRMAN. Do they not find out in a very few days the absolute unfitness of the ordinary citizen to render military duty?

Gen. WOOD. They find it out, and their very souls are opened to conviction as they never have been before.

Senator LEE of Maryland. The National Guard system furnishes its own officers, does it not?

Gen. WOOD. Not always. The National Guard has often had many Federal officers in the higher grades in war and their assistance in mobilization.

Senator LEE of Maryland. That is a very small percentage?

Gen. WOOD. We had to do very largely the essential work of getting them into the Federal service and in the training. Without Federal officers they were often rather helpless. They would not have been fit to meet average foreign troops, any of them. Here and there you would find a good regiment, but as a military organization they were of relatively little value for actual war.

Senator LEE of Maryland. You mean to say that inspiration that they get from the Federal officers who mustered them in was immediately accepted by those men, and inspired in them the military characteristics that they had?

Gen. WOOD. I mean that the inspiration that they got from the Federal officers in learning how to cook their food, pitch their tents, and clean their rifles, and to dispose of their excreta and take care of themselves, gave them much of the military value they had.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Now, if in so short a period we can accomplish such wonderful results——

Gen. WOOD. We did not accomplish any because they were, as a rule, very inefficient when they went and were inefficient when they came back. I am speaking of them now as to their fitness to meet first-class troops.

I insert two reports which are self-explanatory. The militia dealt with is among the best in the department. Reports from the other States in the department are not yet available, but they certainly will not indicate better conditions than those existing in the States herein referred to. Standards of comparison is the best militia, not Regulars.

HEADQUARTERS EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Governors Island, N. Y., January 30, 1917.*

Memorandum for Col. Chamberlain:

Thirty-two reports just received from inspectors on organizations (exclusive of sanitary detachments) which embrace the States of New York, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Maryland have been examined with a view to determining general efficiency under the following heads:

1. Organization (conformity with the act of June 3, 1916).
2. Records (Cir. No. 16, D. M. A., 1914).
3. Equipment (Cir. 10, M. B., 1916).
4. Care of property (U. S.).
5. Target practice.
6. Discipline and efficiency.

A brief summary may be stated as follows:

As to organization, 7 conform, 25 do not.
As to records, 12 are good, 6 are fair, 3 are poor, and 11 are bad.
As to equipment, 4 are equipped, 28 are not.
As to care of property, 31 good, 1 bad.
As to target practice, 20 held practice, 12 did not.
As to discipline, 14 good, 14 fair, 4 poor.
As to efficiency, 9 good, 18 fair, 4 poor, 1 bad.
To Capt. Keen for Gen. Wood.

J. L. CHAMBERLAIN.

---

OCTOBER 11, 1916.

From: Department commander.
To: The Adjutant General of the Army.
Subject: Records of National Guard Organizations.

1. The following are memoranda submitted by the department inspector, department quartermaster, and the officer temporarily in charge of militia affairs:

DEPARTMENT INSPECTOR'S MEMORANDUM.

Special field inspections of organizations in this department prior to departure of same for the Mexican border discovered that in most instances the records were in poor condition, being incomplete and inaccurate.

Officers and noncommissioned officers generally were woefully ignorant as to records and appear not to have appreciated the importance of same.

The same condition of affairs exists in organizations returning from the border, as a result of which their muster out of the Federal service is seriously delayed, with corresponding increased cost to the Government.

DEPARTMENT QUARTERMASTER'S MEMORANDUM.

From all of the reports received by me it appears that the pay rolls and other official records of the organizations of the National Guard returning to their home rendezvous in the Eastern Department for muster out are in a more or less hopelessly incomplete and incorrect condition.

This condition of these official records is greatly delaying the muster out of these organizations, as it has been necessary to make out new papers in some cases as far back as original muster-in papers.

It is recommended that a telegram be sent to The Adjutant General of the Army requesting that the commanding general, Southern Department, in which is now stationed practically all of the mobile troops of the Regular Army in the continental limits of the United States, cause all of the records of the National Guard now in his department to be immediately inspected and, where incorrect, corrected, brought up to date in every particular.

The pay and muster rolls of the regiments should be correctly prepared in the Southern Department under the supervision of officers of the Regular Army detailed for that purpose, leaving blank the day of muster out, in order that these pay rolls may be expeditiously completed upon the arrival of the troops at their mobilization camps or home rendezvous and the organizations promptly and properly mustered out of the Federal service.

DEPARTMENT MILITIA OFFICER'S MEMORANDA, OCTOBER 10, 1916.

Second New York National Guard arrived September 29. Being mustered out.

Fourteenth New York National Guard scheduled for muster out October 11, 1916. This regiment arrived at Green Haven September 14, 1916, and at its armory in Brooklyn September 20, 1916.

Principal causes of delay:

1. No descriptive lists of men kept.
2. No settlements between company commanders and supply officer.
3. Bad condition of records.
4. Ignorance on part of officers and men of requirements (referring to records, settlements, etc.).
5. In most cases muster-out officers had to begin on the records from the time of the original entry of the men in the Federal service.

These remarks will apply to practically all organizations returned to this department for muster out.

First New Jersey arrived at Sea Girt September 9, and left for the armory October 1.

Nine companies of the First New Jersey mustered out to include October 9.

Everything is mustered out in First New Jersey except headquarters company and supply company, field and staff hospital. Field, staff, and headquarters and supply companies will go out to-night. Hospital detachment will go out in a few days.

Fourth New Jersey arrived at Sea Girt September 10 and left for the armory October 1. Five organizations scheduled for muster out October 11.

Fourth New Jersey Machine Gun Company and four others to-morrow night. Four next night; headquarters and four others next night, including field and staff.

2. Attention is invited to the greatly increased cost to the Federal Government incident to this condition, and it is earnestly requested that instructions be sent to the Southern Department to have special attention paid by all organizations to bringing their paper work up to date. There is no sufficient reason for the almost entire failure to correct and bring up to date the necessary organization records. This condition as to records is general. There seems to be ample opportunity on the border to give this important subject proper attention. We have had to detail a large number of officers to aid in the mustering out of the regiments, and practically all of it is work which reasonably competent company and regimental officers ought to be able to do without the assistance of Federal officers.

LEONARD WOOD.
*Major General, United States Army.*

Senator LEE of Maryland. Then, you think those things you have mentioned were of no importance?

Gen. WOOD. I think they were of value to the militia; but I think it would have been a crime to have turned those men into a campaign. They were well-meaning, honest fellows, but they were not soldiers.

Senator LEE of Maryland. You have also stated that it would be equally unfortunate, or almost as unfortunate, to send our Regular troops, suddenly expanded, to the field.

Gen. WOOD. I would not do it. No soldier would do it if it were possible to avoid it. Our Regular Army suddenly brought to war strength would be very inefficient unless the new men were trained. We need reserves of trained men.

The CHAIRMAN. Great Britain has not done it.

Gen. WOOD. No, sir; it would be murder.

The CHAIRMAN. Have any of these European countries done it?

Gen. WOOD. No, sir. The Swiss Government sends her troops to the front well trained. All governments do which appreciate the need of men being well trained for modern war.

Senator LEE of Maryland. I will ask you this question: Does not the National Guard system furnish nearly all of the persons in it that are commissioned as officers?

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir.

Senator LEE of Maryland. There is no room, therefore, in the National Guard for very many additional commissions from the outside—summer camps or the Regular Army?

Gen. WOOD. No, sir; the National Guard, of course, is a very small aggregation of men.

Senator LEE of Maryland. But it is all of the soldiers we have, outside the Regular Army?

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir; it is. It is about five incomplete army corps.

Seantor LEE of Maryland. It is our all. Now, the men who are trained at the military camps are trained each summer about a month?

Gen. WOOD. About a month.

Senator LEE of Maryland. They assume no obligation to serve the country and can not be called on by the President under the existing law.

Gen. WOOD. I think under the present law they have to take enlistment of one month—a month's service.

Senator LEE of Maryland. I saw a number of those circulars that were sent out last summer inviting all these summer-camp men.

Gen. WOOD. There is a change this winter.

Senator LEE of Maryland. And these circulars said the men are under no obligation to serve the Government?

Gen. WOOD. The last appropriation carries a provision, I think, that they shall enlist for 30 days.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Now, General, if you can give, under good instruction, so much to these summer-camp men in such a short time, why could you not under similar instruction, in a preliminary period for the National Guard, as an opening period—coming at the year of 19 in the States—why could you not do the same for the National Guard system?

Gen. WOOD. If we can take your National Guard under the same conritions of intensive training for a month in camp we would obtain just as good results with those men as with any other class of men of the same intelligence.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Now, if you can do that with the summer camps, why do you not address yourself to a reform of applying these intensive training principles to the National Guard under Federal instruction?

Gen. WOOD. Because we have no control over the National Guard. That is a State force, and it is very difficult to get them into camp for even 15 days. Part of the time is spent going there and part coming back. They are under incompetent officers as a class, and the officers freely admit it. In these training camps we have the most carefully selected of our officers, men who understand their work, and they undertake instruction of the men from the ground up. We could do much with the National Guard if we could get them under the same conditions.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Then, it is just a matter for Congress, in your opinion, to get them for a training period?

Gen. WOOD. It is just a matter of making the National Guard a Federal force, without a shadow of State influence or control.

Senator LEE of Maryland. The States have never obstructed any training that the Federal Government wanted to give the National Guard, have they?

Gen. WOOD. It is a good deal like the statement of old John Marshall when he was arguing for the Constitution against federation. He asked some one the question, "Would you want a horse with 13 bridle reins and controlled by 13 pairs of hands?" or words to that effect. He had about the same argument put up to him as our State militia friends are putting up to us now—a question between a confederation with a shadowy general control and a very well-defined central control.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Then, you urge that all the precautions that appear in the Swiss constitution and laws, apparently creating a dual control—giving the Cantons the same power that our States have—are not real but imaginary.

Gen WOOD. I consider Federal control desirable with regulations by the Federal council, without cantonal control.

Senator LEE of Maryland. The Swiss constitution does not say general control. It says "general regulations" issued to the Cantons.

Gen. WOOD. That is the same thing. If it says general regulations it gives the Federal power full control.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Do you contend that there is much difference between "general regulation" and "discipline prescribed by Congress"?

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir; because we can prescribe it but not enforce it.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Your proposition, General, is that these gentlemen who go to the military encampments are to get commissions as officers of the reserve corps, are they not?

Gen. WOOD. After examinations which are open to every officer of the militia.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Is it not an opening held out to them as an inducement?

Gen. WOOD. I think it is. Probably 800 or 900 men have gone through the examination successfully and about 500 have become officers of the reserve corps. We need to build up our reserve corps of officers as rapidly as possible, and to give them their training through attaching them to Regular troops for brief

periods of service, and through summer camps under courses especially designed for this class of officer. We also should build up, as fast as possible, the commissioned increase authorized for the Regular Army. We need all these men as rapidly as we can get them, otherwise instruction provided under the defense act at colleges and universities will be seriously crippled.

Senator LEE of Maryland. If it is fair to hold out this inducement to make these men train for three months in three years for a commission on your plan, would it not be equally fair to hold out the inducement of a commission to the men in the National Guard or Regular Army as privates and noncommissioned officers?

Gen. WOOD. The reserve corps is open to every private in the Regular Army or militia to-day, and we have quite a number of them coming up and taking examinations, and we are very glad to get them.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it not true, in the Regular Establishment that more than 50 per cent of the commissioned personnel of the Army come from civil life?

Gen. WOOD. About 50%. It is approximately even. I looked it up a few years ago, and there was a difference of 49 one way or the other.

Senator LEE of Maryland. I quote from a daily paper:

> Another drawing card for the 1917 camps is that the men who attend the three camps of the Regular course are eligible for the Officers' Reserve Corps by merely taking an oral and practical examination.

Would it not be better to follow the Swiss system of testing the officers first in the actual service as privates and noncommissioned officers?

Gen. WOOD. You are getting back on your old horse. We are very glad to have them get that training. They got it at West Point and at all these cadet camps.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Would it not be more democratic?

Gen. WOOD. That is why I advocate universal training—the pure democracy of it.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Do you think that the patriotism of the Swiss or their love of free institutions is greater or less than the patriotism or love of free institutions in our country?

Gen. WOOD. It is very much greater among the Swiss, as evidenced by their preparedness and sense of individual responsibility for national service.

Senator LEE of Maryland. That is a very interesting statement from you, because the Swiss, with their love of free institutions, have taken certain precautions to preserve them, and I should judge from your answer that in view of their having this great love of free institutions they would be more vigilant even than our people, and that such precautions as the Swiss have taken would be far more urgently required in this country. Now, I will proceed to this statement. The Swiss military system has some leading provisions safeguarding against militarism or revolution against the freedom of the people. I mention a few, as follows: First precaution, the commandment that there shall be no standing army (Swiss constitution, art. 13); second precaution, article 21 of the Swiss constitution based on the militia clause in section 8, Article I, United

States Constitution, and which article 21 provides for raising troops from soldiers of the same Cantons——

Gen. WOOD. May I interrupt you there? They do have a small standing army.

Senator LEE of Maryland. I am coming to that in a little while. And that article 21 further says:

> The composition of these bodies of troops, the maintenance of their effective strength, the appointment and promotion of their officers shall belong to the Cantons, subject to general regulations which shall be issued to them by the confederation.

For the term "general regulation" our Constitution used the equivalent expression "discipline prescribed by Congress." Third precaution, qualifying all officers from the ranks by service and schooling and limiting the professional and regularly paid officers to 230 in number, only one-fourth of whom are permitted to command troops at any one time.

Gen. WOOD. That is right.

Senator LEE of Maryland. With such fundamental precautions first taken, the Swiss granted the great power of conscription or universal service to the confederation, but made action by the Cantons essential to carrying it into effect.

Do you deem it wise and prudent from the standpoint of preserving a republic in this country, and in view of the alleged lesser patriotism here, to give the Federal Government the power of conscription for universal service without taking the precautions for liberty which the Swiss took before granting this great power over a people?

Gen. WOOD. I think it is perfectly safe to give to the Federal Government, or to have the Federal Government put into operation, something which it now has power to do—the power to compel the training and service of everybody who is physically fit. It is not unconstitutional. I think our Constitution provides an adequate safeguard. In fact, I think that universal service, obligatory service—conscription is not used, because it is an objectionable word as it brings up the Napoleonic conscription—conscription, or universal service, means absolute democracy, equality of obligation, and equality of opportunity. All these different schemes which place a military burden upon the educated class, the men in the colleges or men who do this, that, or the other are all undemocratic, and I think most un-American. Our Constitution does not permit the Federal Government to govern the militia; it permits it to prescribe the training and discipline of the militia, while reserving to the States the actual training and discipline and to prescribe regulations; but we have not the power to enforce them, unfortunately.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Then you do not agree with the McCullough case?

Gen. WOOD. I am not going to get into that discussion.

Senator LEE of Maryland. That Congress has power to provide for actual discipline?

The CHAIRMAN. Let me suggest right there this thought. The Senator speaks of safeguards of the Swiss system against anything like militarism. Can that danger concern the American people, where Congress is limited by the Constitution to making appropriations

only for a period of a year, so that in the last analysis the people themselves control the whole matter?

Gen. WOOD. I think you are right; and I think another thing can be avoided. Militarism, as I understand it—and, I think, as you mean to have it understood—is a condition under which a professional military group, meaning by that the navy and the army, exercise an undue influence upon the conduct of national affairs and national policy. In other words, a standing army of large size, with a large professional force of any kind, afloat or ashore, tends to build up a professional class of that type. But where the army represents the people, is made up of the people, and the people are the army, every living man who is physically fit has had his training, you never can have militarism, because all are of the same class, all are under obligation to serve in one service or the other and have been trained.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Is not the power proposed all Federal, in the hands of the central military authority, without any lightning arrester whatsoever?

Gen. WOOD. It must be in the case of war. You remember in the Revolutionary War there were dictatorial powers given Washington on various occasions. You remember in the Civil War we had finally to give Grant almost absolute powers over military operations, and Lincoln was wise enough to see that it was necessary for success.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Now, General, as an illustration: We can take into our houses wires that might bring a thunderbolt and use them safely for the purpose of lighting and telephoning, and in times of peace we can have a Swiss preparation and discipline, yet be safe from the thunderbolt of military revolution because we have the lightning arrestor of local units and local officers.

Gen. WOOD. Senator, in that connection we have a great many interesting communications growing out of this military movement. One of them came in the other day, and it bears somewhat on your line of thought. The writer proposed that the President should have complete and absolute control for defensive war, but if he contemplated an aggressive war then the question should go to a vote of the people, to a referendum. It is sometimes difficult to determine what is purely defensive and what is aggressive action in war. I believe that the control of the military forces of the Nation must be in the hands of the Federal Government under the general restrictions existing to-day. With complete organization and preparedness characterizing as they do the great nations of to-day, it would be very dangerous not to have the instruments of defense under Federal control. We are—and I can not emphasize the word too strongly—wholly unprepared and lack the organization, the weapons, and the reserves to meet attack by a first-class power, and we are not taking those immediately effective steps which we could take to make good our present most alarming shortage of weapons, munitions, and supplies, for, no matter what system we eventually adopt, the weapons and supplies of war require time, much of it, to make, and they must be manufactured in time of peace. Let us be perfectly fair and frank with ourselves. We have spent six months of effort under our present inefficient military system in mobilizing and sending to the border something over 156,000 militia organizations filled

with patriotic, self-sacrificing men. They wear the uniform, and you try to imagine that they are trained soldiers; but they are not. This force represents the effort of this Nation in time of peace. Of the 156,000 men not over 20 per cent were reasonably efficient from the soldier's standpoint when they arrived at the scene of presumptive activity. Had we depended upon this force to meet a strong, well-organized nation, the country would have been largely occupied while we were engaged in preparation for defense, and we could not possibly have prevented it.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Is not your proposition substantially to turn over the entire military control without question to the War Department that has failed, as you admit, to properly handle this relatively small number of soldiers?

Gen. WOOD. No, sir; I would turn it over to the Commander in Chief, the President of the United States, and I would go after the War Department supply organization, if necessary, with a sandbag and reorganize it. I would enlarge the coordinating and supervising control of the Chief of Staff until efficient supply resulted.

Senator LEE of Maryland. But if you have a lot of people interested in military matters in the country you have an audience to appeal to.

Gen. WOOD. The strongest influence of the men from these training camps is for universal service and training for citizenship obligation for preparedness on the lines of true democracy.

Senator LEE of Maryland. I hoped they were to join the militia?

Gen. WOOD. The militia joined them; we just turned it around. One of the strongest influences of these camps is in building up an intelligent discussion of the entire military problem. Many of the best men in the country are at these camps. There are laymen, clergymen, bankers, railroad men, teachers, doctors, engineers, students, workingmen, men from the ranks of labor, indeed, all classes of men come to these camps. Some of them are employers of thousands of men in their own establishments. They are keen, intelligent men, accustomed to good administrative methods. They learn many things, among others the need of a remodeling of our archaic and inefficient methods of organization and supply. When the knowledge of these conditions becomes more general defects and deficiencies of organization will be corrected by the force of public opinion.

Last night in Providence three young men came up to me and said they were officers of a Rhode Island battery, one of the few organizations that went to the front at nearly war strength. Two of them said that they had presented their resignations and were going to enter the Officers' Reserve Corps because they felt a Federal force must be built up. Those are facts and indicate a condition that exists throughout the country. The views, as I understand them, of the rank and file of the militia are sound. They see the need of a change, the vast majority of them. You gentlemen do not reach the great mass of the men, but hear more the opinions of the adjutant generals, the men who are on a salary. These men, in my opinion, do not represent the real militia opinion, the opinion which has resulted from the mobilization.

Senator LEE of Maryland. There are some old lines to the effect that "Every little boy and girl that's born into the world alive is

either a little liberal or else a little conservative." The constitutional instincts of the centralizer and the democrat naturally differ and especially about creating armies?

Gen. WOOD. We find much of the best support—much of the strong support—of a sound military policy among Democrats. Thomas Jefferson, as you remember, became an ardent universal training service man.

Senator LEE of Maryland. But he was strongly against a standing Army.

Gen. WOOD. Yes, but he was finally for universal training—the classifying, training, and arming of our men. In his fifth annual message he advocated "the organization of 300,000 able-bodied men between the ages of 18 and 26 for defense at any time or at any place where they may be wanted," and in his eighth annual message:

> If war be forced upon us in spite of our long and vain appeals to the justice of nations, rapid and vigorous movement at the outset will go far toward securing us in its course and issue, and toward throwing its burdens on those who render necessary the resort from reason to force." * * *
>
> Considering the conditions of the times in which we live, our attention should unremittingly be fixed on the safety of our country. For a people who are free and who mean to remain so, a well organized and armed militia is their best security.

The militia he referred to, as you know, included all men from 18 to 45, in other words, it amounted to the training of all men within these ages. It was in effect universal training, but lacked the necessary organization by classes to make the force immediately available.

The General Staff of the Army are in favor of an Army big enough for the peace needs of the Nation, but it is not in favor of an enormous standing Army. The large professional standing Army as the main reliance of nations passed away with the battle of Jena. As I see it, John Marshall's strength as Chief Justice rested largely upon his appreciation of the need of a strong, coordinating central authority, a Federal Government, and a constitution rather than articles of confederation. He had been through the Revolution and he had seen the miserable fiasco of State troops trying to meet a national emergency. He had reduced in his own mind the militia theory to its true proportions; he saw that it was an absurdity. This you would see if you had to handle a situation incident to preparing the militia to meet good troops.

Senator LEE of Maryland. What is the standing Army that you advocate—about 200,000 men?

Gen. WOOD. About 250,000–300,000 men, that is, if we hold the Philippines, Panama, Hawaii, Alaska, and Porto Rico, and have an adequate training force at home and a force sufficient for our coast defenses and a small expeditionary force.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Do you think 250,000 men as a standing Army would be safe to associate with the great power of universal service in the hands of the National Government?

Gen. WOOD. I think so; yes, sir.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Let me call your attention to the old conditions in the British Navy. There were the crews, the seamen that were seized and brought aboard by the press gang. When they wanted seamen in the old British Navy they went ashore, conscripted by force and brought on board ship for service the captured men,

some very sore and mutinous. They disciplined them and handled them with absolute authority—put the cat-o'-nine-tails on them without trial at the order of an officer. That would have been impossible but for the fact that they had a standing Army to support the conscription. It would have been impossible to have put that arbitrary process into operation without the presence of a sufficient police force. So the marines on those ships were the police force of the old British Navy and the marines with their loaded muskets stood by while the captured sailors were flogged into submission and discipline.

Senator BRADY. Senator Lee, do you not think that would be absolutely impossible under a republican form of government?

Gen. WOOD. It is impossible in the British fleet to-day.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Exactly, that practice has disappeared from the British Navy, but is it not your proposition to revive it in a way?

Gen. WOOD. In what shape?

Senator LEE of Maryland. By putting the power of the Central Government over the whole people, the authority of conscription, and at the same time providing a standing Army of 250,000 men to see that the orders of the Central Government are carried out as operating upon each individual.

Gen. WOOD. Of the standing Army of 250,000 men there would be about 70,000 abroad when the foreign garrisons are completed. The remaining 180,000 exceed a little the registered chauffeurs and truck drivers in the State of New York. I do not think they will impose upon the hundred millions with any degree of ferocity.

Senator LEE of Maryland. While we are on that proposition, is it not a fact that this period in military history is one where a thoroughly equipped military force is more powerful, as compared with the unequipped citizens, than ever before in the history of the world?

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir; the thoroughly prepared military unit as compared with the inexperienced and unprepared citizen.

Senator LEE of Maryland. The relative power of 250,000 men in a regular arm is greater now than ever before?

Gen. WOOD. Not when all your men are trained. How would this little, puny force of 170,000 men—less than two men to a thousand of population—be able to do much with a citizenry trained and armed?

Senator LEE of Maryland. There would be the authority to conscript and to issue orders, and there would be 250,000 policemen behind that authority.

Gen. WOOD. You must assume, of course, that the President of the United States is to become an autocrat and establish a despotism.

Senator LEE of Maryland. We need not have any Supreme Court, we need not have any Congress, or States, or anything else. We could just select a divine sort of president and let him run the affairs of the country. In this system you are obviously throwing the Constitution overboard.

Gen. WOOD. Not a bit. I think our Constitution is an adequate protection. In our elections we are perhaps a little too frequent and make too frequent changes in Congress. But anything such as you suggest is absolutely impossible.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Let us go back to the old three-decker of the British Navy. She had probably 600 or 700 sailors aboard——

Gen. WOOD. Sometimes 1,000.

Senator LEE of Maryland. She did not have over 50 marines.

Gen. WOOD. Sometimes less. Now, to-day there are often none on the ships.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Now, it is none.

Gen. WOOD. Practically none.

Senator LEE of Maryland. The point is that a sailor is not seized or conscripted to-day. Is that not the real point?

Gen. WOOD. They are not conscripted. They are volunteers to-day in the British Navy; but unless they fail absolutely to learn anything from the lessons of the war, they will insist on universal service.

Senator LEE of Maryland. He is a free man and enters that service freely. He is not compelled to enter the service or to be subdued by flogging into obedience.

Gen. WOOD. He is not, because flogging into obedience is medieval. All those things have been eliminated. We used to flog men in prisons and on our ships. The point is that England has had to abandon this beautful system of volunteers in the throes of a great war, and she never will go back to it.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Has England abandoned the system of her great naval defense?

Gen. WOOD. In my opinion she will give up the volunteer feature of her present system. Great Britain after the experience of this war will go to universal service. Her navy has always been popular. As a rule they have as many men in the British Navy as they want. It has been the dominating navy of the world for centuries. Men know it. They know it is the strongest naval power afloat. They like to serve in it. The army has been a small army, like ours, and not so popular as the navy.

Senator LEE of Maryland. You are looking at the whole matter from the standpoint of a general devotion to preparedness—you might say to universal service. Is it better to reject the precautions the Swiss have put into operation and our own Constitution suggests, going ahead to form great armies without any precaution, or is it better to perfect a military service under the precautions of our Constitution and the Swiss constitution?

Gen. WOOD. I think we can perfect a universal service under Federal control without violation of the Constitution. There, again, I am not going to argue the constitutional point with you.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Is not the real dual control in this country, the one that gives the trouble, a professional War Department operating on a professional army and a citizen army at the same time?

Gen. WOOD. Like the judges of the courts, the Regular officers are trained for their job.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you this question—speaking of the large number of officers during the Civil War on both sides and the small number of officers who are graduated from West Point—what does the history of the world show with reference to the destruction of the commissioned personnel of the Army; what percentage of them have to be replaced, and how?

Gen. WOOD. I should say the destruction of the total commissioned personnel would be, at the rate of the destructive war which is now going on, 50 to 60 per cent per year, at least.

The CHAIRMAN. So, even the ranks of the commissioned forces have to be replenished.

Gen. WOOD. The other day I was talking to an American who has been commanding a British battalion at the front for a long time. He said that he and one other officer were the only ones now left of those originally in the battalion. Many have been killed, some wounded, and some transferred. The loss has been very heavy.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Referring to the rifle practice in the National Guard while in the United States service, a good many organizations that were down on the border came back without having had any rifle practice after five or six months under Federal control. I have heard of a cavalry regiment that only fired their rifles some 30 rounds. This has reference to your criticism of their qualifications as soldiers. I understand that there were only two rifle ranges on the whole border, but general ranges could have been made.

Gen. WOOD. That is outside of my department; I do not know anything about that. I have heard much of what you say.

Senator LEE of Maryland. When the Fourth Maryland got back under you on September 8, that regiment had not received its rifle practice.

Gen. WOOD. You wrote me about it.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Were you not communicated with on September 8 by Capt. Waddill, of the Regular Army, who got an answer from your office, from Col. Bartlett, disapproving the request for rifle practice for this regiment?

Gen. WOOD. Let me tell you what happened. I will put this all in the record when I go over my statement. We approved of your general idea of giving these troops their target practice before they went out, but the answer, as I remember it—we have thousands of these telegrams relating to muster out of the militia—but I have a very distinct recollection that we approved that request of yours and the War Department disapproved it on the ground that the men in the ranks of the regiment would be continued on Federal pay for a number of days extra if the target practice was authorized.

Senator LEE of Maryland. That was your idea, but that was not the actual fact. You withheld your approval until the 21st; three weeks practically elapsed in any part of which this regiment could have had its practice. They were only testing two companies a day, and any battalion could have gone to the rifle range without slowing up the muster out.

Gen. WOOD. I will have to look that up and insert the exact facts.

Senator LEE of Maryland. I wish you would put in, if you do that, Adjt. Gen. Henry Warfield's letter of September 9, and your answer of September 21. I finally got the War Department to agree that those men should begin rifle practice, but there were only three days left. That happened again with our First Regiment. The Second Battalion, Companies E, F, G, and H, had not had rifle practice and they were kept in Baltimore from October 24 to November 4.

Gen. WOOD. May I ask this young officer who had charge of those papers to make a statement with regard to that case? Do you know about that Maryland regiment and their target practice?

Capt. KEENE. Yes, sir.

Gen. WOOD. I wish you would state it.

Capt. KEENE. When the First Infantry was being mustered out at Laurel they requested to have target practice and a telegram was sent, if my memory serves me, disapproving it. The regiment was subsequently transferred from Laurel to Baltimore, to its armory, to effect its final muster out. Subsequently to the muster out of this organization the War Department sent a telegram to the eastern department stating that target practice could be held, and that it would not interfere with the muster out of the troops. When the First Infantry arrived at Baltimore, Md., and before muster out, it was quartered in the Fifth Regiment Armory and remained there until muster out was completed. The adjutant general of Maryland, if my memory serves me, made application for the regiment to hold small-arms target practice, and the War Department authorities authorized the mustering officers to permit the organization to hold small-arms target practice, provided it would not interfere with the muster out of the organization, and the First Maryland held that target practice.

Gen. WOOD. Did the Second Battalion get target practice?

Capt. KEENE. I do not remember the designation of the battalion, but I know there were some organizations that held small-arms target practice.

Senator LEE of Maryland. I have a statement here from the adjutant general of Maryland which says that the First Regiment was 10 days being mustered out and its Second Battalion did not get rifle practice. The Fourth Maryland Infantry was mustered out September 26. The correspondence is as follows:

LAUREL, MD., *September 8, 1916.*

TO COMMANDING GENERAL, EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Governors Island, N. Y.:*

Fourth Maryland arrived from Eagle Pass without having target practice. Adjt. Gen. Warfield recommends that their troops be ordered to Saunders range by battalions for four days' practice, in which recommendation I fully concur. Transportation will not exceed $1.10 per man, round trip.

WADDILL.

---

GOVERNORS ISLAND, N. Y., *September 8, 1916.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL OF MARYLAND,
*Annapolis, Md.:*

Relative your telegram of September 8, referring to target practice for Fourth Infantry, department commander regrets that, in that War Department instructions require muster out of Federal service to be effected as soon as practicable, he is unable to approve your request.

BARTLETT.

---

SEPTEMBER 9, 1916.

From: The Adjutant General.
To: The commanding general, Eastern Department.
Subject: Rifle practice for Fourth Infantry, Maryland National Guard.

1. Your telegram stating that it would be impossible to comply with the recommendation of this office that the Fourth Infantry be ordered to the State rifle range for rifle practice received.

2. In making this recommendation it was believed that this work could be done without interfering with the mustering out of this regiment. The idea was to send one battalion at a time to the range, leaving such officers and men at the mobilization camp as may be required in making out the necessary papers and attending to all details incident to the muster out. The range can be

reached from the mobilization camp in less than two hours, so that troops that may be at the range could be gotten back to camp promptly.

3. If the regiment is mustered out of the service it would be impossible for the State to order them to the range this year as the employers would undoubtedly make strenuous objection, owing to the time they have already been in the service, during which service, unfortunately, they have not had rifle practice.

4. This matter strikes this office as being of such importance that the liberty is taken to again bring it to your attention.

HENRY M. WARFIELD.

---

GOVERNORS ISLAND, N. Y., *September 21, 1916.*

The ADJUTANT GENERAL,
*Annapolis, Md.:*

Following War Department telegram, September 20, repeated:

"Reference your letter September 13, relating target practice National Guard regiments ordered muster out, target practice will be held in case of all militia organizations ordered home for muster out when troops have not had target practice on border, and provided facilities therefor exist, and practice will not interfere with or delay the muster out.

"McCAIN."

Camp commander advised.

SIMPSON.

---

HEADQUARTERS, EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
*Governors Island, N. Y., September 21, 1916.*

The following telegram is published for the information and guidance of all concerned:

"WASHINGTON, D. C., *September 20, 1916.*

"COMMANDING GENERAL, EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
"*Governors Island, N. Y.:*

"Reference your letter September 13, relative target practice National Guard regiments ordered mustered out, target practice will be held in case of all militia organizations ordered home for muster out when troops have not had target practice on border, and provided facilities therefor exist and practice will not interfere with or delay the muster out.

"McCAIN."

Strict and careful compliance with the foregoing is enjoined on all concerned.

By command of Maj. Gen. Wood:

GEORGE T. BARTLETT,
*Colonel, General Staff, Chief of Staff.*

Official:
W. A. SIMPSON,
*Adjutant General, Adjutant.*

---

ANNAPOLIS, MD., *September 22, 1916.*

The COMMANDING GENERAL,
*Eastern Department, Governors Island, N. Y.:*

Rifle practice for Fourth Infantry now will somewhat delay muster out owing to delay in receiving authority, but recommend that authority be given to begin practice at once, same to be expedited as much as possible. This office will render every assistance to expedite the practice. Can have range ready immediately. Hope for favorable action.

WARFIELD,
*The Adjutant General.*

[Mem. of Adjt. Gen. Warfield, of Maryland.]

In re: Rifle practice, First Maryland Infantry, National Guard, 1916.

Regiment arrived in Baltimore October 24, 1916.

Regiment mustered out of Federal service November 4, 1916.

The second battalion (Companies E, F, G, and H) did not have rifle practice and qualification while in Federal service.

Gen. WOOD. There was considerable difficulty, Senator, as you may have heard. You asked some time ago, I think, about ammunition. Some regiments started to the border without munitions. They were furnished ammunition by the Coast Artillery defense commanders on their own initiative. I cite that just as an evidence of the willingness of those officers to help out. Some of them were called to account for it, and I had to come to their support on the ground that it would have been a piece of folly to have allowed this regiment to go to the border without munitions, expecting to meet munitions at some designated point fixed by the Chief of Ordnance on the border. They might have been deflected to participate in action anywhere, and for an organization going to the front to have rifles without ammunition would have been inconceivable from a military standpoint.

I cite that simply as an evidence of the general spirit of helpfulness on the part of the officers. They took their own ammunition and turned it over to the guard.

Senator BRADY. They could not have put up very much of a defense for their country without any munitions whatever?

Gen. WOOD. No, sir.

Senator LEE of Maryland. I want to make a little comparison with certain of your figures in the interest of the National Guard as recruit getters. You have condemned them as organizations.

Gen. WOOD. The system, not the men. I am going to keep on going back to that.

Senator LEE of Maryland (reading):

> Organizations raised and trained as these are are not trained, disciplined troops. The portion which had had reasonable training would not exceed 20 per cent.

That is your statement?

Gen. WOOD. That is right; I think that is liberal.

Senator LEE of Maryland. I infer this to mean that 20 per cent had reasonable training before going to the border and are as good as our regularly enlisted men. If, for the sake of argument, it is conceded that the training etc., of the remaining 80 men out of 100, who, you say, are partially trained, is altogether a loss, then the net result as to cost, based on militia appropriations for 1916, is approximately 20 trained militiamen, at the cost of 100 militia for 1916, $4,700; less 80 recruits, at $19 each, $1,620; net cost to Government of 20 trained militiamen, $3,080. One year cost of 20 trained enlisted men, United States Army, $20,000; net saving a year on 20 trained militiamen, $16,920.

If it is suggested that the annual cost of a militiaman is to be doubled under the act of June 3, 1916, it is also to be considered that the number of reasonably trained men will probably be much more than doubled under the new law.

So, if you simply broke up your militia organization and just used this supply of trained men to fill out your skeleton regular companies, you would be saving $16,920 annually on the present regular system of getting the same number of men?

Gen. WOOD. When I used the words "reasonably well trained" I employed as general a term as I could think of. They were not fit to go into the field. They were not comparable to the regular troops.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Do you tell us that you would prefer the poorest 20 men out of 100 of the Regular Army to the best 20 men out of 100 in the militia?

Gen. WOOD. Not a bit; because I might get Regular Army men who have been in the Army only one day, but I would rather take the average of two to one of any regular trained soldiers to reasonably trained militiamen. I was trying to be as just to the militia as possible. The militia organizations are made up of good men, but they are not trained soldiers.

Senator LEE of Maryland. I just wanted to know the attitude of your mind on this proposition. You prefer the 20 worst men in the average regular company——

Gen. WOOD. No; of course not.

Senator LEE of Maryland. To the 20 best men in the average militia organization.

Gen. WOOD. Of course, that is a perfectly absurd statement.

Senator LEE of Maryland. That is what I wanted to get at. It looked to me that way.

Gen. WOOD. It is, as you put it, absurd. I should not prefer the 20 worst men of the Regular Army to 20 of the best men of the militia, because 20 of the best men of the militia may probably be found to be old soldiers who had been well trained.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Let us eliminate that part with reference to the old soldiers.

Gen. WOOD. That is a pretty good way to get out of it.

Senator LEE of Maryland. You understand that no old soldiers are involved in the 20 best militiamen in 100.

Gen. WOOD. I would rather have 20 of the best men in the militia because I would get men of your type of intelligence.

Senator LEE of Maryland. I am a little too old.

Gen. WOOD. Not a bit to fight.

Senator LEE of Maryland. I think I called your attention to the fact that Gen. Barry did not agree with you about this training.

Gen. WOOD. I am sorry he did not.

Senator LEE of Maryland. I will put that in the record, because I would like to have it appear at this point in the interest of the National Guard:

[From report of Maj. Gen. Barry, Central Department, Oct. 19, 1916.]

The fact that as a rule fully one-third of the members of the various organizations were, upon muster in, untrained recruits or men of but a few months' service made it impossible to regard any unit as properly trained. The influx of raw recruits at any time cuts down very greatly the efficiency even of well-trained regular organizations. In the case of National Guard organizations it is especially necessary that in time of emergency such influx be not permitted, and they should not be accepted into Federal service unless up to minimum strength at time of call.

Or in other words, when he shows his disapproval of the skeleton regiments being suddenly expanded, he at the same time says that two-thirds of the militia were fairly trained.

Gen. WOOD. They had a year or more of service, 64 of them only, the balance very little. It is a mistake to put untrained men into any organization going into action——

Senator LEE of Maryland. In your testimony you say:

I feel that the Federal Government must own and control the military forces absolutely and beyond peradventure.

You throw the Swiss system over in that respect?

Gen. WOOD. So far as anything interferes with Federal control.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Now, at another place in your testimony this occurs:

Senator THOMAS. Was there observable any conflict of authority between the Federal and the State authorities in the handling of its militia during its recent mobilization or in the operations of the soldiers on the border?

Gen. WOOD. No essential one, except that the standards of efficiency are all determined very largely by the standards of interest in the State—interest of State authorities.

Senator THOMAS. A necessary result.

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir. There are, of course, possibilities of radical differences of opinion. Governors, if they wish, can muster out men and make radical changes in personnel of organizations.

I call your attention to the fact that the governors can not muster out men under the new law.

Gen. WOOD. Yes. This is claimed to be the case under the new law, but the question of the application of the dual oath is still to be determined. Just where the authority of the governor begins and ends under the new law I do not know. I believe, however, that it will be found that the governor has still a very large measure of control over the State militia, even under the new law.

Senator LEE of Maryland. We are now rectifying that mistake.

Gen. WOOD. It is not a mistake. That is where they take the dual oath.

Senator LEE of Maryland. You state that there is no essential interference or conflict of authority between the Federal and State authorities in the handling of its militia. I again quote from your testimony:

No essential one, except that the standards of efficiency are all determined very largely by the standards of interest in the State—interest of State authorities.

Now, General, that is your statement after having been Chief of Staff for about two years?

Gen. WOOD. I was Chief of Staff four years.

Senator LEE of Maryland. And your experience as major general is not otherwise?

Gen. WOOD. That is right.

Senator LEE of Maryland. That you left the efficiency and discipline of the National Guard to the States?

Gen. WOOD. I did not say that. I said that the efficiency depended largely on State interest—that is, State appropriations, State support, and all that sort of thing.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Yes, sir; that it was left to State authority. It is very obvious.

Gen. WOOD. I did not say it was left to the interest; I said it depended very largely on the interest, but not left to the State authorities.

Senator LEE of Maryland. In other words, no effort was made to impose discipline?

Gen. WOOD. I did not say that. We did supply instructors and *inspectors, etc.*, and their efforts depended very largely on the sup-

port they received from State authorities. These officers could not issue orders; they could only advise.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Then, as a matter of law and military policy, there has never been any final and conclusive effort to impose discipline on the militia?

Gen. WOOD. By the Federal Government?

Senator LEE of Maryland. By the Federal Government.

Gen. WOOD. I do not think there has been. I doubt if they can do it under our Constitution.

Senator LEE of Maryland. And under the Dick law the spontaneous interest of the State authorities was absolutely essential.

Gen. WOOD. Under any law.

Senator LEE of Maryland. You consider that so now?

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir; as long as we have a militia system under which the State authorities interpose, I do not think you will have troops of real efficiency.

Again, I desire to emphasize my previous statements, that this lack of efficiency is not due to the quality of the personnel, but to the method under which it is trained, and the lack of certain unquestioned Federal control at all times. Modern organization throughout the world in all great countries, save China and the United States, is such that we can not hope to offer successful resistance under our present system. War is launched more quickly than ever before, and its organization is such that the entire resources of a country are promptly available not only for its inception but for its maintenance. Conditions are very different from those which existed at the time the Republic was founded, and we must make adequate preparations to meet conditions as they are, not as we would have them, or as they were a hundred years ago. The weapons of the Federal Government must be its own, must be prepared by it, controlled by it, and used by it. There must be no uncertainty, no division of control. A governor may or may not heartily cooperate in time of emergency. When war begins under modern conditions there is no time for argument or discussion between Federal and State authorities. There would be barely time to mobilize the forces even if they are under Federal control and completely equipped. Our military organization must be in harmony with our policy. We assume that our policy is to be nonaggressive. Consequently we shall not be making preparations for wars of aggression. But we must have immediately available the means to check aggressive attack which may be launched against us at any moment on either coast. At present we are without such means or such preparation.

Senator LEE of Maryland. General, in your testimony you said that the regular organizations are short of men, practically all of them, and that they lack much which modern war considers of vital importance under combat conditions.

Gen. WOOD. Our regular organizations lack many things which are vitally essential in modern war. We lack machine guns of all types; in fact, we have very few of the best types of modern machine guns, either light or heavy. Such light guns of the best and the most modern types as we have, we have secured from an English contract with an American firm. These guns do not use our ammunition. The hand grenade or bomb plays an important part in modern

war; we have nothing approaching an adequate supply even for our present small Regular Army. We are without trench mortars of the type in general use throughout the battlefields of Europe. We are without various kinds of field signal apparatus, especially for night work. We are short of modern field wireless to such an extent that we had to strip Panama in order to secure a small amount for use on the border. We are without any of the modern types of heavy mobile artillery such as is in general use in Europe—artillery which often has had a determining effect upon operations. I refer both to the type which is moved on the ordinary artillery carriage, and to that powerful type which is mounted and moved on a railway carriage. We are dangerously short of reserve rifles and of field artillery; we have not enough field pieces to adequately equip even the Regular Army and militia at war strength, and not a field gun for volunteers. We are inadequately supplied with reserve amunition. The fact is our supplies are ridiculously small. We have not built in this country as yet any of the modern aeroplane engines of the latest millitary type. Steps are being taken to correct this deficiency, but it will be a long time before we are moderately prepared in this arm. We are not constructing, as we should, with all possible haste, artillery of various types. We are building little or none of the long range mid-caliber type of artillery such as is now in general use. We have made no adequate increase in the way of reserves of munitions of war since the war began. Indeed we are only just commencing the manufacture of the approved heavy type of machine gun, and have not yet determined the type of light machine gun we are to use, although these guns must be provided in the proportion of about eight of the light to one of the heavy guns. This is the condition, although the world's greatest war is two and one-half years old, and its lessons as to equipment, development of arms and munitions are an open book to all the world. We have not taken the necessary steps to complete immediately the fire control of our seacoast guns. We are without adequate searchlights and also without anything even approximating a reasonable supply of auto aircraft guns. We are not making effective and rapid strides in the absolutely essential remodeling of the carriages of our major caliber seacoast guns, a remodeling which will give them elevation absolutely necessary if they are to meet similar guns afloat. Our arsenals for small arms have been working only to a small extent of their capacity. We are without reserves of clothing, shoes, or other equipment necessary for war. We have not taken the necessary steps to establish nuclear plants for the manufacturing of our military rifle at the great arms factories in various parts of the country. This is absolutely necessary in order to permit that expansion which will be necessary in order to meet the demands of modern war. Our arsenals are wholly inadequate to meet these demands. This is a fact of common knowledge. Adequate steps have not been taken to acquire the necessary reserves of those things which we do not produce in this country, but which are vitally essential in modern war. We stand practically as unprepared as when the great war began, and are apparently unobservant of its clear lessons and unappreciative of the fact that no amount of money and no amount of effort can purchase time or make good its loss. Whatever the ultimate organizations of our resources may be, there is no question whatever as to the necessity of supplying a

sufficiency of the above equipment, arms, and munitions to promptly equip and arm a force of at least two and one-half million volunteers with adequate reserves for a year. Whatever the ultimate organizations of our resources may be, it has been strikingly apparent for two and one-half years that we should immediately prepare in large amounts the absolute essentials of modern war, only a portion of which have been referred to above. We are also very short of reserve officers and practically without reserves of instructed men. Declarations which include, in the list of instructed men, boys who have graduated from so-called military schools, and men who have had short terms of service in the militia, are unworthy of serious consideration, as they indicate entire failure to appreciate the fact that these men are not trained soldiers.

Our people enthuse over some new form of torpedo or a general discussion of the question of organization of our resources, but fail to grasp that the deficiencies enumerated above relate to the absolute necessities, which it will take a long time to produce. They do not realize that we have not and can not secure for many months these absolutely necessary every-day weapons and equipment of war. They fail to appreciate that these must be produced in time of peace and that the organization of all our resources is to keep up the supply once war is upon us. Furthermore, they do not realize that an untutored, untrained, and undisciplined people can not pick up these weapons and use them effectively; that this preparation also requires time, and that little or nothing is being done except in preparation for next summer's training camps and through private efforts conducted with private funds. Our safety now is dependent upon the forbearance of others and not upon our ability and preparation to defend ourselves.

Senator LEE of Maryland. And heavy artillery?

Gen. WOOD. Yes; heavy artillery, which we have never made, nor, as far as I know, even designed on the large type. There is also a shortage of munitions and a shortage in pretty much everything for a volunteer force.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Of course transportation?

Gen. WOOD. Yes; the Regular Army is short of supplies and equipment, as I have stated above. This includes aviators and modern machines. The militia is short to an even greater extent of the same articles. As for supplies for a Volunteer Army—a citizen Army—with the exception of a limited number of rifles, we are absolutely unprepared. Our seacoast-defense guns must be supplied with modern carriages which will not deprive the guns of any portion of their effective range. At present most of our larger seacoast guns are mounted on a type of carriage known as the disappearing carriage. This carriage permits so little elevation that nearly half the effective range of the gun is lost. Recent developments in guns afloat make this a most serious defect and render very radical changes necessary.

Unless these carriages can be so modified as to permit an elevation giving maximum effective range wherever such is required, this type of carriage will have to be given up where such range is required. Thus far the indications are that the carriage can not be so modified. That a seacoast gun should not be mounted on a carriage which deprives it of any portion of its effective range would seem to be a self-evident fact.

The CHAIRMAN. In speaking of deficiencies, would you not put in the first rank of deficiencies trained aviators and sufficient machines and accessories?

Gen. WOOD. Yes; nearly all which is needed in the way of aviators and machines is yet to be provided.

Senator LEE of Maryland. In view of our having one of the most expensive armies in the world, certainly on a peace basis——

Gen. WOOD. It is, undoubtedly, I expect. Adequate defense at reasonable cost can only be secured through universal service.

Senator LEE of Maryland. And if we have all these defects that you speak of, would it not be better to start some kind of competition in the shape of military training and get some independent military inspectors and advisers, such as the Swiss officers, for the National Guard rather than to keep the citizen soldiers longer under such a defective Regular Army system?

Gen. WOOD. The Regular Army officer has never been referred to as defective. The system is generally very largely responsible for conditions. If you will read our recommendations you will find that we have been very frank in pointing out these defects for years.

The CHAIRMAN. In the last analysis, Congress has been responsible for most of it?

Gen. WOOD. I think so, in some respects. Congress, however, in the end generally does what the people want.

Senator LEE of Maryland. I notice that our chairman the other day introduced a memorandum which showed that Congress had given all the money that the Army had ever recommended for the development of the citizen soldiery.

The CHAIRMAN. But not the organization. We have given pretty generously to it, but not the organization which the Army asked. We had two commissions after the Civil War. Generals in the Civil War made recommendations—

Gen. WOOD. And after the Spanish War, too.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; right along. We had reports for 1908 and 1915, and none of the recommendations were adopted. We have been pretty generous in a money way.

Gen. WOOD. There are various causes, Senator. The fundamental cause is lack of knowledge on the part of the people, first, of our military history with its story of wastage of life and treasure due to lack of organization; secondly, to a very general lack of information concerning the condition of preparedness and organization throughout the world to-day. Congress represents, as a rule, the opinions and views of its constituents. Our people have been told of our great wealth and resources in men. They have never been told that these amount to nothing in the way of meeting an immediate attack unless organized and trained and unless the materials of war have been supplied. Panic patriotism and patriotism as illustrated by the putting out of flags and the offer of money and material after war is upon us, while indicating good spirit, indicate a lack of intelligent appreciation. It is too late. To make good shortages and to provide equipment takes time, and much of it is required. No amount of money can buy time, and months of it, many of them, are needed to make even reasonable preparation. The knowledge of our condition is general throughout the world in all lands except our own. There has been a lack also of a sound policy in the military establishment

itself. The establishment of the General Staff has given us the first strong corrective influence, and if supported a sound policy will gradually be evolved. In my opinion much of the delay and much of our shortage in the way of arms and munitions of war is due to the fact that the Ordnance Department, instead of accepting its proper function as a constructing department, has assumed too much the attitude of being the department to decide what type and what quantity of weapons should be made and what devices should be accepted as of military utility and what rejected. Instead of reaching out with a view to studying and accepting the best in use in the world at the time, it has shown a strong tendency to delay acceptance and attempt something of its own. Able as many of its members are, the Ordnance Department can not meet in competition the inventive genius of the world. This has prevented us from taking advantage of many inventions; for example, we are dawdling along to-day in the matter of machine guns—are going to make a trial some time next spring, although we are to-day practically without machine guns. This weapon is so vital that we should have been making trials, if necessary, during the past winter. Let the General Staff, which has representatives of all arms, decide after full consideration, what is to be used and in what amounts, and, once the recommendation has been approved by the Secretary of War, have the construction departments produce the articles as rapidly as appropriations will permit. Congress is to blame only where it has been fully and frankly informed and has not met the clearly apparent needs of the Nation.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator BRADY. Congress generally does what the people want done.

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir.

Senator BRADY. And if there has been any lack of organization, or any lack in the Army of a greater supply of men, it has been a lack in the interest on the part of the people themselves.

Gen. WOOD. After the Civil War we had for 20 years 1,000,000 men who had been in the Civil War. We had scores of distinguished officers, and had a feeling of conscious ability to put a good force in the field in a hurry; but we suddenly awoke to the fact that these trained men are dead or too old to serve; that the officers are no longer fit for field service; that from the old condition of moderate preparedness throughout the world a condition of thorough organization and readiness such as the world never dreamed of had sprung into being; that these conditions no longer permitted the old haphazard methods; that we stand to-day practically wholly unprepared to meet organization and preparedness of this kind. It may or may not be unfortunate, but the fact is, it is here, and it is one of the conditions we must meet. After the Civil War we were engaged in developing the immense natural resources of the country. We had a rather small war with Spain which we got through without serious losses, although it was conspicuous for bad management. The new condition is now upon us. We must prepare to meet this condition, and the only way this can be done, especially under a democracy, is through universal military obligation and service; a standing Army sufficient for the peace needs of the Nation as above indicated, an excellent and

adequate Navy ready at all times, and a citizenry trained to arms, under conditions which will interfere as little as practicable with their educational and industrial lives, a training to be given under a brief period of intensive training. Six months of such training will be equivalent to a year and a half of average training in the regular establishment, and we transfer many men to the reserve after one year's service, because we find them to be efficient and well trained soldiers. Our men after six months of intensive training would average higher in efficiency than these men after a year of service in the regular establishment. The average period of intensive training preliminary to going to the front of the British recruit (the man who has had no previous training) is 14 weeks for the Infantry, Field Artillery, Heavy Artillery—in fact, for all arms except the Cavalry, which is 16 weeks.

Senator LEE of Maryland. As illustrative of the limitations, for the safety and freedom of the people, the Swiss have put in their small standing army a body of 230 inspectors.

Gen. WOOD. May I suggest that they have had much trouble in Switzerland. The people are made up of various racial and religious groups and bound together for mutual protection. Racial and religious differences have sprung up among them from time to time. The cantons of the different racial groups and religious groups have rather jealously guarded their resources and powers. Gradually, however, everything pertaining to defense has been placed practically in the hands of the Federal Council. In other words, the Swiss system is under Federal control.

Senator LEE of Maryland. Precisely; we understand, of course, that they have racial conditions under their constitution which they have solved under local self-government. Now, we have racial conditions here which we solve from our local standpoint. Is it not a great deal better to respect this solution which has been so successfully made under State or contonal arrangement and not delay preparedness by going to work and striking at all these local solutions?

Gen. WOOD. I wish I could agree with you, but I can not. I think we have not an adequate central military control.

Senator LEE of Maryland. I will go on with the instructors of the Swiss Army. He says:

General, I call your attention to these reports showing the interest that the Swiss have in the freedom of their people and the efficiency of their Army because I believe you are earnestly interested and deeply devoted to the cause of general preparation, and I hope you will study them for the reason that it seems to me, as I look at the proposition, that the inevitable effect of your efforts will be to throw the national defense wholly into the hands of the Navy. Many of our people already prefer not to give up the constitutional safeguards as to land forces and rely only upon the Navy. The greater safety and discipline and general benefit that would come to our people through a Swiss military descipline may be lost, unless you and others in your position are willing to respect the safeguards and make the best of our constitutional provisions.

Gen. WOOD. Senator, in replying to these very interesting but rather difficult questions of yours, I have gone into the subject as carefully as possible; and I have given what I think represents a fair statement of the degree of Federal control exercised by the Swiss

Federal authorities and that exercised by the Federal Government under our Constitution.

The CHAIRMAN. I wish you would also put in your testimony the number of National Guard officers, if you have a list of them, who applied for discharge or who were discharged from the time of call until the muster out.

Gen WOOD. I will be glad to do so, Mr. Chairman. As far as I can learn the numbers are as follows:

| | |
|---|---|
| Officers submitting resignations which were accepted | 575 |
| Officers submitting resignations which were declined | 82 |
| Total | 657 |

This list is for the entire militia up to approximately the end of the year 1916.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will now take a recess until to-morrow morning at 10.30 o'clock.

(Accordingly the committee adjourned until to-morrow, Feb. 1, 1917, at 10.30 o'clock a. m.)

# STATEMENT BEFORE HOUSE COMMITTEE

JANUARY 27, 1917

# TO INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
*Thursday, January 27, 1916.*

The committee met at 10 o'clock a. m., Hon. James Hay (chairman) presiding.

## STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. LEONARD WOOD, COMMANDING DEPARTMENT OF THE EAST.

The CHAIRMAN. Gen. Wood, the committee is ready to hear you on the general subject of preparedness.

Gen. WOOD. Do you wish me to make a general statement?

The CHAIRMAN. I think that would desirable.

Gen. WOOD. I believe that we need a very material increase in the strength of the Mobile Army, the Coast Artillery, and the Engineers, with an accompanying increase in the auxiliary arms, an increase proportionate to whatever increase may be given in the line.

The principal shortages to-day are limited not only to the personnel, but they are equally alarming in the matériel. My own recommendations called for a regular establishment of approximately 220,000 men with proper reserves of matériel for this force, and also a reserve of enlisted men equal in strength to the regular force. They also called for a reserve corps of officers of not less than 45,000, for which we have available matériel which is not being used.

I also recommended that general military training be made a national policy. I do not believe that any other system can be considered as other than a makeshift and a stopgap, a source not of safety, but of delusion. When the critical moment comes it will break down, as it has broken down in every war in which we have been engaged. Any attempt to depend upon a volunteer system, pure and simple, admirable as is the volunteer spirit, will fail. It means the organization for war after war is upon us and the transferring of the burden of war to the time of war, than which no more unwise policy can be conceived.

Those were the essential recommendations which I made with reference to increase in the regular establishment, the provision of reserves for the same, both of men and matériel. I also recommended the general training, general military instruction of our men of suitable age and physique, a reserve corps of 45,000 officers, a regular establishment of approximately 220,000 men, which would have to be increased if the foreign garrisons should be increased over what I recommended in my report. This force might be reduced somewhat in strength, so far as the troops within the continental United

States are concerned, when we have an adequate and well-trained reserve, but this reduction should not in any case exceed 15 per cent of the full war strength of the organization.

The CHAIRMAN. General, when you say general training, do you mean compulsory training?

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir; a national training modeled on the Swiss or Australian system.

I also recommended, Mr. Chairman, that we should accumulate sufficient arms, equipment, and reserve supplies for a million and a half men in addition to the reserve, supplies, arms, and so forth, required for the above regular force and its reserve, and in addition to the arms and supplies required for the militia and its reserves, especially those arms and supplies which take a good while to make, such as rifles, field artillery, guns, and ammunition, and certain portions of the equipment.

Mr. TILSON. Gen. Wood, I have propounded this question to Gen. Crozier and others who have appeared before this committee, Whether it would not be possible, instead of storing up a large amount of material, arms, and so forth, to make preparation in advance of special appliances, such as jigs and gages, tools and fixtures necessary for the immediate manufacture of arms and ammunition, and such equipment as is not commercial, so that we could begin the immediate manufacture of those things in time of war, instead of storing up an immense amount of them and keeping that amount on hand?

Gen. WOOD. You mean a thorough organization of our industrial resources?

Mr. TILSON. Not only that, but a special expenditure by the Government for the purchase of these appliances. I have found upon investigation, and upon making inquiry of the officers, that the necessary fixtures and special appliances which would be ready for the purpose of turning out small arms can be made for $275,000, or less, so that we could begin, say, next week to turn out arms and ammunition from any private factory not now engaged in the manufacture of modern firearms of any kind.

Gen. WOOD. I think that would be a wise move, but I do not think it should act to replace the supply necessary for the number of men required to meet an emergency such as war with a first-class power.

Mr. TILSON. We should have a proper amount of reserve material, but instead of having anything like enough on hand constantly to carry us through a campaign, to have these fixtures and special appliances ready so that we could begin immediate manufacture in case of necessity.

Gen. WOOD. I agree with you on that, provided we have constantly on hand the reserve material recommended above.

Mr. TILSON. That has been the trouble with our manufacturers in supplying arms and ammunition to the belligerents. These countries have placed their orders, and it has taken a year in some cases for the manufactories to get ready to turn out the arms and ammunition which have been ordered, and the principal delay was caused by the time taken to manufacture these special appliances which are of a very fine and very accurate nature and must be very carefully made.

Gen. WOOD. The policy what I feel ought to be followed is on

exactly the line you have indicated, for the purpose of upkeeping the output of munitions. If there is any particular lesson of the present war which has been more impressive than another, it is the fact that the manufactories in this country were wholly unable to produce rapidly and in large amounts arms or munitions of war, with the exception of powder. We did produce rapidly large amounts of foodstuffs, clothing, shoes, and leather, but of munitions our output of powder was the only one which was satisfactory, and this was because we had private plants organized and equipped to supply powder in large amounts.

In the matter of the manufacture of rifles, after nearly a year and a half of war, with no limit on the prices, the prices paid being much more than a rifle is worth—sometimes more than twice what it is worth—we were putting out, up to a few weeks ago, less than 3,400 rifles per day for the whole United States.

We shall be able to put out a good many more by the first of May, but we have had to go to work and build plants absolutely de novo, construct the machinery, the tools, machines, and everything else needed, and the time it has taken us to get ready to put out a moderate supply of rifles has been longer than the duration of the average modern war, and this has been, so far as we are concerned, in a time of peace, with no one molesting us in any way.

Now, the output of some other munitions has been equally slow. The question of time fuses for shrapnel and high-explosive shell has been a very serious question, and to-day I doubt if we are putting out over 25,000 a day. We were putting out about 18,000 three weeks ago. We should be putting out about 80,000 or 90,000, or perhaps more, but even that would not meet the demand of any of the great nations now engaged in war for average daily use.

The CHAIRMAN. General, you stated you think we should have a Regular Army of 220,000 men—a mobile army, which includes, of course, the Coast Artillery?

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It has been testified here by The Adjutant General and Chief of Staff and the Assistant Chief of Staff that 50,000 men are all that can be recruited in a year for our Army, under the volunteer system. Do you agree with that statement?

Gen. WOOD. No, sir; I disagree with it absolutely and completely.

The CHAIRMAN. How would you change the recruiting system in order to get the recruits to fill up an army of 220,000 men?

Gen. WOOD. I would establish a form of enlistment under which intelligence, application, and industry would have some bearing upon determining how long a man shall remain with the colors before he goes into the reserve. I would have no minimum period. I would authorize company, troop, and battery commanders to recommend transfer or to transfer a man to the reserve as soon as in the opinion of the officer that man is a well-trained soldier.

I would also eliminate absolutely discharge by purchase and let the transfer to the status of a soldier on furlough in the reserve be accomplished through proficiency rather than through purchase.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, as I understand you, you would provide an enlistment contract which would not have in it any period of years?

Gen. WOOD. I do not care, sir, how long within reason the maxi-

mum period is. There should be a maximum period, but I would have no minimum. I would authorize the transfer of a man to the reserve when he is thoroughly trained as a soldier, provided he is not on foreign service. I think in case a man is on foreign service he should not be furloughed to the reserve until he has served at least a year, unless he is on foreign service, where transfers of recruits and returning men can be made by transport at the minimum of expense.

The CHAIRMAN. How would you discriminate between men on foreign service and men who are at home, when they go in?

Gen. WOOD. You would have to discriminate from the fact that he is on foreign service. It would mean that his transfer should be held up until he came back home or had had a year's service.

The CHAIRMAN. Would not that plan make it impossible to say just how many men would be in the Army at a given time; would it not require the recruitment of more men than under the present system?

Gen. WOOD. Possibly so, but this would be a very minor consideration in comparison with the benefit which would accrue under such a system, and the variation in numbers would be provided against within reasonable limits. I think you would secure a much more intelligent class of men under a system which permitted transfer to the reserve as soon as men are efficient. There are plenty of men who are desirous of qualifying and being passed into the reserve, but who do not want to tie themselves up for a number of years.

I think it is safe to say that at least 100 men last summer applied for information as to whether they could or could not enlist for three, four, five, or six months. They said they would be willing to do that, if by doing so they could qualify to get into the reserve, but they did not like to tie themselves up for the present long period of enlistment.

I think the length of time a man now has to serve is a great bar to an increase in recruiting as is the impossibility of furlough to the reserve on establishment of proficiency.

The CHAIRMAN. The other officers who have appeared before this committee have stated that they did not think the time would have anything to do with the question of joining the Army; but that, of course, is a matter of opinion.

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir; that is a matter of opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. General, what is your opinion as to whether the organizations of the Army should be kept at full strength or skeletonized?

Gen. WOOD. I think that they should be kept at full strength until we secure an adequate reserve. After we secure an adequate reserve we might then cut them down to 90 or 85 per cent.

This should not apply to foreign possessions; the garrison there should always be kept at full strength and, I think, should have about 10 per cent additional to each organization.

The CHAIRMAN. General, I think you are an advocate of keeping the organizations at their full strength?

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir; I think that is absolutely essential, at least, until we have an adequate, well-trained reserve.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your reason for that, General?

Gen. WOOD. I will illustrate that by a case in point. For three years we have been threatened with more or less serious difficulty on the border. Our Infantry regiments there are now at about 46 per cent of their war strength, and if we had to send them to any foreign country we would send them with much less than half their full war strength, with a corresponding liability to disaster. We have only a handful of regiments and our Infantry on the border is only at about 46 or 47 per cent of its war strength. One of our regiments at Panama is 600 men short.

The Cavalry is maintained at about 75 per cent of its full war strength, and the Field Artillery, although we have only a few regiments, is maintained at about 77 per cent of its full war strength. It is a dangerous condition and spells disaster. And it is a condition which exists, although the Army is well below the statutory limit in strength.

The CHAIRMAN. However small the Army may be, you think the organizations ought to be at their full strength?

Gen. WOOD. I think so. Until we have secured an adequate and well-trained reserve and until there has been a very material increase in the Regular Establishment. When this has been done and your reserve built up you could safely drop about 15 per cent in strength, but I would never go below that.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean a reserve upon which you could call immediately in the event of war?

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir; furloughed soldiers in the reserve, assigned to organizations, but on the status of a furlough.

The CHAIRMAN. General, I believe you have testified before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, have you not?

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you have stated before that committee that you think the Field Artillery should be very much increased?

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. To what extent do you think the Field Artillery should be increased?

Gen. WOOD. Nineteen regiments, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That would make how many batteries?

Gen. WOOD. That would be 25 regiments. Some of the batteries would be of the heavier type. It would be, roughly, 25 regiments altogether, including the 6; we have now practically 150 batteries.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you do not agree with the plans proposed by the War Department, to the effect that there should be only an increase of four regiments?

Gen. WOOD. I think that is dangerously inadequate, wholly inadequate. The Artillery is, perhaps beyond everything else the weapon which has come particularly to the front in this European war, and we have very little.

It is very difficult to make, and it is extremely difficult to train men to use, and I think we ought to have a good nucleus of Field Artillery always at hand.

The CHAIRMAN. Does it take longer to train a man to be a Field Artillery man than it takes to train him to be a foot soldier;

Gen. WOOD. No, sir; not if we could train the Artillery throughout the year to the extent that we can Infantry. It requires a great deal

of actual firing to make really good gunners and good judges of the effect of fire. This is difficult to get at many posts, because of lack of proper ground to fire over.

The CHAIRMAN. If the question arose as to whether you would increase the Infantry or the Field Artillery, which would you say ought to be done?

Gen. WOOD. I would not recommend the increase of either without an increase in the other branches. If I could only recommend the increase of one I should recommend the increase of Field Artillery at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. You think they should both be increased in proportion?

Gen. WOOD. My recommendation for an increase of 19 regiments in the Field Artillery was based upon the assumption that we would maintain in the Philippines, roughly speaking, about 20,000 men, exclusive of Philippine Scouts. This estimate contemplates the 26 companies of Coast Artillery with field and staff need for manning the defenses installed and now approaching completion. We now have there 18,600, including Philippine Scouts. My recommendation upon that subject was based upon the further assumption that we should maintain in the Hawaiian Islands a garrison of six war-strength regiments of Infantry, a regiment of Cavalry, and two regiments of Field Artillery—a garrison of about 18,000 men, or, with 10 per cent increase, approximately 20,000.

The CHAIRMAN. Have we 18,000 men in the Philippines?

Gen. WOOD. Counting the native and auxiliary troops, I think we have about 18,600.

The CHAIRMAN. You are counting the Philippine Scouts?

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir. Then we shall need also a garrison of about 15,000 men in Panama. I do not recommend that we should have as heavy a garrison at Panama as some others have recommended, nor do I recommend as heavy a garrison at Hawaii as has been recommended, for the reason that I believe that the garrisons which I recommend will be sufficient to meet successfully a raiding force from a fleet, even from a large fleet, which would probably not be able to land over 12,000 or 15,000 men at most, probably not over 10,000. These garrisons should be adequate to hold these places while we retain sea control or are able to contest the control of the sea. If we lose sea control then an enemy will be able to bring any force he may desire and all these places must in time fall.

The CHAIRMAN. You are aware of the fact, of course, that there is pending in the Senate a bill proposing to give up the Philippine Islands in four years?

Gen. WOOD. I have seen statements to that effect in the newspapers.

The CHAIRMAN. If that bill were passed, what effect would that have on your idea as to an increase of the Army? If we abandon the Philippines, to what extent can we change our view with regard to the Army and the military forces which we ought to have in this country?

Gen. WOOD. If we abandon the Philippine Islands altogether and did not have to go back promptly to reestablish order, then you would be able to reduce the Regular Establishment recommended, namely, 220,000, by the strength of the present garrison of *the Philippines.*

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not consider the Philippines as a source of military weakness to the United States?

Gen. WOOD. Yes and no. It depends entirely upon the strength of the Navy. If we have a strong fleet a base in the Philippines would be extremely useful for operations in Asiatic waters or for controlling the sea communications of an Asiatic power. The Philippine Islands would be a source of military weakness to the extent that we might lose a garrison there stationed unless we had a strong and adequate Navy and able to clear the sea and relieve the pressure on our forces.

Mr. QUIN. The fact that we have the Philippines causes us to have to keep an army there?

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir.

Mr. QUIN. Is that not one of the things that causes the demand for a larger Navy—the fact that we have the Philippine Islands?

Gen. WOOD. Not at all. It has no relation to the holding of the Philippines.

Mr. QUIN. Then the arguments that have been made in Congress on that proposition, based on that assumption, have been fallacious?

Gen. WOOD. I do not know what those arguments have been.

Mr. CALDWELL. General, you had charge of the Business Men's Camp at Plattsburg, N. Y., last year?

Gen. WOOD. Yes.

Mr. CALDWELL. Will you tell us something about your experience there and whether you think that was a good thing?

Gen. WOOD. I think it was a very valuable piece of work, for two reasons. Not so much, perhaps, because of the military information which these men got as the fact that they went away from that camp convinced as to what training really means, and what organization means, and they became pretty thoroughly grounded in the basic principles of organization, in questions of training, as to the need of officers, the need of supplies, and all that sort of thing.

They were given a very hard month's work, about as much work as the ordinary militiaman would get during the period of three years in an average militia organization, and they got it consecutively under the officers of the Regular Army, carefully selected, and in conjunction with regular troops. They were all men of a very high grade of intelligence, and they went ahead, as compared with the average recruit, probably at the rate of 6 or 8 to 1.

The officers of our training staff reported that the work these men had accomplished equalled about four and a half or five months' work by recruits under favorable conditions.

Mr. CALDWELL. How long do you think it would take to make a good soldier?

Gen. WOOD. That depends upon the man's intelligence, his willingness, his interest in the work, and the conditions under which you place him.

Take the men such as we had at Plattsburg last summer, under the conditions that existed there. They had at the Plattsburg camp plenty of officers of marked ability who acted as instructors, Regular troops which served as model organizations, a good target range, and good country to work over. Under those circumstances you could train those particular men very well in three months. At is was,

the average in shooting was something like 66 per cent of marksmen and better, covering the full militia course. Anyone who is familiar with the militia record knows what that means. And in saying that I do not mean to cast any reflections on the militia. That average was about double the average of the militia for the whole country.

Take, for instance, men like George Wharton Pepper or Bullitt. They are types of the hundreds of men who were there. The elements of military drill were not difficult for those men to understand. That type of men you can train to be good soldiers very quickly. The men we should probably get as recruits under the continental-army plan could be trained very well in six months if assembled in large training camps alongside of full-strength organizations of Regular troops and under the instructions of carefully selected officers of the Regular Army. Everything depends upon the condition under which men are trained and the time given to the training each day—the following out of a carefully prepared and progressive schedule. None of these things are possible at the average post, at which recruits are received at frequent and irregular intervals, and at which there is a great amount of police and administrative work. There is absolutely no comparison between what can be accomplished under conditions such as we had at Plattsburg and conditions such as exist at the average post, nor should the results obtained under normal conditions at the Regular Establishment form the basis for estimating the time that would be required to train men under conditions such as would exist in a camp equipped and prepared for intensive training.

Mr. CALDWELL. There has been quite a good deal of talk here in regard to the idea of training a man to such a thorough extent that he will become almost unconsciously obedient to the word of the military commanders. Do you think a man can be so thoroughly trained that he can be gotten into that frame of mind in three months or six months?

Gen. WOOD. That is a rather common expression used by those who are arguing for long periods of training. I believe the training can be acquired by a reasonably intelligent man in the time mentioned. The conditions of modern war are not such that the commanding officer's voice is heard at all times. In extended order and in modern battle formation men have to develop a very considerable degree of individuality and self-control. This condition can only be established to the highest extent where there is a large measure of intelligence. There are two kinds of discipline—one, the discipline of intelligence, where a man surrenders his body and subordinates his will absolutely. This discipline is based upon intelligence and upon an appreciation of the needs of the situation. Intelligent men appreciate that success with large bodies is dependent upon subordination, cooperation, and prompt obedience. They know and appreciate this because they are intelligent men. They have read and studied enough to know that failure comes from the lack of subordination and concerted effort. The other kind of discipline is the discipline of habit. This is the type of discipline that was hammered into men in the days when soldiers were largely illiterate. It is apt to be destroyed by any impulse stronger than the habit. It is not founded upon an intelligent appreciation of a soldier's duty

or the needs of the situation. It is applicable where mentality is low and where the recruit's body has not been made subject to his will by training or exercises which tend to produce that result. This class of recruit has to be drilled until certain things become a habit, but he is never as valuable a man as the man who does things because he appreciates something of the reason for doing them.

The intelligent, reasoning type of man, if he is driven out of one position and sees an equally good one before him, is unwounded and has his supply of ammunition, appreciates that he is, if his organization holds together, practically as well off as he was before. The ignorant man is less appreciative of the possibilities and more difficult to rally. Modern warfare requires not only discipline but intelligence. Men frequently have to work intelligently when separated from their officers, and the idea that officers are always in intimate contact with the men is quickly removed when you appreciate the extent of modern actions and the difficulty of the officers maintaining close contact with the men.

When the intensive method of training is adopted under a well thought out progressive plan, recruits can be trained in six months to be reasonably efficient soldiers. Pretty much depends upon the system and method of training and freedom from outside work which has no direct relation to the man's military training. It isn't the time a man is in the service necessarily, but it is the amount of instruction he receives. A long continuance in the service under conditions which impose work of a nonmilitary character tends to produce not efficient soldiers, but men disconnected with the service whose interests have been destroyed.

Mr. CALDWELL. General, do you think the men at the Plattsburg Camp would be equipped to serve as officers of the United States Army in case of emergency?

Gen. WOOD. Not at all; they would be better equipped by far than any men we have ever had as officers of volunteers at the beginning of a war, except those men who have come in as officers of volunteers after having had previous service either in the Army, Marine Corps, or some well-instructed militia organization. These men had thorough basic training so far as it went, but were prepared to take hold of and commence the training of men in the school of the soldier, squad, and the company. They were familiar with the rifle and with the principles of target practice.

Mr. KAHN. Have you changed your view in regard to short-term enlistments?

Gen. WOOD. Apparently not.

Mr. KAHN. Did you not think several years ago that a maximum enlistment of two years would be about the right thing, and that if an enlisted man was well qualified as a soldier in one year he ought to be let out in a year?

Gen. WOOD. I would let him out in 30 days, if he qualified.

I recommended a measure which provided for an enlistment of three years with the colors and three years with the reserve, with transfer to the reserve whenever, in the opinion of the organization commander, the man is a well-trained soldier. My own ideas have been somewhat modified by recent experiments in one-year periods of training recruits under a progressive system of intensive training,

and I should now recommend enlistment of two years with the colors and six years in the reserve under the provision that a man could be transferred to the reserve whenever he is well trained.

Mr. KAHN. Now, you say you would enlist them for an indeterminate period, and return them to civil life when they are proficient. Do you not think it would be very difficult to get men to join the Army on that kind of an enlistment, with an indeterminate period?

Gen. WOOD. I said it made not so much difference how long the period is; the important thing is that the man should have an opportunity to get into the reserve in as short a time as possible. I said that was the important thing.

Mr. KAHN. I thoroughly agree with you on that.

Gen. WOOD. What I meant, Mr. Kahn, was that if you or I enlist, we would not care particularly whether the period is four or five years if we knew we could be furloughed into the reserve the moment we were proficient and we intended to serve as reservists.

Mr. KAHN. The testimony before the committee is to the effect that there is considerable difficulty in securing men to enlist. About 50,000 per annum is the maximum number that they now secure, and they contend that they are doing better now than they have ever been able to do heretofore. Do you believe if the strength of the Army were increased to 220,000 men, as you suggest, that we would find no difficulty at all in securing the additional men?

Gen. WOOD. Under a proper form of enlistment I do not anticipate the slightest difficulty. In fact, I think you could increase the number to almost any extent you want if you would give intelligence and aptitude and application any recognition in your enlistment act.

Mr. KAHN. Do you not think it would be easier to secure men for the Army if you were to enlist them for a period of, say, two years, with the understanding that if they are proficient inside of that time they can get an honorable discharge and go into the reserve, thus making the maximum enlistment period two years? If a man could not be trained to be a soldier at the end of two years, do you not think he had better get out of the Army?

Gen. WOOD. If he could not be made a soldier, under proper instruction, in six months, he is not worth using in the line.

I recommend a six-year period, two years with the colors and four years in reserve, two years on the active list, with an opportunity to transfer to the reserve whenever qualified. I think under an enlistment act of that sort you would find such a rush of men who would want to come to the colors that you would have no difficulty in securing the desired number of men.

The men of this country would be willing to serve in the Army for the purpose of securing training if there was an opportunity to complete that training and be furloughed into the reserve when qualified, but they are not willing to serve under an enlistment act which does not recognize through making transfer to the reserve practicable on attainment of proficiency, either intelligent application or aptitude. If we had an enlistment act under which these qualities were in any way recognized in securing transfer to the reserve, I am confident we should have a very large number of men undergoing training in the Regular Army for the purpose of preparing themselves to be efficient soldiers in time of war. It is ridiculous to talk

about men not being willing to serve. They are not willing to serve under the present enlistment act, as it is inelastic.

Mr. KAHN. If we were to become involved in war, you could not very well spend more than six months' time in training the men before sending them to the front?

Gen. WOOD. If you could spend even six months' time in doing that, it would be because the enemy had gone to sleep. The man must be trained and in reserve. This must be done in time of peace. The country to-day is wholly unprepared for war with a first-class power.

The CHAIRMAN. It has been suggested to me that I ask whether or not you think the pay should be increased, and if so, how much; whether or not the increasing of the pay would cause more men to go into the Army than go in now?

Gen. WOOD. I do not believe the pay needs to be increased. I would recommend very strong against it. I think if you have a proper enlistment act the men will come in, and that you will get as many men as you can handle.

The CHAIRMAN. Then suppose you had a plan by which men could more easily become corporals and sergeants and other noncommissioned officers, or suppose there should be a way opened for them to go to the rank of second lieutenant, do you think any plan can be devised by which more men would be encouraged to go into the Army?

Gen. WOOD. I think we should only make noncommissioned officers on a basis of efficiency, and I believe with an enlistment act which would attract men we would get a better-educated class of men, and we should be able to prepare more men for furlough into the reserve and develop more material out of which we could make efficient officers. Many good men say they would be willing to enlist for three, four, or five months, and that they would be willing to take the training and do the work for that length of time, but they can not afford to stay longer than that.

The CHAIRMAN. How about giving them a chance to get a second lieutenancy?

Gen. WOOD. I think that could be done under proper conditions. If a man shows capacity and has the education to make an officer, he could be well furloughed into the reserve, with a recommendation that he should be given an opportunity to take the training for an officer of reserves.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you recommend that it be made easier for an enlisted man to get a second lieutenancy than is the case at the present time?

Gen. WOOD. You mean lower the standard? No, sir; I would not lower the standard a bit. I would try to get a better class of men to come up to the standard more quickly.

Mr. KAHN. The present requirement is that a man must have been an enlisted man for two years before he can be designated to take the examination for a commission.

Gen. WOOD. Yes. That is, he can not be commissioned until he has had two years' service.

Mr. KAHN. Do you not think that period ought to be lowered?

Gen. WOOD. You can lower the period if he shows capacity. I think capacity and fitness once demonstrated is the important thing

rather than a specified period of service. For instance, we take a man from civil life without any service whatever provided he can pass a satisfactory examination. We know little or nothing, from observation at least, of his character and habits. I believe a man after a year's observation if he displays capacity could be safely recommended without further delay.

Mr. KAHN. You speak of an army of 220,000 men. Can you give the committee the proportions you would propose in the several branches of the service?

Gen. WOOD. Do you refer to the troops of the United States?

The CHAIRMAN. Will you say whether those 220,000 men includes the Philippine Scouts?

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir; but it does not include the 1,070 increase proposed for organizations or foreign service.

The CHAIRMAN. And the Porto Rican regiment?

Gen. WOOD. Yes; that includes all foreign possessions. I recommended for the Continental United States six infantry divisions complete in all particulars; that each division have two regiments of field artillery of two battalions which in time of peace be expanded into regiments of three battalions in case of war; that each division was to have one battalion of three companies of engineers organized as pioneers and that one battalion of three companies organized as pontooners should be assigned to each field army (three divisions). There should be sufficient field officers to permit of these engineer companies being organized into regiments of two battalions of three companies each. I also recommended the necessary auxiliary troops for each division as described in the table of organizations of the present Field Service Regulations with some modifications made as a result of the developments of the present war.

Mr. KAHN. How many battalions of engineers would that be?

Gen. WOOD. That would be a total of 39 companies of engineers, and as I remember it, an increase of 27 companies over the present number of companies.

I also recommended an aero squadron with each division, two Cavalry divisions of six regiments each, six regiments of heavy mobile Artillery, the guns to be not larger caliber than 6 inches. That was the general proposition for the United States. That means 39 new regiments of Infantry, 19 new regiments of Field Artillery, 6 new regiments of Cavalry, if the present organization is continued, and 27 new companies of Engineers. I recommended an increase of Coast Artillery by 97 companies with an appropriate number of field and staff officers. I also recommended an increase in the various staff corps in proportion required by the line increase especially inviting attention to the needs of adequate aviation corps.

I also recommended that West Point be not only filled up, but that the corps be increased to 1,600 cadets for a period of six years, the academy at the present time accommodating 732 cadets. I think you could increase the capacity somewhat without doing any harm, perhaps putting three men together, and I would put up an economical cantonment. I would increase the cadet corps to 1,600 and keep it at that number until we have officered our new Army, so that at least a fair proportion of the officers shall be West Pointers.

The CHAIRMAN. In speaking of the various organizations, do you mean that they should be at their full strength?

Gen. WOOD. Yes; until we get a reserve.

Mr. KAHN. Would such an organization at West Point as you suggest give us the full complement of 45,000 officers that you say would be required?

Gen. WOOD. No; but it would give us a greatly increased proportion of graduates of West Point for the officers and the latter portion of our increase and it would give enough graduates to very largely fill the vacancies occuring in the Army in the years immediately following the completion of the increase in organizations. In order to do this it will be necessary to increase the number of instructors at West Point and to remove the restrictions of the detached service law so far as the instructors at the academy are concerned. West Point at best can only furnish a very small proportion of the officers needed in case we should raise a large number of citizen soldiers. The officers for these must be trained in time of peace and held as a reserve corps of officers. Fifty thousand should be constantly maintained.

Mr. KAHN. You are familiar with the French system which allows a combination in time of war of two skeleton regiments under one set of officers?

Gen. WOOD. Yes; they have that arrangement, especially with their artillery.

Mr. KAHN. Do you not think that in organizing the new regiments which you suggest it might be well to have skeleton regiments with full complements of officers, so that if we got into a war the regiments could be combined or consolidated to fill up the regiments to full war strength? You would then have a large number of extra officers on hand, who could immediately begin the training of recruits or who might be used for officering the new regiments that would undoubtedly be called into the service?

Gen. WOOD. I would not maintain any regiments in that way at all now until we get an adequate reserve and such a system of general training as will give us reasonably well-trained volunteers, and further, until we get our corps of reserve officers I would not advise having anything but fully equipped full-strength regular organizations in the 220,000 men which I recommend for the Regular Army, because one has no idea of the demands which are going to be made on this country for troops.

At the end of the Civil War we had in the North and South about 1,250,000 men in arms. We had had 4,000,000 men in arms, with no oversea complications. Our population at that time was only one-third of our population at the present time, and the wealth of our country in the seacoast cities has probably increased ten times over what it was in Civil War days.

We are engaged at the present time in the development of the coast defense of the Atlantic. Unless one has gone into the matter you can not realize what the coast defense of this country would mean if we lost sea control. The idea that troops can not be moved oversea is the idea of the man who does not know what he is talking about. It is the easiest and most convenient way of moving troops. Troops can be landed almost wherever it is desired to land them, except under

the guns of our seacoast batteries. We have in all about 31,000 mobile troops in the continental United States; I mean cavalry, infantry, and field artillery. The militia numbers about 120,000 men and about 8,800 officers on paper, or a total of about 130,000 troops. I believe I compliment the condition of the militia, or at least give it the fullest credit for what it can do when I assume that it could place 60,000 fairly well-trained troops in the field in 30 days, properly armed and equipped. This force, in conjunction with the regular mobile force, if all of it was assembled—and it means stripping the entire country—would amount to, in round numbers, 90,000 troops. It would not be an army—it would be a military assemblage. There would not be in that body of troops an officer who had ever commanded more than a division in camp, and that division at peace strength. There would be no supply officers or transportation officers who had ever handled a force of that size. It would take time and much hard work to make an army out of this force, and when the work had been completed it would be only a small handful of troops in comparison with what would be needed. It would be without aviators, without adequate machine guns, without proper field artillery, without armored motor cars, ammunition batteries and material, and other necessary things. And what area would this little force have to cover in case of a threatened attack upon the Atlantic coast? It would certainly be necessary to attempt to prevent an attack within the limits of what is known as the vital area; by this I mean the territory inclosed by a line commencing at Boston and running out around Watertown, Springfield, and then to Watervliet, N. Y., and on, including Bethlehem and out at Baltimore. In that area are the great bulk, probably over 85 per cent of our arms plants, cannon-making plants, powder plants, etc. Our coast defenses will not prevent a landing on our coast. Landings can be made by good troops under great difficulties. Take for the purpose of illustration the recent landing at Gallipoli. There were some 126,000 allied troops landed on the coast of this peninsula in face of the most intense opposition; an opposition prepared long in advance and aided by all the devices of modern war. There are relatively few beaches and the coast was rough and precipitous and yet they landed and stayed there for months. When we say that we have 90,000 men, that is all we have. We may develop others later, but this is the only force we could count on as reasonably effective within 30 days.

Mr. KAHN. You think the paper strength of the militia of a hundred and thirty thousand would dwindle?

Gen. WOOD. The militia has done all men and officers can do under a rotten system. I am not criticising them at all. The militia has 130,000 officers and men enrolled. But when I say they can turn out 60,000 men in fairly good condition I think I have stated the limit. You might turn out more, but they would be untrained and of little value.

Mr. KAHN. Of course, the thing we have to fear, as I understand it, is not an attack by any one nation, but a possible combination of nations against us?

Gen. WOOD. That is just a matter of opinion. I think we have to assume that our next war is going to be a war such as we have never had, a war with a first-class power, thoroughly prepared for war.

Mr. KAHN. General, have you seen the book called "The War Between Japan and America," a Japanese book which has been issued by the National Defense League of Japan, of which Count Okuma, the present Premier of Japan, is the president?

Gen. WOOD. No, sir; I have not seen it. I have heard something of it.

Mr. KAHN. I would like to put into the record, Mr. Chairman, an English translation of a portion of that book.

The CHAIRMAN. I think there is no objection to that.

[From the Continental Times, Friday, Dec. 10, 1915.]

JAPAN PLANS TO INVADE THE UNITED STATES—A STARTLING AND SIGNIFICANT OFFICIAL BOOK—ORIENTAL CONTEMPT FOR AMERICA.

[By R. L. Orchelle.]

We all know the recent hue and cry that was raised over a book—at one time a comparatively obscure book by a comparatively obscure author—"Germany and the next war," by Gen. Bernhardi, a retired officer of cavalry. The book attracted little attention in Germany, and save in interested circles, absolutely no attention abroad. But no sooner did war break out that Gen. Bernhardi, good man, awoke one morning, like Byron, to find himself famous—or infamous. In fact a disinterested observer, reading the English papers and those American sheets that echoed them, might well have asked himself whether the old veteran general had not prepared and precipitated the entire war by his own unaided efforts.

"Germany and the next war" was, of course, merely one man's warning voice uplifted to bid his pacific, trusting compatriots to open their eyes against the terrible danger that threatened them. It was the honest book of a blunt, clear-sighted soldier—and its predictions have in nearly every instance been fulfilled.

Of a character quite different is a book recently published in Japan. It is not the private opinion of an individual, but the official opinion of a powerful society known as the National Defense Association, of which Count Okuma, the Premier of Japan, is president, succeeding Count Yamamoto. Baron Kato, the present Minister of Foreign Affairs, is vice president of the association. Its members comprise army and navy officers, cabinet and government officials. More than a million copies of the work have been sold and it is now in its sixth edition. The title of the book is "The war between Japan and America." Its tone is not defensive, but aggressive. The cover is decorated with a triumphant Japanese dreadnaught and a torn and reversed American flag.

A literal translation of the text has been made by Mr. Lawrence Mott in collaboration with a distinguished Chinese scholar, Hain Jou Kia. It is indeed curious for Americans to behold themselves as seen through the slant eyes of the sons of Nippon, and for this reason we present the following extracts from this popular Japanese work. The present war has taught us not to despise the effect of these literary weapons in influencing the origin and the course of wars.

"The hearts of sixty million Japanese," the book begins, "all loyal subjects of H. I. M. the Emperor, are aflame with courage and eager as the great winds that blow from the skies to begin a war against the United States that shall prove to the boasting Americans that the Japanese people do not know defeat and that their soldiers are invincible!

"Scarcely 30 years ago we vanquished the Chinese troops, and the whole world knows of our defeat of the great Russian armies in 1903–4.

"And now we are still stronger! We have profited by the lessons that we learned in Manchuria, and can easily conquer the very bad troops that the Americans have.

"The question then follows: Why should we go to war with the United States?

"There are two reasons:

"First—Because of the absolute inhumanity of the United States toward Japan in practically prohibiting Japanese immigration; and,

"Second—The palpable and glaring injustice of such legislation against the Japanese. The United States differentiate deliberately between us and Chinese, who are of much lower standing and education.

"The problem of California is so much in the minds of the Japanese at present, and also in view of the fact that we intend to colonize it shortly, that we give its description."

Here follows a description of California, a very accurate and glowing description with a reference to "our great and powerful ally—Mexico—who will help us against the United States when the time comes." Trained soldiers are to be sent out disguised as workmen and even rich merchants.

"These will slowly be reinforced, with the object always in mind of our capturing the Philippines and Honolulu.

"Capture these islands we must, in order to place our hands firmly and once for all on the Pacific Ocean.

"The Americans boast of their Panama Canal, but it is only too ridiculously simple for us to dynamite it effectually—at the cost of an old steamship full of powder. Nominally, of course, the ship would be merely a "cargo" vessel, but at a certain signal the few of the crew that it carried for this noble deed would go ashore and disappear. Then comes the explosion, and the canal is wrecked for many months at least.

"And before the United States warships can come all the way around South America we will have seized the islands. These lie much nearer to our shores than they do to the United States coast, and it will be a very difficult matter to oust us, as our navy is much stronger than the American, better equipped, and better officered.

"Let us ask this question:

"Why is Japanese immigration into California so obstructed and impeded?

"The answer is an interesting one.

"It is because the American people are always not only against the Japanese, but very much in awe and fear of them. And this is especially true of the inhabitants of California.

"To sum up the situation in one truthful statement, Californians and, indeed, all Americans are jealous of us and of our rapid development in every art and manufacture. More particularly are they jealous of our magnificent army and navy, to which they are forced to grant a most grudging admiration and envy."

Intensely interesting is the Japanese conviction that America is jealous of Japan's progress and that she ought to welcome and not reject the superior civilization of Nippon.

"From the humanitarian point of view we should be received in the United States with open arms, but for the reasons that we have mentioned this is far from being the case.

"Ever since we vanquished the Russian hordes the whole world has held us in the highest esteem and reverence. But to the American people we are a giant Nemesis that they know will some day fall upon and annihilate them, smiting them, as their Bible says, 'on the hip and on thigh with great strength.'

"The various activities of American labor unions come in for sharp criticism, and it is charged that many United States paper (which are all purchasable) were bribed to open the campaign against worthy Japanese workmen.

"But we were not surprised, knowing American honor to be as deficient as it is. We only laughed, because we also know that our time is rapidly coming, and the man who is laughing behind will soon laugh in the front rank!

"Many conferences have been held in cities on the Pacific coast by representatives of those deceitful labor unions, and at all of these angry and frightened speeches were made against the Japanese nation. The result has been by these endless rivers of lies, that the Americans have been taught through the bought papers that we are a weak nation and not worthy of an attention! Let America beware! For our cry: 'On to California! On to Hawaii! On to the Philippines!' is becoming only secondary in our country to our imperial anthem!

"The smoke of American falsehoods rises as a vast stinking cloud that destroys the beauties of the innocent heavens. Whereas, the fire in our hearts burns brightly, casting its golden gleams of honor and power over the entire world."

The author now indulges in withering sneers at American "Kultur."

"The strange part of the present situation is that supposedly well-educated Americans are against us! We are tempted to ask the Americans their definition of 'education!' If their vaunted 'education' has not taught them even

the most crude rudiments of hospitality and manners, of what use is such an 'education?'

"It must be remembered that the Americans are a crude race that consists of every kind of riffraff blood—including the negro-white mixture—of every foreign nation (save ours). We in Japan have a glorious history that antedates by thousands of years even the knowledge that the wild and Indian-infested America ever existed!

"The United States seems to us like a huge soup pot, into which every kind of thing has been put in the hope of obtaining a savory mess. The 'mess' is there. we grant, but as to its taste we know that it is bad, and that its smell is worse! We are surprised that the Washington Government has not more authority over the acts of the separate States, and America reminds us of a man (the President) who has a very bad family that he is powerless to control! An amusing situation, from our point of view.

"If Washington is not strong enough to enforce its orders on the Pacific coast, we are! In short, the United States Government is but a foolish childhood game, such as checkers or jackstraws.

"We have tricked California, however, by sending our men as residents to the Hawaiian Islands. There they became 'citizens,' and from there, after a certain time, proceeded to California.

"The Hawaiian Islands are only distant from San Francisco a few hours by our fast warships and cruisers, and in the island are at present 80,000 Japanese—all of them have received army instruction, and they know their duty!

"The Honolulu group of islands, however, is not large enough to adequately support our countrymen. As a matter of fact. we can seize the port and fortifications (such as they are) with the greatest of ease, thus permitting about 60 per cent of our people already there to help in breaking in California's shut door. When that State realized our intentions she tightened her vulture-like claws and forbade our people, even after a residence in the Sandwich Islands, to enter. Still, we have found means of overcoming this difficulty! We have sent both army and navy officers in the clever disguise of workmen, and they, having been thoroughly taught in Japan how to swim, have quietly slipped overboard and gained a landing in California and Oregon ports, under the very nose of the asinine United States customs and immigration officials.

"These officers of ours are scattered everywhere on the Pacific coast to-day. We do not need to explain why they are there!

"We confess that the methods by which we have had to do these things are not according to our ideas of honor. But when it is considered that we are dealing with a nation of liars and evaders of justice, we must perforce 'do as the Romans do.'

"In short, and in conclusion, we wish our people to know that the Americans are a race of what-nots; that even among themselves they are dishonest; that crimes among them run rife to a steadily-growing greater degree every year; and that we Japanese are needed to teach them honor, morals, and cleanliness."

Here follows an attack upon American habits of personal cleanliness which, in view of our boasts about the latest plumbing, etc., is, to say the least, somewhat surprising. There are satiric references to our sensational murder cases and police scandals, such as the Thaw trial and the Becker case. The indignant censor of our civilization goes on to say:

"All these things prove, without doubt, that the Americans are savages—without sense of law or reason. In Japan we would never permit such outrages of common decency and order! The United States has much to learn from us!

"Taken all in all, the Japanese people are far more thrifty than the Americans and far more clever. They are more skillful in invention; better armed in mentality than the clumsy-witted Californians, for instance; and it may truthfully be said that we, in Japan, can find to-day, even among our most humble classes, much better types of men and women than the semi-Irish, semi-French, semi-German, and semi-everything else on two legs that may be called a human being—with which the whole of the United States is pestiferously populated."

"Pestiferously populated" is distinctly good, and could not be excelled even by Roosevelt, ranting at his top note. Invidious comparisons are now drawn between the Japanese table manners and American, between Japanese cleverness and Yankee clumsiness. Much patience will be needed by the Japanese in teaching the Americans—"who are wonderfully stupid." American "graft" is duly honored, and there is a hint of the future control of China by Japan:

"President Yuan-shi-kai can not live forever, and the next man will be of our choosing and under our influence. Yuan-shi-kai has, as we have said, been

bought, body and soul, by American wealth. The Standard Oil Co. is such an octopus of greed that even the Washington Government has been forced to recognize this smelling ulcer in its side. But the Standard Oil has great moneys at its control, and, after all, the President of the United States is simply a man. Money means as much to him—against the time when he is not President any more—as it does to anyone else.

"The whole of the American people are stubborn and blind. They can not see one finger's length beyond their noses.

"Well, stubborn children must be taught.

"This is our answer: American workmen have no education. They are a servile lot of slaves, bent under the yoke of a vicious and dangerous body of men that is called—we might say facetiously called—a labor union. This 'labor union' has insulted us. This 'labor union' is protected by Washington and Washington must bear the consequences of the triumphal success of our men. Instead of taking a wide view—instead of having an open heart—the Californias especially and the Americans in general have once and for all time shown us their narrow minds and their petty 'honor.'

"We ask no clearer vision of them—except that which we will have over the sights of our rifles and over our battleships' guns.

"The disapproval manifested in America against marriages between Japanese and whites arouses the scorn and indignation of the Japanese patriot. Our petted American women will be interested in the oriental view.

"The American people do not know us. They think that we are mere animals; indeed, they have written of us as such, and it is for this reason that we are not allowed to marry their women.

"Not that we regret this, as our own women are better in every way, and especially more obedient, but we speak of this matter merely to assure all our countrymen that they need not in the least be troubled by this attitude of the Americans. When we reach there we will regulate these things in a proper and sane manner. Just think of it, our countrymen. American women often and often marry negroes. They like this sort of marriage and it is permitted by the barbarous American laws.

"What can we think of such a people?

"The only logical explanation to the marriage question is that the citizens (?) of the United States consider us as lower than the common black man, whose real home is in the heart of burning African deserts—and yet the Americans consider the black men as their slaves to-day, and often inflict terrible secret tortures, such as burning alive, putting out their eyes. But we point out these matters as proof of the fact that the Americans are still in a barbaric state of civilization and ideas. It is most amusing to hear the Americans boast of their 'high standards of life.'

"Returning for a brief space to the marriage between Japanese gentlemen and American women, we must say that the latter are always exceedingly anxious to obtain a Japanese husband, who is, of course, the finest type of man, soldier, and father that the world knows. Several cases of the infatuation of Californian women for Japanese are known, and our clever countrymen, recognizing that though she is not perfect by any means, still the Californian woman is a good worker, and so the Japanese have kindly condescended to go into Mexico and have a sort of marriage ceremony performed there."

The signs are indeed ominous, and black thoughts and huge ambitions seem to be fermenting in the hearts of the redoubtable little yellow people. No attempt seems to be made to conceal these:

"The national manifestation that took place last year in Hibiya Park, in our imperial capital, against America, and that was attended by 100,000 people of all ranks, shows how glad we will be when the first shot is fired.

"Among the many speakers that addressed our loyal crowds was Mr. Yamaki, a member of our Imperial Parliament, who said in a superb speech that all the States intended following the example of California. And that we must seize our standards, unfurl them to the winds, and advance without the least fear, as America has no army, and with the Panama Canal destroyed its few battleships will be of no use until it is too late.

"Mr. Iama, who is one of our most able and popular citizens, then said that the Americans are all stupid. See their crazy actions in California. We Japanese have done everything possible in a quiet and civilized way—and failed. Now to arms! Quick to arms!

He was followed on the platform by Dr. Insaki, who said as follows:

"Seek in our history, my friends, and you will read of the American officer, Perry, who, when he came to our shores, roughly and rudely asked the Tokugawa Prince (Shogun) why Japan was so barbaric as to shut its doors in the face of all foreigners, and Americans especially? He accused us of being rude and uncivilized, stating that civilization demanded the opening of our doors and ports.

"And now, my friends, what is the attitude of the nation that sent this rough barbarian Perry to our beautiful and peaceful shores—to our sweet-smelling land of cherry blossoms and scented forests? To our nation that had until then known no strife and only desired to be let alone to develop as a flower develops through the bounteousness of Nature. I ask you again, what is the attitude of this savage Perry's nation to-day? Is it not exactly the reverse from all that we had been led to expect? Does it not shut its doors and lock them in our faces? Can these things be denied? I defy the Americans to call me a liar! We must all defy them, however, and their insults, my friends. More, we must gird on our swords, sling our cartridge belts over our shoulders, and with bright, polished weapons, advance! When we have conquered we must live up to our Bushido and the spirit of forgiving. We must gently try to teach the Americans that although we are their conquerers, we mean only their ultimate good."

The Japanese view of American history is extremely interesting, and he who is properly persuaded of the fact that our own policies have not all been propounded by a council of archangels may even find food for reflection in them:

"America is a nation of sweet words, but of evil deeds. At heart the American people, one and all, are a nation of thieves, with the hearts of rabbits. Their actions prove this.

"I continue, my friends, to tell you of how the United States began. In 1776 the Declaration of Independence was made in a small village called Philadelphia. Thirteen States signed, and shortly after President General Washington threw valuable British tea into the water in Boston Harbor, by this peculiar way declaring war against England. The battles were numerous, but the English never were good warriors, and they were beaten.

"In 1803 the United States bought from France a certain territory called Louisiana, and they acquired great territory along a large river called the Mississippi. Then, in 1819, these 'United States' purchased a Territory called Florida from the Spanish Government. In 1836 the 'United States' brutally overpowered our present staunch and most valuable ally, Mexico, and deprived her of a large land that is now known as the State of Texas.

"In 1848 the 'United States' paid 300,000,000 yen (£1,500,000) to Mexico for various mining and oil rights in California. This did not mean buying the whole land, but the Americans seized it as their own, nevertheless. And the poor Mexicans could do nothing. In 1867 the 'United States' bought from Russia, Alaska, in the far north. In 1898 was the cruel and inhuman war that they ruthlessly inflicted on poor Spain, and in consequence they seized the island of Cuba and the Philippines, maltreating the inhabitants. In 1900 the 'United States' ruthlessly annexed the Hawaiian Islands—much against the wishes of the industrious and sober inhabitants.

"These are only a few examples of American 'humanity.' We call it downright and bold robbery. And, as I have said before, these acts prove them to be villains to the blood.

"And now they seek to inflict us with their 'honor' by driving us from their country. We use word 'honor' in jest, because the American people do not understand its meaning.

"At any rate, my friends, let us take to our arms, both by land and sea, and punish these devils."

"At the finish of the able doctor's speech the crowds went away with the firm knowledge of the truth of the words of this venerable man, who has made an especial study of the strange and crooked ways of the American people."

A resolution was passed requesting the Government to declare war upon the United States. The Japanese patriot thereupon turns his attention to the United States Army, which he treats with scant respect:

"The American Army is so insignificant that it is scarce worth mentioning in these pages. Furthermore, it may truthfully be said ,in paradox, the United States Army is not an army! Nothing but a few thousand of men, who, having

no brains wherewith to gain an agricultural or manufacturing livelihood, take up an army life for the few dollars and the uniform that the United States Government furnishes them with.

"They therefore have good food, plenty of time to sleep, and nothing to do save 'stand guard' (what a joke!) over a few starving wild Indians in the Western States on prison lands which the Americans call 'reservations' but which are in reality nothing but arid deserts, where the poor redmen are forced to do hard labor and to live as animals. All around these poor people are the great American soldiers with fixed bayonets, so afraid are they of even a pitiful armful of the remnant of the noble and illustrious tribes of the redmen, whom they have ground out of existence by the cruelty and barbarity of the trading merchants, who sold the innocent and simple-minded real American much bad whisky and, when they were drunk and poisoned, robbed them of everything. And Washington made no criticism, because these trading merchants bribed all the Senators and Representatives to imitate blindness to their infamous deeds.

"And still the Americans say that their 'Eagle screams with pride.' Rather we should say it had better cry and squawk with shame, or that the United States adopt some carrion bird of filthy habits and that fills its beak with flesh of human bodies from whom life has—fortunately for them—departed. This sort of a bird would be a better emblem for the United States we think.

"At best the American Army consists of 10,000 men, all of them raw, untrained, and awkward, who scarcely know the words of military commands. Even in the most urgent cases, such as our declaration of war will be, the United States has not more than 400,000 men who are able-bodied enough to fight.

"In comparison to these facts we in Japan can mobilize and put in the field at 24 hours' notice 12,000,000 soldiers, every single man of whom is trained to the highest point of efficiency, every man of whom is eager to fight as a hound is eager to follow the trail of a fox, and who is officered by men who have already served noble and strenuous apprenticeships in the God-like art of war for their country's honor and inviolate integrity."

Japan has a lofty contempt for the American spirit of greed, a contempt which must surely have been increased by the latest activities of Wall Street and the floaters of war loans for the allies:

"America has only one god that it really worships, and that is the god of gold. They fall on their knees to it and with much supplication implore it to cast friendly eyes on them so that they may become even more rich. Americans have no philosophy save that of their craze for gold. Yet we have seen in their Bible a proverb that says: 'Thou shalt not worship any golden image.'

"America is too material in its beliefs. Such small soul as it has is covered by a heavy cloud through which no light of education or understanding can pass. And we Japanese must be the ones to divide this terrible cloud of ignorance under which the Americans suffer so that the great light of our education may shine through and fill them with earnest desire to become as we are, viz, sober, industrious, and with clean mentality.

"Therefore our war with the United States will be one whose intention is for the general betterment and benefit of the world. And all nations should be grateful to us for our tearing away the cloak of deceit with which the American people have so long covered their naked badness.

"When the declaration is made the United States will attempt to send from California ports some 20,000 crude soldiers to protect(?) the Philippines. (Little does the United States know that we have many plans arranged for the destruction of Manila forts and guns.)

"Our first move will be to seize Honolulu! This can very simply be done by a fleet of transports carrying 30,000 men and protected by our fast cruiser-class ships. We will take control of the wireless station, drive out the meteorological priests, so that they may not give false weather information from their observatories or communicate with the Americans.

"The Japanese Naval Minister is now occupied in the greatly pushed-on work of hastening the building of first-class battleships, transports, and submarines. Our army and navy commissariat departments at Futagawa are now working night and day in order that adequate supplies of our own compressed foods may be ready."

That all this is not mere impassioned patriotism and injured national and racial pride is proved by the fact that the Japanese are not stopping at mere theories and threats but are busily preparing:

"The Tokyo arsenal is also working night and day in the making of ammunition of all kinds. We have seen the red glaring smoke arise against the skies, and we have heard the clank and shirr of machinery as our deadly projectiles were being formed. We have been glad to notice that double sentries are placed at every gate—for American spies are many in Tokyo, and we must be careful.

"Our great idea and system to-day—in order to vanquish California, to own the Sandwich Islands, Samoa, and the Philippines—is that we must all save, first, our strength, and secondly, every sen that we can. Instead of dressing in silks our women must wear cotton, and our richest men must be content with ha-olis of simple texture, and hakamas of plain cloth. Instead of drinking our favorite sake, or wines of any kind, we must drink water. All these personal expenses saved we must give to our army and navy.

"All our professors must imbue their students with the realization that the United States is our insulting enemy. They must—and they will—teach those who are yet too young to serve all the crookedness of the United States, calling upon their young hearts to fight nobly against American injustice."

There is a second half to the book which treats of the actual war that is to be fought—the capture of the Philippines, of California, etc.—but as this deals entirely with fancy (let us hope) I shall postpone any discussion of it until the encounter between the Stars and Stripes and the rising sun of Japan opens in thunder upon the Pacific—that shall be pacific no more.

Mr. KAHN. The book in many respects is similar to Bernhardi's book entitled "Germany and the Next War."

Mr. MCKENZIE. I would like to ask Mr. Kahn whether he knows that the translation he has is a correct translation or whether it is authentic?

Mr. KAHN. It has been published in this country in several newspapers, and it is now being published abroad. Its authenticity has never been denied in any publication that I have ever seen.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not suppose Mr. Kahn could answer that question, Mr. McKenzie, unless he was familiar with the Japanese language.

Mr. MCKENZIE. I thought he might have some knowledge as to whether or not it was an authentic translation.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the question is very pertinent.

Mr. MCKENZIE. If it was published in a newspaper in this country, I doubt whether that would be any ground for believing it was authentic.

Mr. KAHN. The copy which I desire to insert in the hearings is published in a European newspaper. I understand the translation is authentic. Of course, there was a great deal of laughter when Bernhardi's book was published, but it turned out to be a serious proposition.

The CHAIRMAN. His book was published after the war began, was it not?

Mr. KAHN. No; it was published two years before the war began. He pointed out in that book practically every step which Germany has since taken, and even discussed the possible neutrality of Italy, and her out-and-out opposition to the central powers. It was all published two years before the war started.

Gen. WOOD. Mr. Chairman, I would correct my testimony in reference to reserve supplies. I wanted to state that the experience of the present war has demonstrated that you have to have two rifles for every man who goes into the field.

The CHAIRMAN. I think Gen. Crozier said he thought there ought to be three rifles for every man.

Gen. WOOD. If we can get two rifles for every man with a force of 2,000,000 I think we will do pretty well.

Mr. KAHN. In the European war, General, what is the proportion of artillery to infantry?

Gen. WOOD. The proportion of guns varies somewhat. It is safe to say it is between five and a fraction to six and a fraction guns per thousand rifles. It is not only the guns which have been increased. Our old allowance was 3.18 per thousand rifles. The testimony in regard to the present war is to the effect that the expenditure of ammunition has been simply unprecedented. We have a report which showed that the expenditure on a certain army front in a single day last year was 200,000 rounds. This is a great war, with many million men in it. An officer of one of the allied Teutonic powers, who had been with his corps during a great deal of the fighting, told me that the use of artillery ammunition had exceeded by more than three times the maximum estimate of the German general staff. I think it safe to say that their estimate was twice ours, and remembering that we have only a small fraction of our allowance it is easy to see where we stand in the matter of artillery preparation. As I said above, our condition in this respect is most dangerous. It has been pointed out again and again for a number of years.

I was speaking to an officer the other day who had seen, practically in one continuous group, some 500 heavy field pieces, firing with great rapidity and almost continuously for four hours. Similar statements come from both sides.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by the heavy field pieces?

Gen. WOOD. The 4.7, the 6-inch calibers and larger calibers. The group to which I refer is the group called mid-caliber artillery, probably from 5-inch to 8-inch caliber.

The CHAIRMAN. When you referred to the size of the guns a moment ago, you meant that they were 4.7 and 6 inch guns?

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir. I understand that most of them were sizes that correspond roughly to our 4.7 and 6 inch. Our 4.7 fires a 60-pound shell and our 6-inch a 120-pound shell.

Mr. KAHN. How does that compare with the guns being used on the fronts in Europe?

Gen. WOOD. That is about on a line with their mid-caliber artillery, and they have a good deal of heavier mobile artillery, running, we know, to the 12-inch howitzer, and we believe to the 17-inch, although no one has to my knowledge seen the latter gun.

Mr. KAHN. In your opinion, ought we to have some of those large-caliber guns in this country—those large-caliber mobile guns?

Gen. WOOD. I have recommended that we prepare with as little delay as possible, for the purpose, primarily, of coast-defense mobile artillery, including the 14-inch gun, to be transported on railway cars which are, in effect, gun carriages. The car and the gun are capable of being emplaced so that the gun can be fired from the car. We know that guns up to 12 inches are being moved very rapidly on the western front and fired a few minutes after being placed in position.

I think we should have an ample allowance of heavy guns of this class in order to cover the many harbors which furnish good landing places, but are not of sufficient importance to warrant construction

of permanent fortifications. Armament of this class should be handled by the Coast Artillery, and in case of defensive operations involving an attack upon our coast lines, or operations brought about as the result of piercing our coast line, these guns would be available for service by the land forces. They would also be available for service on either coast. They should be handled, under all conditions, by the Coast Artillery. Armament of this class would be of great all-round value. Their type would be that of the Coast Artillery armament.

Mr. KAHN. Would you recommend any considerable number of those large-caliber guns that could be mounted and transported on those caterpillar wheels?

Gen. WOOD. Very large guns, up to 12-inch caliber, are carried on carriages provided with specially built wheels. The entire mount is carried in several sections and assembled at the place where it is to be used. We should have a liberal supply of these guns and carriages.

Mr. KAHN. Are you recommending any armored automobiles?

Gen. WOOD. I may say that the armored automobile has not had quite as large a degree of utility as was expected. It is excellent in the advance, in breaking through light screens of troops, but I do not think they are using them much now anywhere for purposes other than those of observation. We want a certain proportion of them.

Mr. KAHN. Information has come to this committee that probably the most destructive work done in the European war zones is done by machine guns. Have you suggested any machine guns?

Gen. WOOD. I have recommended that each infantry regiment should have a machine-gun company of 150 men, with 24 machine guns. The Cavalry should have a machine-gun troop with 18 machine guns. The machine gun has come to stay, and there is almost no limit to its possibilities.

The number of machine guns varies greatly and is dependent upon the local situation. They are especially valuable for defense, and when properly implaced and protected by shields, as they often are, the exposure of men is reduced to a minimum, and at the same time an effective power of resistance is maintained. At the shorter ranges the machine gun is equal to about 30 rifles; at longer ranges, the value is somewhat increased. This use of machine guns enables the fire trenches to be held by relatively small numbers of men, the others being in the supporting trenches under conditions which give them reasonable protection. The machine guns tend to stop a rush. Behind each gun, with its equivalent value of 30 rifles, there is only one man exposed, and his exposure is minimized by the use of a shield. It is understood that one group of the allies went into the war with not less than 50,000 machine guns, and that at present they have several times this number. Machine guns of a portable type, especially of a type which can be handled by one man, are particularly valuable in the defense and in gaining superiority of fire. They are also used extensively in connection with aircraft.

Mr. KAHN. Do you think your recommendation in regard to the proportion of machine guns to a regiment would be ample for this country?

Gen. WOOD. I think it would be sufficient for all ordinary occasions. Special conditions would require, perhaps, more guns, but generally speaking, I believe that 24 guns per regiment is a satisfactory allow-

ance. You might, of course, put in machine guns as thick as there is room for them, but I think an allowance of 24 machine guns to a regiment, with 150 men in a machine gun company is sufficient. If they were used for defensive work you might have four or five to a company. You save men by putting in machine guns.

Mr. KAHN. You have made a recommendation for a considerable increase in the aviation corps?

Gen. WOOD. There ought to be an aviation squadron with each division.

Mr. KAHN. Have you looked into the matter of the new Fokker flying machine?

Gen. WOOD. No, sir. I have heard of it, however. I was talking the other day with some men who are flying with one of the European armies, and it appears that the principal uses of the aeroplanes now are the observation and control of artillery fire, putting the guns on the target at long ranges through reporting the positions of shots, and noting errors. The work accomplished in this direction is remarkably effective. They are also used much in observing the movements of troops and in keeping enemy aeroplanes away from their territory and preventing their acting as observers, in other words. Most of the machines engaged in controlling artillery fire carry a pilot, and an observer, and are equipped with a wireless sender for transmitting brief messages.

The antiaircraft guns are becoming very accurate in their work, and a man, in order to be safe from rifle fire, has to be about 2,200 meters up in the air. They can get him sometimes as high as 4,500 meters, with the antiaircraft 3-inch guns.

Mr. KAHN. The dispatches I have seen regarding this new aeroplane indicates that it is a sort of dreadnaught in the air.

Gen. WOOD. It is very fast, but with a rather limited radius of operation. As far as I can learn the biplane is taking the place of the monoplane, and stands more shooting up. They are using the driver more than the tractor with the English and French forces, because you can shoot ahead, and it is more dangerous and difficult to do so when you use a tractor.

Mr. KAHN. Is the Army making any effort at all to secure models of these most powerful machines?

Gen. WOOD. I do not know. We have some, possibly 10. I do not know how many of them are fully serviceable.

Mr. KAHN (interposing). I mean models of the most recent ones, the ones that are doing such terrific damage to-day.

Gen. WOOD. I think you will find under the new development that very soon you will see a fighting plane that will measure 120 feet from tip to tip, and that will carry a number of men and powerful guns. I talked to a man the other day who is familiar with the subject, and he says they are going up to any limit they need.

Mr. KAHN. In your study of war problems to-day have you given any thought to the activity of the aeroplane, and do you think this country ought to embark in the manufacture and operations of aeroplanes?

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir. They are of great value in modern war upon the lines above referred to. I know of no instance where they have had a determining influence upon any large action. They are rapidly

developing and it is difficult to say at the present time what their limitations will be. We should proceed actively in building up an adequate force, both with the Army and reserve, the latter force to be made up principally of civilian volunteers, of whom there are many who are now keenly interested in aviation.

Mr. KAHN. If they continue their work along the lines you suggest, that is, securing information, will they not supersede cavalry?

Gen. WOOD. They will supersede cavalry for observation purposes in clear weather. They can not do this work at night; gunfire is forcing them to fly very high, and the higher the more difficult is their work. At a height of 10,000 feet the earth looks like a flat surface, and it takes the strongest kind of glasses and great skill and practice to pick out small bodies of troops. There are no great movement of troops in the daytime, unless they are engaged in actual attack. Movements are made at night. I asked an officer who has been engaged in aerial work for over a year in one of the European armies how they were able to follow the movements of troops. He said that they tried to keep very close watch on the movement of railway transportation in bulk; that it was practically impossible to follow the movements of small bodies of troops. I asked him about work in cloudy weather and he said clouds were excellent when there were enough holes in them to enable one to look down. They furnish a good deal of protection to the flyers, but when too thick prevent all observation work.

Mr. KAHN. You spoke of the comparative ease with which a landing could be made on the New England coast by any probable enemy of this country. Is that not also the condition on the Pacific Coast?

Gen. WOOD. Oh, yes. It is even more so on the Pacific. There are not many good harbors on the Pacific, except at San Diego, San Francisco, and Puget Sound. I mean harbors where you could land troops in all weather.

Mr. KAHN. Is it necessary to have a good harbor to land troops?

Gen. WOOD. Oh, no.

Mr. KAHN. You can land troops on a shelving beach?

Gen. WOOD. As at Frenchmans Bay.

Mr. KAHN. When Japan went to Chemulpo, she provided for a condition of a 30-foot tide, and so she carried on her transports a large number of trestles. Those trestles put down by her engineers enabled her to march her troops direct from the ships to dry land over the mud flats.

Gen. WOOD. There is no difficulty in landing under ordinary circumstances.

Mr. KAHN. The great military nations of the world, through their staff organizations, plan an aggressive campaign against all the other nations of the world, practically? That is a part of their work, is it not?

Gen. WOOD. Absolutely.

Mr. KAHN. So that if they contemplate activities against us the chances are that they would have a complete plan worked out which would enable them to make a landing without much difficulty.

Gen. WOOD. They have their plan made, worked out in the greatest detail, and when they strike they will strike promptly and the blow

will not be preceded by a note of warning telling us where and when they intend to come.

Mr. KAHN. You do not think a few regiments of squirrel hunters from Arkansas could be brought hurriedly to the coast and thus kill off the invaders as they tried to land on the coast?

Gen. WOOD. I am afraid the squirrel hunters would be with the squirrels.

Mr. KAHN. I agree with you. But such a statement was made in all seriousness on the floor of the House a year ago. You were saying, in regard to the training of the men, that if they were not required to do so much gardening or domestic work they could be trained very much more readily than they are now. Is there very much of that going on?

Gen. WOOD. When you have a large post with extensive grounds, and a great many buildings, and elaborate arrangements, a great deal of the men's time is taken up with nonmilitary work. I think 25 per cent of the men's energy is used, directly or indirectly, in that way.

Mr. KAHN. Has not that a tendency to make the men dissatisfied?

Gen. WOOD. It has a tendency to keep the real soldier out of the Army. He does not like to be a scrubber.

Mr. KAHN. How would you remedy that?

Gen. WOOD. Put the troops in cantonments as far as possible. I am very glad you asked me that question, Mr. Kahn. I recommended, in connection with a recommendation for six divisions, that at least two of them be kept in cantonments. That would be better for the men and for the country. In training them they could be handled in larger units. It is very important that we should have something of that kind, because our people do not understand how completely and utterly the volunteer system has always failed us.

In the Revolutionary War, as you remember, George Washington warned the American people against it at the beginning of the war. He said in effect it would be a failure. The Revolutionary Army was strongest in 1776 and diminished every year until 1781. In 1776 we had 89,000 troops, 47,000 Continental and 42,000 militia. In 1781 this force had dwindled to a total of a little over 29,000.

In the War of 1812–1814 we had similar difficulty. The system was undependable. We had 527,000 men in service during the war. The largest British regular force at any one time was 16,800. They had also some Canadians and Indians, but a relatively small number compared with our forces. The military power of our people was held in abeyance on various occasions by 5,000 of the British regular troops. Our Capitol was burned by a force of about 60 per cent of the defenders, and we abandoned it with a loss of 8 killed and 11 wounded. The land conduct of the war had little that was creditable in it. It was the system and not the men and officers which was at fault. In the Civil War the South went to draft in April, 1862, and the North had its first draft order in August, 1862, and went to the general draft the next year. The condition was one which no soldier or no man who has the best interests of his country at heart would ever want to have repeated, nor would he ever want to have this system in existence in case of a war with a first-class country prepared for war. For the first two years of the Civil

War our Armies were in the process of the making. At the end of the war we had two excellent Armies. In the War of 1812 we had not developed a good Army during the entire war.

Mr. KAHN. If we were to become engaged with any first-class military nation, how many men do you think we would have to call to the colors immediately?

Gen. WOOD. At least 2,000,000.

Mr. KAHN. If we increased the Army to 220,000 men, as you suggest, would it be necessary to have the so-called Continental Army at all?

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir. I do not know that it will be the Continental Army, but it must be a trained reserve of officers and men.

In that connection I would like to say this: The Morrill Act was enacted in 1862 to provide officers for volunteers. We have had these land-grant colleges where military instruction is carried on under officers of the Army, and there are approximately 30,000 students in those colleges to-day. We have had private institutions throughout the country—schools and colleges and universities, all good ones—where military training has been given, with about 10,000 students. In other words, there have been in those institutions about 40,000 men receiving military instruction under officers of the Army.

Assuming that we have 8,000 graduates a year from these institutions and that 60 per cent of them are physically fit to undergo training we should have approximately 5,000 men available each summer. Every effort should be made to place these men in United States military training camps under officer of the Army and in conjunction with regular troops in order to give them 1 month of concentrated training at the end of their sophomore and junior years. We should also make every effort to standardize the instruction in these institutions so that men may come to us who have had the same training. We also have as a source of supply much larger than the one referred to, the men in the nonmilitary colleges and universities.

Many of these big universities and colleges are beginning to wake up to the necessity of military training for their students. Harvard University has just agreed to give a course of theoretical military training for 2 years. The course each year includes 30 lectures and 6 days in the field in tactical walks. The theoretical course includes military history and policy, chemistry as applied to explosives, surveying, one modern language, economics, and so forth. Then they have 30 lectures by the military instructors on the different arms of the service, 6 days for tactical walks, and then 5 weeks in camp at Plattsburg or elsewhere under officers of the Army. These camps follow the university course at the end of each of the 2 years. A man who does that for 2 years and does good work in the course will be given a full-course credit toward a degree.

Yale University has just organized three batteries of field artillery. Princeton University is considering putting in a military course, and the same thing is being done at the University of Pittsburgh and at the University of Michigan, at Ann Arbor, and the matter has also been taken up by Williams College. The movement is very general. The people are taking the movement up themselves and leading in it. What they want now is to get officers as military instructors.

The General Staff is working upon a plan for the establishment of officers' training corps units in the various nonmilitary universities, as well as in universities where military training is established. The purpose is to give such training as will, in conjunction with miltary traning camps, result in turning out a reasonably well prepared officer of junior grades of our citizen soldiery. There is a general appreciation of the need of a large number of well-trained reserve officers. We have plenty of material available and should make use of it.

Mr. KAHN. Is the War Department fostering that movement?

Gen. WOOD. Yes; they are very sympathetic. They are supporting the movement. It will require legislation to put it upon a working basis. From the men who come from these military training camps I have urged that we take not less than 1,000 and commission them as under a temporary commission as second lieutenants of the various arms and departments of the regular establishment, with a view to giving them training to fit them for the grade of captain or major of reserves. We do not propose to commission reserve officers in grades above that of major. A year with the regular establishment will give these men training in administration, supply, and organization. The men who do not pass beyond the training camps will, as a class, be fitted to serve only as lieutenants or in some instances as captains, especially men who graduate from institutions like the Virginia Military Institute, the Pennsylvania State Military College, the Norwich College, or some other of the better class of colleges. The men who have had a year of that sort of training, plus two years in college and a year with us should be well trained to serve as officers of volunteers. This plan would give us in a short time a sufficient number of well-trained men to make up the corps of 45,000 officers which I have recommended. We had 127,000 officers in the Union Army during the Civil War, and about 65,000 officers in the Southern Army. That made a total of 192,000 officers in the Civil War, so you can see what the demand is going to be for officers in case we have a real war.

Mr. KAHN. The present European war has demonstrated the fact that the officer is a very essential factor, has it not?

Gen. WOOD. Absolutely. You will have no time to make an officer after the war starts. Fifty thousand officers are barely enough for an army of a million and a half men.

Mr. KAHN. You say you think this country must eventually come to universal military training?

Gen. WOOD. It seems to me that the very foundation on which this country should stand is equality of service. We are now going on a basis which allows a man of means to go out and buy the services of a substitute, and if there is anything more damnable that can be conceived of in the way of policy in a democracy, I do not know what it is. We must come to equality of service, not necessarily with the rifle in hand, but service in some capacity. A man may be a surgeon at the rear, or he may serve in the quartermaster corps, but somewhere he has his place. He must know where it is and the Government must know it.

Mr. KAHN. Do you not think that in this country it ought to be the general rule that it is the duty of every patriotic American citi-

zen to defend his home and his country and its institution if they are attacked?

Mr. GORDON. That is the rule now.

Mr. KAHN. Unfortunately it is more honored in the breach than in the observance.

Gen. WOOD. We have never conducted a war in which our volunteer system has proved successful. We have had to go either to bounties or the draft. In the Civil War we went to both, and permitted the most vicious of all practices namely, the purchase of substitutes.

Mr. KAHN. England has been trying to secure volunteers for 18 months. Have you any idea how successful she has been with these volunteers? Is it not true that she has been so unsuccessful that she has just had to resort to the draft in the midst of a great war? If she had had a system of obligatory service earlier there probably would have been no war. When Lord Roberts was at the head of the English Army he advocated universal military training in England for a limited period of time.

Gen. WOOD. Yes. Lord Roberts was constantly advocating general training and preparedness. A prominent Englishman recently wrote me, saying that "if we had listened to Lord Roberts we should have been ready now. The pacifists and the opponents of preparedness were always asking Lord Roberts 'who are you getting ready to fight?' We have our answer now. I notice that a similar class of people are asking in the United States 'whom are you getting ready to fight?' No one can tell, but some day you will have an answer." We are not getting ready to fight any particular people. Our preparedness is against war with any people.

Mr. ANTHONY. General, the War Department recommends an increase in the regular establishment from 100,000 to 140,000 men, including officers. Two methods have been put before this committee as to how that should be done, one by increasing the strength of the organization we have to full war strength, and the other by increasing the total number of organizations. Which method do you recommend?

Gen. WOOD. I recommend first the filling of everything we have to war strength. That would be the first step.

Mr. ANTHONY. It is up to this committee to decide which of those methods we shall adopt in order to bring the strength of the Regular Army up to 140,000 men. Which method would you recommend, an increase in the total number of organizations, say, the total number of regiments, or by increasing the enlisted strength of the organization in the regiments we have?

Gen. WOOD. I would not recommend either to the exclusion of the other. If our force is to be limited to 140,000 men we should bring the regiments up to not less than 85 per cent of their full war strength, build up a reserve of men so that they may be promptly filled up, and provide a certain number of new organizations.

Mr. ANTHONY. Those two are the only ones open to us, and that is the reason why I ask you which ones you would choose.

Gen. WOOD. You mean there is a limitation on Congress?

Mr. ANTHONY. I regard it as a certainty that this committee will not go to the extent you recommend in the total increase which will be asked for. If we grant the increase asked for by the War Depart-

ment, which would bring the total strength of the Army to 140,000 men and officers, how do you recommend that to be done—by increasing the enlisted strength of the organization we have to bring them up to that number or by increasing the total number of organizations?

Gen. WOOD. You will have to do both. Bringing up the present organization to full strength would not give you 140,000 men. You will have to create some new organizations.

Mr. ANTHONY. You regard new organizations as more valuable than simply having more men?

Gen. WOOD. If you are limited to 140,000 men, I should fill up the present organization and then create new ones, especially in the Field Artillery, up to the limit of 140,000, but if you do only that you will not have done much for the security of the country. You will not have taken any adequate measure of defense.

Mr. ANTHONY. If any increase is made you think it should be made in the Field Artillery?

Gen. WOOD. First in the Field Artillery.

Mr. ANTHONY. General, it is urged that auxiliary forces be organized in addition to our regular establishment, and the proposed continental army is recommended. What is your advice to this committee on that? Do you believe it will be adequate?

Gen. WOOD. I think that any proposition which does not look to placing the entire military resources of the country under Federal control, absolute and complete, amounts to dodging and evading the issue. The continental army, as proposed, gives the militia an opportunity to come in, but the bill providing for the continental army does not provide for the withdrawal of all support from that portion of the militia which does not come into the Federal service. The bill is faulty and dangerous in that it continues our dependence upon a system which has always failed us—I mean the volunteer system. The continental army will not give us, in any sense, an adequate defense. It will improve present conditions and it is a step, and a long one, in the right direction, in that it embodies the idea of a Federal force replacing the militia. The continental army, when completed, will only be a small portion of the force needed. It is a step forward but it is not a measure of adequate defense in any sense. It will give us a Federal force and I believe that the conditions of enlistment will induce an intelligent class of men to enter it, provided the service is at camps of instruction where relatively large bodies of men are assembled and where the training is intensive, and provided further that the period of service is continuous for six months for all who have not had previous military training. If men have had previous military training, this period may be shortened. I think it is most unwise to pay anything to the militia which does not come into the continental army. Make every effort to get the militia in, and if it does not come, withdraw all assistance and devote your time, material, and money to the building up of a new force. To continue the two forces, a continental army having been created because the militia is unavailable, and to still continue to pay the militia, impresses me as thoroughly inconsistent. It is, rather, a dangerous makeshift, and a stop-gap, and will lead to the

establishment of a new demand upon the Federal Treasury. Build up the Federal force (continental army, or whatever you may call it) and withdraw all assistance from that militia which does not come in. This can not be too strongly emphasized. It is perfectly fair to the Government and to the militia.

Mr. ANTHONY. In the event the continental army is not created as recommended by the War Department, do you advise an attempt being made to increase the efficiency of the National Guard by increasing its members and federalizing it?

Gen. WOOD. I believe that the National Guard, officers and men, have done all that men can do under the vicious system that exists. I have the highest respect for them, and I have always supported them. But in all these schemes there is simply an effort at an evasion of the fact that we owe service to the country; ever man owes service to the country, and we should not fail to recognize that fact.

The continental army, in so far as it gives us a Federal force, is strongly to be commended, but the period of training, I think, should be made a continuous period for men who have not had previous service, and with that training must go the immediate preparation of a corps of officers.

I can not see anything but disaster in starting a new force and planting in the military pathway a struggle for money. The National Guard will be struggling for money, and you will also have the continental army, with all its friends, struggling for an appropriation.

Build up your continental army; I am for it if you will drop your assistance to the National Guard; but do not do that until you have urged the men in the National Guard in every possible way to come into the continental army. Take them as they stand, rank for rank, but do not build up a new force and go on increasing the pay of the old.

Mr. ANTHONY. You have used the words "vicious" and "rotten" in reference to the present National Guard establishment. What do you mean by that?

Gen. WOOD. It is vicious in that you undermine an instrumentality on which the Nation depends, leaving it under dual control. I did not mean to use the word "vicious" in a moral sense. It is a harmful, unworkable system.

Mr. ANTHONY. If some system was devised by which the National Guard could be put under the control of the War Department, do you not think the National Guard could be made a most effective military weapon in this country?

Gen. WOOD. I will answer that in two ways. If you will put the Regular Army itself in the position of the National Guard, and control it as the National Guard is controlled to-day, it will deteriorate as fast as possible. It is not the fault of the National Guard. Take the National Guard out of State control and it will be a very good force indeed——

Mr. ANTHONY. If we can unify the National Guard and bring about an ideal system——

Gen. WOOD (interposing). Make it a straight Federal force without any relationship whatever to the State. The men and officers

remain where they are and they will be available for local use on a call made by the governor to the President. This will make it available to meet any emergency requiring the use of force in excess of the police force.

Mr. ANTHONY. In reference to the summer training camps, General, do you think it would be advisable to continue them?

Gen. WOOD. I think so. I think that in those summer camps we shall develop a very valuable class of men.

Mr. ANTHONY. Do you think it would be advisable for the Government to pay the transportation and subsistence of the men in those camps or pay any of the expenses of those men, or would you have the men pay all their own expenses?

Gen. WOOD. I would give the man who goes to one of those camps his clothing, rations, and shelter, but I should go rather slowly on the question of transportation, because if you should furnish that, I think it ought to be furnished under very carefully drawn regulations, so that men would not go for pleasure.

Mr. ANTHONY (interposing). The Government should take care of the man when he arrives at the camp?

Gen. WOOD. I would not pay him for going there; I would see that it does not cost him anything while there. You get a very unusual lot of men in those camps, they are men who are giving up not only their business but who are putting in a month of hard work. It is as hard work as you ever saw any man do in camp.

Mr. ANTHONY. There has been some discussion before the committee about the present condition of the country for defense, particularly the coast defense. Do you regard the coast defense in a proper state of preparedness at the present time?

Gen. WOOD. We have an admirable body of officers and men. We are short of both officers and men for coast defenses, however. We have some 32 companies without captains and some 80 companies that are incompletely officered. You need a lot more officers than you have now, and if you add any companies to the Coast Artillery you must also add officers, or else you will be in a condition of greater embarrassment than at present, for want of officers.

Mr. ANTHONY. What I refer to particularly is the armament

Gen. WOOD. The guns in our coast defenses are all right. The disappearing carriage was an admirable carriage when it was designed, and it will still be a good carriage in certain positions where extreme range is not required. It will also continue to be a good carriage if we can give it an elevation corresponding to the maximum effective range of the gun; in any event, it should permit of at least 30 degrees of elevation. When this carriage was built it was not expected that we should have to meet naval attack at ranges greater than 10,000 yards. Even up to last January I believe that our own Navy did not expect to fire at much over 14,000 yards. Then came the developments incident to the present war—the sinking of the *Blucher* at over 17,000 yards—the sinking of the ships in the Falkland Islands fight at long range, the Dardanelles forts by the *Queen Elizabeth* at over 21,000 yards. This brought out the fact that there are many places where we are accessible to bombardment, such as Boston and New York, by ships lying in waters our guns can not reach. To correct this various suggestions have been made, and the first was to lighten

the weight of the projectile and slightly increase the capacity of the carriages for elevation. By this means it was thought that the range of the gun might be sufficiently increased, but later developments tended to show that this would not be sufficient; moreover, it meant loss of effectiveness through the use of the lighter projectile. The result is that we are now confronted with the necessity of radical changes in the disappearing carriage which will permit extreme elevation, or the adoption of a type of barbette carriage which will permit at least 30 degrees elevation.

Now, we are confronted by the question of remodeling the carriages for the longer ranges. The disappearing carriage would be all right in some of the narrow areas, but all our guns point seaward.

Take one of our 12-inch guns. It fires a projectile weighing 1,070 pounds. That gun, mounted on one of the old carriages, was limited practically to a range of 13,200 yards. If you change the carriage so as to permit increased elevation, you can increase the range of the gun. If you give it 45 degrees of elevation, you will give the gun a range of 32,000 yards. It will perforate deck armor turret tops and most side armor at 27,000 to 32,000 yards. We have to get a new type carriage and also mortars of much longer range.

Mr. ANTHONY. The statement has been made to this committee that in spite of all criticism of our coast defenses they are in such condition to-day that no fleet, not even the most powerful fleet, would dare attack them. Is that true?

Gen. WOOD. No, sir; it is not true, even in part. It is not. The fleets can lie outside the range of our batteries. They are not going to come within the range of the guns of the fortress, but they can lie 4,000 to 6,000 yards outside and punch them full of holes.

Mr. ANTHONY. It is not true that there has not been a successful reduction of modern coast defenses that has been thoroughly made by sea attack?

Gen. WOOD. I can not cite any at the present time; but it is not a question of reducing them. The only question is that the guns have not the power or range to reach the ships. The ships might lie outside the coast defenses and shell them at will, and in some cases bombard the cities behind them and in others the harbors and shipping. This is true in the case of New York. Ships could lie outside, near Rockaway Beach, and drop shells into New York City up to Fourteenth Street and not be reached by the guns of our coast defenses. The Rockaway waters are not covered by coast-defense guns. They should be.

Mr. ANTHONY. It is the intention, as I understand it, of the proper department to cover that point.

Gen. WOOD. Yes. These seacoast defenses are also vulnerable to land attack unless we have a mobile force to defend them.

Mr. ANTHONY. Gen. Wood, it is probable that there will be an increase in the number of regiments of the Regular Army, and that there will be additional officers provided by legislation. What I want to get at is your opinion as to how this increase should be provided, how it should be spread among the different branches of the service.

In the past there has been a good deal of dissatisfaction on account of the increase in one branch at the expense of the others. Do you

believe there should be absolute equality of promotion provided for in any increase in officers?

Gen. WOOD. I think so. I think we should equalize the present inequalities as far as possible.

I am not going to discuss selection and elimination, although both are vital to efficiency. I think you must take up the question as it has been taken up in the Medical Department and Corps of Engineers and extend the system therein applied as to promotion after a fixed period. If a man is not promoted from the grade of lieutenant before the expiration of 10 years, he will become a captain automatically at the end of 10 years in service. If he does not receive a promotion from captain to major in a period of eight additional years, he will automatically become a major. That will give us majors at about 40 years of age, and the period between major and colonel should be about 10 years. In other words, a man when he reaches the age of about 50 years would be a colonel.

The question is, How many extra officers will that give you? If that rule was applied to the Army regiments to-day, we would have as a result about 600 extra officers, and you would have an absolute certainty of promotion within certain time limits. After you have promotions equalized, it would work along smoothly. The single list is not ideal for efficiency. The inequalities are very great at the present time. There ought to be a greater equality of promotion.

The question must be viewed from two points. First, the point of efficiency of the several arms of the service due to proper representation in the staff corps of the department, the presence of officers of the different arms on details which require especially officers of those arms. By this I refer to service schools, details to militia, details on special boards, inspectors, etc. The other viewpoint is the efficiency of the individual, which is somewhat dependent upon his contentment and pride in his position. This latter makes it strongly advisable that some plan insuring substantial parity of promotion should be adopted. I suggest this be done by legislation on the following lines:

1. The following table shows the number of extra officers there would have been in the mobile Army and Coast Artillery Corps on December 20, 1915, if the officers in these arms had been promoted as follows: To the grade of lieutenant colonel after 28 years of commissioned service; to the grade of major after 18 years; and to the grade of captain after 10 years of service.

*Data taken from the Army Register, 1915, and the Army List and Directory, Dec. 20, 1915.*

| | Infantry. | | Cavalry. | | Field Artillery. | | Coast Artillery Corps. | | Total extra. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Promoted. | Extra. | Promoted. | Extra. | Promoted. | Extra. | Promoted. | Extra. | |
| Major to lieutenant colonel.. | 18 | 18 | 19 | 19 | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | 37 |
| Captain to major..... | 113 | 95 | 83 | 64 | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | 159 |
| Lieutenant to captain..... | 364 | 251 | 197 | 114 | 12 | 12 | 7 | 7 | 384 |
| | | | | | | | | | 580 |

2. The General Staff study of the needs as to detached officers shows the following are required:

| | |
|---|---|
| Extra colonels and lieutenant colonels | 87 |
| Extra majors | 136 |
| Extra captains | 577 |
| Extra first lieutenants | 368 |
| Extra second lieutenants | 32 |
| Total | 1,200 |

3. The bill prepared by the War Department calls for 986 extra officers, including the 200 now authorized by law.

4. Considering the above, it is plain that this plan will not at present produce the number of extra officers deemed necessary, even by the smallest estimate of our needs. Hence, it is suggested that the plan calling for a certain number of extra officers be filled by those promoted on account of length of commissioned service when that will supply the necessary quota, and when the number furnished by this plan does not supply enough, the additional necessary be detailed from the several arms of the service in proportion to commissioned strength of each grade in each arm, as contemplated by the War Department bill above referred to. In this way a portion of the extra officers will always be available for the details necessary to the efficiency of each arm and will at the same time prevent the inequalities of rank, which tend to discourage some officers.

The above proposition will in a great measure rectify past inequalities and will prevent substantial inequalities in the future.

Mr. McKENZIE. Gen. Wood, I am sure you appreciate the difficulty in which this committee is placed in trying to handle this question of the increase of the Military Establishment of the country?

Gen. WOOD. I appreciate that thoroughly.

Mr. McKENZIE. So far as I am personally concerned—and I am sure the American people feel the same way, they do not care about the details but they want to know why it is necessary at this time to increase our Military Establishment.

I am getting many letters—and I judge from my conversations with other members of the committee that they are in the same position—getting many letters from intelligent American citizens protesting against an increase of the Military Establishment.

I take it we ought to have some very concrete reasons set forth to this committee, such as you have been giving this morning, to enable us to explain to the American people why we recommended any increase of the Military Establishment in this country.

If I understand your position, you recommend an increase of the Regular Military Establishment as it now exists, eliminating the militia and the continental army. You would increase the regular standing Army and provide for a reserve.

Gen. WOOD. May I state it completely?

Mr. McKENZIE. That is what I would like to have you do.

Gen. WOOD. I believe in increasing the Regular Establishment, including the native troops, up to 220,000 men, plus 10 per cent for the foreign garrisons, until we acquire an adequate reserve, and then begin to reduce those Regular organizations at home to not less than 85 per cent of their full strength, if deemed necessary, because of expense.

I advocate a new enlistment act such as I have outlined, which will make the reserve practicable, and that we build up a reserve of trained men equal to the strength of the Regular Establishment. I

believe that we could accumulate adequate reserves of material for 2,000,000 Volunteers; that we should build up at once and with all expedition a Reserve Corps of 45,000 officers; that we should urge by all possible means the general application of universal military training to a point which will make our citizens reasonably effective as soldiers. I recommend the establishment of a system similar to the systems which has been adopted by the Swiss and Australian Governments.

In addition to the above I urgently recommend the absolute and complete transfer of the militia to Federal control and the withdrawal from such portions as is not so transferred of all financial and other aid on the part of the Federal Government, and the building up, using the transferred militia in part, and bringing in new men from which new organizations will be created, and existing transferred organizations filled up, of a Federal force of at least 25 divisions complete in every detail. Four divisions should be Cavalry divisions. This force will be the Organized Federal Militia (or Continental Army) and would stand ready for prompt mobilization in whole or in part in case of need. Its reserves would be drawn from the body of trained citizen soldiers, from which body would also be drawn the men for additional organizations. The reserve corps of officers referred to above would provide officers for approximately one and a half million citizen soldiers. In addition, we should have in the Philippines the arms and equipment for a reserve made up of 30,000 Americans and natives organized as a reserve force behind the regular garrison, very much as our Continental Army will be organized in this country. In Hawaii we should have a similar reserve of not less than 5,000; larger, if we can get it. The same is true of Porto Rico and of Panama, so far as the employees of the canal can be utilized and also American residents within the zone. Every man counts when a possession is cut off and troops of this kind can do much to relieve the regular force of police duty, guard, control of population, etc.

Now, with reference to your question in regard to a concrete reason. Let us take, first, the theory of probabilities. We are living in an era of war. We are gradually accumulating most of the gold of the world. We had better stiffen that supply of gold with a little iron.

Who is going to attack us I can not tell. A question was asked me the other day on just these lines, "Whom are we preparing to fight?"

It happened to be a lady who asked me that question. A Cunarder had just come in from a stormy passage. I said, "Madam, if you will ask the captain of this Cunarder for what particular storm he carries his lifeboats and life-saving apparatus and he tells you, I will tell you who we are getting ready to fight." I can only answer your question in the same general way.

We know we are liable to be in trouble on account of our trade and commerce. We known that, if we know anything.

We are like a ship at sea with typhoon signals coming in every five minutes. We must get ready for the storm. You ask me who we are going to fight. I can not tell you. Nobody can tell you who we are going to fight. God alone can tell you that, and he will tell you some day.

Mr. McKENZIE. I take it, Gen. Wood, that it is your opinion that we ought to have an Army, of the size you recommend, to be kept up during times of peace, simply to take care of the preliminary attack that may be made upon us by some enemy?

Gen. WOOD. Yes; it is an insurance for peace as far as our relations with foreign countries go. It serves as a training nucleus for our citizen soldiers and it serves for the maintenance of order at home in certain instances. It also stands ready to meet with great promptness the first shock of war. I do not want you to misunderstand me. We should maintain the Army only sufficient to meet the peace needs of the Nation. By this I mean garrisoning of the over-sea possessions as indicated above, provision of a training nucleus at home, sufficient officers for schools, colleges, militia, etc., adequate coast artillery troops and a mobile army for home purposes and possible expeditionary force, such as we sent to Cuba and later to Vera Cruz. The total regular force necessary to do these things will, in my opinion, be approximately 220,000 troops. In other words let us limit the Regular Army to the demands of reasonable necessity. When I say Regular Army I mean the men always in service, professional soldiers. Outside of this our policy should be to have a trained citizen soldiery, part of it organized as the Continental Army, Federal Militia, or whatever you may choose to call it. This must be sufficient to create the 25 divisions above referred to and provide the necessary men to complete the coast artillery organizations required to adequately garrison the works. Our citizen soldiers, once they have been trained, will return to their normal occupations, returning during their period of liability for service to the colors for brief intervals every other year in order that they may be kept in a condition of efficiency. The system which I believe we should adopt is one similar to that adopted by Australia and Switzerland. It means the acceptance of the basic principle on which a democracy or representative government rests, namely, manhood suffrage means manhood service. Such a system will lead to unquestionably better citizenship, reduction of the criminal rate, better people physically and more efficient economically. We must get out of our heads the idea that the national service is a service for money. We should have it thoroughly instilled into the minds of all the people that the service is an obligatory one, one that all men owe the nation during certain periods of their lives. I mean all men who are physically and mentally fit. We must have them understand that military service is like any other service for the nation, if the country is going to be successful. A real war, a war with a prepared nation will not be successfully fought by the United States until that principle is in every man's head and has been acted upon. The American people are all right at heart, but they have been very largely imbued with the idea that in case of war, all the American people will have to do will be to gallantly rush to the colors, and by simply linking arms with one another go forward and push the enemy into the sea.

That sort of doctrine is mere folly. It spells the death of the nation if continued.

Mr. McKENZIE. General, knowing you to be a practical military man, I want to ask you how large an expeditionary force, in your judgment, could be landed on our shores within six months after hostilities opened?

Gen. WOOD. A million or a million and one-half men; there is practically no limit to the number.

Mr. MCKENZIE. What nation could land that many men on our shores in six months?

Gen. WOOD. Germany or England, after this war is over.

Mr. MCKENZIE. In six months?

Gen. WOOD. Oh, yes; any first-class military power, well prepared, can land 250,000 men on our shores in 15 days, and do it easily, once they secured control of the sea.

Mr. MCKENZIE. Will you please elaborate on that, so that the people of the country, reading your testimony, will understand how that can be done?

Gen. WOOD. Our Navy is easily fourth to-day in power.

Mr. MCKENZIE. On that point I would like to ask you a question.

Gen. WOOD. I said our Navy is fourth to-day. Of course, that is the opinion of one who is more or less of a layman, so far as the Navy is concerned. I am only a soldier.

Mr. MCKENZIE. If you are not prepared to elaborate on that subject now, I wish you would put an explanation of that in the record showing that our Navy is fourth at the present time.

Gen. WOOD. I think I can demonstrate that.

Mr. MCKENZIE. I would like to have you put that in the record.

*Relative strength of navies.*

1. Tonnage (based on 1914 reports; information indicates great activity among belligerent nations since then):

England, 2,713,756; Germany, 1,304,640; France, 899,915; United States, 894,889; Japan, 699,916.

2. Personnel (marines and fortress artillery not included).

| | England. | Germany. | France. | Japan. | United States. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fleet admirals | 3 | 2 | ..... | 2 | 1 |
| Admirals | 12 | 6 | ..... | 6 | [1] |
| Vice admirals | 22 | 12 | 15 | 19 | [1] |
| Rear admirals | 56 | 22 | 30 | 38 | 25 |
| Captains and commanders | 702 | 154 | 360 | 270 | 212 |
| Other line officers | 2,508 | 2,220 | 1,419 | 1,965 | 1,680 |
| Midshipmen | 639 | 448 | 77 | 119 | [2] |
| Engineer officers | 837 | 577 | 505 | 811 | [2] |
| Medical officers | 593 | 340 | 390 | 364 | 336 |
| Pay officers | 750 | 276 | 211 | 388 | 231 |
| Naval constructors | 122 | 162 | 187 | 135 | 75 |
| Chaplains | 147 | 30 | ..... | ..... | 24 |
| Warrant officers | 2,740 | 3,183 | 147 | 1,569 | 867 |
| Enlisted men | 119,597 | 65,797 | 60,505 | 50,050 | 52,566 |
| Total commissioned officers | 6,393 | 4,249 | 3,194 | 4,117 | 2,584 |
| Total warrant and enlisted | 122,337 | 68,980 | 60,652 | 51,619 | 53,433 |
| Grand total | 128,730 | 73,229 | 64,846 | [4] 55,736 | [4] 56,017 |

[1] Special detail.
[2] Included in line officers.
[3] Detailed from line.
[4] United States rated after Japan, first, on account of disparity in officers, and, second, on account of call on personnel for land service.

It is estimated that the average American Navy officer spends only about 55 per cent of his time at sea. There follows a statement of naval yards and stations of lesser importance, all of which form a *drain* on personnel.

The classification is only approximate.

| | England. | Germany. | France. | Japan. | United States. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Navy yards | 12 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 9 |
| Stations of lesser importance | 32 | 7 | 8 | 3 | 9 |
| Total | 44 | 13 | 14 | 9 | 18 |

It is believed that the above estimate (United States) for sea service is high, as it does not always mean sea service in command of war units (ships). It is believed in the near future the ships now building will place Japan fourth. Moreover Japan has a well-balanced fleet with scouts and battle cruisers. We have not a single battle cruiser of modern type in the United States Navy or any laid down or appropriated for, nor have we any suitable scout ships, nor has our Navy that compactness of organization which is required for the highest degree of efficiency and which is one of the distinctive characteristics of the Japanese Navy, nor has our Navy a general staff, a lack of which is a great source of weakness.

Gen. WOOD. We know this, we know that Great Britain from the 1st of last August to the 31st of last December (I do not look upon Great Britain as a probable enemy) has put overboard more fighting power than is in our entire fleet, and she is going to put out six super Queen Elizabeths in the next year.

We know, in fact, that that expedition for Gallipoli pulled into Alexandria Harbor—this was told me by Lieut. Commander Jessup—with 126,000 men, with their artillery and supplies; they disembarked them there, then rested them for two or three weeks, and went away so quietly that one hardly noticed it. They were on 98 ships, some of them big ships, like the *Aquitania*, of nearly 40,000 tons. But they went to Gallipoli, and they landed, not only against the strongest opposition, but against thoroughly prepared opposition, with barbed wire and all that sort of thing, and in country bristling with defense. That cost them 10,000 or 15,000 men, but they went. We would have no opportunity to form any defense. So when I hear people talk about the impossibility of transporting a large body of troops oversea, I say they do not know what they are talking about.

Mr. MCKENZIE. Right on that point, General, do you think it is the proper thing to assume that our Navy could be driven from the sea, such as it is, within 30 days or 60 days, and that an expeditionary force could be landed on our shores?

Gen. WOOD. I do not think our Navy would be driven from the sea until they had done all possible. I think many would be found at the bottom of the sea, and the rest bottled up.

Mr. MCKENZIE. You mean at the end of 60 days?

Gen. WOOD. Within that time. When a condition demanding war comes about, the enemy nation which is going to strike knows when and where it is going to strike. We are not going to get a polite warning saying that we are going to attack you at such a time and such a place. It will come as quickly as the action of Japan against Port Arthur. It is just such an attack as that which is going to catch us.

Mr. McKENZIE. Do you not think our ships will be able to run away?

Gen. WOOD. I do not think they will try to run away. I think our Navy would fight until the last ship goes down, if such would do any good.

The CHAIRMAN. How many ships will it take to land a million and a half men, with all the animals and supplies necessary to sustain an army of that size?

Gen. WOOD. The supplies would be mostly gotten in the country they came to. The number of ships, based on the expedition I have just been talking about, would be about 100 for an expedition of 120,000 men. If you had 250 ships for the first expedition, that would be sufficient to bring over 250,000 to 300,000 troops.

The CHAIRMAN. In 60 days?

Gen. WOOD. Six months was the period we were talking about, but they could land on this coast easily in 30 days from 250,000 to 300,000 men.

The CHAIRMAN. You think that would be the utmost they could land in 30 days?

Gen. WOOD. I do not think that. The number depends on what the enemy country does.

Mr. McKENZIE. General, we have had Army officers here before this committee who testified that in six months we could have sufficient equipment for 700,000 men, equipment such as rifles, and so forth, ready to be put into the hands of the soldiers. You have stated that to make a good fighting man would require six months. My purpose in asking the questions I have been asking is to demonstrate that if we are ruined at all by a foreign power, it must be done within the first six months after hostilities open.

Gen. WOOD. At sea, you mean?

Mr. McKENZIE. On land. We are speaking about the Army.

Gen. WOOD. He will occupy whatever he desires in six months.

Mr. McKENZIE. He will have to do that in six months, because then we would be in a position to cope with an enemy with a large army?

Gen. WOOD. No, sir; whoever told you that is mistaken.

Mr. McKENZIE. I think you misunderstand me.

Gen. WOOD. In order to make soldiers in six months out of average intelligent material we would have to have the officers first. Whoever told you that we could prepare equipment for 700,000 men in six months was gravely mistaken.

Here we have been at it a year and a half, and we are only able to produce 3,400 rifles a day, and it took from 14 to 16 months to get up to that capacity. Those figures I have given you are very close figures. According to that it would have taken us a year to make a million rifles.

Mr. McKENZIE. Is it not true that we have 700,000 Springfield rifles now?

Gen. WOOD. We have about that number. We have 300,000 Krags in reserve; in round numbers, or perhaps a little more than that. We have altogether a million rifles.

Mr. HULL. General, can you explain why it is that this Government institution for the manufacture of rifles is standing idle while we have a crying need for rifles?

Gen. WOOD. I can not explain that. I am sorry it is so.

Mr. HULL. You know it is so?

Gen. WOOD. I know it is practically idle.

We are short in field artillery. I have not gone into the details in regard to field artillery for some time, but when I last looked into it we had 634 guns manufactured. That was last March. I presume we have now about 800. But 800 guns would only be enough to balance an infantry of about 140,000 rifles. That is all we have now. I mean field-artillery pieces.

In last March we had only a small fraction—about one-fourth—enough ammunition for the guns made. If we had to have a large army in the field we should have to have for the Regular Establishment and Militia as now organized, roughly speaking, 1,292 guns, which is about the number we are contemplating building. I believe 1,292 is the present estimate.

But that does not give us a single gun for the citizen soldiery (continental force), and that is where the shortage is coming. I think we ought to lay up a sufficient store now. If foreign countries know that we are prepared and know that we have ammunition and other things necessary, the chances of war will be very much smaller than if they know we have made no preparation at all. When we have made preparation then they know what we can do.

That brings up the very important question of the wisdom or advisability of the United States manufacturing its own arms and munitions of war. Personally, I think that no greater mistake can be made from the standpoint of efficiency and organization for preparedness through ability to increase rapidly our output than to limit manufactures to Government-owned plants. The present European war has, as a result of the demand made upon this country for supplies, developed and is developing an enormous amount of machinery in many plants suitable for the manufacture of war material. We should attempt to maintain at least nuclei plants at certain of these various establishments, so that we can in case of emergency utilize them and the skilled men attached to them for increasing our own output to meet demands which may be made upon it. In order to do this the present policy governing our expenditures in certain particulars—I mean particularly the legislation which compels us to expend 90 per cent of certain appropriations in the arsenals—should be done away with and the policy reversed. We should adopt the policy of spending enough of our appropriations at such plants as it is deemed desirable to maintain to warrant their keeping nuclei of machines and men, neither of which can be produced in a hurry. Moreover, competition between outside plants is necessary if we are to keep pace with improvements in machinery elsewhere in the world.

You know, in the case of this European war, how very difficult it was for the manufacturers to get skilled men. It would not be very difficult for you to find out how much they had to pay for the services of those men. It runs into sums which are exceedingly high. They had to rake and scrape in order to get the men to do that work. They induced officers to resign, and they had to make big inducements to other men to secure them for munitions work. These new plants are really just about ready now. If we had been hit by a big war, we could not have gotten ready until it was too

late. We have the plants now; let us try to keep little nuclei in many of them, so that we can quickly expand when the necessity arises.

Mr. HULL. I do not know whether I understood you correctly or not, but my understanding of your statement was that you are in favor of compelling the men in this large army to serve without pay?

Gen. WOOD. You mean the big citizen army?

Mr. HULL. Yes.

Gen. WOOD. Yes; in the training period. In time of war you would have to pay them. I think we should take it as a Nation service.

Mr. HULL. Would you recommend any reduction in the pay of the men in your proposed Regular Army of 220,000?

Gen. WOOD. No; I would not at present. But I do think when the people awake to the fact that we all owe a man's service to the country, there will be more patriotism and less dollars about it.

Mr. HULL. Under those circumstances we could maintain a large army at very much less expense.

Gen. WOOD. Yes. Take the Swiss system. Their murder rate is about 12 per 1,000,000, against a rate of 124 per 1,000,000 here. Taking those figures into consideration it would seem that their military training has done some good. They are running their entire military establishment for about $7,000,000 a year. They could put a quarter of a million men in the line in 48 hours, and they would have 200,000 more in reserve. This has been done by means of the acceptance of the general principle that every man owes something to the nation's service. That is what we will have to come to.

Mr. GREENE. General, I have in mind to ask a few questions in regard to matters concerning which questions are very likely to be raised in debate in the House.

Do you favor, in the maintenance of the Army at peace strength, a disproportionate number of trained officers in the Regular Establishment; that is, disproportionate to the number of enlisted men normally required, so that in the event of the expansion of the Army to war strength these trained men will be ready and can be fitted into their places?

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir; I advocate that for several reasons.

The first one is the one which you have outlined, and my second reason is that it should be done in order to have more officers as training factors in time of peace.

Take, for instance, a university like Norwich. We have one officer there, while we should have two. Then take the case of the University of Illinois, with 6,000 students, and 2,000 of those students in uniform, making two regiments at peace strength, with only one officer there. We ought to have four, one officer for every 500 men or additional fraction thereof, because if there is any place where men can do valuable service, it is working with 2,000 men of that class as instructors.

At the University of Ohio we have one officer who is doing splendid work, but he has some 1,200 men enrolled. We need at least three officers there. If we had the large number of extra officers that we should have, at least 1,200, we could do very much more in the way of military instruction, not only at the military schools and colleges, *but also* at the nonmilitary institutions.

When Yale University had three batteries organized, it was difficult to get an officer for them, and yet there were at that institution three batteries of the finest kind of personnel.

Cornell University, which is one of the land-grant institutions, has a large corps of cadets, and has done much to give sound military training. We could use two more officers at Cornell University to the greatest advantage. It is the best investment we can make of trained officers in time of peace, and we ought to have a lot of them at work.

Mr. GREENE. Would not the same reasoning apply in regard to the same number of noncommissioned officers?

Gen. WOOD. If we could get them. That is a problem we have not yet tackled. We must approach it sometime, but I think first we should get our reserve corps of officers of the civilian type from the colleges, and we must have a very material addition to the number of regular officers. I think your bill, Mr. Hay, provides for over 700 additional?

The CHAIRMAN. It provides for 786.

Gen. WOOD. That is going to be of the greatest assistance. It will be of greater assistance in the matter of training than any single thing, and will help tremendously in the dissemination of military knowledge.

Mr. GREENE. The noncommissioned officer is regarded as the bone and sinew of the Army, is he not?

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir; and I have always recommended that he should have a better status than he has. He really is a factor of tremendous value.

Mr. GREENE. The public generally has rather been led to be indifferent to the status of the noncommissioned officer, having only in mind the commissioned officer, and forgetting that without the organization which the noncommissioned officer maintains under himself the personnel would go to pieces.

Gen. WOOD. Yes.

Mr. GREENE. Without involving the question in any field of strategy, but merely to elucidate an answer, stated in general terms, should we, in our preparations for a defensive war, have in mind a war such as is now being waged in Europe, or does our situation present somewhat different factors?

Gen. WOOD. Our preparation is really a preparation against war. I think if we make reasonable preparation and establish a condition of general military instruction, that it will be pretty difficult to get anybody to attack us. If we were attacked by any European power it would be undoubtedly an attack launched on the Atlantic coast between Baltimore and Boston, at the great lines of communication and the great centers of wealth, in an area comprised within a line drawn, beginning at Boston, and including our arsenals, our munition plants in Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania, and running out at Baltimore. That would include about 85 per cent of all our arms-making and ammunition-making facilities. That would be the territory at which an enemy would strike. An enemy would strike at that territory in an effort to cripple our supply of arms and ammunition, and they would attack the main lines of communication running between the principal eastern cities, and from the eastern

cities to the West. We have nothing in the West which would concern an enemy very much in the way of arms or munition factories. We have the Rock Island Arsenal. We ought to have our arms and munition plants more scattered and some of them in the Middle West.

Mr. GREENE. We will continue to hear, and we have heard in the popular discussion of this matter, the remark of President Lincoln, which has been frequently quoted, that an invader never could water his horses in the Ohio River. Of course, that is a patriotic sentiment, but in your opinion would an invader ever attempt to do that?

Gen. WOOD. It is hard to tell what he would do.

Mr. GREENE. In other words, would not the probable intention of an invader be to go straight to the locality you have indicated and then, say, for instance, occupy that territory and levy tribute on the rich cities in that locality? Would he not be more likely to do that than to try to go into the interior?

Gen. WOOD. He would probably hold New York and Boston; possibly the entire arms and munitions area from Boston to Baltimore, and exact such tribute as he wanted; then take whatever action might be necessary to prevent us from longer asserting the Monroe doctrine. He would take anything he wanted. It would be just a question of how much he wanted. If we should be driven out of that comparatively small area, we would go back practically to the condition of prehistoric man so far as arms are concerned.

A great many of the supplies that we need in case of war come from other countries. Take nitrates, for instance. All our nitrates come from Chili. There is not a plant of importance for the manufacture of synthetic nitrogen in this country. We need synthetic nitrogen. We have to have it in huge quantities. All our nitrates come from over sea.

Then, taken up another industry; we do not make any optical glass in this country. There is not optical glass sufficient in this country to equip a large army. It is particularly needed for the range finders, field glasses, etc. You could go on indefinitely with the enumeration of things of that kind, concerning the supply of which this country is in a very bad condition.

The reason we could not make arms any more rapidly was because we could not get the high-speed tool steel. Why was that? It was because we could not get certain materials—antimony, etc. Those things indicate the need of a certain industrial organization behind the War and Navy Departments. The Army and Navy are just the edge of our war organization; behind are moral and industrial organizations.

Mr. GREENE. I think it is the idea in the popular mind that in caring for the defense of the country we would be obliged to have ready men and material to face about the same conditions that exist in this present European war, and I am of the opinion that most of the questions likely to be put in debate, here and elsewhere, will be predicated upon conditions that will be about as obtain in the European war, and my former question was only directed to obtain, if possible, your judgment, briefly and in general terms, as to whether our preparations necessarily would cover all the features that have been somewhat conspicuous in that war.

Gen. WOOD. I thing we should have to prepare, unless sea control is lost, for a highly organized and very well-equipped attack within the area I have spoken of, and in the vicinity of San Francisco or Puget Sound on the Pacific, and our entire policy would be to keep the action as near the water as possible and to keep the enemy out of the country.

Their idea would be to push back as far as the Ohio River and occupy this great machine-gun, powder-making and rich manufacturing section of the country, knowing if they can hold that that we could not rearm and reorganize anywhere else in the country. They would bring against us all their latest implements of war, including the heaviest movable guns and mortars such as are used in the present war. Both these guns and the guns of the fleet would be brought against our coast fortifications. Aside from seacoast fortifications the day of the concrete fort and steel turret have probably passed. Artillery must be capable of as much movement as possible within the limits of a fortified area in order to prevent its being too definitely located. The attack always has the advantage of knowing where guns are when they are in fortifications, and can easily put them out of action, as seen recently in the attacks on permanent works in Belgium. A thorough study of this question has brought up an exceedingly interesting problem—that is, the possibility of a heavy mobile armament, including guns and mortars of the largest calibers, mounted either upon railway cars or upon carriages which permit rapid mobility by roads or easy transportation by rail; of a design which permits prompt assembling and use. Some of the designs now in use have practically converted the flat car into a gun carriage. One of our problems is to secure a type of carriage which will enable the transport of this artillery over our railroads and make it available for the defense of harbors which, while furnishing a good landing for an enemy force, do not warrant the construction of permanent fortifications. One device which has been brought up contemplates a car which will be so constructed as to be capable of emplacement in a heavy concrete receptacle or block which will give the necessary stability for accurate fire. Guns so emplaced will have the advantage of guns in permanent emplacement in that they can be used in connection with a preestablished fire-control system. Moreover, the arrangement is inexpensive. Railways pass, in most instances, within range of the harbors we should want to cover, and all that it is necessary to do is to project short spurs running to the gun position. Some of these might be immediately adjacent to the main lines and others a little more remote. If our coast line is ever pierced these heavy guns and mortars will become available for use against an enemy force, which will undoubtedly have a very powerfully if not an equally powerful equipment. They should be handled by coast artillery troops especially trained in their use. Their primary use is for coast defense, and their secondary use is in connection with land operations. They will be available on either coast. It is a most important feature of our preparation.

Mr. GREENE. Your reply suggests that the popular mind tends to confuse the coast defense with a general defense of the entire coast,

whereas, if I am not mistaken, military men understand that term as now applied to mean harbor defense.

Gen. WOOD. Yes, the fixed forts are for harbor defense entirely.

Mr. GREENE. That leaves open this tremendous area of coast line between fortified harbors for which we have no preparations for defense, does it not?

Gen. WOOD. That is correct, and that is why we are proposing to have these mobile guns.

Mr. GREENE. General, do you believe the road conditions in this country would permit the mobility of as heavy ordnance as is now being employed in Europe?

Gen. WOOD. Only in the sector of improved roads. Our idea would be to use the railroads largely for the big-gun transportation.

In the European theater of war they are building temporary railroads for the transportation of the big guns to positions, running them off on spurs. Some are so mounted that they can be moved rapidly on good wagon roads. You always want big guns in an important area. The important area is the area you will be trying to defend. That is where the enemy will strike and strike the hardest. They are never going to go into the unbuilt-up sections of country. They will strike at the richest and most important section of the country.

Mr. GREENE. I just want to ask you one more question. It has been suggested, and I think once referred to this morning, that the development of the aeroplane and its use would be likely to render less necessary the proportion of Cavalry which has hitherto been considered essential. What have you to say in regard to that?

Gen. WOOD. I do not believe it would affect the Cavalry at all. The reports from the present war I do not think should be used as a guide until they have been coordinated. One situation is presented on the western front, which is really a beleaguered fortress, like one of the old cities, surrounded by works and walls, and the one of the old cities during a siege surrounded by works on investment the entire force is immobilized. The situation is that of siege. Cavalry are dismounted and fighting in the trenches just as mounted men were frequently fighting dismounted on the walls and in the trenches during sieges in the Middle Ages. On the eastern front there has been a tremendous use of cavalry. I do not believe that the aeroplane is going to eliminate the cavalry in any way. The cavalry will undoubtedly have its part to play. Cavalry played a very important part in the German advance and in the French effort to meet it. During this period the cavalry was used to the limit. I doubt if cavalry has ever seen harder service in campaign. The French Cavalry made 192 kilometers in three days.

Mr. GREENE. You have indicated your belief that the industrial and commercial resources of the country should be very highly organized in contemplation of the possibility of war, that they may, on the instant, if need be, coordinate themselves into some determined plan of the War Department.

Gen. WOOD. It seems to me in connection with that subject that we have come to the point where as a part of our industrial organization the Government should know what shops and foundries can do in the way of making arms and munitions. These establishments should

on their part know just exactly what they are expected to do. Once this is done a long step forward will have been taken in industrial organization.

It is the same thing in the case of organization of transportation. On the seaboard our great railway authorities, at least those charged with transportation, should know something of our general plans and what we would expect of the railroad under certain conditions. This is necessary in order that sidings may be put in in important places and necessary tracking provided. We should also take up with the railroads the question of constructing the right type of car for the movement of men, horses, arms, and guns—a type which at the same time would be useful for every-day work, but have those essentials which would make it available for the use above referred to. We should also organize our railway men so that they will be available in time of war. It would be the height of folly to take over an able transportation man from one of our great railroads, where he can do his best work, and use him as an officer of the line. The same is true with reference to communications, telephone, and telegraph. Their controlling men must know something of what is to be expected of them in time of war, and from their forces must be organized large reserves for use along the coast and with the troops. These are some of the many things which must be done in the way of organizing our industrial resources.

Mr. GREENE. Would not the cooperation and coordination of such an emergency organization be better secured by having not only the plans well prepared but the personnel who are to act under those plans known, their names recorded, and have them organized now, in an unofficial sense?

Gen. WOOD. They should be all organized. Every man should have his designation, and should have his duties defined, and know exactly what would be expected of him and where he would go in time of war.

Mr. GREENE. Would it be necessary to have any legislation that might, in some way, authorize such action; or if that is not necessary, to help to maintain such a nonofficial or nonmilitary organization?

Gen. WOOD. They would have to be organized under the proviso for general training and liability for service.

In this country we have, in round numbers, a million men coming of age every year. That means possibly 500,000 fit for military service. To begin military service at 18 years of age and terminate it at 25 years of age, you would have three and a half million men on whom you could depend, and that would be a force up to the limit of need in any ordinary war.

Out of that force you would have organized certain military units—Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, field and coast engineers, reserves, railroad men, etc. Every man ought to be used in that arrangement in the line of work for which he is best fitted.

Mr. GREENE. So that, in order to be effective, such an organization should have its correlation by name and location to the class and character of duties to which each man would be assigned and for which he should be expected to prepare himself?

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir; to be ready when the gong strikes, so that when the gong does strike he knows where he is going to go.

Mr. KAHN. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Morin was compelled to leave the hearing awhile ago, and he asked me to ask Gen. Wood a couple of questions.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sure there will be no objection to that.

Mr. KAHN. The first question is, In case we should not lose control of the sea, would the mobile force we now have be sufficient to hold back an invading force?

Gen. WOOD. If we controlled the sea absolutely, no one could land troops unless he sent them in from the north or from the south.

Mr. KAHN. The other question is this: If we lost control of the sea, how long would our present force be able to hold back any force of invaders?

Gen. WOOD. It could not do it at all, sir.

Mr. GREENE. General, we see in the arguments advanced by some of our friends now, in the attempt to compare our naval and land forces with those of foreign powers, compilations of tables of comparative strength, and in the strategy they work out they always put our greatest strength against at least the minimum strength that could be brought against us. Is it not a fact that whatever tables may show about muzzle velocities and calibers, the elements of calm, wind, water, and tide, and all the freaks and caprices of nature tend to disturb such calculations?

Gen. WOOD. They do, to a certain extent. They used to, especially in the days of sailing vessels.

Now, when you have big ships, such as the *Aquitania*, which are more or less indifferent to storms and weather disturbances, they bring all the apparatus they need. They are down pretty much now to the railroad train as to schedule; they arrive on time.

Mr. GREENE. I particularly had in mind this fact, that the invader would know where he was going to be, and whether we would have odds against him at the proper place and time, a sufficient force to successfully meet the invading troops.

Gen. WOOD. We would not, unless as was once suggested we were able, by an intelligent and comprehensive knowledge of the enemy's movements, to move our troops and meet him, but we would be engaged in a lively performance up and down the seaboard. Such movement would be impossible.

Mr. TILSON. First, referring to the National Guard, I understand you to say you would utilize the National Guard as far as possible in the creation of this new Federal volunteer force?

Gen. WOOD. I would use every man and officer in it, if I could. I would make every effort to get them into it. I mean the Continental Army.

Mr. TILSON. Assuming that the Federal Government would have control of the National Guard, which you deem impossible, that the United States Government should have full control, and you would not only use the personnel of the National Guard, but also use the armories, the ranges, and so forth.

Gen. WOOD. I think the Federal Government ought to take over everything from the States which the Federal Government can properly use. It will want those places for training centers, storage of arms and equipment. The very fact that you have, for instance, in a city like New York, several such places means that you will not

have to ship men off and pay the transportation. Everything is at hand.

Mr. TILSON. You referred to the matter of pay, and said, I believe, that everyone should serve for patriotism. In view of the fact that only a small portion of the men of the country will serve or could serve under this arrangement, is it fair that that small percentage of men should bear this burden, while a much greater number would escape entirely?

Gen. WOOD. The men in these organizations would be taken from the men within the period of obligatory service, let us say from 18 to 25. The procedure would probably be to permit such men as wanted to enter the organized unit of the reserve to do so and in case any district failed to present its proper quota the men would then be drawn by lot. The number of men in each district, let us assume that the military reserve districts correspond to congressional districts as they will be based on population, would be approximately the same. All men liable to service would have to take the chance of being drawn to fill up any units which were not filled otherwise. This liability would only last during the period for which they are liable to service. These organized units would correspond to the present militia except that they would be the organized units of a Federal force, presumably the continental army. They should be paid a little something while at maneuvers and camps of instruction, but not at any other time. Men not serving in these organizations and not engaged in any duties as instructors or otherwise will not receive pay. They would simply be performing their obligatory military service for the Nation. The period would be brief and they would receive benefits far more than equivalent to the time they give to the Nation.

IMPROVED HEALTH, STRENGTH, AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY.

Mr. TILSON. There is only a small proportion of these men between the ages you mentioned who can be used, and so would there not be an element of unfairness when certain men were drawn, or if certain men volunteered or whatever the system of selection might be, and would it not be fair to pay them to help to sustain their families while they are away?

Gen. WOOD. I think during the training period they should be paid when they are assembled in camp. When I said I thought they should not be paid, I was referring to the time when they are not mobilized.

Mr. TILSON. You spoke of a man's chances to become an officer. Do you not think that would be one of the greatest inducements that could be offered to cause young men of intelligence to go into the Army, that is, the fact that he had an opportunity to become an officer?

Gen. WOOD. I think that is one thing. I think the real thing would be the training they would get and the fact that they were performing their citizens' duty.

Mr. TILSON. Referring now to the matter of promotion, can you state what are the plans in the different European armies in con-

nection with promotion? We have always had trouble on that subject in this country.

Gen. WOOD. In all European armies they have selection. Some have selection beginning at the bottom and some at a certain grade. In either case when you reach a certain grade then they have selection. I think in the French Army they have selection after a certain grade, and up to that promotion goes by seniority. I think the same is true, in effect, in the German Army, based on a system which effects the certain elimination of those unfit for promotion. But in all of the European armies selection and elimination play an important part.

Mr. TILSON. What do you think of having an increase in armored autotraction, especially in the case of field artillery?

Gen. WOOD. Yes; I think it is going to come to motor transport almost altogether in the field. I think the day of the horse and the mule for drafts is very largely gone, at least in the built-up sections of the country where the are good roads.

Mr. TILSON. As I remember it, the instructions to infantrymen in firing guns are to fire at the horses, the fact being recognized that the wounding of one horse will put a whole battery out of commission.

Gen. WOOD. Yes.

Mr. TILSON. So that it would be important, would it not, that autotraction be substituted as far as possible?

Gen. WOOD. You can pass the danger zone more rapidly. The space per truck is not more than two-fifths the length it would have with the horses.

Mr. TILSON. It is much more difficult to hit the vital part of one auto-truck engine than it is to hit one of the horses, is it not?

Gen. WOOD. Yes; and then there are other factors which give the auto truck the advantage. You can hitch on other wagons to an auto truck. The rapidity of movement and capacity for covering great distances make the auto truck valuable. Then, too, in the cost of maintenance it is cheaper.

Mr. TILSON. You spoke of moving the larger field pieces on cars. Are there any being moved which are larger than the 6-inch gun?

Gen. WOOD. They are using now, as far as we can tell—we know they are moving 8-inch pieces on what is practically a railroad car. That is, the gun is mounted on the top of the car, and alongside the car are flanges, and the gun can be swung around in any direction. There are all sorts of devices. We are trying to get the best one for our own service.

We know they are moving 8-inch guns on these cars, and they are moving 12-inch guns on the caterpillar wheels, and we heard that they are moving the 17-inch gun, but I have not found anybody who has seen the 17-inch gun being moved that way.

Mr. TILSON. You have spoken of the number of machine guns you would recommend for a regiment. Would you not recommend a very large general reserve of these guns, so that they could be sent to one place or another, as they might be needed?

Gen. WOOD. We should have a reserve of at least 25,000 of those guns.

Mr. TILSON. Under such a scheme as I have proposed in regard to the preparation of appliances, do you not think it would be possible to arrange matters so that these guns could be turned out rapidly?

Gen. WOOD. So far as the manufacture of machine guns in this country is concerned, several firms are building the guns. One firm which is building them expects to put out 50 machine guns a day, beginning the first of April. They have just filled one order for 2,500, and they have taken an order from one of the European countries for 10,000 of those machine guns. That is the Lewis machine gun, an American invention. I think you will find that in the end the machine gun will be one which can be carried by one man, as can the Lewis gun, which is carried as a rifle would be carried, and which weighs a little bit under 26 pounds.

Mr. TILSON. You have spoken also of having a flying squadron with each division. Would you not also have a very large general reserve of flying machines?

Gen. WOOD. We can make flying machines in every way, pretty rapidly, except the engine. We have not yet gotten a good engine. The engines now in use are too heavy. I suppose we will overcome that.

Flying machines in great numbers are going to be absolutely necessary, because when the enemy trys to make observations you try to keep him back. It is simply Cavalry translated to the air.

Mr. TILSON. The fact was developed the other day during the examination of the officers of the Signal Corps that these machines go to pieces rather rapidly, even in time of peace. What would you say, regarding these machines as arms and equipment, or as ammunition; would they not come under the head of ammunition to be explained?

Gen. WOOD. I think you will have to maintain a considerable reserve of machines. I think we can build the machines pretty rapidly. We ought to train as many men to fly as we can. We can build the machines very rapidly, but the engine is now the big problem.

Mr. TILSON. If we have a certain number of machines at the beginning of this year, there is no assurance that we are going to have that number a year from now, even in times of peace?

Gen. WOOD. I should create a flying corps on a war footing, maintain it on a war footing always, and I should organize a flying reserve corps from among the civilians of the country. I think you would have no difficulty in getting a good and a numerous flying reserve corps.

I was talking the other day with one of our American boys who is flying on the other side, and I asked him about the number of machines over there. He said, "We had a review the other day, and we started off on a bomb raid. We had 121 machines lined up, in columns of fours, and we were in the air and off in 18 minutes." I think we could, perhaps, put up 10 machines. Those 121 machines to which my friend referred comprise only part of the machines on one army front.

Mr. TILSON. You spoke of the reasons why we should be prepared, and one of the reasons you gave was that we are accumulating most of the gold of the world. Is it not a fact that we are also accumulating some of the ill will and enmity of other peoples of the world?

Gen. WOOD. That is a matter of opinion; but I think we are.

Mr. HULL. General, as I understand your answer, you think it is advisable to have an increase in the arsenal capacity located west of the Allegheny Mountains?

Gen. WOOD. It is advisable.

Mr. HULL. You also think it best to maintain a reserve of supplies and equipment in the small towns?

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir; a reserve at those armories which may be used as the headquarters of the training units of the Continental Army or other Federal reserve force. I have also recommended that our present supply of reserve arms and equipment be more widely distributed, and that some of it be held in the smaller arsenals, and some of it stored in the armories which are of fireproof material, in cities like New York and Buffalo, for instance, and in arsenals such as Watertown, Springfield, Watervliet, Augusta, Allegheny; in brief, our material is stored in too large quantities, and as we shall not be able to ship it promptly, considerable delay will be unavoidable. Again, it is not, in my opinion, as secure against fire as is desirable or as would be the case if distributed as I have above recommended.

(Thereupon, at 12.15 o'clock p. m. the committee adjourned, to meet to-morrow, Friday, January 28, 1916, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

3 6105 110 737 884